Not the systems per se, but skills are becoming the game changer in modern conflict. The mass use of unmanned systems in Ukraine and Russia has led to the emergence of an entirely new category of combatants—drone operators.
Ukraine has over 30 private schools and centers that train both civilians and military personnel to operate a range of unmanned systems—including FPVs, multirotor drones, interceptors, fiber-optic drones, reconnaissance platforms, heavy bombers, UGVs, USVs, and others.
One of the most well-known among them is Dronarium Academy, which, prior to the full-scale invasion, trained drone operators for the civilian sector and transitioned to military drone training in 2022. Recently, Dronarium opened a training center in Poland and is cooperating closely with Latvia, Japan, and other countries.
I discussed with Dronarium Academy how drone operator training is evolving and where it is heading as autonomous technologies become more widespread.
About Dronarium Academy
Dronarium Group is a holding company that includes Dronarium, Dronarium Academy, and an R&D division. The group focuses on training and consulting in unmanned systems and actively partners with manufacturing companies, such as Warmax Technologies.
Through its diversified activities, the group covers the full cycle—from the development and production of aerial, ground, and underwater unmanned systems to the training of operators.
Since 2014, Dronarium activities have included organizing drone-related events and applying drone technologies in film production, media, geodesy, and agriculture.
Following the start of the full-scale invasion, the first two trainee groups were still trained under a civilian-oriented approach. After that, graduates began sharing their frontline experience, allowing the program to be continuously refined and adapted. The company, in the form of a Military Academy, began its operations in March 2022 in Lviv, where it opened the first training center.
In October 2024, Dronarium Academy became certified by the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the Main Directorate of State Aviation of Ukraine.
Its graduates receive a certificate recognized by MoD, along with recommendations for further military service or volunteer engagement.
Training Courses
The Academy offers courses on FPV drones, multirotors, underwater drones, fiber-optic FPV systems, FPV engineering, and interceptor drone piloting.
According to Anastasia Sobova, CBDO at Dronarium, the most popular courses in Ukraine are FPV Engineering, FPV Drones, Fiber-Optic FPV, and Multirotor Systems. The latter was the first course introduced by the academy and remains highly relevant, as it provides the foundation for further training.
Other courses are offered on demand. For example, the academy recently reinstated its Humanitarian Demining course for a limited time in response to renewed interest.
Dronarium also trains operators of heavy bombers and reconnaissance drones. It works directly with manufacturers and military units that operate these UAV systems.
The duration of training varies depending on the complexity of the system and the level of trainees’ preparedness.
For instance, FPV drone training from scratch typically takes around three weeks.
The fiber-optic drone course at Dronarium Academy lasts three days and is designed for experienced FPV combat pilots, electronic warfare (EW) specialists, engineers, defence tech developers, and personnel from related units within the Armed Forces. Participation requires passing an entry assessment to demonstrate basic FPV piloting skills.
Dmytro Slediuk, Head of the Training Department at Dronarium, told UNIAN that at present, fiber-optic technologies are at the peak of attention and popularity. Neither Russia nor Ukraine currently possesses a weapon capable of systematically countering these drones. Russia, however, is scaling its deployment faster than Ukraine. They are creating entire “kill zones,” where drones intercept other drones and hunt the crews operating them.
The underwater drone training course, also designed for experienced operators, lasts around five days and includes on-water practical training using three types of platforms: torpedo-type, bathyscaphe-type, and hybrid systems.
As for interceptor drones, the Head of the Training Department explains that training a single interceptor drone operator to an effective level takes approximately five months. According to him, this is a complex skill set that involves not only theoretical knowledge but also extensive motor training: the operator must be able to manually guide a high-speed drone toward a fast, maneuvering target—something that requires significant practice.
“It is practically impossible to teach this in a week, two weeks, or even a month. Ukraine can provide trained specialists and training programs tailored to existing technologies, enabling the mass preparation of operators locally. Our expertise continues to grow throughout the war with Russia, which is why our instructors will remain ahead of others,” Slediuk noted.
Dronarium has a dedicated team that collects frontline data to continuously update their training programs.
A “test drive” of unmanned systems with the 424th Battalion of the Unmanned Systems Forces, Svarog, typically lasts 3 days.
The Instructors at Dronarium Academy
These are motivated and experienced drone operators, some of whom have direct combat experience. Those without combat experience conduct field training for military units near the front line. “As a result, there are no instructors who, so to speak, have ‘never seen combat,’ Anastasia told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.
The shortage of instructors is a real challenge for many training schools. It is not simply a matter of recruiting experienced drone operators and providing them with teaching methodology. In practice, nearly all qualified pilots are currently deployed, while the few who are demobilized are often actively recruited by HR specialists from IT companies. Despite this, Dronarium maintained a stable core of instructors in its Kyiv and Lviv centers, with relatively low staff turnover.
State funding could have helped address this issue, but for reasons that remain unclear, it was discontinued in November 2023. When there is a need to train military personnel on a specific type of unmanned system, the training cost is, in certain cases, covered by the system manufacturer.
For other courses, civilian trainees cover their own training, partly subsidizing the training of military personnel who always study free of charge.
Launch of a Drone Training Center in Poland
In September 2025, according to Militarnyi, Dronarium Academy, in partnership with former members of the Madyar’s Birds unit, announced the launch of a joint project in Poland—Dronarium Birds —focused on the full spectrum of UAV operator training. At the beginning of March 2026, it was officially presented at the Drone World Expo in Warsaw.
Anastasia Sobova commented on the peculiarities of EU-based drone training programs prior to the full-scale war: “In the EU, training is primarily oriented toward regulatory compliance—obtaining EASA certification, documenting compliance, passing exams, and so on. Practical training is included, but it is minimal and strictly regulated, even for civilian, non-combat drone applications. Courses are short, typically lasting between one and three days.
Attempts to introduce more combat-oriented training—such as those previously launched in Poland—have largely failed to reflect the realities of modern warfare and were quickly discontinued. They relied on outdated equipment and obsolete tactical approaches. Without direct access to active military personnel, it is difficult to update training programs in a timely manner—so it is not surprising that a clear advantage remains on our side”.
This initiative is designed to train civilians, volunteers, reservists, and defence personnel, with the aim of transferring Ukrainian battlefield expertise and preparing specialists to operate a wide range of unmanned systems, including underwater, ground-based, FPV, and multirotor platforms.
Training for interceptor drone operators is expected to last from one month, depending on the trainee’s initial level of knowledge.
International Partnerships and Regional Differences
The Academy considers opening similar training centers in other countries. At the same time, partner requests vary significantly by region and specific operational needs.
“Following the start of military operations against Iran in the Middle East, demand for training in interceptor drone operations has increased substantially. We are actively working with partners in this area; however, such programs are highly specialized, as they effectively involve elements of air defence systems, which differ from country to country. Moreover, operator training in this domain is significantly more complex and time-consuming—typically ranging from two to five months—compared to multirotor operator training (around five days) or FPV drone training (approximately four weeks),” commented Dronarium Academy to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.
In other countries, the most common requests focus on training in the combat use of FPV drones and multirotor platforms. At the same time, each project is tailored to the client’s specific needs.
For example, last year the Academy conducted training for the Latvian National Guard. Their primary requests were the transfer of real combat experience, training for FPV and multirotor drone operators, and the development of unit-level coordination in line with NATO standards.
To meet these requirements, Dronarium adapted its existing Multirotor and FPV courses, engaged an instructor specializing in combat coordination to develop NATO-aligned interaction scenarios, and introduced a new training module focused on simulated FPV strike operations.
Another project currently being developed in cooperation with Japan focuses on basic training in the combat use of FPV drones. At the same time, the training center plans to expand this program to include other types of unmanned systems in the future.
Ethical Considerations
Given the large number of international volunteers undergoing training and joining Ukraine’s defence forces, there is a growing risk that skills and knowledge, particularly related to unmanned systems, may spread to other conflict environments.
The primary focus of Dronarium is training Ukrainian operators. Since March 2022, more than 17,500 military personnel and around 1,500 civilians have completed training. This corresponds to approximately 85% military and 15% civilian trainees.
The share of foreign trainees is very small, and they typically come to fight on Ukraine’s side. The Academy screens out those who seek training simply to return to their home countries.
When asked how they assess the risk that drone operations and engineering knowledge could be exploited by criminal groups across different countries—many of which are closely monitoring the technological developments of this war—and what measures can be taken to prevent this, Dronarium representatives outlined their mitigation approach and emphasized the limits of control: “We cannot fully control how and for what purposes our graduates ultimately apply the knowledge they acquire. However, we mitigate these risks through a careful candidate selection process. At the initial application stage, we conduct a mandatory interview with each candidate to assess their training objectives and ethical principles. This procedure is the same for all applicants, both Ukrainian and foreign. If any concerns arise, the candidate may be denied admission.
It is also important to note that all candidates undergo security screening by the relevant Ukrainian state authorities. The final decision on admission or rejection rests with them. From our side, we accept applicants from partner countries, while citizens of hostile or unfriendly states are not admitted to the program.”
According to various estimates, 14,000-15,000 foreigners from 72 countries have joined Ukraine’s Defence Forces. At the same time, Russia has involved over 24,000 foreigners from 128 countries.
The Future of Drone Operators
At present, each unmanned system is operated by a human pilot, and in some cases—such as long-range or ground-based platforms—entire crews are required to support its operation. FPV piloting is also a team effort, involving a pilot, a navigator, and a sapper.
“In the coming years, the demand for drone operators is unlikely to decline. The vast majority of missions are still carried out directly by human operators.
Autonomous systems and artificial intelligence are undoubtedly promising and developing rapidly, with the potential to become highly effective tools over time. However, they remain tools in human hands, and at present, the readiness for large-scale deployment of fully autonomous systems on the battlefield—without operator involvement—is significantly overstated,” according to Dronarium Academy.
Drone operators are considered high-value targets on the battlefield. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces reportedly assign “points” for eliminating enemy specialists. Entire areas can be targeted if operator positions are identified.
In April 2026, Ukraine’s Minister of Defence announced that special attention within the military’s bonus point system would be given to targeting Russian drone operators. Neutralizing one operator earns twice as many points as a standard infantry target.
Ukraine’s objective is to reduce the survivability of enemy drone operators on the battlefield. To achieve this, dedicated units have already begun forming to identify and eliminate Russian operators.
Ukraine’s approach to drone operator training demonstrates a level of adaptability and operational integration unmatched in most global contexts. The use of unmanned systems is evolving rapidly, and we now see developments that were not present in 2022, such as the widespread use of fiber-optic drones and the growing demand for interceptor drones in air defence roles.
Training programs at centers such as Dronarium Academy are continually updated, and their close ties to frontline military units provide a level of practical experience that trainees would not be able to obtain elsewhere.
This expertise in unmanned warfare has reached a top-tier level and is applicable to virtually any armed conflict worldwide.
If you found this article useful or learned something new, I invite you to consider supporting my fundraiser for a Mavic 3T drone for my friend serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is the fourth drone we are raising funds for, and I hope this campaign will be just as successful - https://www.paypal.com/pools/c/9nSSd7NqxK
Thank you 🇺🇦🇺🇦🇺🇦
Read other articles on this topic:
Turning Virtual Errors into Ukraine’s Battlefield Advantage: Drone Simulator Obriy;
(Un)Manned Warfare: 80% of Drone Success Depends on Pilot Skill;
Importance of Operator Training for Interceptor Drones: Kruk Drones UAV Training Center.
Check my topic navigator for more articles:
Which does modern war consume more of — drone operators or infantrymen?
I don't doubt the necessity of drone operators. Or the spectacle of their success. I wager few fighters choose the rifle over the controller, given the option. The harsh economics of war have a rule no one likes to say plainly: ground is taken and held by infantry. Ukraine has few of them left. The burn rate exceeds 500 per day.
Skills are indeed the game changer — the article is right about that. Wrong about which skills, and wrong about who is being left behind. Dronarium has compressed the doctrine loop: frontline experience feeds back into the program, operators improve, the cycle repeats. That is real. But does anyone produce a reportable lethality index on the operator? There is no measure, no diagnosis, no prediction. Schools, certificates, and the assumption that attendance produces enhanced human lethality. Producing reliable lethality demands metrology.
Meanwhile Ukrainian infantryman — the one who takes and holds the ground every drone in the sky is supposed to support — has been abandoned to fate. No measurement. No development system. Where is the institutional effort to improve their cycle time? Where is Lethality developed to enhanced automaticity in the individual and teams? Where is training and development that produces mission command skill so effective that C2 becomes rightfully useless? Ukraine is spending its infantry faster than it can replace them, and an institutional answer is more drone schools. Your infantry training is not producing the results your civilization requires for survival.
Drones and C2 are force multipliers for an infantry that must exist first. More NATO generals fighting Ukrainian wars from C2 nodes thousands of kilometers away does not reduce that consumption rate — it accelerates it. I get it, generals insist that with better C2 they could have commanded better and won more battles - they said that in Iraq and Afghanistan too. The billion dollar contracts are all about Lattice and Edge networks. A boondoggle. Debacle is the polite way to describe it. Remote command is never as good as terminal node automaticity. The man at the point of contact, acting without hesitation, is the variable that decides the engagement. C2 belongs on the ash heap of history. replaced by P&F "Prepare and Facilitate" infrastructure in the rear, while the people at the terminal node are improved for greater performance. That's where the investment belongs.
The static firing range and NATO-style war games do not build that man or instill in him that mission command. Ukraine is not running out of drones. You are running out of boys. Next come fathers, grandfathers, then children. Mathematics. No Drone or C2 architecture changes it.
Olena,
What strikes me in your observation is not only the pace of development—
but the way learning seems to have become *embedded*.
---
Because many militaries adopt new technologies.
Far fewer manage to reorganize themselves around them.
---
What you describe—training centres tied directly to frontline units—
is not just about better instruction.
It changes the nature of knowledge itself.
---
It is no longer:
* written
* standardized
* and slowly updated
---
It becomes:
* lived
* iterative
* and continuously corrected
---
> **Pull note**
> When learning sits close to reality, doctrine stops being fixed.
> It becomes something that evolves under pressure.
---
That, I think, is the real distinction.
---
The emergence of fibre-optic drones, interceptor roles, layered unmanned systems—
these are visible outputs.
But behind them sits something less visible:
👉 a system that shortens the distance between **experience and adaptation**.
---
And that distance matters.
Because in most institutions, it is long.
---
Feedback travels upward slowly.
Decisions travel downward even more slowly.
By the time something changes, the environment has already moved on.
---
In Ukraine’s case, that loop appears compressed.
---
Frontline → training → iteration → deployment
---
Repeated, again and again.
---
Not perfectly, of course.
But fast enough to create momentum.
---
And momentum, in this domain, becomes a form of advantage.
---
You also point to something that deserves emphasis:
this is not just tactical competence.
It is becoming transferable knowledge.
---
But here I would add a small note of caution.
---
What works in Ukraine works within a very specific environment:
* high-intensity conflict
* dense electronic warfare
* continuous attrition
* immediate operational feedback
---
That environment accelerates learning in a way peacetime systems rarely can.
---
So while the expertise is clearly top-tier,
its application elsewhere will depend on whether others can replicate not just the tools—
but the conditions that produced the learning.
---
> Capability can be copied.
> The conditions that create it are harder to reproduce.
---
Still, what you are describing feels like more than adaptation.
It feels like a shift in how warfare knowledge is generated.
---
Less centralised.
Less doctrinal.
More networked.
---
And perhaps most importantly:
more willing to change while still in motion.
---
That is not something most systems are comfortable with.
---
But under sustained pressure, it becomes necessary.
And once it is learned, it does not easily disappear.