Quantity over quality? The ability to scale or a groundbreaking innovation?
In 2025, Russia clearly led in the first category—the ability to produce thousands of its most effective drones, whether Shahed-type systems or fiber-optic FPVs, to overwhelm Ukrainian defenders both at the frontline and deep in the rear.
Ukraine’s advantage, by contrast, lies in its capacity to innovate and to allow those innovations to prove themselves on the battlefield. Across all categories of unmanned systems, Ukraine has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt, iterate, and find creative solutions under enormous pressure and multiple constraints. This adaptability aimed to compensate for shortages in air-defence systems and missiles, artillery ammunition, long-range strike capabilities, and naval assets. And, to some extent, it succeeded.
Observing drone warfare in 2025 has been an interesting exercise. It would be easier if it were not about my own country.
Below is a summary of the key developments that caught my attention in 2025.
And what stood out to you in the Russia-Ukraine drone war?
Fiber-optics
“2025 will become the year of fiber-optics,” the commander of Ukraine’s K-2 regiment said in March. In 2025, fiber-optic drones were used en masse by both Ukraine and Russia. Russia is leading in terms of production volumes - in September 2025, it doubled the production of its fiber-optic FPVs to more than 50,000 per month. In terms of reported accuracy and range, Russia also appears to be ahead.
Ukraine, which was initially in a reactive position in this niche, quickly organized the codification, procurement, and scaling of all available fiber-optic drones.
However, Russia still holds an advantage, as it has its own facilities for fiber-optic cable production at the plant in Saransk, and actively cooperates with China on spool production.
Meanwhile, Ukraine remains reliant on cable imports from China.
Both Russia and Ukraine experiment with integrating fiber-optic systems into more complex unmanned operations. For example, Russia has unveiled a fiber-optic sea drone. While its range is not expected to exceed 100 km, it could perform a variety of useful tasks, such as acting as a drone carrier—delivering FPV drones to other areas and launching them for strikes.
Ukraine is working on integrating fiber-optic FPVs onto its maritime drones, such as the Sea Baby.
Despite their simplicity, fiber-optic drones are not expected to disappear from the battlefield. They are highly effective in areas with strong electronic warfare coverage and are often used in ambushes. “A fiber-optic drone is not designed to conduct 30–40 sorties per day. It is intended for a single sortie and a precise strike. Countering it is extremely difficult; so far, only kinetic interception is effective,” said a Ukrainian veteran.
More recently, Russia has reportedly increased the range of its fiber-optic drones to up to 50-65 km, using them to strike Ukraine’s logistical nodes.
Interceptor drones
In 2025, we witnessed the emergence of a large category of inexpensive interceptor drones - kamikaze, dome-shaped FPVs capable of reaching speeds exceeding 300 km/h and targeting enemy strike drones.
Unfortunately, the need for these systems was not recognized early enough. Ukrainian manufacturers mentioned that work on these drones began several years ago, but only in 2025 did we see their scaling.
This was preceded by two related developments: a shift in U.S. support and an increase in Russian strikes. Shortages of air-defence systems and missiles—caused by delays in U.S. assistance—combined with repeated pushes for various “peace deal” negotiations, played to Russia’s advantage.
In the summer of 2025, Russia significantly increased both the size and frequency of its drone and missile salvos. If in 2022, a typical attack involved about 100 weapons and occurred roughly once a month, by 2025, attacks had grown to nearly 370 munitions and were taking place about every eight days. The largest Russian strike since the start of the full-scale invasion occurred in September 2025 and involved 818 drones and missiles.
In response, interceptor drones emerged as a cost-effective, complementary air-defence solution that Ukraine is able to produce and scale.
Interceptors have now become an integral part of Ukraine’s layered air defence, alongside surface-to-air systems, mobile firing units, electronic warfare, and helicopter crews.
According to various estimates, they are among the most effective means of countering Shahed-type drones, intercepting around 20% of targets.
With a cost of around $2,500, interceptors are an economical option to counter Russian Gerans, which cost $30,000-50,000.
As of December 2025, the use of interceptor drones over cities and other residential areas in Ukraine remains forbidden. As Russia is increasingly using Shahed-type drones for targeted strikes against Ukraine’s residential areas, this ban might be reconsidered.
Asymmetric warfare
2025 provided several outstanding examples of how a smaller country with limited resources, like Ukraine, can successfully damage the strategic capabilities of a large nuclear state.
Operation Spiderweb in June 2025 involved the use of small FPV drones to damage or destroy over 40 Russian high-value aircraft deep in the rear, including Tu-95MSs, Tu-22M3s, and A-50s jets capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The operation took around 1.5 years to prepare. Ukrainian forces used not the usual $500 FPVs, but systems specifically designed for this complex operation. The drones used mobile data networks and were operated remotely from Ukrainian territory.
Later, Russia introduced restrictions on mobile internet in several regions and is now effectively copying Ukraine’s tactics, remotely operating Shahed drones through mobile network.
In August–September, Ukraine carried out a series of highly successful strikes against Russian energy infrastructure: processing facilities, and ports. As of October 2025, Ukrainian drones have delivered a historic blow to Russia’s oil industry, disrupting operations at 38% of oil refineries and triggering an unprecedented fuel-market crisis. Residents in at least 57 regions of the country faced gasoline shortages, and in several regions, authorities introduced limits on fuel sales per customer. In December 2025, the Russian government extended the ban on gasoline exports for the third time.
According to estimates by the ‘Oko Hora’ open-source intelligence community, in 2025, the Ukrainian Defence Forces carried out more than 350 successful deep-strike attacks on Russian territory.
In late autumn and winter 2025, Ukraine returned to one of its best-known weapons—maritime drones—to strike Russian maritime infrastructure and, for the first time in naval history, hit a submarine at the Russian naval base in Novorossiysk in the Black Sea.
We can draw several conclusions from these developments. First, there is awareness that smaller states with limited military capabilities now possess effective tools of warfare that can significantly damage much more powerful adversaries. Their innovative thinking, careful planning, and deep knowledge of the enemy allow them to strike deep and inflict serious harm.
Second, these events show how industrialized states with large traditional capabilities remain vulnerable to modern asymmetric warfare. Following Operation Spiderweb, reports emerged highlighting how poorly protected strategic sites are in Europe and North America.
What is important to note is that not only states, but also malicious non-state actors worldwide are observing and learning from the Russia–Ukraine war.
Humans and AI
Drone warfare still very much depends on people—drone operators, engineers, and technicians. The skills of these specialists are essential to operate and service even small systems, let alone long-range drones, which often involve larger crews. For instance, the above-mentioned Operation Spiderweb relied on a team of more than 100 drone pilots during its execution—one pilot per drone (117 drones in total).
Training drone pilots remains a major challenge, especially amid manpower shortages in Ukraine. With the rise of interceptor drones operating at very high speeds, Ukraine needs a significantly larger pool of well-trained pilots.
AI-enabled innovations are intended to address this challenge. Ukrainian companies are already developing and testing autonomous targeting and terminal-guidance modules designed to counter Shahed-type loitering munitions.
The ultimate goal of AI-tech is to make autonomous operations possible. The human involvement is expected only at the final stage—the decision to engage a target. This would comply with guidelines on the use of autonomous systems in conflict, though it will slow operational tempo, which is critical in this sort of mission.
AI development for unmanned systems in Ukraine has advanced in several directions — optical target recognition and acquisition, navigation algorithms, and swarm technologies.
In 2025, Ukraine experimented with drone swarms. Reportedly, it has already tested swarm technologies in more than 100 operations involving groups of 8–25 drones.
On the Russian side, there were innovations in V2U drones, including attempts to develop pattern-based recognition. According to experts, these drones adopt “bird flock” technology: each wing of a drone has a unique pattern that allows the drones to recognize each other.
At the same time, these are still early experiments that cannot yet be described as true “swarm technologies.” They do, however, show that Russia actively invests in these developments and aims to transfer the most successful technologies to its Shahed-type drones.
Ground drones
Ground drones in Ukraine continued to improve in 2025, though they have not yet reached the peak of their development. They are increasingly effective in evacuating wounded soldiers from the battlefield and in logistical deliveries, especially as Russia began targeting logistical nodes in the rear of Ukraine’s frontline.
Ground drones have also been used in offensive operations and work well in combination with aerial systems. Notably, we observed the first unmanned assault operations—including the capture of prisoners of war—using a combination of UGVs and UAVs.
Russia’s Innovations
With each iteration, Russia’s drone tech is becoming more lethal and increasingly dangerous to military and civilians. The use of FPV drones to deliberately strike Ukrainian civilians in near-frontline areas is already a well-documented fact, reported by several independent investigative bodies. This amounts to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
More recently, improvements in Russia’s long-range Shahed-type drones have placed civilians across all of Ukraine in immediate danger.
Russian Shahed-type drones, which are considered the best strike drones in their niche, are now being deployed with double payloads, increasing their explosive weight to up to 100 kg. They are equipped with cameras and R-60 air-to-air missiles to target helicopters.
Now they also have modems that allow stable connections with operators inside Russia, enabling the deliberate targeting of civilian trains, highways, and residential buildings far from the front lines.
As of December, Ukrainian forces have been recording Russian Molniya UAV strikes using Starlink terminals almost daily. These attacks are occurring not only along the front line but also in rear regions such as Poltava and Mykolaiv. EW is ineffective in this case.
In 2025, multiple drone incursions were recorded in countries neighboring Ukraine, with the most striking case occurring in Poland in September. Expert assessments showed that the Russian drones that entered Polish airspace were modified specifically to reach such long ranges, and according to some reports, several of them were armed.
This Russian operation exposed multiple vulnerabilities in European drone detection and air-defence approaches, highlighting how few lessons have been learned despite four years of active warfare in Ukraine.
Russia’s production of more advanced systems is only partially constrained by sanctions. It remains resilient: more and more domestic components are being identified in the wreckage of Russian drones. Support from China also plays a crucial role in sustaining Russia’s military capabilities. According to a NATO official, about 80% of critical electronic components used in Russian drones and other modern equipment are manufactured in China.
Russia’s main advantage lies in its financial and human resources. It is able to scale the most effective systems and deploy them in “nearly unlimited” numbers against Ukraine’s Armed Forces.
Looking ahead to 2026, we can definitely say that Ukraine will focus on scaling its long-range capabilities - particularly deep-strike drones—in order to increase the size and frequency of salvos used against Russia. The launch of the Build with Ukraine program in 2025, which enables the co-production of these vehicles in European states, is specifically aimed at mitigating the security risks faced by production facilities located on Ukrainian territory.
In this context, it is important to stress that Ukraine is increasingly investing not only in drones, but also in indigenous ballistic and cruise missiles, which have already been used against Russia—albeit with limited effect so far. At the same time, the development of mini cruise missiles represents a timely innovation within Ukraine’s broader long-range strike portfolio.
Another emerging trend—visible in both Ukraine and Russia—is the growing production of cheap reconnaissance platforms. Systems such as Russia’s Knyaz Veshchiy Oleg are treated as consumables, as more advanced reconnaissance assets are now intercepted with greater frequency.
Improvements in ground robotics, along with an increase in their numbers, are another trend we can expect to see. Russia continues to lag behind in this area, while Ukraine’s primary objective is to expand the use of ground robots in offensive operations.
While Ukraine’s ability to incentivize bottom-up innovation has produced many effective battlefield solutions, it has also resulted in a ‘zoo of drones.’ As a result, the standardization of unmanned systems and the shift toward modular architectures are likely to continue.
I personally will keep an eye on two things: laser technologies against Shahed-type drones and swarm innovations. Although we’ve heard a lot about Ukraine’s Tryzub laser system, virtually nothing has been reported about its actual use against Russian drones.
As for swarm technologies, we have only fragmented reports. Even if they have already been used in hundreds of operations, the details remain scarce.
Naturally, many things are happening behind the scenes, as they should be—not to impress or prove something to anyone, but to achieve real results.
Among my 157 articles published in 2025, the most popular were:
May 2026 bring continuing success to the valiant defenders of Ukraine — both on and off the battlefield. Standing with you in Australia. Slava Ukraini! 🇺🇦Heroyam Slava! 🇺🇦🕊
Excellent post. The bravery and technical excellence shown by the Ukrainian people are an inspiration. Slava Ukraini!