Bayraktar TB2 Drones and Ukraine-Türkiye Strategic Defence Partnership
opportunities for cooperation in defence tech
Türkiye, with its 3,000 defence producers, has an impressive defence industrial base that should not be overlooked. Despite its strategic balancing, Türkiye’s support for Ukraine in this war has been substantial. Often delivered in a low-key manner, Türkiye’s military assistance so far has included Bayraktar TB2 drones, heavy machine guns, laser-guided missiles, electronic warfare systems, armoured vehicles, and protective gear.
I’ve summarized an informative report on this strategic partnership and spoke with several Turkish experts who shared their views on the most promising areas of defence cooperation between the two sides and the challenges they face.
On a personal note, Türkiye holds a special place in my heart, as it was my second home for nine years. I earned my PhD at a Turkish university, and many of my professional and personal milestones took place in this country.
I hope you’ll find this publication useful 🇹🇷 🇺🇦
Ukraine-Türkiye Defence Cooperation
Ukraine and Türkiye define each other as strategic partners, with security and defence being a key pillar of their relationship, writes Maryna Vorotnyuk, an associate fellow at RUSI (read her report “Ukraine-Turkey Strategic Partnership in Security and Defence. Navigating the Disruption of the European Security Order”).
Kyiv sees Ankara’s role as a potential security guarantor, mediator, and contributor to Ukraine’s peace plan; however, the differences in foreign policy and threat perceptions are apparent.
Since Ukraine-Türkiye relations were established in 1992, the prevailing sentiment has been that the Black Sea unites, rather than divides, these two nations.
Before Russia’s invasion in 2014, Ukraine’s foreign policy was bipolar, oscillating between Russia and the West, while the potential for collaboration with Türkiye was infrequently addressed and mostly declarative. As a result, the Black Sea dimension of Ukraine’s diplomacy remained largely unexplored.
Relations between Ukraine and Türkiye have been strengthened through the High-Level Strategic Council, which was established in 2011 and has facilitated discussions at the presidential level across various sectors of mutual interest, such as increased trade turnover, the signing of the Free Trade Agreement (2022), energy cooperation, investments, and other areas of interest.
In 2020, on the government level, the “Quadriga” format was introduced. The format includes the foreign and defence ministers from both countries and is meant to facilitate regular discussions and enable the coordination of Kyiv’s and Ankara’s actions on regional security issues.
During the same period, Ankara has established similar high-level formats with countries such as Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.
The relations between Ukraine and Türkiye began to change following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014. After that, Türkiye emerged as a crucial player in Black Sea security, and its strategic weight for Ukraine increased.
Türkiye expressed and maintained its strong stance on not recognizing the annexation of Crimea by Russia and voiced support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine.
The country provided assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine – particularly concerning the rehabilitation of Ukrainian servicemen and their families – support in the professional training of Ukrainian military personnel in Turkish educational institutions, as well as material and technical assistance to strengthen Ukraine’s defence capabilities.
Türkiye, which was facing sanctions from its Western partners due to its operations in Syria and the purchase of Russian S-400 systems, needed alternative sources for technologies and components. This made Ukraine a natural partner, particularly in the areas of aviation engines and radar systems.
More than 30 joint defence and industrial cooperation projects were underway in 2020. For instance, Ukraine’s state-run design bureau Luch collaborated with Türkiye’s Aselsan to develop the first Ukrainian-Turkish anti-tank missile launching system, “SERDAR”, while Ukraine’s state-owned enterprise SpetsTechnoExport signed a memorandum with Turkish Aselsan for the production of radio communication equipment in Ukraine.
In 2018, Ukrainian companies secured a $40 million contract to repair and upgrade Turkish Mi-17 helicopters.
Additionally, Türkiye built two Ada-class corvettes for the Ukrainian navy. “Personnel training for the first of them is now underway,” stated Ukraine’s Minister of Defence in September 2025.
“It’s notable that these corvettes can launch American, Italian, and French missiles, along with Turkish missiles, therefore providing an opportunity to Ukrainian decision-makers to flexibly choose their procurement sources both in the short and long terms. Given the importance of a large stockpile
of ammunition and weapon systems, Ukraine would procure its needs from several different sources,” Rıfat Öncel, Senior Defence Researcher at SETA Foundation, told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.
Ukrainian companies are now supplying engines for Türkiye’s KAAN fighter jet; Kızılelma, Akıncı, and Anka III combat drones; and the Atak II helicopter.
The Kızılelma combat drone has even been called a “Turkish bird with a Ukrainian heart.”
In 2023, Ukraine sent two engines to the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) for the company’s T929 ATAK-II attack helicopter; Ukraine has committed to sending twelve more by 2025.
Since Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Türkiye’s military assistance to Ukraine has been substantial.
Although Türkiye may not have been the leading provider in terms of aid volume, its supply of combat drones to Ukraine was particularly timely. The systems arrived in Ukraine before the 2022 invasion, when no other Western partners were willing to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine.
In addition to Bayraktar drones, which will be addressed in a separate section below, Türkiye has also provided laser-guided missiles, protective gear, Kirpi armoured vehicles, and Canik M2 heavy machine guns.
This June, Türkiye joined the International Drone Capability Coalition, an initiative by international partners to bolster Ukraine’s defence capabilities.
Russia is unhappy with these developments. Russian FM Lavrov said he was "surprised" that Türkiye is continuing to supply weapons to Ukraine while offering to act as mediator in the conflict.
In an exclusive commentary to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor, Dr. Sertaç Canalp Korkmaz, an independent analyst on defence & security affairs, said that defence cooperation between Ukraine and Türkiye is significant and strategic. It should mainly be seen as a collaboration between two nations that experienced Russian revisionism and aggression in history.
The recent momentum between the two countries in the defence sector could develop even more. There is already strong cooperation in the engine sector between Baykar and Ivchenko-Progress. Türkiye’s expanding maritime capabilities allow Ukraine to work together on areas like corvettes, assault boats, and unmanned surface vehicles needed in the Black Sea.
“Türkiye’s ongoing submarine projects could boost Ukraine's naval strength. Likewise, Türkiye’s recent project called “Steel Dome” is a multi-layered air defence system that, during the war, underscored the importance of layered air defence capabilities for Ukraine. Selling these systems to Ukraine could open significant opportunities for Türkiye, and both sides can benefit,” Dr Korkmaz emphasized.
Rıfat Öncel highlights the prospects for cooperation in unmanned naval systems. Türkiye is well known for its work on unmanned systems across all domains of warfare. Turkish maritime drones with electronic warfare capabilities have begun participating in NATO exercises, while Ukrainian systems have played a crucial role in damaging and restraining Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.
When it comes to the challenges of further deepening defence cooperation, Maryna Vorotnyuk notes in her report that Ukraine’s traditional stance—similar to that of its neighbours on NATO’s eastern flank—has been to support NATO and the United States as the central pillars of European defence. In contrast, Türkiye’s pursuit of strategic autonomy from the West, its emphasis on limiting external actors in the Black Sea, as well as its strategic partnership with Russia are seen by Ukraine as the main obstacles to fully leveraging their strategic ties.
Still, since the beginning of the 2014 war, Türkiye’s stance has shown a notable duality, often described as the so-called balancing act. Ankara asserted its right to remain neutral in the West/NATO-Russia confrontation after 2014, positioning itself as a “bridge” for communication between the two sides.
The country did not join the Western sanctions against Russia after 2014, and helped to facilitate Russia’s economy. In Ukraine, the dualism of Türkiye’s foreign policy has been seen as a key obstacle to deepening the strategic dialogue.
At the same time, Ukraine’s growing cooperation with NATO — and the desire to involve the alliance in the Black Sea region — is not always viewed positively in Türkiye.
Dr Korkmaz noted that since the second half of the 2000s, there has been a growing pro-Eurasianist ideology within Türkiye’s defence and security bureaucracy. Those who support this view are uncomfortable with Türkiye’s current support for Ukraine and its cooperation with NATO. Every problem Türkiye faces with Western countries is empowering this ideology in Türkiye.
Also, Türkiye’s reliance on Russia for energy limits its ability to act completely independently in its relations with Ukraine. According to the analyst, if the second nuclear power plant is awarded to the Russians, it will maintain Türkiye’s dependence on Russia for energy for many years.
For the context: in 2010, Turkey and Russia signed a bilateral agreement that paved the way for the construction and operation of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu. The project is being carried out by Russia’s Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation.
Reportedly, Russia supplies about 40% of Turkey’s gas and over 70% of its crude oil.
Nevertheless, defence researcher Rıfat Öncel expects a deeper defence-industrial cooperation between Türkiye and Ukraine in the coming period. The rapid evolution of the battlefield further incentivizes such cooperation, as Ukraine needs to persistently innovate, and Türkiye seeks to shape emerging military technologies.
Overall, the Türkiye-Ukraine defence partnership plays a stabilizing role in the region and functions as an important pillar in the regional security architecture surrounding the Black Sea.
Bayraktar TB-2 Drones
“The most promising area of defence cooperation between the two countries seems to be unmanned systems. Türkiye, in recent years become a global player in this sector, while Ukraine has become the leader of drone innovation,” believes Öncel.
The Bayraktar TB2, a medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle, gained global attention for its role in the Nagorno-Karabakh war when Türkiye supported Azerbaijan.
Armed with laser-guided bombs, the TB2 can loiter for up to 27 hours, striking targets with precision from altitudes exceeding 25,000 feet.
Its successor, the TB3, builds on this foundation with enhanced features: larger dimensions, a higher payload capacity, and foldable wings designed for deployment from naval vessels like aircraft carriers or amphibious assault ships.
In 2021, Ukraine purchased dozens of Bayraktar TB2 drones, integrating them into its air force with devastating effect against Russian armor and supply lines.
By the end of 2022, Ukraine had received an estimated total of 77 Bayraktar TB2s, combining pre-war purchases, wartime acquisitions, and international donations.
The TB-2 would go on to play a big role for Ukraine in the early part of the full-on war as an unmanned platform able to conduct both strike and reconnaissance missions.
During the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva on April 13, 2022, reports suggested TB2s may have played a role by distracting the ship’s radar or providing targeting data for Neptune missiles.
However, these drones had receded from the front lines due to their vulnerability to Russian air defence and electronic warfare. Ukrainian officials acknowledged that TB2s had become highly vulnerable to Russian systems like Pantsir-S1, Buk, and Tor.
In summer 2025, after a long pause, Bayraktar TB2 drones reappeared in the sky as Ukrainian forces struck a Russian boat and troops on the Black Sea coast.
Russia’s air defence coverage in southern Ukraine has likely been degraded by months of targeted strikes on S-300 and S-400 batteries.
The Bayraktar’s recent use aligns with a broader Ukrainian strategy of suppressing and exploiting gaps in Russian air defences. When paired with naval forces or used in semi-permissive environments, TB2s remain a viable strike platform.
In 2019, the creation of a joint venture in the field of high-precision weapons and aerospace technologies between Ukrspecexport and the Turkish company Baykar Defence was announced. One of the first projects of the JV was to develop a new generation of UAVs that can conduct detailed reconnaissance flights at high altitudes, fly long hours, have significant acceleration capabilities, and attack a wide range of high-precision weapons.
Despite ongoing hostilities, construction of the Baykar Makina factory in Ukraine began in 2023, with completion expected in 2025. The firm committed to a $100 million investment in Ukraine.
According to estimates, the factory will be able to produce up to 120 combat drones annually once operational. In March 2025, Baykar began training future employees for a drone manufacturing plant under construction.
Türkiye’s Defence Industrial Complex: Key Numbers
Türkiye’s rapidly developing defence industry has been seen as a model that is entirely applicable to Ukraine. This model includes effective state policies and successful reforms, as well as a productive collaboration between the state and private businesses.
In the 2010s, the country switched focus to domestic design, resulting in a huge increase in domestic defence production.
In 2024, Türkiye’s defence exports skyrocketed, rising to over $7.1 billion (compared to $5.5 billion in 2023), ranking it as the 11th largest arms exporter globally. Analysts and officials agree that Türkiye is a compelling alternative for European nations scrambling to boost their capabilities and diversify suppliers.
Prof. Dr. Haluk Görgün stated that the latest export growth involved almost 300 different defence systems, with the latest export figures reflecting Türkiye’s “self-written vision of independence in the defence industry” and the building of its “ground-breaking ecosystem in technology exports for the future”.
In 2024, Turkiye’s exports reached 178 countries, marking a 103 percent increase compared with 2015-2019. Its main customers in the 2020-2024 period were the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Qatar.
One of the most high-profile Turkish defence exports has been the Bayraktar TB2 UAV. In February 2025, Baykar stated that 90% of its 2024 revenues, or USD 1.8 billion, had been generated from exports.
So far, the Bayraktar TB2 and Bayraktar Akinci UAVs have been delivered to 35 countries in total, with the TB2 entering the inventories of 34, and the Akinci, ten of those.
Bayraktar TB2s have now been supplied to six NATO Allies and four EU member states, including Albania, Croatia, Poland, and Romania. Other Baykar UAV exports include Akinci systems exported to the UAE at the start of 2024, and unspecified Bayraktar platforms sent to Azerbaijan, Kenya, the Maldives, Mali, Morocco, and Pakistan during the same year.
Türkiye has several other important unmanned innovations, including the medium-altitude long-endurance Anka-S, which has a payload of 200kg (441lb), and the Vestel Karayel tactical UAV with a 70kg (154lb) payload.
The country is developing a “Steel Dome” (Çelik Kubbe) — an AI-enhanced system intended to detect and intercept airborne threats.
Work is also underway on Türkiye’s first domestically built fifth-generation fighter, the KAAN, which is meant to replace ageing F-16s in the Turkish Air Force.
Today, there are about 3,000 weapons companies in Türkiye.
Türkiye and Russia’s S-400
In 2017, Türkiye signed a contract with Russia for the supply of S-400 air-defence systems and missiles.
The contract was valued at approximately $2.5 billion and consisted of two systems along with at least 120 long-range 48N6 missiles. The systems were delivered to Türkiye in 2019.
Following that, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Türkiye and banned it from the F-35 fıghter jet programme. The S-400 is said to pose a risk to the NATO alliance as well as the F-35, America’s most expensive weapons platform at the time.
Before the 2019 ban, Ankara sought 100 F-35As. Today, it seeks 40 as it has since invested in developing its domestic stealth fighter, the TF Kaan.
In the summer of 2025, Russia offered to buy back the S-400 systems. It’s unclear if Russia is willing to repurchase the missiles for that price or if Türkiye is even willing to sell them.
Such a move could have major implications for Ankara’s prospects of re-entering the F-35 programme and for its broader arms relationships across the Middle East.
Türkiye never fully commissioned the S-400s despite insisting it would; as of last year, reports said it was considering placing them in storage under U.S. inspection.
Important note: The country formally changed its international name from Turkey to Türkiye in June 2022, following the United Nations’ recognition of its request.
While we may sometimes use the old name out of habit, let’s make an effort to switch to the official one, out of respect for our partner country.
Now this is called cooperations between countries to protect each other from a dictator! What’s the problem in the United States for also not stepping up to protect other little countries from dictators? And the rest of UK? Maybe Mattel and thier gi joes might? They do have a decent set of toys.
Yippie that’s the big toys!