NATO and Conventional Arms Control: Military Transfers to Ukraine
Recently, I’ve prepared an article about NATO and conventional arms control. Two topics that don’t necessarily go together when we think of them, right?
When we say NATO, we probably mean militarization, new arms deals, transfers, and defense spending. But in this relatively short article, I wanted to draw attention to another important aspect of military transfers: end-use and end-user control, and the prevention of weapons diversion to illicit actors.
Basically, states that conduct military transfers must ensure that the weaponry and its components won’t be used for any purpose that violates human rights or international humanitarian law. They must also ensure that the importing state has full capacity to exercise control over those weapons and equipment and that they won’t end up with undesired users, such as criminal or terrorist actors, or enemy states. This is a very important aspect of military transfers that is often omitted and not extensively mentioned.
The diversion of weapons (the transfer from authorized use to unauthorized use) can contribute to the rise of armed violence in different regions and undermine the security of exporting states.
There are many measures being taken in the context of the war in Ukraine to prevent the diversion and illicit trafficking of weaponry. So far, there have been no reported cases of weapons trafficking outside of Ukraine, for many reasons. But in this article, I argue that NATO, as the alliance of the largest donors of military aid to Ukraine, should take this commitment more seriously and consider investing in proper infrastructure to enhance Ukraine’s ability to exercise control over the received weaponry.
Just taking a quick look at the long-term security cooperation agreements between Ukraine and its partners, only a handful mention cooperation to prevent “diversion and the illegal circulation of defense materiel provided to Ukraine.” The agreement with the United States contains provisions for “End Use Monitoring/Accountability” and mentions “coordination to mitigate the risk of diversion of advanced conventional weapons.” But what exactly are “advanced conventional weapons”? We have no way of knowing, as the U.S. Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Conventional Weapons in Eastern Europe is classified. This provision should, of course, encompass all conventional weapons.
By any means, this part of arms transfers deserves more attention, as well as greater transparency. The efforts conducted by Ukraine’s partners and allies to prevent weapons diversion should be publicized, and not just reports about “large accounting mistakes” or Ukrainian weapons popping up somewhere in the Middle East, which is often a product of Russian disinformation. Additionally, Ukraine seems very motivated to implement new technologies for handling weapons and to modernize its old systems.
And a short comment about the image I’ve chosen for this article. It’s borrowed from NATO Allied Command Transformation and has the caption: “Battlefield Innovation: Ukraine’s DELTA System Paves the Way for Allied Interoperability at CWIX24.” I find it a very interesting illustration of Ukraine, represented by a young woman with a laptop covered in stickers like “Armed Florks of Ukraine” (yes, I put in extra effort to track them down), showing the DELTA System to her mature and serious colleagues from NATO. Isn’t this, in some ways, exactly how it works right now?
NATO and Conventional Arms Control: Military Transfers to Ukraine
In December 2024, NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) took over the coordination of the provision, transfer, and repair of military equipment critical to Ukraine’s battlefield needs. While it is crucial to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to protect itself against Russian invaders, equally important is ensuring proper control over the delivered weaponry. The diversion of weapons and military technology to unintended users or uses can pose significant risks to the security of NATO allies.
In 2023, Ukraine was the world’s fourth-largest importer of weapons. Together, NATO allies account for 99% of all military aid to Ukraine. NATO member countries have been sending weapons, ammunition, and various types of light and heavy military equipment to Ukraine, including anti-tank and air defence systems, howitzers, drones, tanks, and fighter jets.
Under the Arms Trade Treaty, a legally binding international arms control agreement, exporting, importing, transiting, and brokering parties have responsibilities regarding military transfers to prevent human rights violations and harm to civilians due to improper transfer procedures. Currently, NATO member states support Ukraine in its efforts to prevent the diversion and illicit trafficking of donated weaponry by conducting regular monitoring activities and strengthening Ukraine’s transition to digital systems for tracking the delivery, distribution, and use of donated arms.
In July 2022, Ukraine’s Parliament established a special temporary commission to monitor the use of weapons provided to Ukraine by international partners. One of its key priorities is engaging with representatives of partner countries. According to the latest report, released in July 2024, the commission held meetings with defence attaches and their deputies from the embassies of 17 NATO states, including Canada, the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and France.
As part of their cooperation with international partners, the members of the commission and foreign delegations visited Rzeszów district (Poland) to inspect the logistics hub where military and technical assistance from Ukraine’s allied and partner countries is delivered. The commission members, along with a mission from the United States, also traveled to the city of Kherson and its surrounding region to monitor the accounting and use of military and technical assistance.
As the largest donor of military aid to Ukraine, the United States strives to conduct regular end-use monitoring of the delivered equipment. While previous monitoring efforts by U.S. delegations, which focused on the storage and use of military aid, did not identify significant deficiencies, the challenges of conducting on-site visits—due to the proximity to the battlefield—limit the effectiveness of these activities. In its latest report, released in December 2024, the U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General noted that, since its previous evaluation, the Office of Defense Cooperation-Ukraine and the Ukrainian Armed Forces had improved their inventory reporting processes. However, personnel were still only able to conduct limited end-use monitoring and serial number inventories.
Modern software plays a crucial role in tracking the delivery, distribution, and use of donated weaponry. Currently, the information systems employed in Ukraine include the SOTA information and analytical system, Logistic Functional Area Services (LOGFAS), KOROVAI, and SAP.
Among these, it is important to highlight LOGFAS, an integrated set of software systems developed to support NATO’s logistics operations and facilitate coordination between NATO member states. This system ensures transparency and control over the weapons and military equipment received by Ukraine. Ukraine has had limited access to LOGFAS since 2019, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces were officially introduced to it in October 2022. However, according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, due to the slow transition process, the full-scale implementation of this system may take several years.
Additionally, a barcode system is used to track weapons arriving from the United States. Introduced in December 2022, this technology requires that each weapon arriving from the U.S. be affixed with a barcode. Ukrainian military personnel then scan the barcode, instantly transmitting information about the weapon’s serial numbers to a centralized database in the United States. This streamlined process enhances traceability and ensures accurate record-keeping of the weapons received.
While international civil society organizations that track the risks of diversion and illicit trafficking of weaponry in the region have not reported any cases of Western supplies spilling out of Ukraine, the danger remains and should be addressed with vigilance. Although the United States has attempted to implement various procedures to monitor delivered weaponry and conduct end-use control, there is evidence that existing measures are insufficient. As for other NATO allies, there is almost no publicly available information on their efforts to support Ukraine’s capacity to ensure the proper use of Western donations.
The positive sign is that cooperation to prevent the illicit diversion and the illegal circulation of defence materiel provided to Ukraine was mentioned in long-term security agreements signed in 2024 between Ukraine and several NATO member states, such as Norway, Sweden, and Latvia.
It is recommended that the NATO alliance develop a comprehensive strategy to strengthen Ukraine’s practices in weapons and ammunition management, establish joint monitoring of the transfers and use of donated military equipment, invest in advanced technologies, and allocate sufficient human resources to conduct proper inspection procedures to protect these weapons from misuse or diversion. To this end, Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is the suitable arm of NATO to be tasked with developing a standardized system for monitoring and controlling the weapons NATO members donate to NATO partner states. This would make NATO’s thirty-two members more interoperable and streamlined in their efforts to ensure weapons do not inadvertently end up in the hands of unauthorized users.
The article was originally published on the website of the NATO Association of Canada.