Interceptor drones or mobile fire groups? Electronic warfare or aviation? There are at least seven different ways of countering Shahed-type drones that Ukraine has demonstrated over the last year. All were born from the urgent need to protect the civilian population, the lack of traditional air defense systems, and overall, the large number of kamikaze drones launched by Russia. All solutions applied by Ukraine are a part of its multi-layered defense, and make sense under certain conditions; they have their advantages and disadvantages, which I will be discussing in this post.
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Russia’s Kamikaze Drones and Their Improved Modifications
The Shahed drone is an Iranian-made loitering ammunition, also called a suicide or kamikaze drone, developed and manufactured by Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA).
The term “loitering munition” refers to a class of UAVs equipped with an integrated warhead. After launch, they can remain airborne for some time while searching for a target, and once the target is detected, they strike and explode. They can operate either under the control of an operator or autonomously by executing pre-programmed tasks.
Over time, the Russians established their own production of Shaheds. This became evident as early as 2023, when they built their first factory in the “Alabuga” Special Economic Zone in the city of Yelabuga (Republic of Tatarstan), located 1,200 km from the front line. These drones are also being produced at the Kupol plant in the city of Izhevsk.
C4ADS estimated that Russia paid Iran $1.75 billion for the Shahed technology, equipment, source code, and 6,000 drones. This way, Russia was able to manage its own supply chain and expand the scale and frequency of its attacks (read more here).
At first, Russians used two types of loitering munitions in Ukraine: the Shahed-131 and the Shahed-136. The Russians gave them their own designations — Geran-1 and Geran-2. According to Ukrainian experts, the Russian drones are fundamentally no different from earlier Iranian models, and the observed differences are of a "cosmetic" nature, driven by the desire to reduce production costs.
Drones with markings beginning with “Ъ” and “Э” are associated with Alabuga, while those labeled “К,” “КБ,” and “КЦ” are produced at the Kupol plant.
These drones are largely ineffective against the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ military positions, which is why the occupiers more often use them to strike civilian infrastructure. “They set targets on fire and disable them not through an explosion, but through fire. That’s why they try to use the drone against infrastructure sites — because its strike is not as effective against concentrations of personnel,” said the spokesperson for the Southern Operational Command's press center.
The Shahed is based on a delta-wing shape design with stabilizing rudders at the tips. The engine is located at the rear of the fuselage. The design also incorporates a rear-facing pusher-prop arrangement. It has a length of 3.5 m with a wingspan of 2.5 m and a weight of around 200 kg.
The nose section of the Shahed-136 contains a high-explosive fragmentation warhead estimated to weigh 30–50 kilograms
The drone can fly at a speed of 185 km and has an estimated range from 1,000 to 2,500 km. It can fly at an altitude from 60 to 4,000 m. In 2023, one Shahed-type drone cost Russia approximately $200,000, and according to experts, the current price is even higher.
The drone’s body is made from inexpensive paper-based composite material. It is powered by a two-cylinder gasoline engine and propelled by a wooden propeller.
The updated version of the Shahed — the Shahed-238, which the Russians call Geran-3 — allegedly began production as early as 2023. This type of drone has been given its own name — Italmas.
Since 2024, alongside the Shaheds, the occupiers have also started using another type of long-range drone — the Molniya. This is a cheaper UAV capable of striking targets at distances up to 40 kilometers. It is often launched simultaneously with Shaheds to overwhelm the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ air defense systems. The warhead of the Molniya is 10 times smaller than that of the Shaheds, weighing up to 5 kg.
The Molniya features a simple construction made from plywood, plastic, polyethylene, and inexpensive components — including Chinese engines and electronics.
The Russians are continuously working on modernizing and improving their Shahed-type drones.
According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, in 2025, Russia established production of the Geran-3 equipped with a compact Tolou-10/13 twin-circuit turbojet engine. With this engine, the drone can fly at speeds of up to 550–600 km/h and has a range of up to 2,500 km. This creates additional challenges for Ukraine’s air defences.
In June 2025, Russian forces began using an upgraded version of the Iranian Shahed drones equipped with cameras, radio control modules, and artificial intelligence components. Ukrainian military radio technology expert Serhii FLASH Beskrestnov reported the first recorded use of Russian Shahed attack drones equipped with video guidance systems at a distance of at least 150 km inside Ukraine (read more here).
Another change has been in drone tactics. Now:
They can fly at altitudes up to 4 km and glide down onto targets at speeds of 400 km/h, making timely interception more difficult;
Drones fly in pairs at different altitudes simultaneously, complicating their detection;
They are equipped with improved electronics for protection against electronic warfare (EW);
Alongside Shaheds, Lancet kamikaze drones are launched, which target mobile fire groups and “clear” the way for the “mopeds”;
Alongside its strike drones, Russia uses large numbers of decoy drones that do not carry an explosive payload and are launched in significant numbers to divert and exhaust Ukrainian air defense resources. As of May 2025, “approximately 60% of the drones were strike-capable, while the remaining 40% were decoys”.
Ukrainian expert Serhii FLASH Beskrestonov wrote that so far, no sensors or evasive maneuvering systems have been found on Shahed drones.
Everything observed is the result of pre-programmed flight routes. Although the drones’ maneuvers may appear deliberate, they are based on intelligence data factored in during the programming phase by Russian forces. Additional clarification, Shaheds are currently NOT controlled via mobile networks.
As of May 2025, Russia reached a daily production rate of approximately 170 Shahed loitering munitions and decoy drones, with plans to increase output to 190 per day by the end of the year.
On July 9, 2025, Russia fired a record number of more than 700 attack and decoy drones at Ukraine overnight, topping previous nightly barrages.
The head of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, Kyrylo Budanov, stated that Russia is incapable of launching 450–500 drones daily, although it can do so on occasion.
Sometimes, 100 “Shaheds” target 20 different spots; at other times, 100 attack just three. Even if 80% are intercepted, the ones that reach their targets still do serious damage to Odesa, Kyiv, Dnipro, or other cities.
Ukrainian air defenses aim to intercept or neutralize all incoming targets.
Ukrainian Countermeasures
Over time, Ukraine has developed multiple ways of countering Shahed-type drones. They can be summarized into seven types.
1. Mobile Fire Groups
Currently 40-20% efficiency
Challenges: Shaheds often fly too high or in swarms; targeting is imprecise
Mobile fire groups are a Ukrainian innovation developed to counter the large-scale use of attack drones. At their peak, they were responsible for up to 80% of successful Shahed interceptions.
Equipped with machine guns, MANPADS such as Igla or Stinger, thermal imagers, laser target designators, and advanced optics, these teams play an important role in Ukraine’s layered air defense.
However, many admit that mobile fire groups are currently of limited effectiveness. Despite nearly a thousand crews, they account for less than 1% of confirmed drone kills—most successful interceptions are credited to MANPADS or radar-guided anti-aircraft systems like the German Gepard. For a machine gunner to hit a Shahed drone, they must be in the drone’s exact path, which is a rare scenario.
Crews are often deployed based on estimated azimuths, but if a drone shifts even a few kilometers, the ambush can fail completely. Even when visible, Shaheds are hard to hit, and disabling them requires striking critical components like the engine or electronics, which is extremely difficult.
When Russian Shaheds fly above 2 km, machine guns are no longer effective. Today, the effectiveness of mobile fire groups is estimated at around 40% according to Ukraine’s officials. However, according to experts, it even drops to 20%.
2. Surface-to-Air Defense Systems
Effective but too costly and limited in number
Prioritized for defending against missiles, not drones
So far, such systems as IRIS-T and NASAMS have been used to shoot down Shaheds. Patriot air defense systems are not used for this purpose.
Systems like the IRIS‑T are highly effective but extremely expensive; a single missile costs around half a million dollars. As a result, they are primarily used to protect critical infrastructure rather than to intercept every drone.
Ukraine also employs short-range air defense systems like the Ground Forces' SHORAD and anti-aircraft guns, including the Gepard. These systems operate within a limited range—Gepard’s effective radius is about 4.5 km. While it's impossible to cover the entire country with them, they are effective for protecting specific high-value targets.
On July 12, the Rheinmetall-developed short-range Skynex system demonstrated impressive effectiveness by reportedly destroying seven Russian UAVs. The cost per engagement is estimated at approximately €4,000, which is significantly lower than missile-based air defense systems such as IRIS-T.
While this solution seems promising, Ukraine still depends heavily on its partners to provide both the systems and missiles for its ground-based air defenses.
3. Electronic Warfare (EW)
Widely deployed across the country
Plays a major role in disrupting drone signals
Limited: short-to-medium range, not efficient for swarms
One of the main countermeasures against Russian Shahed drones is electronic warfare. These systems disrupt the drone’s ability to hit its target. EW is used to protect specific objects targeted by Russia, and by jamming the drone’s signal, it becomes more vulnerable to other means of destruction, such as mobile strike groups.
But EW also has limitations. Jammers work best at short-to-medium range, and Russia has started hardening some drones against GPS interference or programming them with pre-loaded coordinates. When swarms of drones are launched simultaneously from multiple angles, EW alone can’t cover every approach.
Ukrainian expert and representatives of an EW production company emphasized that the growing difficulty in intercepting Shahed drones is due to their increasing numbers, not engineering improvements. He stressed the need to scale up detection and interception systems, as well as expand and enhance electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. Local governments should work with manufacturers to build a layered defense system that can disrupt Russia’s ability to launch and coordinate drone attacks. This would significantly reduce drone accuracy.
Over 140 Ukrainian companies are currently producing EW systems. Ukraine’s best-known system, the Bukovel-AD, can detect drones at distances of up to 100 km and jam their signals within a 20 km radius.
4. Interceptor Drones
They need to be faster than Shaheds and capable of flying at high altitudes
Inexpensive systems, can be produced locally
Performance drops in poor weather
Require extensive personnel training and better radar coverage
Experimental Ukrainian interceptor drones began successfully shooting down Russia’s Shahed-type attack drones starting in March 2025. Before, they were mostly used against significantly slower reconnaissance drones.
In June, the Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi stated that interceptor drones used against Shaheds have an effectiveness rate of 70%—almost twice that of mobile fire groups.
Interceptor drone needs to be capable of flying at least along diagonal routes at a speed of around 300 km/h. It should have a wing with powerful engines that can quickly close in on a Shahed along such a trajectory.
The interceptor drone is inexpensive, costing $5,000 to $10,000—several times cheaper than a Shahed.
This year, Ukraine plans to produce hundreds of thousands of interceptor drones. On July 3, Ukraine and the American company Swift Beat signed a memorandum to expand drone production. Under this agreement, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will receive drones designed to destroy missiles (read here).
However, the main challenge to their effective use remains the critical shortage of radar systems within the Air Force. Reportedly, only a few units are currently available, while hundreds are needed.
Radar systems are an essential component for the effective operation of interceptor drone crews. “The enemy is actively hunting our radar stations. Sometimes they succeed, and sometimes they don’t,” says the consultant of Come Back Alive Foundation (it’s a famous Ukrainian charity organization - you can donate here).
Ukraine has radars from large surface-to-air missile systems that can detect these drones, but many areas remain invisible to them, for example, zones along riverbeds. These blind spots need to be covered with smaller radars, such as the Israeli RADA systems.
There is currently a very high demand for Ukrainian radar systems, which are highly praised by the military. The waiting time for one domestic model has more than doubled—from 6 months six months ago to 13 months now. Demand is growing faster than production capacity can keep up.
Ukraine has already approved at least five types of interceptor drones for operational use, and procurement of such systems is ongoing.
However, interceptor drones are not a silver bullet. They can’t operate in poor weather conditions like fog or thunderstorms. In such cases, Ukraine must rely on other means of defense, particularly surface-to-air missiles.
The use of interceptor drones needs to be scaled up, but it's not just about the number of drones; it's also about having enough trained crews to operate them. “The interceptor drone is just the tip of the iceberg. Behind it are dozens of crews training every week. The response is becoming automated, faster, and less dependent on the human factor”.
5. Aviation
Useful at high altitudes
Limited in areas protected by Ukrainian air-defense systems (risk of friendly fire or collision)
Russia started launching drones at altitudes of 2–4 kilometers, making it difficult for ground units to shoot them down. However, this makes it easier for Ukrainian aviation—especially helicopters and light sport aircraft—to engage them.
Helicopters are very effective at detecting and engaging Shahed drones, but Ukraine doesn’t have enough of them. Light sport aircraft like the Yak-40 in Odesa also show good results—it’s not a perfect solution, but it works. Typically, one person pilots while another shoots the drones from the cabin with a machine gun or rifle, explained expert Serhiy FLASH.
Jet fighters, however, struggle to combat drones due to the large speed difference. Shaheds fly at 180–200 km/h, while fighters are 3 to 5 times faster, making it especially difficult to engage drones flying as low as 200 meters above ground.
Where ground-based air defense is active, aviation cannot operate to avoid friendly fire risks. In regions without such systems—particularly in central and western Ukraine—helicopters and fighter jets can be deployed to counter threats like Shahed drones.
6. Laser Systems
Potentially one of the most efficient systems against drones
No confirmed large-scale use so far
Combat lasers concentrate intense light and direct it at enemy equipment. The concept behind laser air defense systems is to burn through the body of an enemy aircraft within seconds, damage it, or trigger an explosion.
Ukraine’s defense sector is actively engaged in research and development projects aimed at advancing innovative military technologies, as reported by Defence Blog in February 2025. One key focus has been countering enemy aircraft and unmanned aerial systems (UAS), including Iranian-made Shahed drones. “Laser technologies are already striking certain targets at certain altitudes,” said (now former) Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, Colonel Sukharevskyi. According to him, Ukraine’s laser system, called Tryzub, can down aircraft at altitudes exceeding 2 kilometers. Read more about the Tryzub system here.
In March 2025, Forbes Ukraine published an interview, according to which “details of this project remain classified”.
7. AI-turrets
Fully autonomous
Scalable potential, but real-world performance is still limited
Recently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces received their first fully autonomous Ukrainian-made Sky Sentinel turret, equipped with an M2 "Ma Deuce" heavy machine gun.
Its key feature is full autonomy: it detects targets, calculates the trajectory of Shahed drones, and opens fire—all without a human operator, relying entirely on artificial intelligence.
Ukrainian developers are moving ahead with implementing the AI-based OCDSS system, which enables swarm drone mission planning based on simulations of thousands of combat scenarios. While these systems have only been tested so far, they promise fewer losses, higher accuracy, and better airspace control. Their real-world performance remains to be seen.
According to developers, it can take down aerial objects flying at a rate of up to 800 kilometers (497 miles) per hour, including cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and other types of drones. The system can defend both sprawling urban centers and frontlines. 10 to 30 systems (each costing $150,000) are required to protect a city.
A Sky Sentinel prototype has already downed four Shahed drones on the battlefield. Further details have not been disclosed due to security concerns.
Read more about SkySentinel in my recent newsletter here.
To summarize, currently, there is no single solution to counter Shahed-type drones. Instead, Ukraine employs a multi-layered defense system, ranging from small arms to advanced surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs) and aviation. Promising solutions are in development, but details are classified, and their effectiveness remains to be seen.
Missing from the list is the best defense: destroy the manufacturing sources of the munitions and launch platforms
This is excellent Olena, thank you for this 👍