The most discussed development of the past week was the possible U.S. licence for the production of interceptor missiles in Ukraine. However, it remains to be seen whether a final decision has been made and which missile or production stage it would cover.
Ukraine is facing an acute shortage of interceptors and has struggled to shoot down dozens of Russian ballistic missiles used in recent attacks.
In this edition:
Ukraine’s—and the Global—Shortage of PAC-3 Interceptor Missiles;
Licensed Production of Interceptors: When Will Ukraine Have Them?
How Ukrainian EW System LIMA Disrupts Russian Missiles and Drones;
and 10+ developments in Ukraine and Russia.
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Last Friday, I launched a fundraiser for the fifth Mavic 3T drone for my university friend’s battalion. By a meaningful coincidence, he was recently awarded the Order of Danylo Halytskyi for his service to Ukraine.
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Ukraine’s—and the Global—Shortage of PAC-3 Interceptor Missiles
In six weeks of summer, Russia fired as many ballistic missiles at Ukraine as it did during the entire three months of spring, with most strikes concentrated on the Kyiv region.
In the first twelve days of July, Russia launched 67 ballistic and anti-ship missiles on Kyiv and other regions of Ukraine. According to BBC Ukraine, the interception rate was 6%. During the July 6 attack, Ukraine was unable to intercept any of the ballistic Iskander or anti-ship Zircon missiles (in total, 29 of them hit the targets).
On the night of July 11, Russia struck Kyiv with ballistic missiles fitted with shrapnel warheads, which was especially dangerous to civilians.
Ukraine’s ballistic interception rates have been declining over the recent months.
In March, Ukraine’s air defences intercepted 37% of ballistic missiles (16 of 43). That figure fell to 14% in April (7 of 50) and just 11% in May (12 of 104).
Russia began significantly escalating its ballistic missile campaign in early June. Over the course of the month, it launched 114 ballistic missiles, of which 45 were intercepted, according to Ukrainian authorities.
Russia's attack pattern has become relatively consistent: either two large-scale missile strikes per month, each involving more than 30 ballistic missiles, or three to four smaller attacks per month, each using roughly half that number
Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence says Russia produces around 60–65 9M723 missiles for the Iskander-M system each month, and roughly 100 ballistic and hypersonic missiles in total. President Zelensky told the Ukraine-NATO Council that Russia produces 120 such missiles a month.
According to Ukrainian aviation expert Valerii Romanenko, Russia typically employs three missile brigades against Ukraine, with 36 Iskander-M launchers in total. The launchers are generally not reloaded in the field, with additional missiles stored hundreds of kilometers away, limiting Russia’s maximum theoretical salvo to around 70 missiles.
To intercept a single ballistic missile, Ukraine typically needs at least two—and sometimes three—PAC-3 interceptors for its Patriot systems - meaning at least 120 missiles per month, or over 1400 a year.
Meanwhile, in 2025, Lockheed Martin delivered 620 PAC-3 interceptors. The company plans to expand to 2,000 missiles by 2030. This number is intended not only for Ukraine but also for other countries, including states in the Middle East that have recently faced ballistic missile threats.
According to The Economist, in the first three days of the war with Iran, Gulf countries had fired 800 Patriot interceptor missiles at incoming Iranian missiles and drones. At the time, they did not yet realize that cheaper systems could be used to counter drones, and did not have such alternatives.
European specialists argue that the Franco-Italian SAMP/T cannot fully substitute for the U.S.-made Patriot. Europe currently manufactures only about 100–150 interceptors per month for SAMP/T and other European air-defence systems, which is insufficient for sustained large-scale air and missile defence. The situation is further complicated by European countries’ concerns about their own security, making them reluctant to share scarce interceptor missiles with Ukraine.
Currently, Ukraine wants to purchase around 100 interceptor missiles using EU loan funds. Ukraine’s defence minister has sent letters to nearly 40 partner countries, asking them to urgently provide Ukraine with Patriot missiles from their existing stocks — in exchange for future deliveries already contracted for Ukraine.
On July 9, President Zelensky announced that Ukraine would receive a new package of Patriot missiles “in the coming days.”
At the same time, Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence assesses that Russia has nearly reached its production ceiling for precision-guided missiles, allowing it to conduct no more than two or three large-scale missile strikes per month.
Although Russian sources claim the Iskander-M has a circular error probable (CEP) of 5–30 meters, Ukrainian intelligence says Russia has not achieved that level of accuracy and continues to struggle to reduce the missile’s CEP below 30 meters.
Reducing Russia’s missile capacity will require sustained Ukrainian drone attacks on the enemy defence-industrial facilities, alongside an expanded Ukrainian missile programme capable of disabling critical production.
Read my recent reports on domestic Flamingo missiles:
Flamingo Missiles Got Intercepted Again (July 06);
Flamingo Missiles: New Results (June 29);
How Accurate Are Flamingo Missiles? (May 4).
Licensed Production of Interceptors: When Will Ukraine Have Them?
During the NATO Summit in Ankara, US President Donald Trump said the US plans to provide Ukraine with a licence to produce Patriot air defence interceptors. “This way you can’t complain that we’re not giving them enough and instead, make them yourself,” he said.
The decision prompted a polarized reaction in Ukraine: government-linked figures expressed optimism, while some independent experts questioned whether reliance on a U.S.-controlled system could hinder the development of a domestic alternative.