Russia's Arms Trends: Sarmat production challenges, drone ambitions, and Middle East interests
Three stories of the week: 25 - 31 Jan. 2025
I started this weekly digest about Russia’s military trends one week ago. It’s free because I want it to reach more people and make them realize that Russia is not a joke—every state, whether in Europe, the Americas, or even Australia and Oceania, should take the threats from this country seriously. Even states that cooperate with Russia should stay aware of what’s happening, as Russia is known to be an unreliable partner.
In this edition, I’ve curated research on three main themes: Russia’s production of Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles—critical for its deterrence capabilities; its ambitious plans to become the world's leading drone power by 2030; and the establishment of relations with the new administration in Syria. And, of course, more extra news!
Let’s go!
How Russia's Struggles with ICBM Sarmat Production Impact Its Nuclear Deterrence Capabilities
Russia is facing difficulties with the production of its intercontinental ballistic missile, Sarmat, according to The Business Insider, which quotes experts Timothy Wright and Fabian Hoffmann (if you haven’t subscribed to his Substack, be sure to check it out).
Russia's new RS-28 Sarmat ICBM appeared to suffer a catastrophic failure during testing in September, with satellite imagery showing a big crater around the launchpad at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome.
The Sarmat is meant to replace the Soviet-era R-36, which first entered service in 1988. Without the new Sarmat, Russia has to rely on older missiles.
Reportedly, Russia utilized Ukrainian expertise to develop that type of missile, but its attack on Ukraine has since isolated it from that crucial knowledge.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has developed capable solid-fueled ICBMs. But with Sarmat, it decided to use a liquid-fueled system, which was something the Ukrainians previously did.
The particular feature of Sarmat is its ability to carry 10 large warheads or 16 smaller ones. Other Russian ICBMs are much smaller. As of May 2023, Russia had 1,674 warheads deployed, with a total stockpile of 4,489. Russia wants a big missile with a tremendous destructive capacity, so if they then took Sarmat out of service, then they have a bit of a gap.
For Russia, it's also important to ensure they have warhead parity with the Americans. Wright said he can't see Russia deciding to cancel the Sarmat program. Putin has invested a lot of propaganda into the system. Russia appears to be keeping its warheads limited in accordance with the New START treaty. But if that changes, and it may as Russia has suspended its involvement with the treaty, Russia may want to deploy more warheads. Without the Sarmat, Russia will need to find other places for its warheads.
Mass Drone Production Plans and Manpower Problems
On January 28, 2025, Putin announced plans to establish 48 drone production centers within the next decade, with 15 of these facilities already operational. This initiative aims to increase production capacity and make Russia a world leader in drones by 2030.
Existing centers are located in various regions, including Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novgorod, Ryazan, Sakhalin, Tomsk, Perm Krai, Udmurtia, and Tatarstan, with an expansion planned for Samara.
Identified as a key hub for drone development, the Samara research and production center for unmanned aircraft systems is expected to expand, forming a broader research, educational, and production cluster focused on civil unmanned aviation.
The Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan has been identified as a key production center, manufacturing Shahed-style loitering munitions and reconnaissance drones under Project Boat, an initiative reportedly involving Iranian cooperation. Recently it was reported that Russia is fraudulently attracting foreigners to the production of Shahed-136 strike drones. These are citizens of post-Soviet countries, including Azerbaijan, who are offered employment under the Alabuga Start program in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone through an online advertising campaign.
More than 400 domestic companies are involved in research and production efforts, with supporting infrastructure being developed to facilitate the transition from concept to mass production.
In December 2024, the Institute for the Study of War published a special issue “Russian Efforts to Centralize Drone Units May Degrade Russian Drone Operations” analyzing a coordinated effort by Russian MOD to create a centralized separate branch for unmanned systems, likely to reorganize informal specialized drone detachments and centralize procurement of unmanned systems.
Russia is likely trying to free up more manpower by disbanding informal drone detachments to generate assault troops to maintain the offensive tempo in Ukraine.
It is noted, that decentralization and greater degrees of independence have given drone operators on both sides of this war advantages in the extremely rapid evolution of combat techniques and in the offense-defense race between drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Russian MoD’s centralization and restructuring efforts may degrade the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slow the Russian unmanned systems innovation cycle.
The author of this report, Kateryna Stepanenko stated, that the Russian MoD is likely trying to catch up to the establishment of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) earlier in 2024.
For context, Ukraine officially established the USF on June 11, 2024, and Ukrainian military officials announced that the new separate branch will become the first in the world to use aerial, surface and underwater naval, and ground-based unmanned and robotic systems in combat missions.
The Russian MoD's coercive centralization of Russian drones and specialized detachments closely resembles its attempt at formally subordinating the Wagner Group PMC under the Russian MoD's control, which resulted in the destruction of one of Russia’s most effective and innovative military organizations.
Developments in Syria
Satellite imagery suggests that Russia has been withdrawing from Syria’s port of Tartus. Maxar satellite imagery taken on Jan. 25, obtained by TWZ, shows the Russian-flagged roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) cargo ships Sparta and Sparta II docked in Tartus, along with ongoing cargo transloading activity. The images also reveal the disappearance of a significant number of Russian vehicles and other materiel from a pier where they had been marshaled weeks ago.
The final status of Russia’s naval base in Tartus and Khmeimim Air Base remains unclear. This recent activity around Tartus follows still-unconfirmed reports claiming that the government in Damascus has canceled Russia’s 49-year lease agreement for the Tartus base.
Several days later, on Jan. 28, a delegation of Russian officials arrived in Damascus for the first such visit since the fall of former President Bashar al-Assad. The delegation included Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, who also serves as Putin’s special envoy on the Middle East and Africa, and Alexander Lavrentyev, the president’s special envoy on Syria. Bogdanov, a former diplomat in Syria during the 1980s and 1990s, speaks Arabic. Lavrentyev has previously participated in negotiations with Assad.
Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, emphasized the deep strategic ties between Russia and Syria, stating: “All Syria’s arms are of Russian origin, and many power plants are managed by Russian experts... We do not want Russia to leave Syria in the way that some wish.”
Thus, there are currently no indications of a total Russian withdrawal from Syria or the closure of its military bases.
In December 2024, Ukrainian diplomats met with Syria’s new leadership, with Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiga urging Sharaa to expel Russia from the country.
Other news:
Russia’s Year of Truth: The Missing Military Hardware (Pavel Luzin for CEPA). 2025 will be the last year Russia can rely on its massive stockpiles of Soviet-era conventional arms, including artillery, main battle tanks and armored vehicles. If the intensity of combat, and consequent Russian losses, follow the same pattern as 2022–2024, most stockpiles will be exhausted by the second half of the year, forcing Moscow to rely on newly manufactured arms rather than repaired and modernized ones. The examples of Rostec and Tactical Missile Corp. show clearly that Russia’s military-industrial complex is suffering the effects of cost-push inflation and pressure from the weakness of the ruble. This is the inevitable result of the sector’s continuing dependence on imported supplies of components and machine tools, despite the import substitution policy. Another major obstacle to manufacturers is a shortage of qualified workers, although, this data is contradictory. The Kremlin’s strategic threat could be weakened, if not eliminated, if, in the long term, Ukraine is able to maintain and increase military pressure on its invaders.
After the EU and the U.S. imposed sanctions in 2022, China became Russia's sole source of gallium and germanium, as well as one of the leaders in supplying antimony, chemical elements necessary for the production of weapons, including nuclear ones. These metals are imported into Russia by state and private connected to the Russian military-industrial complex, purchasing them from Chinese state-owned firms. This is stated in the investigation by Schemes, a project of Radio Free Europe (full text is available in Ukrainian).
Russia appears to be on the brink of starting serial production of a new version of its well-known Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile system, which could reshape the strategic capabilities in the region. Some experts are calling it the Iskander-1000, with its main distinguishing feature being the extended range, reaching up to 1000 kilometers. One key component is the autonomous inertial navigation system, which provides high accuracy by using built-in sensors to track the missile’s position and orientation during flight. This technology has been improved with new algorithms for course correction, greatly reducing the chances of deviation. Additionally, the missile is equipped with satellite navigation capabilities, such as GPS and Russia’s GLONASS system, ensuring precise targeting over long distances and in open terrain. This integration of satellite guidance is especially critical given the extended range of the Iskander-1000. To further safeguard against interception, the Iskander-1000 could deploy advanced electronic countermeasures, including active and passive decoys designed to confuse or mislead enemy missile defense systems.
To continue using military airfields near the border for strikes against Ukraine, Russia has installed new air defense systems and is building hangars for aircraft. New positions for S-300/S-400 air defense systems have appeared at the Millerovo air base in the Rostov region. They were not there last October. Hangar construction was also observed at the Belbek air base in occupied Crimea and the Primorsko-Akhtarsk airfield in the Krasnodar region.
A senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) official revealed that Iran has proceeded with its planned purchase of Russia’s Sukhoi-35 fighter jets. It was not specified how many Sukhoi-35 jets have been ordered or if they have already been delivered to Iran. Dubbed by NATO as the “Flanker-E” or “Super Flanker,” the Sukhoi-35 (Su-35) is widely regarded as a “marvel” of Russian aerospace engineering. The aircraft is also capable of carrying a variety of air-to-air, air-to-surface, and precision-guided munitions, depending on mission needs. The Su-35 is expected to replace Iran’s aging fleet of F-14 Tomcat jets, which were originally delivered by the US in the 1970s when the two countries were still allies.
A senior NATO official confirmed that there was a Russian scheme to kill Armin Papperger, the head of German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall. The plot, which was foiled by the United States and German intelligence, was part of a series of Russian plans to assassinate defense industry executives across Europe.
Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB) claimed to have uncovered and dismantled a criminal group operating a smuggling network that transported firearms, ammunition, and military uniforms from the United States to Russia via Kyrgyzstan.
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