On December 8, I delivered a presentation at the conference, “Inside the networks: How knowledge transfer drives improvised weapons production,” organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva.
I am so happy that I finally made it there despite many bureaucratic hurdles, which I was able to resolve only weeks before the event (thanks to the office of Hon. Chrystia Freeland for assisting with that).
In my presentation, I emphasized the role of FPV drones on the battlefield and the efforts of civilians in both Ukraine and Russia to produce them, as well as to develop the knowledge and skills needed to adapt these systems to specific battlefield conditions, including making them highly resistant to electronic warfare.
I also highlighted the role of frontline workshops that arm, redesign, and modify drones. A dedicated section of my report focused on the importance of drone pilots and the training of large numbers of personnel capable of operating these systems. Ultimately, the intention behind these efforts is what matters most—and for Ukraine and Russia, those intentions are fundamentally different.
You can read my speech and view the presentation below.
Good afternoon,
Today, I will address how the Russian-Ukrainian war has driven the improvised production of unmanned systems, and how the skills required to assemble, adapt, and operate them are spreading far beyond traditional military structures.
This war is a conflict that draws deeply on societal mobilisation. Both Ukrainian and Russian civil societies have engaged to an unprecedented degree, raising funds, producing equipment, volunteering technical expertise, and filling critical capability gaps.
As a result, the skills, tools, and knowledge that shape today’s battlefield no longer belong exclusively to military personnel. Hundreds of thousands—if not millions—of civilians on both sides are directly involved in developing systems that have redefined modern warfare, particularly unmanned systems.
The most visible trend of the Russian-Ukrainian war has been the rise of small, inexpensive UAVs, especially first-person view (FPV) drones. These drones have proven effective in destroying heavy equipment such as tanks, armoured vehicles, and artillery systems.
Once weaponized, these drones can be employed not only for military purposes but also for striking civilian targets. In the context of this war, they have become tools used to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity against the Ukrainian civilian population.
In Russia and Ukraine, programs run by NGOs and private initiatives—and further supported by the governments—train anyone interested in assembling and operating drones.
Manuals, tutorials, and step-by-step assembly videos circulate widely on social media platforms such as Telegram, YouTube, and Russian VKontakte, making production accessible to anyone with a basic technical interest.
The 3D printing technology has transformed these processes even further, allowing specialists to print necessary parts and spare components to meet the immediate operational requirements of frontline units.
The advantage of 3D printing is that drone parts can be fully customized to meet specific requirements.
Based on information available on open-sources, the most commonly 3D-printed components include:
payload delivery systems
structural and mounting parts
and launch infrastructure
Virtually any 3D-printed quadcopter can be built at home if a person has the necessary schematics also widely available in open sources.
Hobbyist communities collaborate online to print, modify, and troubleshoot components, especially for FPV designs.
Assembly is only one part of the required skill set. To make these drones effective, they must be fine-tuned in frontline labs or workshops on both sides of the war. According to my interviews with Ukrainian servicemen, 100% of FPV drones received by their units go through the frontline labs.
Similar workshops also operate on the Russian side, where teams of 5-7 engineers and technicians modify hardware and software, arm drones, replace civilian firmware with military versions, and adjust frequencies. They also reprogram the captured drones and can redesign them for other functions.
The continuous contest between drones and counter-drone systems also drives the rapid iteration cycle of unmanned technologies on the battlefield.
2025 has seen the expansion of drones resistant to electronic warfare, the most prominent being fibre-optic vehicles.
There are now detailed instructions and videos online showing how to assemble these drones in domestic conditions and how to attach commercially available spools with fiber-optic cable.
In frontline workshop conditions, most standard FPV drones can be transformed into unjammable fiber-optic vehicles.
The rise of autonomous technologies, which allow drones to operate without a pilot during the final stages of a mission, has encouraged civilians to experiment with machine vision and automated target-recognition.
One documented example describes a hobbyist with no technical education who, in two weeks and with the help of AI tools, created a working machine-learning model capable of recognizing targets in FPV video.
His work was not used on the battlefield, but it demonstrates how low the entry barrier to autonomy has become.
Next-generation drone technologies, such as autonomous and swarming systems, will pose a set of dangers as they proliferate into the hands of state and nonstate actors.
While autonomy remains limited on the battlefield, reliance on human drone pilots is high, which makes training essential.
Drone crews are responsible for more than 70 percent of drone mission success.
Training can now begin at home using a personal computer or even a mobile device, supported by highly realistic simulators such as Liftoff, the DRL Simulator, and VelociDrone.
Given the conditions of active war, training is also delivered through organized courses designed to rapidly prepare new pilots.
In Russia and Ukraine, there are state-funded and private schools for drone crews. It takes, on average, 21 days to train an FPV drone pilot in a course, and about two months to train an engineer.
Ukraine aims to train 30,000 drone pilots.
According to government sources, Russia’s goal is to train 1 million specialists in unmanned systems by 2030.
Particularly concerning is the involvement of children and youth. Over 500 Russian schools and 30 colleges now teach standardized drone curricula. The first official Russian UAV textbook developed by a drone manufacturer has entered the federal education system.
In addition to that, there are reports that in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, the Russian authorities are involving Ukrainian children in assembling FPV drones for the needs of their armed forces.
The existence of a large pool of trained operators—and long-term plans to expand that pool—creates serious risks of skill proliferation beyond the region. These skills may diffuse not only through formal channels but also through political, military, and economic networks that extend far beyond the battlefield.
The trends emerging from the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine will not remain confined to the region. They will shape future conflicts, empower new actors, and challenge existing arms-control frameworks. Understanding these dynamics is essential for any effort to build effective international responses.
I will conclude by emphasizing that my analysis today, and my work more broadly, is framed within the assessment that Ukraine is exercising its inherent right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, while the Russian Federation’s use of force constitutes a violation of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter.
The full presentation is available at the following link.
Great and informative presentation. I can only imagine how this militarization of young minds will lead us into a world of chaos and violence we can only imagine now. But it’s interesting to note how this decentralizes violence , that military aggression can now easily transformed into civil violence , terror, and it’s difficult if not impossible to trace the actual physical aggressors. It seems It’s heading in the direction of being the ultimate terrorizing tool. A frightening combination of aggression and anonymity. That makes enforcement of protocol almost impossible.
Heart Breaking— I appreciate your reporting