In this digest, I examine how Russia, despite once being considered a major military power, now demonstrates significant vulnerabilities across several key capabilities and remains dependent on countries it considers adversaries. Ongoing support from China is perhaps one of the most important factors sustaining this war of aggression.

In this digest:

• Key Vulnerabilities of Russia’s Air Defences (RUSI report);

• Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine (CSIS report);

• Adapt or Perish: What the Kremlin Is Learning From the War in Ukraine (Foreign Affairs);

• Russian Officers Establish Weapons Smuggling Channel Through Crimea;

• 10+ additional developments.

My digest on Russia is always free of charge - please feel free to read and share.

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Russia-China Cooperation

NATO Secretary General Rutte warned that the world could face its most dangerous scenario since World War II—a simultaneous act of aggression by Russia and China. According to him, Beijing is closely monitoring the situation around Taiwan, and in the event of military action there, it could encourage Moscow to escalate further in Europe.

The Jamestown Foundation has prepared an overview of Russia–China cooperation and the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.

• Russia and China (PRC) are combining conventional warfare with electromagnetic disruption, cyber attacks, digital influence campaigns, and unmanned and autonomous systems to target U.S. partners and allies.

• The PRC has recently unveiled new unmanned systems capabilities for use in a Taiwan contingency, signaling its intent to operationalize lessons from Russia’s war in Ukraine.

• The PRC and Russia’s military technological modernization builds on decades of Cold War-era research, illicit procurement networks, and recent battlefield experience in Ukraine.

• Both countries are exploiting procurement loopholes and legacy networks to accelerate the acquisition of military technology. Beijing continues to use middlemen and shell companies to circumvent export controls, while Moscow faces constraints from sanctions, talent shortages, and budget limitations that hinder sustained innovation and production.

• Chinese military experts are incorporating lessons from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the use and importance of drones and autonomous systems, which is reshaping the PLA’s (People's Liberation Army) strategic planning and operational doctrine.

• Chinese strategists emphasize the need to develop stealthier drones, robust anti-jamming capabilities (such as fiber-optic guidance), and autonomous ground logistics systems to enhance battlefield sustainability and reduce vulnerabilities in future combat scenarios.

• The PRC is promoting cross-border power transmission projects, deploying its leading producers of submarine electric cables to deepen integration with other countries’ critical infrastructure. Beijing sees submarine cables as critical infrastructure that can serve as conduits not just for electrical power but also for its own geopolitical power.

• Earlier in 2025, suspicious activities by the merchant vessels Shunxing-39 and Vasili Shukshin in the vicinity of Taiwan suggest a possible collaboration between Chinese and Russian merchant ships related to the reconnaissance and sabotage of undersea communications cables connecting Taiwan to the outside world.

• In the Baltic and Arctic regions, Russian hybrid attacks targeting critical undersea infrastructure, particularly fiber-optic cables, have surged. Incidents in 2023 and 2024 involving Chinese vessels damaging Baltic subsea cables raise concerns over possible Russian–PRC hybrid warfare collaboration.

Additionally, the Telegraph reported that it had identified at least $10.3 billion worth of equipment China has sent to boost Russia's military industry, including machines and tools used to build Oreshnik warheads.

China's Foreign Ministry on Jan. 29 dismissed these reports.

Key Vulnerabilities of Russia’s Air Defences (RUSI report)

In the report, Disrupting Russian Air Defence Production: Reclaiming the Sky, the authors state that Russia fields some of the most capable integrated air and missile defence systems (IAMDS) in the world and produces them in high volumes. With up to 80% of NATO firepower currently being air-delivered, these systems are of disproportionate importance in shaping the conventional balance of power in Europe.

Types of Systems

Ballistic Missile Defence: early-warning radars such as 77Ya6-M Voronezh-M, 77Ya6-DM Voronezh-DM and older Daryal; and satellites for tracking missiles, including the US-KMO, US-K and Oko early-warning constellation. The primary ballistic missile defence (BMD) system is the A-135 protecting Moscow, which is managed with the Don-2N AESA radar, paired with 53T6 nuclear-armed interceptors.

Strategic SAMs: derivatives of the S-300 family. The most modern S-400. Radars: NEBO-M; 48Ya6-K1 Podlet; 96L6E; 91N6. Collectively, these radars provide the S-400 system with significant range and coverage against various threats.

Tactical SAMs (to protect critical nodes): core system - Buk-M3.

Short-Ranged Air Defence: primary systems - 9K330 Tor-M2 and 96K6 Pantsir-S2.

Vulnerabilities

Russian air defences rely on a wide range of foreign-sourced components and raw materials.

Russia’s microelectronics industry is still dependent on foreign suppliers for more complex chips. Disruption to its operations would have a serious impact on the production of some of its most critical components for air defence systems.

Even where Russia does produce its own microelectronics, it is often dependent on imports of critical materials and products, including from the US.

Among these raw materials, beryllium oxide ceramics are commonly used in high-power radiofrequency and microwave electronics for their superior ability to prevent overheating. Russia has no operating plants for the production of beryllium oxide ceramics.

The Russians also rely on Western technologies to calibrate and measure the performance of their own radars. These are important for the initial acceptance of radars into service, but also for the continuous process of improving radar performance against threats.

Russia’s air defence enterprise is also vulnerable to physical attack, largely because of its concentration of functions around some key concerns. As Ukraine’s stockpile of indigenous cruise missiles expands, the ability to reach and damage the relevant targets improves.

While the clustering of these sites enables the concentration of air defence, it also means that once the defences are saturated, all sites become vulnerable.

What Ukraine and partners can do

• Prevent the modernisation of Russian microelectronics production and disrupt the purchase of critical materials used in Russia’s microelectronics industry.

• Sanction companies involved in the supply of raw and processed materials to Russia, such as beryllium oxide ceramics, which are critical to the production of radar.

• Use export controls to prevent the shipment of Western-made measuring equipment and calibration tools for quality control and certification of air defence systems.

• Exploit software critical to the design and development of Russian air defences through cyber intrusions, to gain information to enable the compromise of air defence complexes and disrupt production processes.

• Prioritise the kinetic targeting of critical nodes within air defence production that are vulnerable to deliberate attack.

• Impose sanctions to disrupt the repair and recovery of Russian air defence facilities that have been damaged by Ukraine and rely on Western-supplied machine tools.

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Defence Production

Russia currently has 3–4 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from the “Oreshnik” missile system in service. This was reported by the First Deputy Head of Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service.

According to him, Russia plans to launch serial production of these missiles in 2026, with output of at least five units per year. He noted that the system has greater political than military significance. It is primarily a tool of intimidation aimed at European countries. The system’s combat effectiveness remains questionable.

On the night of January 8–9, Russia for the first time struck the outskirts of Lviv, just 70 km from the European Union border, with an Oreshnik ballistic missile. Read my report here.

It was the second time Russia used the Oreshnik against Ukraine—a hypersonic missile that Ukraine is currently unable to intercept. It is considered to be less destructive (if not equipped with a nuclear warhead) than other Russian missiles used against Ukraine, which is why the use of Oreshnik was widely seen as a tool for political messaging.

Additional developments:

• Russia has postponed the launch of the first batch of 16 low-Earth-orbit broadband internet satellites, which was scheduled to take place by the end of 2025, by the company Bureau 1440. The constellation is intended to become a Russian analogue of Starlink and to provide “internet access at any geographic location.”

  According to sources in the space industry, the delay in launching the initial 16 satellites may be due to the satellites not yet being assembled in the required number.

• Russia is negotiating with India to localize the production of Russian drones, including the Lancet, in India. Analysts believe Russia likely intends to use these drones in its war against Ukraine — potentially in exchange for providing India with new Russian technologies and combat experience. Also, it was mentioned that Russia could accept an “unlimited number” of labor migrants from India under a new bilateral “labor mobility” agreement signed that day in New Delhi. Manturov said Russian industry is short 800,000 workers, while trade, construction and services need an additional 1.5 million people.

Russia and the West

• Russia is building up military infrastructure near the Finnish border, likely as part of wider military expansion efforts that seek to prepare the Russian force for a potential future conflict with NATO. Finnish national broadcaster Yle published satellite images between June 2024 and October 2025 showing Russian construction at the Rybka military base in Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia (approximately 175 kilometers from the Finnish border).

• Russia has increased the number of spies along its border with Norway and is also attempting to infiltrate fishing vessels that enter Norwegian ports. Due to the growing number of Russian spy cases and the overall decline in security across Scandinavia, Norway plans to double its military presence in the northern part of the country by 2032.

• Several churches in Sweden have hosted fundraisers linked to the Belarusian St. Elizabeth Monastery, which is suspected of supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — and of having ties to the Russian military intelligence agency, the GRU. Such cases fit into a broader pattern of Russia’s attempts to influence religious organizations and public institutions in Europe, noting that the Russian Orthodox Church has sought access to Church of Sweden premises located in the vicinity of military facilities and airports.

Sanctions and Sanction Evasion

• American and European microchips were found in Russia’s latest missile-like drone, Geran-5. Ukrainian intelligence has established that Geran-5 features a Chinese-made Telefly turbojet engine and a satellite navigation system receiver. The receiver contains microchips branded with the names of three American companies: Texas Instruments, CTS Corporation, and Monolithic Power Systems. Additionally, a microchip bearing the logo of the German company Infineon Technologies was identified in another part of the drone. Customs records reviewed by the Kyiv Independent indicate that Western chips are shipped to Russia by a vast network of electronic component traders, primarily registered in China and Hong Kong. A smaller portion of them are based in countries like the UAE or Kyrgyzstan.

• Russia’s state atomic corporation, Rosatom, is the world’s largest exporter of reactors and enriched uranium, and a major player in the global civil nuclear industry. Despite the significance of the nuclear industry to the Russian state, Rosatom has largely escaped meaningful sanctions. The company has not faced full blocking sanctions from the U.S., EU, or U.K. — all of which continue to import Russian nuclear fuel or uranium, the Kyiv Independent reported. The limited U.S. and U.K. sanctions imposed against some Rosatom subsidiaries and personnel leave it less restricted than Russia's heavily sanctioned defense industry. As a result, the corporation has circumvented stricter sanctions against its close partner, Rostec, Moscow’s largest arms group.

Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine (CSIS report)

The CSIS report by Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe, published in January 2026, shows that Russia is paying an extraordinary price for minimal gains and is in decline as a major power.

• Since February 2022, Russian forces have suffered nearly 1.2 million casualties, more losses than any major power in any war since World War II.

• Russian battlefield fatalities in Ukraine are more than 17 times greater than Soviet fatalities in Afghanistan during the 1980s, 11 times greater than during Russia’s First and Second Chechen Wars in the 1990s and 2000s, respectively, and over five times greater than all Russian and Soviet wars combined since World War II.

• Russian battlefield casualties and fatalities are significantly greater than Ukrainian casualties and fatalities, with a ratio of roughly 2.5:1 or 2:1.

• The reasons for that: Russia’s failure to effectively conduct combined arms and joint warfare, poor tactics and training, corruption, low morale, and Ukraine’s effective defense-in-depth strategy in a war that favors the defense.

• Russia’s attrition strategy has accepted the costs of high casualties in hopes of eventually wearing down Ukraine’s military and society.

• After seizing the initiative in 2024, Russian forces have advanced at an average rate of between 15 and 70 meters per day in their most prominent offensives, slower than almost any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century. For instance, in the Pokrovsk offensive, Russian forces advanced at an average rate of just 70 meters per day.

• Russia has failed to generate rapid breakthroughs to collapse the Ukrainian front line and allow for sweeping territorial gains.

• In 2025, Russian forces made marginally larger gains, seizing approximately 4,831 square kilometers (about 0.8 percent of Ukraine).

• In total, Russian forces have seized around 75,000 square kilometers (approximately 12 percent of Ukraine) since the 2022 invasion and now control about 120,000 square kilometers (approximately 20 percent of Ukraine and an area roughly the size of Pennsylvania).

• Russia is becoming a second- or third-rate economic power. Its economy is showing strains because of the war, though it has not buckled.

• Economic growth slowed to 0.6 percent in 2025, and Russia continues to fall behind in key technologies such as AI.

• Russia had a grand total of zero companies in the top 100 list of technology companies in the world as measured by market capitalization.

• Russia’s space industry, which was once a global leader, has fallen to historically low levels. Roscosmos, the state corporation in charge of the Russian space program, carried out only 17 orbital launches in 2025, compared to 193 orbital launches by the United States (led by SpaceX) and 92 by China.

• To help prevent a further deterioration of Russia’s economy and defense industrial base, Russia has leaned heavily on China. China-Russia trade reached nearly $250 billion in 2024, up from $190 billion in 2022.

• In the defense sector, China has significantly increased exports to Russia of “high-priority items,” a set of 50 dual-use goods that include computer chips, machine tools, radars, and sensors that Russia needs to sustain its war efforts.

• Chinese exports helped Russia triple its production of Iskander-M ballistic missiles from 2023 to 2024, which Russia has used to pound Ukrainian cities.

Adapt or Perish: What the Kremlin Is Learning From the War in Ukraine

Moscow is analyzing combat experience and disseminating the lessons it has learned throughout its force and defense ecosystem. It realizes that the future character of warfare is changing, so the military must change, as well. Here are some key points from an excellent article written by Dara Massicot for Foreign Affairs:

• Beginning in 2022, Russia launched a systematic effort to examine its combat experience, draw lessons from it, and share those lessons across its military.

• By early 2023, Moscow had quietly constructed a complex ecosystem of learning that includes the defense manufacturing base, universities, and soldiers up and down the chain of command.

• Today, the military is institutionalizing its knowledge, realigning its defense manufacturers and research organizations to support wartime needs, and pairing tech startups with state resources.

• The result has been new tactics on the battlefield—codified in training programs and combat manuals—and better weapons.

• Russian soldiers have been sharing advice informally through social networks, closed social media channels, and self-published advice manuals. This type of informal, person-to-person or unit-to-unit learning is an important first stage of wartime adaptation. The second stage of learning includes institutionalizing those changes, such as by revising training programs, procurement plans, and operational concepts. After that, militaries must engage in predictive learning about the future of warfare and recognize the need for reforms or transformational change.

• In 2022, the military ordered dedicated staff officers and researchers to frontline military command posts so they could observe the war as closely as possible and seek to understand troop performance.

• In Moscow, the Russian military has over 20 commissions devoted to implementing recommendations based on information it receives from the frontlines and from Russian researchers.

• At a 2023 conference hosted by Russia’s artillery academy, soldiers and experts came together to revise artillery tactics and integrate drones into artillery strikes. In just three years, Russia has made over 450 interim modifications to combat manuals. Military leaders emphasize that these handbooks are likely to be completely overhauled after the war ends.

• The Ministry of Defense relaxed regulations to shorten research and development timelines. It held meetings with the defense manufacturing base to ensure it received and digested feedback from frontline units and made changes.

• And starting in early 2023, the Kremlin created programs to integrate civilian universities and research centers into national defense efforts.

• The Ministry of Defense set up Rubikon, the country’s elite drone research and operations unit, which experiments with different types of tactics that now inform how other UAV units are instructed.

• Russia rotates troops between the battlefield and training ranges, much as it has sent defense manufacturers to the front. When in-person visits are not possible, the military sets up secure videoconferences between frontline units, academies, and training centers. Some disabled veterans have become full-time instructors.

• Russia has made its simulators more realistic and has modified its instruction of tactical first aid. It has started teaching troops how to drive military vehicles through a complicated drone battlefield, as well as how to carry out a small assault within a larger drone and armored assault—both critical tasks in a war where the frontlines are under constant surveillance by Kyiv.

• Russian instructors are using drones to monitor soldiers’ training so they can better evaluate and discuss the units’ successes and failures afterward.

• At the same time, Russia’s training programs remain uneven.

• The Russian military’s learning process has a critical flaw. The Russian military has struggled to implement the recommendations and ensure the guidance is followed.

• There are areas in which Moscow is still struggling to learn at all, such as discipline and professionalism, long-neglected areas of combat power.

• Given its current architecture, finances, and leadership, the Russian military appears poised for a comprehensive and intense learning period after the war in Ukraine ends.

• Russian officials have stated that overcoming threats to large-scale armored assaults is a top research priority and that they are planning to alter the military’s force design and operational concepts to account for this challenge.

• From now on, the Russian military will likely create more UAVs and other uncrewed systems, which will supplement Moscow’s military power relative to NATO.

• Russian military experts have written that uncrewed systems will become the most important weapons of the twenty-first century. The world they envision will soon have swarms of autonomous drones that can overwhelm adversaries’ defenses, microdrones that are difficult to identify or stop, and drones that mimic birds, bugs, or other wildlife.

• The Russian military has been observing the Ukrainian military’s use of combat robots and is preparing to invest more in this area to help with tasks such as sentry duty, logistics, mining and demining, and undersea surveillance.

• Russian experts are considering how to field AI decision-making systems and AI-enabled weapons by the early 2030s. Although this area is a national priority, investment in AI remains relatively modest, limiting Russia’s capabilities in the near term.

• Moscow also worries that the United States and Europe will study its war and develop countermeasures to Russia’s newest capabilities and tactics. NATO must prove these fears to be justified.

Russian Officers Establish Weapons Smuggling Channel Through Crimea

The Ukrainian hacktivist group 256 Cyber Assault Division, in cooperation with InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community, conducted a CYBINT operation, obtaining important intelligence for the Ukrainian Defense Forces. The public portion of this study focuses on exposing the supply chains of contraband weapons from the war zone to temporarily occupied Crimea. Read the full report here.

• The Crimean peninsula functions as a logistics hub for the further transfer of weapons to black markets in regions of the Russian Federation, as well as to countries in Europe, Western Asia, and Africa. These transfers reportedly involve Russia’s so-called shadow fleet of tankers.

• The investigation uncovered direct cooperation between Russian army officers and representatives of Kadyrov’s Vostok-Akhmat battalion in the illegal arms trade.

• Data obtained through CYBINT operations indicate that Russian military personnel have established stable channels for smuggling weapons from frontline positions through the temporarily occupied territories of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts into occupied Crimea, which has emerged as the primary and relatively safe transit hub for weapons from the front lines.

• The scheme relies on the duty schedules of specific Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) units at checkpoints along the R-280 highway on the Berdyansk–Melitopol–Chongar–Simferopol route.

• Depending on prior arrangements, Rosgvardia personnel either allow suspicious cargo to pass without inspection (for regular and “trusted” clients) or, for a fee, deliberately ignore discrepancies between transport documents and the actual cargo.

• Primary sourcing of arms begins with Russian officers commanding assault units on the front line. It is common practice for them to deliberately inflate reported losses of small arms during assaults.

• At the same time, some soldiers are sent into attacks without standard-issue weapons, sometimes being told to “win their weapons in combat.” Firearms left on positions are subsequently written off as lost and diverted into illicit circulation.

• Another frequent source involves weapons and ammunition found or seized in no-man’s-land along the line of contact, which are deliberately not reported. Most often, these are weapons taken from the bodies of soldiers from neighboring units.

• The scale of the weapons trafficking in the Russian army is significant. Some smugglers even get caught. Thus, following tip-offs to the FSB from “concerned citizens,” a large-scale raid took place on December 12, 2025, when the FSB, police, and the Russian National Guard detained 169 individuals from 53 regions of Russia involved in illegal arms trafficking. Among the items seized were machine guns, assault rifles, grenade launchers, marksman rifles, mines, approximately 220,000 rounds of ammunition, as well as large quantities of TNT and gunpowder.

Other Developments

• Russian forces are currently unable to build out a strategic reserve and will therefore likely be constrained to grinding, slow advances at their current rate and scale in 2026 — ISW. HUR said on December 3 that Russia had fulfilled its plan to recruit 403,000 people in 2025. Former HUR Chief Budanov stated that Russia can continue recruitment for a “long time” given its population and financial resources and has plans to increase its mobilization to 409,000 people in 2026.

• Russian forces are using African mercenaries as “suicide attackers” to destroy Ukrainian fortifications. The published video shows an African mercenary with a TM-62 anti-tank mine attached to his load-bearing vest. A Russian serviceman refers to him as an “opener” and says that he is about to be sent to “jump through the forest.”

  At least 1,436 citizens from 36 African countries are currently fighting in the ranks of the Russian army, Ukraine’s MFA informed.
  Russia recruits citizens of African states using a variety of methods. Some are offered money; others are deceived and do not fully understand what they are signing up for. In other cases, recruitment occurs under coercion.

• According to a report by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), after focusing initially on Africa, Russia is turning to Latin America as a source of labor to boost its production of drones, especially the Geran-2, which is based on the Iranian-designed Shahed-136 kamikaze drone. This campaign is part of Alabuga Start, which presents itself as an international career-development exchange program, offering airfare, housing, health insurance, and Russian-language courses to entice applicants. In reality, the program serves as a pipeline into SEZ Alabuga, 600 miles east of Moscow in the Republic of Tatarstan, where recruits reportedly work in harsh conditions assembling the Geran-2 and other drones.

  Alabuga Start’s recruitment in Latin America has scaled up rapidly in both scope and sophistication. The program uses social media platforms — including TikTok, Instagram, Facebook, X, Telegram, and RuTube (a Russian video platform) — to drive this expansion, relying on promotional videos generated by artificial intelligence (AI), dedicated regional pages, and influencer partnerships. FDD has identified Alabuga Start’s primary recruiter in Latin America, along with local recruiters in Brazil, Mexico, and Bolivia. The report profiles those individuals and presents a country-by-country review of the program’s presence in 13 Latin American countries.

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The new edition of my newsletter on Russia discusses why sanctions matter and why there is still much more Western countries can and should do to weaken Russia’s military capabilities. Whether we are talking about the new Shahed-107 UAV or Sukhoi aircraft, these systems continue to rely on Western components sourced through third countries. Much of the research I cite in this edition shows that fully substituting these components — as well as the machinery used to manufacture military equipment — is not feasible for Russia.

In this edition:

• Russia and Venezuela Are Deepening Military Cooperation;

• Russia’s Budget Crisis, Explained and What It Means for the War in Ukraine;

• Vulnerabilities in Sukhoi Production: Clipping Russia’s Wings: RUSI Report;

• Shahed-107 Drone;

• 10+ other developments in Russia.

My newsletters on Russia are always free — please feel free to share them with your network!

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Military Cooperation and Alliances

Russia continues to supply weapons to Venezuela amid rising tensions between Venezuela and the United States.

The deputy head of the Russian parliament’s defence committee, Aleksei Zhuravlev said that Russia remains the country’s key military-technical partner and provides “a full spectrum of armaments — from small arms to combat aircraft.”

The official noted that the volumes and types of these deliveries are classified, hinting that “the Americans may be in for surprises.” He confirmed the transfer to Caracas of several divisions of S-300VM (Antey-2500) air-defense missile systems, as well as Buk-M2E and Pantsir-S1 systems.

Militarnyi reported that the S-300VM and Buk-M2E systems were already in service with the Venezuelan army, whereas the Pantsir-S1 has been delivered to the country for the first time.

Zhuravlev also said that Moscow could provide Venezuela with its intermediate-range ballistic missiles, Oreshnik, and Kalibr cruise missiles.

Intelligence Online reported that Russian drone instructors from the elite Rubikon unit were secretly flown to Venezuela aboard an Il-76 military aircraft to train local forces in FPV and wire-guided drone operations. The specialists arrived with their own equipment—assembly kits, programming modules, and fibre-optic guidance systems—and were stationed at secure facilities in Fuerte Tiuna in southern Caracas.

Read: Russia’s Rubikon: What Drives Its Success in Drone Warfare.

In May 2025, Russia and Venezuela signed a strategic partnership agreement that provides for military-technical cooperation. Lavrov said that while Venezuela remains a friendly nation and strategic partner, the relationship does not include mutual defense commitments.

Additional developments:

• North Korea has cut its artillery shell shipments to Russia by more than half in 2025 due to dwindling stockpiles, Vadym Skibitskyi, deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (HUR), said.

  According to Skibitskyi, North Korea has begun mass production of FPV drones, as well as larger medium-range attack drones, on its own territory. “They are learning and drawing on their experience from this war to expand production at home,” he said.

  By the end of 2025, Russia plans to bring in around 12,000 North Korean workers to the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan, where long-range Shahed/Geran-type drones are produced.

• Myanmar said it had commissioned Russian helicopters and Chinese airplanes into its air force. Thus, Myanmar has become the first effective foreign recipient of the new Mi-38 helicopter family produced by the Kazan Helicopter Plant. The contract for the delivery of three Mi-38s to Myanmar was likely concluded back in January 2020, when Rosoboronexport announced that it had “signed the first contract with a foreign customer for the supply of the latest Mi-38T transport and assault helicopters.”

• According to the US, Iranian nuclear scientists made two trips to Russia last year in an effort to acquire sensitive technologies with potential applications in nuclear weapons development.
  The secret visit in November 2024, which followed an earlier trip in August, was part of a growing exchange between Russian military-linked research institutes and Iran’s Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) — a body the U.S. identifies as being associated with Tehran’s armed forces and responsible for overseeing nuclear weapons research.

• India will pay around $2 billion to lease a nuclear-powered submarine from Russia, concluding a process that followed nearly ten years of negotiations between the two countries’ defence ministries - Bloomberg reported.

  The submarine will be larger than the two Russian nuclear-powered vessels that previously served with the Indian Navy under earlier lease agreements.

• The owner of a major Chinese drone parts supplier has acquired a 5% stake in Rustakt, one of Russia’s leading drone manufacturers. The move underscores the growing cooperation between the Russian and Chinese military-industrial sectors, particularly in the production of FPV drones used by Russia in the war against Ukraine.

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Defence Production and Innovations

Russia intends to produce up to 120,000 of its inexpensive glide bombs this year, a HUR official told Reuters. This figure includes both newly manufactured munitions and older bombs upgraded with glide kits. Among them are roughly 500 of a new, longer-range variant. According to Ukraine, Russian forces are currently launching between 200 and 250 glide bombs each day, up from a daily average of around 170 last month, based on defence ministry data.

Defence Express notes that these figures indicate Russia is producing glide bombs not only for immediate deployment to the front “straight off the production line,” but also for building up stockpiles of this weaponry — and in significant quantities.

Additionally, according to HUR, in 2025, Russia is estimated to make a total of about 70,000 long-range drones, including 30,000 Shaheds.

Additional developments:

• Russia’s arms exports, which before the invasion of Ukraine brought in around $14 billion in foreign revenue annually, have fallen by half compared to 2022. Reuters reported that these figures were announced at the Dubai Air Show 2025 by Sergey Chemezov, head of the state corporation Rostec. According to him, the defence industry is now working mainly to supply the Russian army itself.

• Local residents recorded the fall and subsequent explosion of a missile near the settlement of Yasny in Russia’s Orenburg region. Militarnyi concluded that it was likely a UR-100N intercontinental ballistic missile equipped with an Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. Based on the published video, an explosion occurred on board during the flight, causing the missile to lose control and crash to the ground. The remaining rocket fuel then detonated. The large orange cloud that formed indicates that this was a liquid-fuel missile using nitrogen-based propellants.

Russia’s Budget Crisis, Explained and What It Means for the War in Ukraine

Vladimir Milov, in his report for Free Russia Foundation, says that Russia has entered a full-blown budget crisis, which is now recognized by the authorities: the budget for 2026-2028 admits that Russia faces seven consecutive years of high budget deficit, something unseen since 1999, amounting to no less than a full-scale budget crisis.

• Russia is not able to borrow money internationally due to sanctions, and even China is not ready to provide access for Russia to its domestic financial market.

• Ballooning military expenditures are a key driver of Russia’s budget crisis, as publicly acknowledged recently by VTB Bank Chairman Andrey Kostin.

• Here are the most important ways the budget crisis impacts the financing of the war:

  • High budget deficits do not allow for expanding military spending further. The Russian government is forced to cap further increases in military spending - at least on paper for now - because higher spending figures will devastate the markets that already don’t like budget deficits much.

  • Military production is severely underfinanced. As recently admitted by the CEO of Rostec, Russia’s largest arms producer, Russian military manufacturing companies face great financial difficulties: “the profitability of production remains low, and somewhere even zero, if not negative,” leaving “not too many funds for development;” production and investments “nearly completely depend on the state budget” given the dramatic contraction of arms exports from 2022-2025; sanctions and expensive credit are also taking its toll. In September 2025, as reported by the Government, monthly weapons and ammunition production had contracted for the first time since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

  • Indexation of military salaries is highly insufficient, which impacts the motivation of military personnel. From October 1, 2025, military salaries were indexed only by 7.6%, which doesn’t even match officially reported inflation (over 8%), not to mention cumulative inflation of the past few years.

  • Russian regions started to sharply cut sign-up bonuses for contracting with the MoD. In October 2025, such large Russian regions as Saint Petersburg, Samara, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and others have sharply reduced regional payments of sign-up bonuses for signing a military contract by as much as 4-5 times in total.

• This situation will exacerbate further.

• This does not mean that Russia will be unable to carry out large missile and drone strikes on Ukraine or conduct limited offensive actions along parts of the front — the resources for operations of that scale will still exist. What is no longer feasible, given current constraints, are major offensive campaigns comparable to those launched in 2022.

Sanctions Evasion and Arms Control

HUR published new data on foreign equipment that Russia uses in weapon production, focusing on Eastern Asian companies, including the Japanese Okuma Corporation, Korean Samsung Machine Engineering Company, and Taiwanese AKIRA SEIKI.

HUR said that its list of equipment from Eastern Asian companies is helping Moscow produce a Unified Module for Gliding and Guidance (UMPK) kit for glide bombs, as well as missiles and artillery ammunition.

Also, HUR released information regarding the structure and manufacturing cooperation enterprises involved in the production of the Iskander-M ballistic missile. 13 of the 49 Russian enterprises are not currently under sanctions by any countries in the sanctions coalition.

Additional developments:

• Entrepreneurs in Uzbekistan have established sanctions-bypassing channels to supply Russia with cotton cellulose, a key ingredient in the production of gunpowder and solid rocket fuels.
  After the invasion of Ukraine began, the scale of this covert trade in cotton-based cellulose for Russia’s defence industry increased dramatically. For instance, in 2019, the Kazan Gunpowder Plant purchased 48 tonnes of cellulose from Uzbekistan. During 2022 and early 2023, it bought 1,225 tonnes from the Fergana chemical plant — worth $2.1 million. The volume of sales increased twenty-fivefold.

• Despite formally leaving the Russian market, Austrian optics manufacturer Swarovski Optik continues to be spotted on Russian weapons used in Ukraine. Typical Swarovski scopes cost between $3,000 and $5,000 and are comparable in quality to products made by Carl Zeiss.
  Their high price makes them inaccessible to ordinary civilians — the main users are elite military units and security services, including the FSB and GRU special forces.

• The Homel-based cookware factory Santex has been supplying drones to the Russian army in circumvention of sanctions since the start of the full-scale invasion, according to an investigation by the Belarusian Investigative Centre (BIC). Journalists examined the company’s customs documentation, which shows that in 2022–2023, Santex delivered 309 DJI drones of Chinese origin to Russia, worth a total of $2 million.

  According to BIC, between 2022 and 2025, 14 Belarusian companies sold more than 20,000 drones to Russia, with a combined value of $34 million.

• The Insider reports that although most defence-industrial products are manufactured in Russia and even rely on Russian raw materials, the technological chain still contains imported “weak links” — catalysts, plasticisers, additives, and components of chemical-processing equipment.

  For example, missile and aviation production requires fuels obtained through chemical processes such as hydrotreating, cracking, and reforming — all of which depend on catalytic reactions. The manufacture of weapon and ammunition components, as well as aircraft construction, also relies on phenol-formaldehyde and epoxy resins.

  China, India, and Iran help Russia bypass shortages of chemical substances and technologies. Through these countries, Russian factories receive products, including those originally manufactured by Western suppliers.

Vulnerabilities in Sukhoi Production: Clipping Russia’s Wings: RUSI Report

Excellent report by Nikolay Staykov and Jack Watling for RUSI on the exposure of Russia’s production of Sukhoi combat aircraft to industrial disruption, and the opportunities to displace Russia’s defence exports in the aerospace sector.

This paper is concerned exclusively with combat aircraft that remain in production – the Su-30MK, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-35S and Su-57 – and does not cover wider Russian aviation, including Tu-160 bombers, Il-76 and Il-78 transport aircraft, and other military aviation.

Check the full report for a detailed list of Russian enterprises involved in Sukhoi production, as well as the Western manufacturers supplying critical components for the aircraft.

Here are some key takeaways:

• The Soviet Union and, thereafter, the Russian Federation have been a leading manufacturer and exporter of fighter jets since the 1950s.

• Russia’s aerospace industry today is consolidated under the United Aircraft Corporation (OAC). Within OAC, Sukhoi is the largest element working on the production and modernisation of Russian combat aviation.

• Today, Sukhoi fighters provide high-yield and precise firepower in the form of glide bombs for Russian ground forces in Ukraine, and complicate Russia’s layered system of air defence for NATO air forces. Combat aircraft have also become an important layer of Russian ISTAR and battle damage assessment.

• While Russian combat aircraft are less capable than NATO or Chinese equivalents, they still serve important battlefield functions.

• Russian fighters are optimised to perform three functions.

  • The first is maintaining medium- to high-altitude combat air patrols for defensive counter-air (DCA) operations.

  • The second is the delivery of precision firepower in support of ground operations, with a particular emphasis on the reduction of enemy strong points rather than interdiction.

  • Third, Russian fighters have been tasked with escorting bombers or naval vessels and conducting periodic intercepts beyond Russia’s borders.

• During Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russians have moved away from both medium-altitude precision bombing and lobbed rocket salvos by aircraft at low altitude, to instead employ gravity bombs augmented with a glide and guidance kit (UMPK).

• In 2022, Russia assessed what capabilities would achieve the greatest damage for the lowest price per unit and identified the UMPK fitted to its FAB-500, FAB-1000 and FAB-1500 bombs as the most promising capability against this metric.

• Primarily dropped from Su-34, glide bombs are now systematically used as part of Russian preparatory fires, destroying defensive positions in advance of Russian ground force operations.

• The Sukhoi manufacturing enterprise involves many primary and secondary production facilities distributed across Russia. Sukhoi production requires a wide range of specialised metals and alloys, which are provided by dedicated facilities.

• Import data shows that all main metal suppliers – most of which are not sanctioned – depend on critical imported materials such as titanium ores and concentrates, vanadium and molybdenum oxides, and alloying agents, such as rhenium, for their products.

• At the higher level, Russia’s aviation industry appears to be a strong sovereign sector with advanced indigenous capabilities. However, Russia’s aviation industry is more susceptible to disruption from abroad than is generally appreciated, and this is creating real problems in the production of Sukhoi aircraft.

• During the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has lost approximately 40 Su-34 and up to eight Su-35, while a subset of its fleets has built up significant fatigue hours.

• Production of aircraft has increased during the war. In 2022, for instance, Russia produced nine Su-34. This rose to 13 in 2023 as Russia’s defence industry increased its shifts and was partially mobilised. The target for 2025 is 17 Su-34.

• While Russia has therefore increased its output of aircraft and been able to largely replace its losses during the war, the struggle to significantly expand production stands in contrast to other parts of Russia’s defence industry, where outputs have increased between two and 10 times pre-war rates.

• Throughout Russia’s aviation industry, a more detailed examination shows systematic use of Western-manufactured tools, equipment and components, along with other foreign-sourced materials.

• For example, Russian engineers use the Ceyear 1465 Series Signal Generator, made by Meilhaus Electronic GmbH of Germany, which retails at around $90,000. Direct shipments from Germany to Russia are not visible in trade databases, but the equipment has been freely imported to Russia via China and Vietnam since 2022.

• The manufacturing of specialist components for high-precision machinery requires precise measuring and testing equipment.

• Russian manufacturers of avionics and the university laboratories all use the products of leading manufacturers of measuring equipment like the US-based Keysight and National Instruments or Germany’s Rhode & Schwartz and Ceyear.

• In 2023 and 2024, Russian companies continued to import products made by Keysight and National Instruments mostly via China and Hong Kong, but also through Thailand, the UAE and Turkey. The most imported instruments included signal generators, oscillographs and spectrum analysers.

• Substituting Western components with Chinese ones is not always possible. Even where it is possible, it can be highly disruptive in more complex products, such as in the aerospace sector.

• Expanding the sanctions regime against the second and third tiers of the Sukhoi supply chain could help to disrupt production of Russian aircraft today and highlight to Russia’s potential export customers the risks in becoming dependent on Russia for the maintenance and provision of aircraft in the future.

• Coordinating sanctions with Ukraine’s expanding deep strike campaign that is liable to further disrupt Russian metallurgy and defence industrial concerns over the next 12 months could see a compounding effect, whereby Russia struggles to replace damaged equipment.

Russian Drones

In November, Ukraine’s HUR released details about the new Iranian Shahed-107 drones that Russia is using to strike the frontline regions of Ukraine.

The Shahed-107 drones are believed to be equipped with technology for detecting high-value targets, including the British and American MLRS systems operated by the Ukrainian army.

In the sample examined by HUR specialists, the drone carried a 15-kg shaped-charge high-explosive fragmentation warhead. According to HUR, its characteristics are similar to those of other Iranian Shahed warheads, though it is smaller than the “standard” variants (40–50 kg) or the “enhanced” versions (up to 90 kg).

Ukrainian radio technology expert Serhiy FLASH Beskrestnov wrote about the trophy Shahed-107 in the following way: “We can see a CRPA antenna — this is satellite navigation to the target. We also understand that if it uses satellite navigation, then we have the capability to suppress that navigation. But we need to study in more detail how exactly this CRPA antenna works. For now, I can say that the range is certainly several hundred kilometers”.

According to him, it is still necessary to thoroughly analyze the exact flight range of these Shahed-107 — whether it is 200, 500, or 600 km. It is also important to determine the capacity of this drone’s fuel tank.

“I can say that this Shahed is 100% made in Iran. It has markings from around July 2024. So, this is not a Russian product — it is Iran supplying it to the Russian Federation,” FLASH wrote.

Like the Russian Gerbera, BM-35, Parody, and Delta drones, the new Shahed is equipped with a small Chinese-made two-stroke gasoline engine, the DLE 111.

As is the case with other types of Shahed drones, Iran and Russia rely on electronic components from Western and other countries, such as the U.S., Switzerland, China, Japan, Taiwan, the Netherlands, and Ireland, for Shahed-107 production, according to HUR.

Additional developments:

• Russia has begun using Shahed kamikaze drones equipped with R-60 air-to-air missiles in an effort to overcome Ukrainian air defences. This represents an attempt by the aggressor state to escalate the conflict and counter Ukrainian helicopters, which frequently shoot down Russian UAVs.

  The R-60 missile, also known as the AA-8 Aphid, is a short-range infrared missile. It homes in on the heat signature of an aircraft’s engine and can strike targets at a distance of roughly 8 kilometres. The weapon was designed specifically to engage helicopters and tactical aircraft.

Other Developments

• In November, South Africa’s government said it had received distress calls from 17 citizens trapped in Ukraine’s Donbas region after joining mercenary forces. It stated that efforts were underway through diplomatic channels to bring them home, though no repatriation has occurred so far. The men had reportedly been recruited under the false promise of lucrative contracts, and the government condemned “the exploitation of young, vulnerable people by individuals working with foreign military entities.” Five people have been charged in relation to the alleged recruitment of men for the Russian military, according to South African police.

• Institute for the Study of War, December 4, 2025: Putin reiterated his commitment to his original war aims from 2021 and 2022 and unwillingness to compromise during an interview with Indian media – likely as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to shape the international information space during the ongoing negotiations process. The Kremlin is setting conditions to frame any future agreement to not attack and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv cities as an alleged Russian “concession” in peace negotiations, even though Russia is currently incapable of seizing these cities. Russia appears to have launched a new cognitive warfare campaign aimed at spreading narratives about Russian preparations for an offensive on Chernihiv City.

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Check out the list of all editions of Russia’s Arms Trends newsletter here: link.

Also, here is the Topic Navigator, where I’ve grouped all my posts by theme, such as “Deep Strike Capabilities”, “Air Defence and Counter-UAS”, and others.

While Russia builds a triple ring of air defenses around Moscow, Ukraine continues striking targets across the rest of Russian territory. Reportedly, around 60 regions of Russia are already experiencing a gasoline crisis.

Despite sliding into an economic abyss and facing a shortage of skilled workers, Russia follows the logic of “war excuses everything” as it tries to stretch its military production capacity.

In this edition:

• Russia Tests the Burevestnik Nuclear-Powered Missile;

• How is Russia’s Arms Industry Organised and Operated?

• The Impact of Russia’s People’s Military-Industrial Complex on the War;

• How Ukraine’s Deep Strike Campaign Affects Russia;

• and 10+ other developments from October.

My digest on Russia is always free — please read and share!

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Military Cooperation and Alliances

According to a NATO official, about 80% of the critical electronic components used in Russian drones and other modern weapons are manufactured in China.

The WP analysis indicates that Chinese commercial drone producers have played a key role in enabling Russian drone makers to expand production capacity.

Customs statistics show that China exported record amounts of fiber-optic cable to Russia in May (119,000 miles) and June (130,000 miles), followed by a dramatic increase to 328,000 miles in August. By contrast, Ukraine received only 72 miles of cable in August, the most recent month for which data are available.

Similarly, China’s exports of lithium-ion batteries to Russia peaked at $54 million in June, declining slightly to $47 million in August. Over the same period, exports of such batteries to Ukraine remained modest — between $11 million and $12 million per month.

According to the WSJ report, Russia imported more than 3.3 million motors from the Chinese company Shenzhen Kiosk Electronic Co, which likely sources them from other Chinese manufacturers. These engines can have nonmilitary uses such as washing machines, pumps, or electric scooters. But the report says the “final recipient” is Rustakt LLC—a Moscow-based company identified by Ukrainian intelligence as a drone maker. In December 2024, the European Union sanctioned Rustakt for its support of Russia’s military.

Additional developments:

• Mercenaries from North Korea are helping Russian forces in Ukraine’s Sumy region by operating drones and adjusting strikes on Ukrainian positions. North Koreans are working in the territory of Russia’s Kursk region. They conduct reconnaissance using drones, identify positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and help adjust strikes.

• Independent investigators from the Conflict Armament Research identified a modified North Korean submunition used as a warhead in a Russian FPV drone used against Ukraine. While North Korea has previously supplied Russia with personnel, artillery shells, and ballistic missiles, this marks the first known instance of North Korean bomblets being repurposed for use in small Russian drones.

• Venezuelan President Maduro turned to Russia, China, and Iran for help in strengthening his country’s aging armed forces. According to internal U.S. government documents obtained by The WP, Caracas has sought defensive radars, aircraft maintenance, and possibly missile systems.

• The deputy head of Russia’s parliamentary defense committee said that Moscow could supply Venezuela with its Oreshnik missiles.

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Defense Production and Innovations

Putin claimed that Russia recently completed the successful test of a new nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed missile, Burevestnik, calling it “a unique weapon that no other country possesses.” Because of its onboard nuclear power, the weapon has, in principle, a nearly unlimited range. Putin alleged that the test lasted around 15 hours, with the missile traveling more than 14,000 kilometers. The Norwegian government confirmed that the test flight launched out of Novaya Zemlya, an archipelago off the northern coast of Russia. The Burevestnik has not yet been fielded.

CEPA Fellow Pavlo Luzin, whose interview I’ve added below, said that Burevestnik is pure mystification. Building a compact nuclear reactor for a cruise missile is practically impossible. It is more an attempt to bluff and to scare, disorient and demoralise the enemy.

Additional developments:

• Report by Frontelligence Insight proves that Moscow has no plans to seriously downsize its current, already expanded army. Russia is estimated to have produced roughly 240 T-90M tanks in 2024 and is believed to be on track for a similar figure in 2025. Even accounting for battlefield losses, the net effect appears to leave Moscow with more operational T-90M tanks than before. Combined with more restrained use of armor on the battlefield this year, the buildup suggests the Russian army may require far less time to replenish its tank park than many analysts assumed. It also underscores that Russia retains the capacity to sustain a war of aggression.

• How Much Do Russian Missiles Really Cost? (report by Militarnyi).

  Cruise missiles

  • 9M728 Iskander-K — ~$1.5 million per unit.

  • Kalibr — ≈ $2.0 million per unit.

  • 3M-14S (special nuclear warhead) — ≈ $2.0–$2.3M) per unit;

  • Kh-101 (“Izdeliye 504AP”) — ~$2.0–$2.4M per unit.

  Ballistic & hypersonic

  • 9M723 Iskander-M — ~$2.4–$3.0M per unit.

  • 9-S-7760 Kinzhal (air-launched ballistic/hypersonic) — ~$4.5M per unit.

  • Zircon anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile — ~$5.2–$5.6M per unit. (Still one of the least documented Russian missiles in this war; no high-quality public imagery to date.)

• Russia has begun serial production of its glide bombs, which now have a range of up to 200 km thanks to the integration of turbojet engines. This upgrade enables Russian aircraft to strike targets without entering Ukrainian air-defense zones.

  Earlier glide bombs fitted with UMPK guidance kits had a maximum range of around 75 km, marking a major increase in standoff capability.

  Pictures of a KAB that impacted in the Poltava region last month, published by Ukrainian electronic warfare specialist Serhiy FLASH Beskrestnov, showed a Chinese-made turbojet engine that can be purchased for $US18,000 ($27,650) on Alibaba.

How is Russia’s Arms Industry Organised and Operated? (summary of the article)

Because the sector is so closed, it is very difficult to investigate what is happening in Russia’s defense-industrial complex. Illiia Bolharyn interviewed Pavlo Luzin, a senior fellow at CEPA and the Saratoga Foundation, who has studied the Russian defense industry for many years.

Here is my summary of his article for Oboronka:

• Since the 1990s, Russia has been constantly rearming. The Topol-M missiles were adopted in the 1990s. The Iskander systems began development in the late 1990s. At the same time, they started building a dozen nuclear submarines. It is noteworthy that the Americans allocated funds to decommission Soviet submarines while Russia was building new ones.

• Later came larger rearmament programmes: 2011–2020 and 2018–2027.

• By 2022, Russia had 1,356 enterprises connected to the defence industry. Most of them are organised within state corporations: Rostec, KTRV, the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC), Almaz-Antey, Roscosmos and Rosatom. These are real “matryoshkas” made up of hundreds of factories, legal entities, and research institutes — and these corporations keep absorbing new enterprises.

• For at least the past decade, Russia’s entire defence sector has been operating at a loss. Aware of this, the Kremlin in the 2010s set a target that by 2027, half of defence industry output should be civilian. However, civilian products from defence plants hardly withstand competition from imports.

• Export data: for many years, there were two principal figures — Russian official data and SIPRI’s estimates. They used to coincide, but starting from the 2010s, that changed. Russia claimed exports of $15 billion, while SIPRI put them at around $7 billion per year.

• The reason is that Russia subsidised exports, effectively supplying weapons for free. Vnesheconombank (VEB), which finances exports, provided loans at about 2% per annum in rubles. Creditors were allowed to repay the loans after receiving the equipment.

• Real buyers of Russian weapons in the 1990s were China, later India (until the S-400 deal), Algeria, and Vietnam. Now, Russian exports are roughly $1 billion a year because production capacity is mainly working to fulfil domestic defence orders.

• Currently, Russia is almost entirely dependent on equipment and components from China. China is not doing this out of charity — Russia still has to pay. But China is not interested in Moscow’s defeat; as long as Russia is fighting, China gains time.

• As long as the border with China remains open, components will be available. There are constraints, like skilled labour and software, because talented programmers rarely choose to work for the defence industry (unlike in Ukraine, where the best minds are working for the common cause).

• Before 2022, Russian authorities mentioned 2 million defence-industry employees, but by Pavlo’s calculations, the figure was about 1.5–1.6 million. Questions remain about workforce quality: the majority are ordinary labourers, while engineers and scientists are catastrophically scarce. The average age is 43, and 35–40% of employees are of pre-retirement or retirement age.

• How do they incentivise people to work in factories? They offer roughly 100,000 rubles (1200 USD) per month instead of the old 60,000, but the working week has risen from 40 to 70 hours. Hourly pay has therefore barely changed.

• “I remember an interview with a young engineer who was the chief designer at the Ivanovo Machine-Tool Plant. In the interview, he called his main achievement the successful copying of a Czech machine tool. That says something about their design capabilities. And although some design bureaus do create new things, more often they develop based on existing technologies.”

• Among Russia’s strengths are centralisation, access to money, and motivation. You cannot say this is solely Putin’s war when a significant part of society supports it.

• Tanks — everything comes down to people and equipment. Even if UralVagonZavod somehow began producing 200–300 new tanks a year, that would take decades and a huge number of radial-forging machines.

• Shells — looking at the propellant industry’s performance, there is no sign that they can suddenly surge output. And two years’ worth of shell supplies from the DPRK also indicate that Russia has difficulties scaling up production.

• Navy — Russia does not build cruisers, and there are major problems producing large landing ships. Frigate production is constrained by engine problems that were only partially solved after 2014. But Russia does produce small missile ships (cruise-missile carriers), and will likely continue to do so — especially given they can be moved between the Baltic, Caspian, and Azov-Black Sea regions via rivers and canals.

• Aviation — tactical aircraft continue to be produced at roughly 12 airframes of various types per year. Modernisation programmes for the Su-30/34/35 helped: some avionics are now localised, while other components are still imported. Helicopters are produced in small series — around 10–15 per year.

• FPV drones — the production sites are numerous and dispersed across regions. These are assembly operations affiliated with regional elites that build drones from Chinese components. Output is therefore measured in many tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands, depending on the model.

• We will most likely see equipment simplification: instead of IFVs, there will be armoured cars, possibly wheeled “tanks.” They will try to keep producing aviation, missiles, and drones. But reducing the range of product types also means closing plants, which creates political risks — no one wants to take responsibility.

• At the same time, one should not assume that loss of money or production potential at defence plants will end the war. If there is political will, the Kremlin will find ways to keep fighting.

Read my recent summary of the Russian article: Digital warfare — a New Reality.

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Sanctions Evasion and Arms Control

Russian snipers are using Canadian rifles despite sanctions. Although Canada has banned all military exports to Russia, Canadian-made firearms continue to appear in Russia. Images of these rifles are increasingly surfacing on Russian social media — shown both in the hands of snipers and listed for sale.

A seemingly brand-new Cadex rifle was displayed at the OrelExpo 2025 gun show, held in Moscow from Oct. 2 to 5, according to photos of the event. Cadex said it does not export to Russia. How the rifles got there is a mystery.

Canada’s Global Affairs (MFA) spokesperson said that Canadian exporters were responsible for validating that the end-users of their products were not under sanction.

Additional developments:

• South African officials launched an investigation into how locally manufactured electronic components ended up inside Russian drones Garpiya A-1, targeting Ukraine.

  The device in question is a laser range finder produced by Lightware Optoelectronics Ltd., a company located near Pretoria. According to Ukraine’s special envoy for sanctions, Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the equipment can be used to measure distances and potentially trigger explosions.

• The Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera published an investigation where it stated that in 2024, at least 232 tonnes of liquid epoxy resins were shipped from Italy to Russia — about 20% of all imports of this type of raw material.

  Epoxy resins are a key ingredient in the production of carbon-fibre (carbon composite) airframes and fairings. Such composites are used to manufacture lightweight but strong casings for ballistic missiles and loitering munitions, including elements of the Iskander-M design.

• Despite strict Western sanctions, the Russian shadow fleet continues to transport billions of dollars’ worth of oil across the Baltic Sea every day. Companies based in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are helping to keep Russia’s “shadow fleet” running, in particular, by refueling the tankers.

The Impact of Russia’s People’s Military-Industrial Complex on the War

All of us already know about the role of Ukraine’s civil society in this war, but the involvement of Russia’s volunteer efforts remains an underreported issue — which is why I found this piece by Samuel Bendett extremely insightful.

Here is my summary:

• From the start of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian civil society has mobilized to an unprecedented degree to assist the military.

• Numerous Russian voluntary and civil society organizations, small technical start-ups, and individuals took to social media platforms such as Telegram to call for assistance, advertise their efforts, or actively fundraise to purchase all manner of supplies and equipment.

• This assistance comprised drones, counter-drone technology, EW and SIGINT systems and equipment, drone detectors, frequency analysers and antennae, as well as vehicles and commercial vans, UGVs, uniforms, medical equipment, masking nets, spare parts and food items – essentially, anything and everything needed by the soldiers on the frontline.

• For the most part, the Russian military bureaucracy still allows the flow of such civilian-acquired and built supplies and technologies directly to the front, often to specific units and soldiers. Many volunteers can travel to the frontline unimpeded to deliver such technology and equipment.

• The extent of Russian government support for what has been dubbed the “People’s VPK” is not always clear. (VPK is a Russian acronym for the military-industrial complex.)

• Some efforts receive MOD assistance and facilitation, while others receive assistance from local and regional governments. Others claim that their efforts are supported entirely by donations from regular citizens and wealthy individuals.

• In late 2024, President Putin even ordered the domestic defence sector to work more closely with the People’s VPK.

• In December 2024, Defence Minister Belousov noted that the MOD’s traditional development and acquisition procedures, which provide for a long, strictly regulated process of weapon and systems development, testing and production, make it “extremely difficult” to rapidly provide the troops with much-needed technical solutions.

• Between April 2024 and December 2024, more than 65 People’s VPK projects were delivered to the military, comprising 31 types of UAV, eight ground robotic systems, two types of electronic reconnaissance equipment, 20 electronic warfare systems and four types of unmanned surface vessels.

• By December 2024, more than 100,000 products from small domestic design bureaus and civilian manufacturers had been purchased for military needs.

• In mid-2025, the Russian military was still depending on volunteer and start-up efforts for key technologies, systems and supplies, a trend that is likely to continue as long as the fighting in Ukraine.

• The MOD has launched accelerator platforms as a bridge between developers and end-users. However, it is still unclear how many Russian developers trust or even engage with such official outlets, or instead work directly with specific commanders and units.

• Overall, the Russian defence industry maintains a monopoly over technology development and fielding, but the impact of so many voluntary organizations and their success has not gone unnoticed by many in the Russian government.

• Given the lack of historical and socio-cultural perspective on private sector military development in the country, some in the Russian government have defaulted to simply calling for the state to take control of this wider civil society initiative to “prevent the spread of UAS technology that could fall into the hands of terrorists”.

• Events such as the annual “Dronnitsa”, hosted by the Centre for Assistance to Novorissya, and a few smaller meet-ups, aim to ensure that volunteers can continue to do their work alongside and often in cooperation with the official Russian defence industry and military bureaucracy.

• According to a Russian volunteer, Chadaev, who is one of the co-organizers of the annual Dronnitsa event and is behind the effort to set up Ushkuynik enterprise, Russian culture prefers a vertical arrangement for managing efforts and directing resources, since it is easier for many Russians to listen to authority “from above” rather than attempt to build cooperative efforts themselves.

• Other Russian commentators said that current military acquisition mechanisms are not set up to procure products and technologies from the volunteers. The MOD is still geared towards dealing with established enterprises with products that pass official certification.

• The Russian defence industry is currently being encouraged by the Russian government to cooperate with the People’s VPK, and is taking major steps to regain its major development and manufacturing role.

Russian Drones

Russia unveiled its interceptor drone. The drone follows a typical interceptor layout: four motors and vertical take-off. Conceptually, the drone resembles the Ukrainian interceptor Sting. There is a high probability that, when developing similar interceptors, the Russians borrowed some design solutions from Ukrainian models, which have repeatedly demonstrated effectiveness in intercepting various types of UAVs. (Read my report on STING here).

• Russia uses three types of Shahed kamikaze drones that differ by their share of imported components. The newest variant — the Shahed “Alabuga” (Geran), contains 294 imported components from: China & Taiwan — 120/294 (40.82%), USA — 100/294 (34.01%), other countries — 74/294 (25.17%).

  The Shahed “Izhevsk” modification, also known as the Garpiya, has fewer imported parts — 112 items; their distribution is: China & Taiwan — 40/112 (35.71%), USA — 40/112 (35.71%), other countries — 32/112 (28.57%).

  The classic Iranian Shahed variant contains 105 imported components, of which 40/105 (38.10%) originate from the United States and 65/105 (61.90%) from other countries.

• Ukrainian drone expert Serhiy FASH has recorded the appearance of the Russian EW systems of the “Shtora” type in the FPV frequency band 6.2–7.2 GHz on video. These are not yet serial-produced systems, but they already exist.
  "The enemy adapts to innovations quite quickly. We can hide any solutions and developments, but as soon as they fall into the enemy’s hands as trophies, they immediately share the information about them in groups and start the process of developing the same solution or a countermeasure,” Serhiy added.

How Ukraine’s Deep Strike Campaign Affects Russia

According to the Russian independent outlet The Insider, in 2025, drone attacks on Russian oil refineries are occurring at much greater distances from Ukraine and with increased intensity.

There have been 45 confirmed successful strikes on 22 facilities (18 between January 1 and March 31, and 27 between June 1 and September 30). If the current trend continues, the total could reach 60–70 strikes by year’s end.
This time, most of the attacks targeted refineries located 500 kilometers or more from the Ukrainian border.

Altogether, these strikes have triggered a severe gasoline crisis. Supply disruptions are now observed in nearly 60 Russian regions, with the situation particularly dire in occupied Crimea.

A JPMorgan Chase & Co. estimate, cited by Bloomberg, appears realistic: Russia’s refinery throughput has fallen below 5 million barrels per day — a drop of about 500,000 barrels per day, or roughly 10%. Reuters puts the decline even higher, at 17%, or 1.1 million barrels per day.
The key issue is the trend: refinery strikes continue, disabling capacity faster than it can be repaired — meaning the percentage will keep rising.

By the end of 2024, Russian oil refining had decreased by only 3%, to 267 million tonnes, but in 2025 the decline is expected to be far more significant. In August–September 2025, at least ten major refineries were forced to partially or completely halt operations.

In the medium term (6–12 months), according to an international affairs expert, George Voloshyn’s assessment, refinery shutdowns could reach 25% of total installed capacity.

After that, the forecast for Russia is even more grim, as difficulties replacing AVT units (atmospheric-vacuum distillation systems) will likely stabilize refining output at levels well below prewar volumes and could lead to a surge in low-quality fuel and rationing of higher-grade products through administrative allocation.

Experts at the International Energy Agency share a more optimistic view, predicting a recovery in refining volumes after June 2026 — though their forecast appears not to account for further Ukrainian attacks.

Zelenskyy is predicting that the Kremlin will face an unprecedented budget deficit of around $100 billion in 2026.

Other Developments

• Russia has reinforced its air defense network around Moscow, according to the jembob project. Over the past two months, at least 21 new air defense positions have been established within a roughly 50 km radius of the city. About 80% of these are located south of Moscow, in the direction of Ukraine.

  

  At the same time, according to the estimates, only about 60% of objects in the Russian Federation are protected.

• Russian authorities have introduced a new restriction on mobile internet and SMS services for citizens returning from abroad, citing security concerns linked to drone attacks. The measure, described as a 24-hour “cooling-off period,” will disable mobile internet and text messaging for Russian SIM cards after subscribers return from international roaming or if their card has been inactive for more than 72 hours. The same mechanism already applies to foreign SIM cards.

• Russia is targeting UK space infrastructure, and in particular “shadowing” military satellites, on a weekly basis, according to the head of UK Space Command. Shadowing involves orbiting and aligning a satellite close to the target satellite, in order to be near enough to jam communications or intercept signals to steal critical information.

• Ukraine’s intelligence indicates that at least 1,436 African nationals are fighting for Russia in Ukraine, though the true figure is likely higher.

  The Kremlin uses “money, lies, and coercion” to recruit foreigners.

• Russia trained militants at a resort in Serbia to prepare them for street clashes in Moldova during the parliamentary elections.

  This was reported by the editorial team of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). The training took place at the “Sun River” resort complex on the banks of the Drina River. Just six days before the elections, on September 28, Moldovan police arrested about 70 people, stating that most of them had received training at the Serbian facility.

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“While Poland panics and NATO trembles, ‘Zapad-2025’ showed what we can do!” — Russian media never fails to hype up its military. At the strategic Zapad-2025 exercises in Belarus, Russia kept personnel numbers low — likely to avoid OSCE’s mandatory observation threshold of 13,000 troops. The smaller scale was then used to present the drills as routine and peaceful, while shifting the blame onto NATO countries for raising the risk of military incidents and destabilizing regional security.

But can the security situation be destabilized even further? Apparently, it can, as unidentified drones are now appearing regularly in the skies of European NATO member states and disrupting civilian infrastructure.

In this edition:

• Russian Drone Incursions in Europe;

• Zapad-2025 Military Exercise;

• Moscow Adapts Its Ballistic Missiles to Evade Ukraine’s Air Defences;

• and 20+ additional developments in Russia.

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Russian Drone Incursions in Europe

On September 9, 19 Russian drones entered from Ukrainian territory into Poland, prompting jets from several NATO countries to scramble and shoot 4 of them down. Russia denied intentionally flying drones into Poland, claiming instead that Ukrainian electronic jamming may have forced them off course.

Days later, on September 13, Russian drones violated Romanian airspace, prompting Bucharest to scramble fighter jets.

Several Danish airports, in particular, the one in Copenhagen, faced drone-related disruptions in late September. Overnight sightings were reported near the airports in Esbjerg and Sønderborg, over Skrydstrup airbase—which hosts Denmark’s F-16s and F-35s—and above a military installation in Holstebro.

The drones were left to fly their course. Danish defense chief put it simply: “When you shoot something down in the air, something also comes down again,” underscoring the dangers of using kinetic counter-drone measures over populated areas.

Later, reports emerged of unidentified drones being spotted over Finland, Sweden, and Lithuania. The flights of unknown drones halted operations at the airport in the German city of Munich on October 2nd. Due to security restrictions, 17 flights were unable to depart from the airport, affecting nearly 3,000 passengers.

On the night of Friday, October 3rd, 15 unidentified drones were circling the Elsenborn military training ground in Belgium.

In general, 10 NATO countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Denmark, Norway, Romania, Poland, Estonia, Germany, France, and Belgium) have seen drones or disruptions over their territory in the past three months.

According to Ukraine’s UAV and radio expert Serhiy FLASH Beskrestnov, sightings of mysterious drones have been concentrated in countries near Russia. The drones are unlikely to appear spontaneously—they must either be flown long distances, which NATO’s air defence would track, or launched locally by small sabotage groups. FLASH suggests they may have been deployed from Russian ships in the Baltic Sea.

In the context of the developments in Denmark, three Russia-linked ships have emerged as possible players in the mysterious drone flights. Investigation by Danwatch revealed that a Norwegian ship with a Russian crew was located a few kilometers from Copenhagen Airport during the drone attack. Danwatch revealed that the ship’s owners have previously collaborated with a large Russian paramilitary organization (RSB Group) for years.

So far, the tangible impact has been limited to disrupting airports and civilian flights, but the informational effect has been significant, fuelling fear and speculation.

From a strategic perspective, such operations fit into Russia’s hybrid warfare playbook, Serhiy FLASH adds. They project the image of Moscow as a powerful, unpredictable adversary, aiming to deter Europeans from confrontation. They also divert attention from Ukraine by pushing NATO countries to focus resources on bolstering their own air defence instead of supporting Kyiv. Finally, they allow Russia to test NATO’s “red lines,” probing how far it can go without provoking a strong reaction. In this sense, the drones are as much a psychological and political weapon as they are a physical one.

It is unlikely the drones are being used for reconnaissance, given Russia’s advanced satellite intelligence capabilities, FLASH noted on his Telegram.

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Military Cooperation and Alliances

British researchers Oleksandr V. Danylyuk and Dr. Jack Watling from RUSI concluded that Russia is helping China prepare to seize Taiwan in 2027. Russia has agreed to supply and train China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in airborne operations, an area where China lacks experience but Russia has combat know-how.

Under the deal, Russia will sell China:

• 37 BMD-4M light amphibious assault vehicles (100 mm gun, 30 mm automatic cannon)

• 11 Sprut-SDM1 light amphibious anti-tank guns (125 mm cannon)

• 11 BTR-MDM ‘Rakushka’ airborne APCs

• Several Rubin command/observation vehicles and KSHM-E command vehicles

All vehicles will be fitted with Chinese communication and command systems, tested for compatibility with Russian electronics.

Russia will also train a battalion of Chinese paratroopers on how to use this equipment. The biggest benefit for the PLA is not the hardware itself, but the training in airborne tactics and command-and-control procedures that only Russia can provide, thanks to its combat experience. Read more about Russia-China cooperation in my previous report.

Additional developments:

• Russia reportedly approached Türkiye with a proposal to repurchase the S-400 air defense missile systems that Ankara received in 2019. Türkiye had originally bought two of these systems in 2017 for $2.5 billion, a deal that sparked a major diplomatic dispute with the United States. Russia, which does not have S-400s in reserve, would benefit from boosting stocks lost in Ukraine. The deal would also help Russia’s struggle to meet its commitments to other S-400 buyers, such as India.

• According to internal Vietnamese documents obtained by the Associated Press, Russia and Vietnam developed a back-door system to conceal arms deal payments and evade Western sanctions. Vietnam has purchased Russian military equipment—including fighter jets, tanks, and ships—on credit, and then repaid that debt through its share of profits from a joint Vietnam–Russia oil venture in Siberia. These transactions bypass conventional banking channels and are structured to keep funds flowing discreetly, even under tightened sanctions aimed at curbing Russia’s war in Ukraine.

• South Korea launched an investigation into reports that Russia may have supplied nuclear reactor modules for submarines to North Korea.

  Moscow allegedly transferred two or three such modules to Pyongyang during the first half of this year.

  The report states that the delivery involved reactor cores, turbines, and cooling systems removed from decommissioned Russian submarines. “Such a move could represent a breakthrough in North Korea’s long-standing ambition to build its own nuclear fleet,” the article noted.

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Zapad-2025 Military Exercises

The joint military exercises of Russia and Belarus, called “Zapad-2025,” began on September 12 and lasted for four days.

Russia conducts annual strategic exercises in different regions, practicing operations in potential “theaters of war.” One year it’s Zapad, then Vostok, followed by Tsentr and Kavkaz. Over four years, the situation in possible theaters of war changes, and then they repeat all these exercises in a cycle. Several times, such exercises have served as precursors to Russian invasions of neighboring countries.

For example, during Kavkaz-2008, Russia concentrated troops and equipment near the Roki Tunnel — a highway under the Greater Caucasus mountain range. It was precisely this tunnel that Russia used to invade Georgia six days after the official end of the exercise.

And during Zapad-2021, which involved more than 200,000 Russian and Belarusian troops, the so-called “Central Federation” (the name given in the exercise scenario to the joint forces of Russia and Belarus) practiced airborne landings, deep raids, and other maneuver operations against a notional adversary called the “Polar Republic.” Five months later, Russia attempted to carry out precisely such a “blitzkrieg” in reality — trying to seize Kyiv, Hostomel, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and other Ukrainian cities as part of the full-scale invasion.

Poland decided to completely close its border with Belarus from the evening of September 11 due to the “Zapad-2025” military exercises. Ukraine was monitoring developments in Belarus and strengthened its defence capabilities along the border.

Here is a summary of an excellent report by Fabrizio Minniti and Dr Giangiuseppe Pili for RUSI, Wartime Zapad 2025 Exercise: Russia’s Strategic Adaptation and NATO:

• For both Moscow and Minsk, Zapad 2025 functioned as much as a political instrument as a military rehearsal. Their goal was to project carefully tailored messages to domestic and international audiences, while managing the significant resource constraints imposed by the ongoing war.

• The official participant numbers were kept below the OSCE Vienna Document thresholds for mandatory observation, which require outside monitoring for exercises with 13,000 or more personnel.

• This long-standing practice, used by Russia since at least Zapad 2013, allows it to under-report total numbers and modularise parallel events to avoid mandatory verification.

• Unlike previous iterations, which emphasised demonstrations of military mass and tempo, Zapad 2025 appeared as a meticulously calibrated, scaled-down, and geographically constrained exercise.

• Militarily, it served as a field laboratory where Russia stress-tested and refined its Initial Period of War (IPW) playbook, incorporating direct lessons from the Ukrainian battlefield.

• The focus this time was on high-leverage capabilities such as long-range precision fires, integrated air and missile defence (IAMD), and electronic warfare (EW), while conserving mass and materiel critically needed in Ukraine.

• Russia’s Initial Period of War (IPW) seeks to disorganise an adversary through rapid deep strikes against operational command and control (C2), airbases, IAMD nodes, logistics hubs, and rail chokepoints.

• The exercise stressed ISR–fires integration, long-range precision strikes (including from standoff bombers), and counter-ISR/EW operations. Russia also rehearsed tactics designed to compensate for weaknesses exposed in Ukraine, such as the use of glide bombs to mitigate limited air superiority.

• It further practiced deploying dense Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD) and electronic warfare to counter adversary ISR capabilities—a persistent challenge on the front lines.

  For NATO, Zapad 2025 underscores the need for a nuanced threat assessment.

• NATO must be prepared to exploit predictable Russian vulnerabilities while addressing key areas of weakness.

• Since the IPW strategy relies on early deep strikes against critical infrastructure, C2 nodes, airbases, and logistics hubs, NATO and Ukraine must prioritise hardening these targets to increase their resilience.

• Furthermore, accelerating the integration of air and missile defence with counter-ISR capabilities is the centre of gravity for any contemporary defensive strategy against Russia’s IPW playbook.

• The exercise’s emphasis on GBAD and EW suggests that Russia sees these as its most effective tools for securing a favourable outcome.

• Russia’s IPW doctrine is not static. The emphasis on long-range fires, an IAMD duel, and electronic/cognitive shaping highlights a deliberate effort to build a military capable of overwhelming a defender’s strike complex and exploiting the resulting opportunities on the ground.

Defense Production and Innovations

According to Ukraine’s HUR, by the end of 2025, Russia intends to produce 57 modern fighter jets of various models – Su-57, Su-35, Su-34; around 250 T-90M tanks, over 1100 BTR-3 and BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, as well as 365 artillery systems. These are new combat units, not modernizations.

During more than three years of full-scale invasion, Russia has lost over 4,000 tanks, including an astonishing 1,200 T-80s.

According to estimates of the Conflict Intelligence Team, the largest Russian tank producer, Uralvagonzavod, produced between 60 and 70 T-90M tanks in 2022. In 2023, amid efforts to mobilize the defence industry, output may have risen to 140–180 tanks. By 2024, production could have exceeded 200 units per year, possibly approaching a rate of 250–300 tanks annually.

However, according to analyst and former British Army intelligence officer Sergio Miller, CIT’s estimates are overstated. He argues that Russia struggles to produce even 100 new T-90Ms per year, with most being upgraded T-90As rather than entirely new tanks. Miller noted that Uralvagonzavod itself reported only 100 deliveries in 2024 and, in reality, may have completed as few as 10 T-90s this year. With such low output, he concluded, the Kremlin will find it difficult to rebuild its depleted armored regiments.

Last month, I reported that Uralvagonzavod has been using hundreds of pieces of foreign equipment in its tank production — read more here.

Additional developments:

• By the end of the year, Russia also plans to manufacture about 2500 missiles of various types. Among them are cruise and ballistic missiles for the Iskander system, air-launched ballistic missiles like the Kinzhal, and others. New long-range missiles and modern hypersonic anti-ship systems are also under development.

• Ukrainian and Western officials report that Moscow has managed to adapt its ballistic missiles to better evade Ukraine’s air defences, the FT reported. Russia is believed to have upgraded both the Iskander-M mobile system, with a range of roughly 500 km, and the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, which can reach around 480 km. These missiles reportedly begin on a standard trajectory before abruptly shifting course—either by diving steeply in the terminal phase or performing evasive manoeuvres designed to disrupt and outmanoeuvre Patriot interceptors.

  Ukraine’s interception rate of ballistic missiles had improved during the summer, peaking at 37% in August. However, by September, it had dropped sharply to just 6%, even though the number of missile launches was lower.

• Kyiv Post reports that Russia’s long-range strike capability has dropped significantly, with its strategic bombers now launching only about half as many cruise missiles as a year ago. A review of Ukrainian Air Force data shows the bomber fleet has fewer operational aircraft, missile deliveries to airbases are down, and Ukrainian drone attacks have hit missile factories. According to Ukraine’s SBU, Russia’s heavy bombers averaged 33 cruise missiles in nighttime massed strikes during April–May, but that figure fell to just 19 in June–July.

  According to open sources, Ukraine has attacked Russian cruise missile plants at least twice: on May 28-29, 2025, and Aug. 11, 2025.

• After a brief pause in early August, Shahed drone attacks surged again in September, averaging about 188 per day—similar to June (181) and July (203)—with roughly 5,400 drones launched monthly across the June–September period, suggesting production may have plateaued, according to Igor Anorkhin. Since September 8, Ukrainian officials have begun publishing estimates of Shaheds in total salvos, showing they account for about 58 percent—around 3,250 drones in September—consistent with earlier assessments of Alabuga’s output.

• The latest innovation in Shahed is installing video cameras and modems so that strike drones, which are preprogrammed, have possibilities to be guided online, and drones that previously only served as decoys are now also used as reconnaissance drones deep inside Ukrainian territory. Serhiy “FLASH” Beskrestnov warns that the emergence of Shaheds fitted with cameras and remote-control modems is no surprise — but their effectiveness against moving targets is limited. Unlike the Lancet, a Shahed’s launch and in-flight control are less dynamic, so realistic targets are railways, mass transport and large equipment rather than small pickups; a 50 kg warhead is ill-suited to hunting light vehicles. FLASH notes these drones use Chinese cameras and radio modems, with a practical employment range of about 200 km (the technology could extend to ~400 km), making rail transport within that envelope the primary vulnerability.

Sanctions Evasion and Arms Control

Between 2023 and 2024, Chinese companies supplied more than $63 million worth of materials to Russian drone manufacturers under sanctions. Around $14.3 million of these supplies went to companies linked to the production of Shahed drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan, according to an investigation by The Telegraph. The shipments included motors, microcircuits, metal alloys, lenses, fiberglass, emulsion binders, and carbon fibers—critical components for drone manufacturing.

Additional developments:

• Ukraine is finding more and more Russian and Belarusian-made electronics in the wreckage of missiles launched by Moscow. “They currently have the ability to produce chips, though of relatively poor quality, for now. Over time, however, their capabilities will improve,” a Ukrainian official warned.

• Italian outlet Linkiesta reports that Kalashnikov assault rifles without serial numbers — alongside ammunition from Russian state-owned factories — are being smuggled into Italy via Sicilian ports and the Friulian mountain passes. The investigation suggests the Russian “shadow fleet” is likely being used to facilitate these shipments, and finds that modern weapons produced between 2010 and 2020, including assault and sniper rifles, are among those trafficked.

Other developments

• The Russian army established its first specialized UAV detachment equipped with a drone control point situated hundreds of kilometers behind the frontlines, according to the Center for Unmanned Systems and Technologies (CUST), Russian media TASS reported. The CUST clarified that this rear command center for reconnaissance and strike UAVs was formed based on the Somali unit and the 24th Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade, in collaboration with the United Russia party. These units have been supplied with Skvorets drones and Orbita hardware and software systems.

  The Russian defence industry has long been known for making inflated claims — from supposed geophysical weapons to particle beams and even an atomic pistol, writes David Hambling for Forbes. CUST, however, deserves to be taken more seriously, as it has a proven track record of delivering on its projects.

• Reportedly, Russia is developing a $5 billion alternative to the Starlink satellite internet service. 17. In total, the company is expected to launch 383 satellites, including 91 replacements for those that may fail.

• Google Earth has updated its imagery of Novaya Zemlya, the Arctic archipelago where Russia’s nuclear weapon designers are testing their latest systems, The Barents Observer reports. The test site is located at Pankovo on the southern island, less than 900 km from Norway’s northeast corner.

  This summer saw record-high activity at Pankovo. The number of missiles tested remains unknown, as does how many may have crashed at sea—or possibly on land, likely near the former atmospheric nuclear test site north of the Matockhin Strait.

  So far, radiation protection authorities in the Nordic countries have not reported any unusual isotope readings.

• Less oil means less money, writes David Kirichenko for Forbes. The Kremlin has leaned heavily on oil and gas revenues to finance soldier salaries and compensation for families of the dead and wounded, with sign-up bonuses reaching $28,000 and monthly pay starting at $3,200. Recent estimates from Re: Russia, a research group of exiled academics, put personnel costs at a record 2 trillion rubles ($25.6 billion) in the first half of 2025—nearly 10% of federal spending. But as Ukrainian strikes erode Moscow’s oil revenues, that funding base is under pressure.

  RBC reports nearly 40% of Russia’s refining capacity is offline, with up to 70% of shutdowns caused by drones, while Kommersant notes petrol output in September alone dropped by 1 million tons, leaving the domestic market short by about 20%. There’s a short quote from me in this article 🙂

  Also, read my recent report, “Ukraine’s Long-Range Drones Hit Russia’s Oil Network”.

While I fight Russia in the information space, my friends and family are confronting it on the battlefield in Ukraine.

I’ve recently launched a campaign to raise $3,400 for fiber-optic equipment for the military unit of my university friend, Vasyl, who is currently serving in Ukraine’s Armed Forces. We’ve already raised almost half of the target amount, and I’d be deeply grateful for your donation!

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This newsletter highlights some important ways of countering Russian aggression through non-military means. First of all, sanctioning all of Russia’s military production sites is crucial—surprisingly, in the fourth year of the full-scale invasion, 40% of the enterprises involved in producing Kh-59 missiles are still not under sanctions. Yet there are encouraging signs that sanctions do work: in the case of these missiles, Russia is already struggling to meet state defense orders.

China remains a key player here, which, with the move of a finger, could halt the production of some key Russian weapons and systems, making it impossible for Russia to wage this war

In this monthly edition:

• Military Cooperation and Alliances: Russia and China;

• Defense Production and Innovations: MoD Priorities;

• Kids with Drones: Russia Militarizes Education at Record Pace in 2025 (summary of the report);

• Sanctions Evasion and Arms Control;

• and 20+ additional developments in Russia.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

Military Cooperation and Alliances: Russia and China

While some in the West had hoped that a reapproachment in US-Russia relations might pull Moscow away from Beijing, developments have taken a different course. Putin stated that his relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping has reached an “unprecedented level” as the two met in Beijing on the eve of a major military parade.

According to The Telegraph, Russia owes much to China for keeping its fleet of combat drones supplied. An investigation revealed that, between 2023 and 2024, Chinese companies delivered parts and materials worth at least £47 million ($59.7 million) to Russian firms under sanctions for drone production.

Of that sum, around £10.7 million ($13.6 million USD) went to sanctioned entities directly involved in assembling Iranian-designed Shahed drones in Alabuga. Chinese shipments covered a broad range of crucial components: aircraft engines, microchips, metal alloys, optical lenses, fibreglass, chemical binders, and carbon fibre yarns.

Altogether, The Telegraph tracked supplies from 97 different Chinese exporters. This steady flow of drone technology underscores the depth of military cooperation between Beijing and Moscow. In private conversations with European diplomats, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly acknowledged that Beijing could not allow Russia to lose the war, as this would free Washington to concentrate its full strategic attention on China.

“Despite declarations of a ‘no-limits’ partnership,” experts from CEPA argue that “the cooperation is in fact limited.” While joint military exercises have become more frequent, they function primarily as political signals rather than evidence of genuine interoperability between the two forces.

• In its article “The Sleeping Dragon: 5 Simple Ways China Could Instantly Stop the War in Ukraine”, the Russian opposition outlet The Insider reports that China remains virtually the last stronghold keeping Russia afloat amid sanctions. Beijing does not necessarily need to make a politically complex decision and sanction major sectors of Russian exports. It would be enough to quietly halt exports of certain specific goods to Russia. By doing so, China could instantly paralyze key segments of Russia’s military-industrial complex, making it impossible for the war to continue in the foreseeable future.

  The Insider compiled a list of the most critical items:

  • Gunpowder stabilizer: diphenylamine. At least half of Russia’s need for diphenylamine is covered by Chinese supplies.

  • Anti-jamming antennas. Without these antennas, the “Shaheds” would be completely blind.

  • Electric motors (for FPV drones). According to The Insider, Russia relies heavily on imports of small Chinese-made motors for drones. No Russian production on a comparable scale is known to exist. Should Russia be cut off for even a year to a year and a half, it would struggle to establish mass production at home. This would quickly and severely affect the battlefield, where drones have become a central weapon.

  • Carbon fiber. Russia is highly dependent on Chinese carbon fiber. Without it, no Shahed/Geran drone could take flight, and even ordinary drones would become heavier and less efficient.

  • Optical fiber. FPV drones equipped with fiber-optic systems have become a major force in open-terrain combat. Russia is almost entirely reliant on China for both optical fiber and its raw material—quartz glass preforms. Russia does not produce preforms domestically, and its own fiber production may have been disrupted after a Ukrainian strike on the plant in Saransk.

• Russia is cooperating with China on the development of an automated command-and-control system (ACCS) for airborne operations, under the codename “Mech” (R&D project Mech).

  According to the information, the Russian state-owned company Rosoboronexport signed a contract with China’s CETC International Co Ltd in June 2024 for the supply of technical documentation to develop the system, valued at €4.284 million.

• Using original data scraping analysis, infographics, and satellite imagery, CSIS experts assess the degree and substantive nature of changing alignment patterns among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK), and the challenges they pose to global governance.

  CRINK's Support for Russia's War on Ukraine:

Additional developments:

• Recently, a Russian Gerbera drone was found with a camera that contained test footage from a Chinese factory. The video showed workers checking the camera by filming passing cars. The discovery was reported by military technology specialist Serhii Beskrestnov (“Flash”).

• Russia plans to expand its military-technical cooperation with India, according to the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU). From September 15 to 18, St. Petersburg is set to host the fourth meeting of the working subgroup of the Russian-Indian intergovernmental commission on military and military-technical cooperation.

  According to intelligence, over the course of four days, the Indian and Russian delegations intend to develop and agree on plans for bilateral military cooperation activities between Russia and India for 2025–2026.

• Russia is pressuring the Central African Republic (CAR) to phase out the Russian Wagner mercenary group and replace it with Moscow's state-controlled Africa Corps. The Africa Corps, a newly created unit under the Russian Defense Ministry, is part of Moscow's broader effort to centralize control over foreign military operations once handled by Wagner. The CAR government prefers Wagner, which they view as a more effective force with deep ties to local military and political structures. Read about Russian influence on Africa’s illicit economies post-Wagner here.

• Russia plans to sign an intergovernmental agreement on military cooperation with Benin. Russia earlier signed a similar agreement with Togo and will participate in exercises and train military personnel.

• North Korea may soon deploy about 6,000 soldiers and from 50 to 100 pieces of military equipment to Russia - HUR. Read more about Russia’s cooperation with North Korea here.

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Defense Production and Innovations: MoD priorities

Russian Defense Minister Belousov gave an update on the ten priority directions for the Russian MoD. The main priorities of the State Armaments Program through 2036 are: strategic nuclear forces, space assets, air defense, electronic warfare systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and robotics. The program has been structured in line with anticipated threats and new methods of warfare, based on the experience of the “special military operation” (war).

He announced a shift in MoD priorities toward light vehicles over heavy armour, reflecting battlefield tactics since winter 2024–2025. He reported 22,725 motorcycles, ATVs, and buggies already delivered to the front, with 12,186 more expected by August 2025. Russia reportedly purchased over 40,000 Chinese motorcycles in 2024 and may acquire up to 200,000 motorcycles and 60,000 other light vehicles in 2025. The reliance on light vehicles stems from their low cost and mobility compared to tanks, which remain vulnerable to Ukrainian drones amid shrinking Russian armour reserves.

Additional developments:

• The Russian Center for Unmanned Systems Rubikon has adopted unmanned strike boats, conducted training, and rehearsed scenarios, and is now working on improvements. The video footage also shows a submersible boat. Their stated primary mission is to target Ukraine’s maritime infrastructure.

  As for the threat posed specifically by surface drones, the Russians may attempt to replicate the Ukrainian tactic of launching FPV drones from them to strike high-value targets deep in the rear.

  Ukrainian military intelligence is preparing countermeasures against enemy naval drones after one of Russia’s unmanned boats struck a Ukrainian Navy vessel in the Danube Delta.

• One of Russia’s largest drone manufacturers, AO Kronstadt (the manufacturer of the Orion and Inokhodets drones—systems often compared to the American MQ-9 Reaper) is on the verge of bankruptcy after months of financial turmoil and mounting lawsuits, Russian media reported. Ukrainian strikes on Kronstadt’s production facilities added to the difficulties.

Kids with Drones: Russia Militarizes Education at Record Pace in 2025

This is a summary of the report by OpenMinds published in early September. You can access the full report here. OpenMinds is a cognitive defense tech company countering authoritarian influence in the battle for free and open societies.

• Kremlin’s strategy is to attract children to the hottest topic of modern warfare — drones. Russia has been actively promoting this strategy since 2023.

• Across dozens of regions, schools are being equipped with specialised classrooms for drone training, the Ministry of Education has issued a “UAV 101” textbook, and Kremlin-backed patriotic centres — often run by active war veterans — are teaching children war-related skills such as FPV piloting and firearms practice.

• In January 2024, the Ministry of Education announced that schools and colleges in 30 pilot regions would be equipped with the necessary gear to conduct drone training.

• In May 2025, the Russian education system introduced a textbook on UAVs for 8-9 grades in school. It contains general information on the history of drone development and how they are manufactured. Also, there is a chapter called “Foundations of FPV flights” with guides on how to control the FPV drones, currently one of the main types of weapons on the frontline.

• In June, Putin instructed the Ministry of Sports to lower the minimum age for participating in drone piloting competitions. Since then, 7-year-old children are allowed to enter such tournaments.

• There was another notable event in July — six kindergartens in Perm set up infrastructure for drone operations.

• OpenMinds detected 30 000 posts across 4 000 channels related to the promotion of drones among children and youth through school curriculum or events such as workshops, competitions, and hackathons. During the 7 months of 2025, there were 8600 posts — a six-fold increase compared to the whole of 2022.

Sanctions Evasion and Arms Control

Japanese authorities conducted an investigation into the supply of high-precision equipment to Russia’s defense industry and uncovered large-scale sanctions violations. More than 300 machines produced by Tsugami went missing after being sold to seven Chinese companies, with around 30 of them already found in Russia.

Japan has ordered Tsugami to terminate contracts with the intermediaries involved. The company will cease providing support for machines already delivered to Russia and will also cut ties with other suspicious Chinese partners.

Another investigation concerned the company Ferrotec, which supplies chemicals and tools. The investigation confirmed that Ferrotec’s products had reached enterprises of Russia’s military-industrial complex, including companies such as Epiel, Mikron, and Vympel. In April, some of these contracts were terminated, and the supplies were placed under constant monitoring.

Additional developments:

• The Russian arms manufacturer, the Research Institute of Applied Chemistry, is receiving components for RG-Vo chemical grenades—banned under international law—from two Russian companies which, despite supplying a sanctioned defense enterprise, have themselves not yet been subjected to Western economic restrictions. Both the Saransk Mechanical Plant and EuroChemInvest are supplying components, yet neither has been placed under Western sanctions.

• Russian state-owned Biysk Oleum Factory acquired Siemens equipment via a Russian intermediary sourcing from Chinese resellers, circumventing Western sanctions, according to customs and procurement records reviewed by Reuters.

• Russia declared that it no longer considers itself bound by a moratorium on the deployment of nuclear-capable intermediate-range missiles. Under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the U.S. and Russia agreed not to deploy short- and intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles. The U.S. withdrew from the INF in 2019.

  In his Missile Matters Substack, Fabian Hoffmann says that Oreshnik is a missile system based on the Russian RS-26 Rubezh (SS-X-31), which was developed between 2008 and 2018. Oreshnik and the RS-26 are, to a large extent, the same missile; they likely share many features, including payload capacity, range, and function. The Oreshnik serves as further evidence that the INF Treaty was effectively dead long before the United States withdrew under Trump in 2019. From at least the mid-2000s, Russia ceased to view the INF Treaty as a genuine arms control tool. Instead, it treated the treaty as a means to create asymmetric advantages over NATO by developing restricted missile capabilities while ensuring NATO remained constrained.

• According to an interactive chart published by Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence (HUR), Russia has 116 enterprises involved in the production of Kh-59M2/M2A air-launched missiles, nearly 50 of which are still not under sanctions from any country.

  Despite this, Russia is already facing serious difficulties in fulfilling state defense orders. Ukrainian intelligence has documented cases where Kh-59 missiles were fitted with mass-dimensional mock-ups instead of active radar homing heads (ARH seekers).

  The above examples demonstrate that sanctions are working. Further increasing pressure and expanding restrictions on enterprises supplying lower-tier components could reduce the production rate of Russia’s primary strike weapons even more.

• Russia’s largest producer of tanks and armoured vehicles, Uralvagonzavod, uses hundreds of units of foreign equipment in its production. HUR’s database currently contains information on more than 260 CNC machines and machining centres, as well as other high-tech foreign equipment in use at the plant.

  Most of this equipment was purchased during the rearmament of Russia’s military-industrial complex, which had been underway since 2007 in preparation for the full-scale invasion. Uralvagonzavod continues to expand production to sustain Russian aggression.

Russian Drones

Russian UAV adaptations appear to be achieving partial effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI), the Institute for the Study of War reports. BAI refers to the use of air power to strike targets in the near rear of the frontline in order to disrupt battlefield operations in the short term. Such operationally significant targets typically include roads, railways, bridges (key ground lines of communication), command posts, ammunition depots, assembly areas, and training grounds.

Recent Russian drone innovations — including extended FPV flight ranges, limited AI/ML integration, the spread of fiber-optic UAVs, the use of thermobaric warheads, the deployment of sleeper drones, and other technological upgrades — are providing Russian forces with notable battlefield advantages in Ukraine.

Neither side has been able to carry out traditional BAI with manned aircraft or UAVs due to dense air defenses and sophisticated electronic warfare systems. However, Russian forces are increasingly achieving partial BAI effects through drones in support of offensive operations. Tactical UAVs are restricting Ukrainian movements in the immediate rear, complicating troop rotations and medical evacuations. Ukrainian sources report that the battlefield “kill zone” — the contested grey zone dominated by strike and reconnaissance drones — now extends up to 10 kilometers from the frontline. Russian forces are also targeting Ukrainian training grounds with precision missile strikes cued by reconnaissance UAVs.

Support from Russia’s allies, particularly China, has enabled the development and scaling of UAVs that are more resistant to electronic warfare and capable of operating over longer ranges, at higher speeds, and in more challenging conditions.

Additional developments:

• Taras Chmut, founder of the Ukrainian Return Alive foundation, considers the Shahed kamikaze drone the best in the world in its niche. He noted that Ukraine has at least three analogous models with a similar appearance, but they remain inferior in both quality and cost. “Making the Shahed is like making an iPhone. We can take apart an iPhone, right? Why can't we make an iPhone?” he added.

• On September 4, Ukrainian military radio technology specialist Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov informed that Russians have begun using new versions of the Shahed drones, the “Ь” series, which can be remotely controlled via the internet. According to him, this is a recent discovery. These drones have antennas mounted on the wingtips, which improve signal reception and transmission. Beskrestnov added that, unlike the Geran drones, the modems and antennas on these new models have so far proven difficult to locate, as they are destroyed and burned upon impact.

Other developments

• The Kremlin is likely escalating its hybrid campaign involving GPS and communications jamming against NATO states bordering Russia - ISW. Bloomberg reported that European states along Russia's western border and the Baltic Sea, including the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and Sweden, have raised concerns to international transport organizations over sharp increases in GPS and signal jamming and spoofing in recent months, as well as an increase in Russian electronic warfare (EW) installations in border areas.

  In early September, the navigation system of a plane carrying Ursula von der Leyen was disrupted due to suspected Russian interference. Following this development, Italy considers keeping state flights secret.

• Russia is transforming the Ukrainian territories it occupies into a vast military hub — and a potential springboard for future offensives. One of the clearest cases is Donetsk International Airport. Recent Planet Labs satellite images, obtained by the Kyiv Independent, reveal sudden construction activity on the ruins of the long-abandoned airport. The new facilities are serving as a launch site for Russia’s ever-growing fleet of long-range drones. Launches from Donetsk Airport may even allow Shaheds to fly armed with artillery shells that they can drop along the way to their final kamikaze attack.

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A long read summarizing major developments in Russia’s defense production, cooperation, and innovations throughout July. The doubling of gunpowder production, efforts to educate schoolchildren about drones, and an expanding missile arsenal that Russia is reportedly stockpiling—if this doesn’t convince you that Russia is preparing for a broader conflict, I don’t know what will.

Cooperation with North Korea continues to deepen, posing additional challenges for the Indo-Pacific region. Meanwhile, sanctions evasion persists.

It seems the allied West is still not doing enough.

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Military Cooperation and Alliances

On July 1, the Head of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR), Budanov, said that Russia had transferred the first batch of its Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile systems to North Korea and provided North Korea with equipment and technology for producing Shahed-type attack drones. According to Budanov, Moscow has been supplying not just equipment, but also technical expertise and manufacturing capabilities—rather than transferring complete Shahed drones. This move could further destabilize the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Budanov also reported that Russian specialists are currently training North Korean forces to use the systems, which are already deployed for the defense of Pyongyang. North Korean troops are expected to begin operating the systems independently shortly. Available information indicates that North Korean workers are undergoing training at Russian enterprises, including a drone plant in the “Alabuga” Special Economic Zone (Tatarstan), where modified “Shahed” drones are assembled.

According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia is providing North Korea with a wide range of modern weaponry, including:

• tanks, artillery systems, and drones;

• missiles (in particular, air defense missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles);

• MiG-29 and Su-27 aircraft, Mi-8 helicopters;

• air defense systems.

In the technological sphere, Russia is granting North Korea access to microelectronics, missile technologies, gas turbines, and equipment for coal gasification. Additionally, RF supplies Pyongyang with fuel: gasoline and diesel.

Ukrainian officials assessed that North Korea had additionally deployed 20,000 to 30,000 troops to Russia.

During a visit to North Korea, Russian FM Lavrov warned the U.S., South Korea, and Japan against forming a security alliance aimed at countering Pyongyang.

Read more about Russia’s cooperation with North Korea here and here.

Additional developments:

• Since 2022, Belarusian state-owned companies—especially electronics manufacturers—have played a key role in supporting Russia’s war effort by supplying critical components like microchips and capacitors, helping Moscow offset Western sanctions through import substitution. Among Belarusian electronics manufacturers, Minsk-based “Integral” JSC is the key supplier of components to Russian military factories. Its microchips enable the production of critical systems like altimeters for Kh‑101 cruise missiles—one of which struck the “Ohmatdyt” children’s hospital, killing two and injuring sixteen. Integral’s role directly links Belarus to deadly attacks on civilians and infrastructure across Ukraine.

• In December 2024, an Indian company exported $1.4 million worth of HMX (octogen)—a high explosive with military applications—to Russia, according to Indian customs data reviewed by Reuters. One recipient was the Russian firm Promsintez, reportedly linked to Moscow’s military, according to Ukraine’s SBU security service. This shipment occurred despite U.S. warnings of sanctions against entities aiding Russia’s war effort. The Indian company Ideal Detonators Private Limited stated that it complies with all national regulations, and the shipment was made exclusively for civilian-industrial use, not for military purposes.

• Russia again postponed the delivery of the fourth and fifth squadrons of the S-400 systems to India. This is already the second deadline postponement, as the delivery of the last two batteries of the system was supposed to be completed before April 2023.

• Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) claimed that Russia was intensifying its military presence at Armenia's Gyumri base to exert greater influence in the South Caucasus. The news came amid a major deterioration in Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Armenia denied that.

• Russia launched the first phase of a plant in Venezuela to produce 7.62 mm ammunition for Kalashnikov rifles. The facility will manufacture up to 70 million cartridges annually, according to the Russian state corporation Rostec. The agreement was reached in 2006 by Presidents Putin and Chávez. The project was launched in 2009.

• Russia became the first country to formally recognise the Taliban government in Afghanistan.

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Defense Production and Innovations

Gunpowder production in Russia nearly doubled from 2022 to 2024 due to increased imports and domestic manufacturing of cotton cellulose nitrate. This rise suggests a potential doubling in artillery shell output during the same period.

While imports amounted to 1,400 tons in 2019, by 2023 they had more than doubled to 3,000 tons. At the same time, domestic production also grew: between 2016 and 2021, Russia produced an average of 6,500 tons annually, which rose to 11,580 tons in 2023. Altogether, this amounts to 14,600 tons of nitrocellulose, which can yield up to 7,300 tons of pyroxylin gunpowder. For comparison, production volumes in Russia in 2014 were only 1,400 tons.

Russia continues to rely on imported raw materials—especially cotton pulp and cellulose nitrate. There is no significant domestic cotton cultivation in Russia, and most cotton lint, cotton pulp, and cotton cellulose nitrate have recently been imported from Uzbekistan, India, Malaysia, and Türkiye.

The workforce in key defense chemical enterprises increased from 23,600 employees in 2021 to 27,700 in 2024, marking a 17% growth.

Alongside this, thanks to the modernization of production capacities, overall manufacturing efficiency rose by 70%.

These figures demonstrate Russia’s focused expansion of its industrial capabilities to supply its armed forces with large quantities of ammunition.

Additional developments:

• Russian Su-35 fighter jets have begun using the new K-77M long-range air-to-air missile. The K-77M (also known as “Izdeliye 180”) was developed by the JSC “State Design Bureau ‘Vympel’, named after II Toropov, part of the Tactical Missiles Company. It is an upgraded version of the R-77-1 medium-range missile. Unlike the R-77-1, which uses lattice fins, the K-77M features conventional aerodynamic control surfaces and redesigned stabilizers, likely to allow internal carriage aboard the Su-57 fighter. The missile is reportedly powered by a dual-pulse solid-fuel motor, increasing its nominal maximum range from 110 km (R-77-1) to 190 km.

• Russia continues to expand its production of Shahed-type drones in order to launch even larger long-range drone strike packages that include up to 2,000 drones in a single night. Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to 2,000 drones in a single night by November 2025 should the current pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage continue - ISW. Russia’s use of one-way attack drones in nightly strike packages grew at an average monthly rate of 31 percent in both June and July 2025.

Sanctions Evasion

A Spanish company has circumvented international sanctions to deliver a 110-ton forging machine to Russia, which could potentially be used in the production of artillery barrels.

According to the investigation by The Insider, the Spanish firm Forward Technical Trade SL supplied a used CNC forging machine—manufactured by the Austrian company GFE (Gesellschaft für Fertigungstechnik und Entwicklung Schmalkalden e.V.)—to the Russian company AZK Group.

The production of artillery barrels in Russia entirely depends on such equipment. Howitzers’ barrels often wear out and need replacement. They can only be forged with the required precision on machines that Russia is currently unable to manufacture itself.

Austrian GFM forging machines for artillery barrel production have been used by the USSR and Russia since the 1970s.

Without radial forging machines, Russian artillery would soon run out of new barrels, and since Soviet-era reserves are limited, this would create significant problems on the front lines.

Russia and the West

Is Russia Outpacing NATO in Weapons Production? RFE/RL and the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), an open-source intelligence group, recently analyzed Russian and Western weapons production to determine whether Russia truly holds a significant production edge over the U.S. and its allies. Their analysis covered artillery, ammunition, tanks, aircraft, missiles, drones, and air defense systems.

Artillery Shells

Currently, U.S. production stands at about 40,000 shells per month—roughly 480,000 annually—bringing the combined U.S. and EU output to about 1.7 million shells per year.
CIT estimates that Russia’s expanded production facilities in Biysk, Kazan, and elsewhere could generate up to 4 million 152mm and 122mm shells per year.

Analyses by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service and consulting firm Bain & Company for Sky News both estimated Russia’s total artillery shell output for 2024 at approximately 4.5 million rounds.

Russia predominantly produces 122mm and 152mm artillery shells, while the NATO-standard shell has a slightly bigger diameter of 155mm, and is mainly used in the Western Howitzer systems, such as those provided by allies to Kyiv.

Artillery Systems
Russia continues to rely heavily on its vast Soviet-era artillery stockpile. Reserves of towed howitzers have reportedly declined from about 12,000 in 2022 to just over 6,000 by mid-2024. Meanwhile, Russia is estimated to produce fewer than 100 modern self-propelled howitzers annually, including the Msta-S, Giatsint-K, and Malva.
In contrast, NATO countries are increasing production: France plans to manufacture 144 CAESAR systems in 2025, Poland is doubling the output of its AHS Krab to 100 per year, Slovakia is set to produce 40 Zuzana howitzers, and the U.S. builds 216 cannon tubes for its M777 howitzers each year.

Tanks
Russia appears to have the advantage in tank production, having resumed full-scale production of its modern T-90M, with an output of around 280 tanks per year.
Tank production in most European countries is limited. France hasn’t produced a Leclerc tank in over a decade, while the UK has ordered just 148 Challenger 3 tanks for delivery by 2030. Germany produces about 50 Leopard 2A8 tanks annually, and the U.S. manufactures 109 M1A2 Abrams tanks per year.

Combat Aircraft
Here, NATO holds a clear lead. Russia is estimated to produce 50–60 combat aircraft annually, including Su-57 fighters and Tu-160M2 strategic bombers.
Meanwhile, the U.S. alone is set to deliver more than 170 F-35 fighter jets this year. Additional production comes from European partners: France (Rafale), Sweden (Gripen), and others contributing dozens of more advanced jets annually.

Air Defense
As of 2024, Russia operated 248 S-400 batteries and added another 18 in 2025—implying a production rate of around 36 systems per year. Data on other systems like the Tor, Buk, and Pantsir is less transparent.
On NATO’s side, Raytheon produces around 12 Patriot systems per year. Germany’s Diehl plans to produce 8 IRIS-T systems in 2025 and between 800–1,000 associated missiles. NATO also fields the NASAMS system, which uses U.S.-made AIM-120 and AIM-9X missiles—produced at an annual rate of 1,200 and 2,500 units, respectively.

Drones and Cruise Missiles
Ukraine estimates Russia produces around 5,000 long-range drones per month—roughly 60,000 per year. These include the Geran-2 (a variant of Iran’s Shahed) and the Gerbera, a decoy drone without a warhead used to overload air defenses.
NATO does not currently produce equivalents to these low-cost kamikaze drones. The U.S. primarily fields more sophisticated and expensive systems like the Reaper and Global Hawk UAVs.
Russia also manufactures an estimated 200+ cruise and ballistic missiles per month, according to Ukraine’s military intelligence, amounting to 2,400–3,000 missiles annually. By comparison, the U.S. produces around 700 JASSM cruise missiles and 500 ATACMS ballistic missiles per year.
In this category, Russia holds the advantage in both kamikaze drone output and missile volume.

In his article, Russia is Preparing for the Next Missile War — Are We?, Fabian Hoffmann wrote that Russia does not appear to be using its full missile arsenal in Ukraine. Many newly produced missiles have been stockpiled rather than deployed, even during the winter months when attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure were expected.

This suggests a broader objective: Russia is likely reserving these weapons for future contingencies, including a potential confrontation with NATO.

Publicly available Russian military strategy emphasizes a short, intense campaign designed to compel NATO to capitulate quickly. Missile strikes would be central—beginning with limited salvos and escalating rapidly to signal that continued resistance would only lead to greater destruction.

Additional developments:

• Russia said European commercial satellites supporting Ukraine are legitimate targets for signal jamming. In March, eight European countries filed a complaint with the U.N. over Russia’s interference with the continent's satellite communications. Seventeen other EU countries and the U.K. expressed support for the initiative, which urges Russia to stop its alleged sabotage.

• Russia will "firmly defend" its interests in the Baltic region, Kremlin spokesperson Peskov said on July 14, responding to Estonia's recent test of HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems over the Baltic Sea.

• Recent satellite images revealed that Russia has begun building a garrison for an artillery brigade in the Murmansk region near the border with Finland. This construction is the first concrete sign of a lasting troop presence in the area. Local authorities in Murmansk state that a new military town is being built about 150 kilometres from the border, with renovations underway on existing housing.

Russian Drones

The Russian government launched an extensive, multi-tiered initiative aimed at rapidly advancing the country’s drone development and production, with aspirations of becoming a global leader in the field. This plan combines significant federal and regional funding, support for thousands of startups, and even the structured training of schoolchildren in drone technologies.

As of March, Russian state media outlet TASS reported that nearly 900 companies were engaged in drone manufacturing, with about 70% classified as small or medium-sized enterprises. These businesses collectively employ more than 7,000 workers.

Between 2022 and 2025, Russia earmarked 243 billion rubles (roughly $3 billion) specifically for drone development. An additional 112 billion rubles (approximately $1.38 billion) have been set aside in the latest three-year federal budget. This funding is separate from military expenditures, which already account for nearly one-third of the national budget.

While Moscow officially emphasizes non-military goals for its drone program—often citing civilian or commercial uses—the dual-use nature of drone technology makes the boundary between peaceful and military applications inherently unclear. In 2023, Defense News reported that a Russian company, Integrated Robotics Technologies, publicly marketed itself as a manufacturer of agricultural and industrial drones while secretly promoting explosive, single-use drones. The company has not yet been subjected to international sanctions.

A notable feature of the Kremlin’s strategy is its geographic diversification. The 2025–2027 federal budget includes 21 billion rubles (around $260 million) to support eleven regional hubs dedicated to UAV research and production. Many of these facilities are located within existing economic zones, tech parks, or near legacy industrial and research centers—spanning from the St. Petersburg Technopark to Tomsk in Siberia.

Russian media and government statements present this geographic dispersion as part of a broader concept known to analysts as “strategic depth.” The idea is that scattering drone production capabilities across the country makes it more difficult for adversaries—such as Ukraine—to disrupt them with targeted strikes. Some of these facilities have already been attacked by Ukrainian drones.

Russian authorities have systematically involved children in the design and testing of drones for the war in Ukraine through nationwide competitions that begin with innocent-seeming video games and end up with the most talented students headhunted by defence companies, according to a recent investigation by The Insider. Russian authorities are actively cultivating a generation that is being taught not to distinguish between civilian and military uses of technology — and which may be prepared to take part in a war of aggression in exchange for a boost to exam scores or the offer of better career prospects.

ISW reported that Russia continues to use child and youth labor to produce drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan.

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Additional developments:

• Russia recently showcased its “Shturm” robotic assault system during a series of field tests. The platform was developed by Uralvagonzavod, the world’s largest producer of main battle tanks. Designed for remote deployment in hazardous environments—especially urban combat zones—the Shturm emphasizes minimizing personnel risk.

  Although the system is intended for remote operation, at least one unit was observed carrying a crew during testing, implying that its autonomous or remote functionality may still be under refinement.

• Ukrainian OSINT analyst Dnipro Osint (Garbuz) published a detailed report examining where Russia launches Iranian-designed Shahed drones from.

  Main Launch Sites:

  1. Orlov Region – Tsymbulovo Village (Main Hub)

     • ~175 km from the Ukrainian border.

     • Known as the main “droneport” (shown in Russian propaganda).

     • Features: 8 stationary launchers, 2.8 km launch road (vehicle-based), 15 bunkers.

     • Capacity: Up to 14 drones launched simultaneously, over 100 per strike.

     • Up to 3,000 warheads may be stored on-site.

     • One warehouse was destroyed previously with 3 SS missiles (~200 warheads destroyed).

  2. Bryansk Region – Navlya Village

     • ~70 km from the border.

     • Smaller than Orlov, built recently.

     • Features: 3 bunkers (~600 warheads), 3 garages.

     • Only mobile launches possible; no stationary launchers.

     • Can launch only a few drones at a time. May be expanded.

  3. Krasnodar Krai – Primorsko-Akhtarsk

     • ~230 km from the frontline.

     • Tactical airbase with 3 designated Shahed launch zones.

     • 8 stationary launchers + launches from airstrip via vehicles.

     • Capacity: 10 simultaneous, ~25 drones per strike.

     • Protected by an S-400 battery (6 launchers, 2 radars).

  Other Launch Directions:

  • Additional (less-known) launch points exist in Crimea and Eastern Russia, though harder to track.

  • The Orlov base remains the primary hub.

  • A full-scale disruption of Orlov would require dozens of Storm Shadow missiles and coordinated drone attacks.

  Successful Ukrainian Strike Example – Yeysk

  • Target: 726th Air Defense Training Center.

  • Stored: ~20 Shaheds, 90+ recon drones in tented depot.

  • Result: 2 “Neptune” missiles destroyed buildings, injured 9, killed 1, depot wiped out.

  • Supply warehouse in nearby Oktyabrsky (35 km away) was also destroyed.

  • Outcome: No further Shahed launches from Yeysk since.

Russia’s Warfare Tactics

Russian forces may be testing an experimental version of the KAB guided glide bomb to extend its operational range. Ukrainian air defenses successfully intercepted a Russian Grom-1 hybrid missile-bomb near the outskirts of Dnipro City.

Ukrainian air defense official explained that Russia had previously equipped these bombs with jet engines to increase their reach and likely used a lighter warhead on the bomb targeting Dnipro to reduce weight and thus further boost range. It was also suggested that the bomb was launched from an aircraft as close to Dnipro as possible.

Ukrainian expert and a former engineer at the Pivdenne Design Office, Kochetkov, said that the Grom-1 was developed to improve the range and precision of KAB guided bombs while reducing risk to Russian aircraft.

He described the Grom-1 as a hybrid between a glide bomb and the Kh-38 air-to-air missile, utilizing the Kh-38’s propulsion system, which enables a range of approximately 100 to 150 kilometers. Kochetkov also noted that the Grom-1 may have been deployed for the first time in August 2024 during a strike on Kostyantynivka in Donetsk Oblast, but Russia has yet to begin mass production of this missile-bomb.

Russia: Naval Affairs

On July 25, Patrushev, Assistant to the President of Russia, Chairman of the Russian Maritime Board, announced that in the coming years, the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) will be strengthened, including through the introduction of new marine robotic systems. Patrushev noted that the Black Sea Fleet successfully resists the growing opposition of NATO in the region and plays an important role in the special military operation.

A day earlier, Putin said that Russia would ensure its security in all areas of the world's oceans. He also expressed his intention to fully implement the planned plans for the creation of a modern Russian Navy. “There are more than 70 ships at various stages of construction at Russian shipyards. For example, at Sevmash alone, six new nuclear submarines are planned to be built by 2030,” – Putin added.

Ukraine claims it has sunk or disabled a third of all Russian warships in the Black Sea. Beginning with the April 2022 sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva, Ukraine used a combination of domestically produced drones and missiles together with Western-supplied long-range weapons to strike a series of devastating blows against Putin’s fleet. Cruise missiles delivered by Kyiv’s British and French partners have played an important role in this campaign, but the most potent weapons of all have been Ukraine’s own rapidly evolving fleet of innovative marine drones, such as Magura and SeaBaby.

In the most recent edition of the Drone Warfare in Ukraine, I reported that Russia is increasingly investing in naval drone production. In mid-July, Russia opened a unified center for the production of maritime drones based at the defense-industrial enterprise Kingisepp Machine-Building Plant in Saint Petersburg. The shipbuilding enterprise, which specializes in the production of marine propulsion systems and boats, plans to manufacture several dozen maritime drones for civilian purposes.

On May 30, Putin approved a naval strategy through 2050. Among other points, it highlights a significantly increased role for unmanned systems—primarily uncrewed surface vessels, underwater drones, and, in the future, fully autonomous ships.

Additional developments:

• Russian authorities cancelled a major annual navy parade planned for July 26 for “security reasons”, without specifying the threat or concern.

• Russia conducted large-scale naval exercises dubbed “July Storm” on July 23-27, involving over 150 ships and 15,000 personnel across the Pacific and Arctic oceans, as well as the Baltic and Caspian seas.

  During the "July Storm" exercises, the Russian Navy showcased a new unmanned naval vehicle. According to Russian claims, the drone can be launched from a ship, operate autonomously for up to 24 hours, and strike naval targets at distances of over 300 kilometers.

• According to Forbes, Russia has effectively acknowledged that its only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, is nearing the end of its service life and will likely be scrapped or sold. The decision follows years of costly maintenance and a failed 2016 deployment to Syria that highlighted the vessel’s chronic technical issues. Andrei Kostin, head of Russia’s state shipbuilding corporation, confirmed in July that repairing the 40-year-old ship is no longer viable due to its age and high costs.

• A powerful 8.8-magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of Russia’s far eastern Kamchatka Peninsula early on July 30, generating tsunami waves across the Pacific. The epicenter was located just about 75 miles from a strategic concentration of Russian naval bases, including facilities that house nuclear ballistic missile submarines. The proximity of the quake has raised questions about potential damage to these military installations.

  While modern submarines are built to withstand underwater pressure and shocks, land-based infrastructure, including missile storage depots, docking systems, and nuclear maintenance facilities, is far more susceptible to seismic damage. If any part of the command-and-control systems were compromised, the consequences could be severe — not just for Russia, but for global nuclear stability. The fact that one of the world’s most dangerous nuclear stockpiles sits atop one of the world’s most active seismic zones is a strategic paradox that demands international attention.

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Russia is producing as much ammunition in just three months as NATO does in an entire year and could be ready to use military force against the Alliance within five years, the NATO Secretary General has warned.

According to figures provided by Ukraine, Russia has increased its ballistic missile production by 66% over the past year, already surpassing the total production of air defense missiles for Patriots. When you add drone capabilities, currently at a production rate of 2,000 Shahed-type drones per month, with plans to increase to 5,000 per month, this creates a recipe for disaster not only for Europe but for the entire world.

In this newsletter, I provide an overview of how Russia is expanding its military presence simultaneously across multiple regions, including Africa and the Arctic.

This digest on Russia is open access — feel free to read and share! Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

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Military Cooperation and Alliances

Russia’s cooperation with its allies is a two-way street: it not only receives weapons to sustain its war effort, but also transfers advanced military technologies, particularly those related to drone production.

The Commander of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Kyrylo Budanov, told The War Zone that Russia is supplying technology and expertise to North Korea to support the development of long-range kamikaze drones (Garpiya and Geran) and significantly improve the accuracy of North Korean KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles. This support also extends to helping Pyongyang advance its submarine-based nuclear deterrent.

Possessing Shahed-type drones would give North Korea the ability to strike targets anywhere in South Korea, and potentially in large volumes. These drones could overwhelm South Korea’s air defenses, clearing the way for follow-up attacks with other munitions. Additionally, they could be exported back to Russia to support its war effort in Ukraine.

According to reports, North Korea plans to send 25,000 workers to a Russian drone manufacturing plant in exchange for training in drone operations.

In early June, North Korea supplied Russian military forces with 140mm towed mortars, following the 60mm mortars.

Additional developments:

• According to report “Russian Mercenary and Paramilitary Groups in Africa” by RAND, Russian mercenaries maintain an active presence in six African countries: Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, Mali, Niger, and Sudan. These forces include a mix of Wagner Group operatives, Africa Corps personnel, and, in the case of Burkina Faso, a new paramilitary group known as Brigade Bear, which provides security services. In Chad and Mauritania, Russian mercenaries are carrying out “spillover operations”, crossing the borders from neighboring Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali.

  Russian mercenaries serve as a key instrument through which Moscow seeks to counter its growing international isolation, both economic and political. However, the security situation in the countries where they operate is deteriorating. These groups often exploit instability for profit, worsening the very crises they claim to mitigate. GI-TOC prepared a great report, “After the Fall. Russian Influence on Africa’s Illicit Economies Post-Wagner”, and you can read its summary here.

• The Russia-backed Wagner Group announced that it is leaving Mali after more than three and a half years of fighting Islamic extremists and insurgents there. However, Russia will still maintain a mercenary presence in the country. On the same day, the Africa Corps, Russia’s state-controlled paramilitary force, said that Wagner’s departure would not change anything, and Russian forces would remain in Mali.

• Russia has been shipping weapons to conflict zones in West Africa in violation of international sanctions. According to the AP, Russian-flagged cargo ships transported howitzers, radio jammers, and other military equipment to a port in Guinea in late May, following a month-long journey from the Baltic Sea. Similar shipments arrived at the same port in January, carrying armored vehicles and tanks. Reportedly, the weapons delivered to Guinea were then carried in trucks to neighboring Mali.

• Russia has been using a Chinese-made Silent Hunter laser to shoot down Ukrainian drones despite persistent claims from Beijing that it is not offering military support to Moscow. It is one of the most significant and sophisticated pieces of equipment that Russia has obtained from China during the three-year war on Ukraine.

• Moscow is planning to deploy multiple Oreshnik missile systems to Belarus by the end of 2025. The "Oreshnik" is an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that Russia touts as an experimental weapon capable of bypassing advanced air defense systems.

• Moscow offered India the Su-57E stealth fighter and full access to its source code. Such access would let India embed home-grown avionics and weapons under its Make-in-India drive. India is weighing the purchase of Russia’s Su-57 stealth fighter, drawn by promises of technology access and rapid delivery. However, strategic concerns, including Moscow’s deepening ties with China and India’s push for indigenous defense development, are complicating the decision.

Defense Production and Innovations

Russia’s production of ballistic missiles has increased by at least 66% over the past year, according to data from Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) shared with the Kyiv Independent. Moscow is now producing 60 to 70 Iskander-M — the ballistic version of the missile — and 10 to 15 hypersonic Kinzhals per month. This compares to a reported 40 Iskander-Ms in May 2024, and a reported 4–5 Kinzhals in April 2024.

If HUR's figures are correct, Russia’s production of ballistic missiles today outnumbers total production of PAC-3 MSE missiles for Patriot air defense systems, the preferred anti-ballistic defenses for much of Europe, which Lockheed Martin hopes to boost to 650 per year by 2027. “Other Western systems like the SAMP/T and IRIS-T have not proved effective against ballistic missiles”.

Additional developments:

• Russia's weapons arsenal includes over 1,950 strategic missiles and thousands of drones, according to Ukraine's military intelligence agency (HUR), including up to 500 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, as well as up to 150 hypersonic Kinzhal missiles. Moscow also has up to 60 North Korean-made KN-23 ballistic missiles.

  In addition to ballistics, Russia possesses up to 300 Iskander-K cruise missiles, up to 260 Kh-101 cruise missiles, up to 280 Kh-22/Kh-32 cruise missiles, and over 400 Kalibr cruise missiles.

• Open-source intelligence suggests that Russia is increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities. Georgia-based organization Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) reported that Russia has been undertaking systemic efforts to increase tank production since before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and estimated that pre-war production rates and Russia's transition to a constant production schedule since 2022 have likely allowed Russia's primary tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod to produce 60 to 70 T-90M new tanks in 2022; 140 to 180 new tanks in 2023; and 250 to 300 new tanks in 2024.

• Ukraine’s Foreign Minister warned that Russia has begun preparing strategic military reserves, signaling plans for military operations that may extend beyond Ukraine.

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Russia in the Arctic

The Kremlin is expanding its military presence in the Arctic and preparing a foothold for resource-driven expansion, — said a representative of Ukraine’s HUR.

A key tool in implementing Russia’s Arctic strategy is the state-owned Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute. Although officially tasked with “scientific objectives,” the institute is part of Moscow’s broader resource and military project, which aims to:

• Conduct geological exploration of new gas and oil fields;

• Analyze ice conditions in the Northern Sea to lay out shipping routes;

• Model climate and oceanographic changes up to 2035 to support long-term regional exploitation.

Scientific expeditions organized by the institute study water temperature, current strength, wind dynamics, and forecast changes in ice coverage. All of this data has a dual purpose — for civilian use and for planning military operations and naval fleet movements.

At the same time, Russia is building up regional infrastructure: installing communications equipment, including satellite systems, which could be used to coordinate Arctic operations by Russia’s Northern Fleet and support the activities of unmanned systems.

“The world must be prepared for the fact that the Kremlin’s so-called ‘scientific initiatives’ are merely a cover for a new phase of Arctic militarization. The aggressor state is gradually turning the region into a platform for projecting power, controlling logistical routes, and gaining access to resources. If the international community continues to underestimate these developments, the Arctic could become the next flashpoint,” said Andrii Yusov, a representative of HUR.

Read more about Russia’s military expansion in the Arctic here.

Sanctions and Sanctions Evasion

Russia’s strategy for evading sanctions relies on leveraging countries that do not enforce these restrictions to buy and sell what they need, writes Eric Woods for Riddle. As a result, Russia has not only rebuilt its international trade with new partners but has also successfully sourced critical parts and components for military production despite sanctions.

Western governments have not applied as much diplomatic pressure as they might have on the key third countries that facilitate Russia’s sanctions evasion—countries that consider their trade with Russia entirely legal.

At present, the overwhelming majority of electronic components for Russia’s drone and missile program come from Hong Kong and Southern China. Beyond electronics, Russia’s military production lines rely on modern machine tools and advanced robotics. According to the investigation, the most important sources (in order of importance) for Russian acquisition of machine tools were Turkey, South Korea, the UAE, and China.

• Zelensky stated that Russia continues to receive machine tools for its defense industry from abroad, including exports from eight Czech companies. According to The Insider, around 12 Czech equipment manufacturers supplied machinery to Russia in 2024.

  Most of the metalworking equipment exports from the Czech Republic to Russia are routed through third countries, including Estonia, Serbia, Turkey, and Latvia. According to Russian customs data reviewed by The Insider, imports of Czech machine tools to Russia totaled $18 million in 2023 and $12 million in 2024.

  Among the Czech manufacturers whose products ended up in Russia, at least 12 companies were identified. Three of them — Šmeral Brno, Varnsdorf, and TAJMAC-ZPS — accounted for the majority of the exports, totaling around $8 million.

• A Ukrainian anti-corruption NGO, NAKO, has identified antennas supplied by an Irish Company, Taoglas, in the wreckage of Russian bombs. NAKO said the patch antenna arrays cost just $7 (€6.16) each and are an important component in allowing Russian bombs to evade Ukrainian jamming systems. They are part of the Kometa (comet) module being used to evade Ukrainian air defences. NAKO has concluded that Russia needs so many antennas for their UMPKs that it is cheaper and easier for them to import them from abroad.

• Ukraine’s military intelligence analyzed the wreckage of Russia’s new Shahed drones equipped with AI-based targeting and identified that some components were sourced from third countries: United States – 65 components (Texas Instruments; Analog Devices; ON Semiconductor (ONSEMI) etc); China – 8 components (XLSEMI, WeEn Semiconductors, GigaDevice, EGmicro, and others); Switzerland – 8 components (STMicroelectronics, U-blox, TE Connectivity); Japan – 4 components (Toshiba, Renesas, Murata); Germany – 3 components (Infineon Technologies, Pierburg); Taiwan – 3 components (Panjit, Winbond); Austria – 1 component (ams-OSRAM); South Korea – 1 component (RN2 Technologies); Netherlands – 1 component (NXP Semiconductors); unknown origin – 3 components. I wrote about these AI-equipped Shaheds here.

Nuclear Russia

On June 1, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) carried out Operation Spiderweb, disabling 34% of Russia’s cruise missile bomber fleet and inflicting an estimated $7 billion in damage.

This development sparked widespread concern that the attack may have crossed significant thresholds, potentially marking a dangerous escalation due to its impact on Russia’s nuclear delivery capabilities.

As nuclear strategy expert Fabian Hoffmann writes in his Substack, currently, Russia is estimated to deploy around 1,600–1,700 strategic nuclear warheads on approximately 700 strategic nuclear delivery systems. Russia maintains its strategic bomber fleet as fully dual-capable, without dividing it into separate "nuclear" and "conventional" sub-fleets. Among the three legs of its nuclear triad, the air-based leg is the smallest: “it accounts for only about 10 percent of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which are supposed to deliver around 11 percent of Russian strategic nuclear warheads in case of a major nuclear confrontation”. From an escalation management perspective, targeting this component is considered less escalatory than striking more critical assets. For example, if Ukraine were to destroy a docked SSBN undergoing maintenance, it could significantly undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent, given the essential operational role each SSBN plays in its strategic posture.

Additional developments:

• Putin claimed that Russia possesses the world’s most advanced nuclear triad, stating that 95% of its strategic nuclear forces are equipped with modern weapons — the highest share globally, according to him. He directed officials to prioritise nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of Russia’s sovereignty in the new state armaments programme for 2027–2036.

• Satellite images reveal that Russia expanded and modernized at least five nuclear-related facilities near European borders in recent years, Swedish broadcaster SVT reported. One of the most notable developments is in Kaliningrad, where the suspected nuclear weapons storage site has undergone significant reconstruction. In Novaya Zemlya, a remote Arctic archipelago long linked to Soviet-era nuclear testing, several new buildings have appeared, reinforcing its role as a potential site for future test activities.

Russian Drones

In the first two weeks of June alone, Russia launched as many long-range attack drones against Ukraine as it did during entire months in 2023.

On June 18, Ukrainian forces recovered debris from a Shahed drone equipped with an advanced camera, a computing platform with AI and machine learning capabilities, and a radio system that allows remote operation by the drone’s pilot. Some Shahed drones have also been upgraded with thermal imaging cameras, significantly enhancing their precision and overall effectiveness.

Additionally, Russian forces are reportedly using cheaply made drones, such as the Gerbera drone, to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems.

• According to Ukraine’s HUR, Russia is now building about 2,000 Shahed type of drones per month, with plans to increase that to 5,000 per month. Russia is continually improving Shahed’s range, payload, connectivity, and attack patterns.

• Putin stated that Russia is in the process of forming unmanned systems forces as a separate branch of the military, emphasizing the need for their rapid and high-quality deployment and development.

  He added that the state armament program should focus on the development and integration of advanced digital technologies and artificial intelligence into weapon systems and military equipment. It should also promote the advancement of weapons based on new physical principles, as well as ground and maritime robotic platforms.

• Russia has developed a new loitering munition called the V2U that, according to Ukrainian reports, can use AI to navigate and strike targets and may have a swarm capability. If these reports are true, the V2U marks a significant step forward in Russian autonomous drone development. The disclosed specifications of the V2U include:

  • electric motor, battery capacity: 34 A⋅h,

  • flight time: 1 hour,

  • cruising speed: 60 km/h.

  There's also a new modification of this drone equipped with an internal combustion engine, increasing the range to 100 km. The core of V2U's brains is the Nvidia Jetson Orin — a ready-made modular solution for artificial intelligence from a world-leading developer and manufacturer of graphics processors, video cards, and other PC components.

Other News

• Russia mobilizes around 40,000-45,000 men for its military every month, while Ukraine mobilizes about 25,000-27,000, President Zelensky said.

• Putin ordered his military command to substantially enhance the combat capabilities of Russia’s ground forces.

• Putin approved a new naval strategy aimed at fully restoring Russia's position as a leading global maritime power. Russia currently operates the world's third most powerful navy, according to most public rankings, behind China and the United States. However, the fleet has suffered a string of losses during the war against Ukraine, particularly in the Black Sea.

With or without a peace agreement with Ukraine, Russia is preparing for a broader confrontation. According to the Dutch intelligence, Russia will be ready for a new war a year after the end of hostilities in Ukraine. The country has increased military spending to more than 6% of GDP this year, from 3.6% before the war, and is producing much more artillery than it needs for the war with Ukraine.

While many remain sceptical about the potential for the armed conflict between Russia and the collective West, or separate countries of the Western bloc, I remember many articles with similar titles like “Five reasons why Putin might not invade” published just days before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Let’s stay informed and prepared!

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Military Cooperations and Alliances

According to the report released by the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, established to monitor the implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea, the rapid expansion of cooperation between North Korea and Russia contributed to Moscow’s ability to increase its missile attacks against Ukrainian cities, including targeted strikes against critical civilian infrastructure. It also provided the resources to allow North Korea to fund its military programs and further develop its ballistic missiles programs, which are themselves prohibited under multiple UNSCRs, and gain first-hand experience in modern warfare, in return for its military support to Russia against Ukraine in which over 11,000 North Korean troops have been deployed to Russia since October 2024.

While Russia faces a labor shortage of 1.5 million workers, which could rise to 2.4 million by 2030, North Korea is apparently ready to help. Reportedly, the country sent 15,000 workers to Russia to help alleviate a labor shortage driven by Moscow’s military losses in Ukraine and falling birth rates.

“In exchange for military support, Russia is compensating North Korea with missile and space technologies. It is also possible that this includes technologies related to nuclear weapons or their advancement,” the head of Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service said.

The Telegraph reported that the Kremlin sent North Korea an advanced air defence system in exchange for thousands of troops that battled Ukrainian forces inside Russia.

Additional developments:

• Zelensky said that China has stopped selling Mavic drones to Kyiv and other European nations while continuing shipments to Russia. According to European officials, China also appears to have restricted exports of certain components, such as magnets used in drone motors, to Western buyers, while simultaneously increasing such shipments to Russia. Read more about Russia-China cooperation here.

• Ukraine confirmed Chinese supplies to 20 Russian military plants, the intelligence chief said. China supplies tooling machines, special chemical products, gunpowder, and components specifically to Russia’s defence manufacturing industries.

• In the near future, Iran plans to supply Russia with launchers for its short-range ballistic missiles, specifically the Fath-360 system. With a 75-mile (120-km) range, the Fath-360 would give Moscow's forces a new weapon to fire at Ukrainian frontline troops, nearby military targets, and population centers close to the border with Russia, analysts say.

• Russia has relied heavily on Iranian-designed drones to execute its war against Ukraine. Russia and Iran have coordinated a multi-billion-dollar project to produce Iranian-designed drones inside Russia for use in the war in Ukraine, according to a report published by C4ADS. Iranian company Sahara Thunder collaborated with the Russian firm Alabuga JSC to transfer the technology and expertise needed to produce a variant of the S-136 drone. The companies used a UAE-based intermediary to conduct parts of their partnership.

• A significant number of Russian heavy weapons appeared for the first time in the arsenal of the Libyan National Army (LNA), which controls a portion of the country. Among the most notable items were 300 mm BM-30 Smerch multiple launch rocket systems and Tor short-range air defense systems, both seen for the first time in Libya.

• Niger’s military regime has abruptly ended its intelligence cooperation with its key allies, Russia and Turkey. The primary reason for the decision was the low effectiveness of both the equipment and the personnel provided by Russian and Turkish partners.

• Russia’s Africa Corps, also known as the Russian Expeditionary Corps (REK), released an image of a BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle operating in an undisclosed location in Africa, likely in Mali. According to regional analysts, the deployment of armored fighting vehicles such as the BMP-3 highlights a continued shift toward more formalized state-backed military support in Africa under the Russian flag.

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Defense Production and Innovations

Several reports released last month claimed that Russia has increased its production of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as improved their quality.

The Economist, while arguing that Russia is unlikely to initiate an invasion or armed conflict with NATO, reported that Russia is producing weapons at a remarkable pace, estimating over 1,400 Iskander ballistic missiles and around 500 Kh-101 cruise missiles being made each year.

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency recently released an interesting infographic with its estimates of Russia’s current capabilities and projections for future production. For all existing types of hypersonic weapons, Russia’s current arsenal is estimated at approximately 200–300 units, including the Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal," the "Tsirkon," and the "Avangard" warheads. By 2035, this number is projected to grow to 1,000 missiles.

As for cruise missiles, Russia is currently estimated to possess between 300 and 600 units, with a projected increase to 5,000 by 2035. For intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the current number is around 350, with a slight projected rise to 400 by 2035.

According to a recent investigation, Russia has significantly increased production of Kh-101 cruise missiles. Their production has risen from 56 units annually to approximately 50 per month. This is supported by round-the-clock operations in three shifts. At least 633 Kh-101 missiles are expected to be manufactured — 400 under a primary state contract and 233 under supplemental agreements.

Also, Russia is undertaking a major factory expansion to ramp up production of a RDX, a powerful explosive used in artillery shells and other munitions. It is not currently produced at Sverdlov Plant’s factory, the Biysk Oleum Plant (BOZ). The plant is located about 3,000 km (1,860 miles) east of Moscow, which puts it out of range of most Ukrainian attack drones. The new facility is expected to produce 6,000 metric tons of high explosive annually. This would be enough to fill the warheads of 1.28 million of Russia's OF-29 artillery shells, a common long-range projectile that measures 152 mm in diameter.

For its other report, The Economist used commercial mobile-phone tracking data to measure human activity at major defense-industrial sites across Russia. These indicators (device presence, traffic patterns, fitness app usage) reveal massive increases in night shifts, construction, and workforce relocation near key arms plants. Russia has also invested in support infrastructure such as housing, commuter corridors, and dormitories, especially near NATO borders (e.g. Luga).

The Ukrainian authorities claimed that Russians recently upgraded their Iskander-M ballistic missiles. The modified missiles are now equipped with radar-decoy systems and use quasi-ballistic flight paths that make them more difficult to track and intercept using Patriot systems. Read more in my recent newsletter.

Additional news:

• Russia has invested heavily in the repair of Tu-95MS strategic bombers, indicating plans to use these Soviet-era aircraft for many years. In March 2025, the Russian Ministry of Defence approved and funded the overhaul of six Tu-95MS strategic bombers.

Sanctions and Sanctions Evasion

Russia's defense industry has adapted to a new normal. Despite international sanctions, factories across the country have been able to keep building bullets and shells, drones and military vehicles. "Things don't have to be great; not everything needs to be functioning or running. You just need to have them accessible for the armed forces at the right moment and in the right place," reports Kyiv Independent. This system of military supplies, however, is still reliant on outside help. Higher-tech components such as microchips and semiconductors are more difficult to acquire, and this is where Russia's third-country connections prove vital.

The number of foreign parts used for the production of Kh-101 cruise missiles has decreased significantly in recent years. For instance, an altimeter is a key part of a missile's guidance system, enabling cruise missiles to determine their position in space, adjust altitude, and maneuver around terrain or avoid air defense systems. Without this sophisticated component, Russia’s cruise missiles wouldn’t be able to function effectively in combat. Internal documents from Russia’s TRV-Engineering suggest that the country and its allies have largely localized the production of these systems. The only component not confirmed to be domestically produced is a chip made by Integral OJSC, a manufacturer based in Minsk.

Russia and the West

• Russia is expanding its bases along the border with Finland. Military experts inside Russia, though, characterize the activity along the Finnish border as part of the Kremlin’s preparation for potential conflict with NATO: “When the troops are back [from Ukraine], they will be looking over the border at a country they consider an adversary”.

• Data analysed by the BBC show that Ukraine's Western allies have paid Russia more for its hydrocarbons than they have given Ukraine in aid. By 29 May, Russia had made more than €883bn ($973bn; £740bn) in revenue from fossil fuel exports since the start of the full-scale invasion, including €228bn from the sanctioning countries. The lion's share of that amount, €209bn, came from EU member states.

Warfare tactics

• Eight Il-76 transport aircraft arrived at the Engels-2 airbase in just four days - Ukrainian sources reported on May 29. These transport planes deliver Kh-101/555 cruise missiles. This possibly indicates that the Russian military is preparing for a massive missile strike on Ukraine in the near future.

• Russia appears to be preparing to incorporate motorcycles more systematically into its offensive operations in Ukraine during the summer and fall of 2025, likely as a way to counter Ukraine’s effective use of drones. The Russian Ministry of Defense released footage showing what are likely members of the 299th Airborne Regiment (part of the 98th Airborne Division) conducting both offensive and defensive maneuvers on motorcycles in small groups of two to three at a training facility in Russia. Motorcycles allow Russian soldiers to enhance their speed and maneuverability, which is crucial for evading Ukrainian drone strikes, but the loud noise of the motorcycle prevents the rider from hearing approaching Ukrainian drones.

• Russia deployed decoy S-300/S-400 systems in the Far East in place of actual air defense systems. This was identified by a Japanese OSINT analyst through satellite imagery analysis. Two such decoys were spotted at the site of the 1533rd Guards Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment near Vladivostok. It appears that Russia is attempting to maintain the illusion of sustained air defense capabilities in the Far East. At the same time, this tactic may help conceal the transfer of real air defense systems closer to the Russia–Ukraine front line.

Russian Drones

• Russia seeks to produce up to 500 drones per day, Zelensky said. He expressed doubt that Russia could launch 1,000 drones in a single attack, but acknowledged it could become possible in the future if Russia amasses enough drones over time.

• Despite bold claims, Russia is currently incapable of launching a thousand Shahed-type attack drones at Ukraine every day, said Editor-in-Chief of Ukrainian publication Defense Express. Reaching such a scale would require significant time and effort to ramp up production.
  To reduce Russia’s ability to produce Shaheds, it is essential to target component suppliers, strike final assembly facilities, and enforce sanctions more effectively.

• A Ukrainian officer told The Economist that Russian drones are operating at altitudes between 2,000 and 2,500 meters—beyond the reach of the small-caliber weapons and shoulder-launched missiles typically used by Ukraine's mobile air defense teams. On May 25, Russian forces had recently achieved a new altitude record for Shahed drones, reaching 4,900 meters. It was also reported that Russia is ramping up production of both Shahed and decoy drones and is increasingly deploying them at higher altitudes.

• On May 29, Russians attacked with a new type of strike jet-powered UAV called “DAN-M.” These UAVs were launched in a group from Crimea. The “DAN-M” is originally a jet-powered target drone used for air defense training and testing, which Russia has converted into a strike UAV. It's unclear why Russia made this modification — perhaps simply because they have a large stockpile of these drones. Flight time: 25–40 minutes
  Speed: 400–750 km/h
  Flight altitude: up to 9 kilometers

• Russian engineers are working to integrate FPV drones into a prototype naval reconnaissance and strike platform known as Katran. The effort involves adapting the serially produced 10-inch Skvorec FPV drone for operations from a naval drone carrier. The Katran unmanned boat, currently undergoing trials with Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, will serve as the launch platform. Developers claim it can carry and deploy dozens of FPV drones at ranges of 100–200 km. After launch, the vessel would act as a control signal relay.

Other News

• Russia is introducing new nuclear-tipped air-to-air missiles as part of an overall expansion of its nuclear forces, according to an assessment from the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency, or DIA. Russia probably maintains a nuclear stockpile of about 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and up to 2,000 non-strategic warheads.

• Since the beginning of 2025, the Ukraine’s Defense Forces have hit more than one thousand Russian tanks (1,159) and more than two and a half thousand war-armored vehicles (2,510), Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi said. Ukraine's General Staff on May 18 reported that Russia lost 10,832 tanks and 22,645 other armored vehicles since the start of the full-scale invasion.

  Independent open-source intelligence platform ORYX visually verified the destruction of 3947 Russian tanks and 7987 other armored vehicles.

  

• Satellite images show a complete depletion of armored vehicle stocks at the Omsk Tank-Automotive Engineering Institute’s storage facility. A relatively small amount of equipment was stored at this base. This is the only higher education institution in Russia that trains engineers specializing in the repair, maintenance, and modernization of motor vehicles and armored vehicles. The fact that equipment is being removed from educational institutions’ warehouses highlights the Russian army’s problems with depleting its equipment reserves.

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In its war against Ukraine, Russia continues to rely heavily on its artillery dominance—a traditional cornerstone of both its physical and psychological warfare. Ukrainian forces have made countering this a top priority, destroying 49 Russian artillery systems on April 19 alone. To reinforce its capabilities, Russia has turned to allies in the Far East, including North Korea, which has reportedly supplied M1991 multiple launch rocket systems, as well as at least 4 million artillery shells.

Unfortunately for Ukraine, North Korean missiles have significantly improved and were used in recent attacks on civilian populations.

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Military Cooperations and Alliances

China remains the main enabler of the Russian war effort in Ukraine. On April 17, Zelensky stated, referring to Ukraine’s intelligence sources, that China is supplying weapons to Russia, including gunpowder, artillery. China dismissed this claim. More recently, Kyiv presented Beijing with evidence that “Chinese representatives are engaged in the production of some weapons on the territory of Russia”.

Earlier this month, two Chinese nationals were captured by Ukraine’s armed forces in the Donetsk region of Ukraine. According to Western intelligence, more than one hundred Chinese citizens are fighting for the Russian military against Ukraine as mercenaries, with no apparent direct ties to the Chinese government.

It was reported that China has been actively adopting modern warfare practices currently used in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as the Chinese military has begun introducing fiber-optic FPV drones and drones equipped with machine vision systems for automatic targeting.

The other close ally of Russia, North Korea, has been supplying artillery shells, missiles, and even soldiers in exchange for oil products and advanced rocket technology. Experts note that the North Korean defense industry operates as a branch of the Russian one. Reportedly, the majority of artillery shells used by Russian forces in Ukraine in 2024 were manufactured in North Korea. In some Russian military units, between 75% and 100% of artillery shells are North Korean-made.

Over the past 20 months, North Korea has supplied Russia with at least 4 million artillery shells, according to a Reuters investigation. The shells are systematically shipped by sea and rail, significantly boosting Russia’s firepower on the front lines.

The quality of North Korean weaponry has also been improving. It turns out that KN-23 missiles are now capable of maneuvering and evading Ukraine's air defense interceptors during the terminal phase of flight — something they were not able to do before. You can read the report on the improved quality of North Korean missiles in my recent newsletter: Ukraine sees marked improvement in accuracy of Russia's North Korean missiles.

Recently, North Korean artillery systems, specifically the powerful 170mm “Koksan” guns, have been spotted in Russian-occupied Crimea. The Koksan’s extended range – up to 60 kilometers with rocket-assisted projectiles – makes them particularly dangerous, as only Ukraine’s HIMARS and GLSDB systems have the capacity to strike back. Additionally, in April, Russian forces started using North Korean M-1991 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in combat operations against Ukraine.

Reportedly, the ballistic missile that struck a residential building in Kyiv on April 24 and killed at least 12 people was made in North Korea. It contained at least 116 components sourced from multiple countries — most of them made by U.S. companies.

Additional developments:

• Russia committed to helping military governments in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger acquire arms and training for a planned 5,000-strong force to deploy in the central Sahel region. (I’ve reported on the Russian post-Wagner involvement in Africa in one of my previous newsletters: read here).

• Syrian authorities requested that Russia extradite ousted dictator Bashar al-Assad, but were turned down. Speaking to the NYT, Syrian President al-Sharaa alluded to the possibility of continued military cooperation with Moscow, stressing Syria's long-standing reliance on Russian arms.

• On April 14, 2025, it was reported by Janes, that Russia had formally requested permission from Indonesia to station long-range military aircraft at Manuhua Air Force Base in Biak Numfor, Papua, a mere 1,200 kilometers from Darwin, Australia. Indonesia dismissed the report of a Russian request to base aircraft in Papua. Moscow has defended its military ties with Jakarta but did not deny claims that it sought access to an air base in Indonesia.

• Don’t Let Russia Build a Naval Base in Sudan (Mohamed Suliman for Kyiv Post). Recently, Russia almost secured an agreement to build a naval base on the Red Sea east of Sudan. The West should prevent this step as it will pose a serious threat to the regional interests and the stability of world trade in the Red Sea area. The implications of building the Russian naval base will be severe; this unique location on the Red Sea will provide Putin with a strong foothold to project power and threaten global trade that traverses an area crucial for 30 percent of the world’s shipping containers. Conceivably, this could become an ideal pressure card that Russia could use ruthlessly against European nations. Russia could also utilize what would be its first African naval base to transfer mercenaries and smuggle gold from the continent to finance its unjust war against Ukraine.

• On April 4, the Russian-Indian naval exercises, INDRA, successfully concluded in the Bay of Bengal. Over the course of three days, the sailors from both countries practiced tactical maneuvering in joint groups and improved practical skills in combating unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned boats of a hypothetical adversary.

• India is accelerating its push to boost defence exports, aiming to fill the gap left by countries traditionally dependent on Russian weaponry. New Delhi plans to expand the availability of cheap loans for arms purchases—even for nations with higher political or credit risks.

• Rosoboronexport has announced a plan to establish a new maintenance and repair center for Russian Mi military helicopters in Peru. Rosoboronexport’s service center framework will be presented to the Peruvian government alongside the introduction of other Russian-made equipment to further expand the firm’s reach in the Latin American region.

Military Production and Innovations

A central element of Russia’s strategy in Ukraine has been its reliance on massive and sustained artillery bombardments. In contrast, Western militaries have in recent years shifted focus away from traditional artillery, favoring the precision and sophistication of smart munitions. For Russian commanders, however, artillery remains a psychological and physical weapon—used to devastate enemy positions and break the will of those defending them - writes Michael Peck for The Business Insider.

Russia’s defense industry ramped up production of its latest wheeled self-propelled howitzers (either Malva or Giatsint-K), reported Militarnyi. A photo showing a train convoy of these systems was published in February. At least 8 guns were recorded as being transported on the platforms. The Defense Express poses a question: What kind of military doctrine does Russia have in mind for using these wheeled self-propelled guns in its operations? Wheeled artillery has not been a traditional component of the Russian arsenal, meaning there is no established strategic or tactical framework for its use.

Additional developments:

• Putin: Russia's armed forces are still short of certain weapons, including drones, despite a big increase in production. Russia’s production of weapons, communications, reconnaissance and electronic warfare systems more than doubled. The troops received over 4,000 units of armoured weapons, 180 combat aircraft and helicopters. More than 1.5 million drones of various types had also been produced, Putin added, including about 4,000 first-person view (FPV) drones.

• Putin unveiled a sweeping development strategy for the Russian Navy, outlining plans for a significant expansion and modernization through 2050. The strategy emphasizes the integration of advanced technologies, including hypersonic weaponry and unmanned systems, while committing RUB 8.4 trillion ($100.8 billion) over the next decade for the construction of new warships.

  Over the past five years, 49 ships of various classes have been built, and from 2020 to 2024, to this date, four Project Borei-A strategic submarines and four Project Yasen-M multipurpose submarines have been commissioned - Putin said.

• Russia launched the fifth Project 885M Yasen-M nuclear-powered submarine, Perm. Perm would be the first Yasen-class submarine to serve as a dedicated carrier of 3M22 Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile.

• Russia's modernized ballistic missiles are now harder to intercept, according to Ukraine’s authorities. The Russians have increased the proportion of ballistic missile use since the beginning of 2024.

• The Ukrainian military publication Defense Express revealed satellite images showing progress on Russia's new flagship, "Ivan Rogov," under construction in occupied Kerch, Crimea. This vessel will surpass the sunken cruiser "Moskva" in size and capacity, accommodating up to 900 troops, 75 vehicles, 3 landing craft, and 15 helicopters. Sea trials are expected in 2027.

• Moscow is testing its Nudol anti-satellite missile, which has already been launched to blast a Soviet-era spacecraft in low Earth orbit, and could in theory likewise smash into any of SpaceX’s 7000 satellites.

  ---

  Sanctions and Sanctions Evasion

  In 2024, Russian defense companies imported over $10 million worth of metalworking tools from Israel, including drills, milling cutters, and precision equipment like grinding and grooving tools, often routed through third countries, according to The Insider's analysis of Russian customs data. The largest supplier of these products is ISCAR, an Israeli manufacturer that is part of the multinational corporation IMC (International Metalworking Companies), headquartered in the United States. ISCAR products—primarily cutting tools and other metalworking instruments—were imported into Russia in the amount of over $4 million. Another leading Israeli brand is Vargus. In 2024, products from this company worth approximately $3 million were imported into Russia. Vargus is part of the German industrial group NEUMO Ehrenberg Group.

  I’ve reported on an investigation by Kyiv Independent, “How Russia profits from arms exports to Saudi Arabia despite sanctions,” here.

  Additional news:

  • The German company EKC is the largest supplier of chromite to Russia, which is used in military equipment. From January 2023 to April 2024, it exported chromite worth €24.2 million, covering half of Russia’s imports.

    EKC.AG is a well-known German company headquartered in Bavaria, led by Vladimir Platunov, a Russian citizen who has lived in Germany since the 1990s.

Russia and the West

• Russia said it will view any Ukrainian strike using German Taurus missiles as "direct participation" by Berlin in the war. The warning came after Friedrich Merz, Germany’s incoming chancellor, expressed his willingness to send the long-range system to Kyiv.

• Denmark is planning to send some of its soldiers to Ukraine so they can learn from Ukraine's experience in drone warfare. Russia's ambassador to Denmark said that the move was a provocation.

  He said that facilities "including headquarters, training and education centers, as well as locations of military personnel and military equipment, both deep inside Ukrainian territory and on the front line, are a legitimate target."

Warfare tactics:

• Russia used a double-tap strike tactic and cluster munitions in its attack on Ukraine’s Sumy city - the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission of Ukraine reported. On April 13, two ballistic missiles launched from the Voronezh and Kursk regions of Russia struck the center of Sumy, killing over 30 civilians and injuring dozens more. According to preliminary reports, the attack was carried out using Iskander-M/KN-23 missiles.

  The first missile, equipped with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead, deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure. Shortly after, as rescue workers and medical teams began assisting the victims, a second missile was launched — this time carrying a cluster warhead.

• Russia used cluster munitions in its strike on Kharkiv on April 18.

• Russia is intensifying its focus on Shahed OWA-UAV operations by launching ever-increasing numbers, expanding production capabilities and refining tactics, Matthew Bint and Fabian Hinz write in their analysis for IISS. Despite a steady flow of Shahed 136s from Iran, Moscow is heavily investing in its own production facilities, and the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) has long been assessed to be a production facility for Russian-manufactured systems. Also, Russia has established a second production line for Shahed 136 copies in the city of Izhevsk.

  On April 23, the Armed Forces of Ukraine launched a long-range strike on a drone manufacturing plant situated within the Alabuga Special Economic Zone more than 1,000 km from the Ukrainian border. The attacked facility has the capacity to produce up to 300 combat drones per day.

  

Russian Drones

• From the Steppes of Donbas to the Deserts of Syria. The increasing use of first-person view drones in wars and conflicts involving Russia. This report, based on the OSINT investigation, explains how Russia is leveraging the military experience it is gaining in its war on Ukraine as a means to further its influence abroad. Beginning in late 2023, Russian instructors started training Syrian soldiers in the use of first-person view (FPV) drones. Three Syrian Arab Army units underwent training in FPV drones usage: the 5th and 7th mechanized divisions, and the 25th Special Mission Forces Division, the renamed “Tiger Forces”, formerly under the command of the notorious Suheil al-Hasan. Al-Hasan is currently the head of the Syrian special forces. Pro-Assad forces were actively developing the drones, such as by installing larger batteries and thus improving range. According to the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, pro-Assad forces were regularly targeting civilians with FPV drones. Dozens of civilians were targeted, maimed, and killed by these devices, particularly at the start of 2024. At the same time, a large part of the success of the rebel offensive was due to their own astute use of FPV drones - likely involving Ukrainian trainers and even operators. Another armed Syrian faction, the Kurdish-dominated SDF, has also recently been using FPV drones in its fight against Turkish-backed militias.

• Russians are expanding the use of interceptor drones to combat Ukrainian reconnaissance and strike drones. The videos show Russians deploying anti-aircraft FPV drones equipped with both day and night optics. There are two types of intercepts: one where the signal is lost before impact, and another involving a direct collision.

• Russians have begun testing a "friend-or-foe" system for drones. The automatic drone recognition system will operate within a radius of 100 km and at an altitude of 5 km.

• Russia announced the start of testing its own satellite communication system for medium-class unmanned aerial vehicles. Reportedly, the system operates in the Ku-band frequencies, with the possibility of producing a version for the C-band. The developers promise that the system will ensure stable operation at the edges of coverage zones of space vehicles in geostationary orbit and prospective high elliptical orbit, including in high latitudes.

Other News

• Putin ordered another 160,000 Russian citizens to be called up to serve in the military. The new order, starting April 1 and to be completed by July 15.

  This marks the largest conscription campaign in 14 years.

  According to Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi, Russia can mobilize 5 million troops who have undergone military service and training, while its overall mobilization capacity is as many as 20 million.

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A new assessment by Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Armed Forces indicates that Russia sees itself in a systemic conflict with the West and is preparing for a major war with NATO. Russia's military economy is producing more than what is needed for the war in Ukraine. In 2025, Russia plans to spend 6.3% of its GDP on national defense.

Once a month, I publish a free digest on military developments in Russia. In this edition, I focus on the deepening military cooperation between Russia and its authoritarian partners. The decline in Russian arms exports, as reported by SIPRI, also deserves attention. Finally, I explore why Russia has been using fewer tanks on the battlefield—are its reserves running low, or is this a shift in tactics?

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Russia Deepens Military Cooperation with Allies (Belarus, North Korea, Iran, China)

Despite the United States’ efforts to encourage closer cooperation with Russia and potentially distance it from its adversarial allies, current developments in military cooperation suggest that these efforts are not working. It is important to highlight that Russia is able to sustain its war efforts against Ukraine, particularly due to the military support from its partners.

Russia is strengthening its strategic ties with China and Iran, highlighted by the Security Belt-2025 naval drills in the Gulf of Oman this month (March 2025). The Chinese naval fleet arrived near Iran’s Chabahar Port and joined the Iranian and Russian navies for the naval assembly. The joint exercises aim to boost military trust, featuring simulated maritime attacks, search-and-rescue operations, and interception drills. Additionally, China hosted high-level talks with Russia and Iran in Beijing to discuss Tehran’s nuclear program.

Russia and Belarus are developing cooperation in drone production and training. During the visit to Belarus, Russian authorities proposed a project to build a drone production facility to ensure the country’s security. The plant is expected to produce up to 100,000 drones per year once fully operational. Moscow and Minsk will discuss its location and other details. Belarus also steps up drone training in Russia. President Lukashenko said that specialists operating drones in the military and law enforcement should receive training in Russia on modern UAV deployment.

At least 287 Belarusian enterprises are producing weapons for Russia’s needs, according to an unpublished study by BelPol, cited by Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. BelPol has identified that Belarusian manufacturers produce 122mm rockets for the BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket system, artillery shells, and more than 30 types of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), many of which have been tested in Ukraine.

Additionally, the country has localized the full production cycle for ammunition, manufactures storage and transport crates for shells, and produces military uniforms. The enterprises Integral and Planar are engaged in microchip production. By 2027-2028, according to BelPol, Belarusian enterprises could produce up to 300,000 Grad rockets, 450,000 artillery shells, and 100,000 UAVs.

Through these efforts, the Belarusian President positions himself as an indispensable ally of the Kremlin, securing his own political survival.

A meeting took place between the delegations of the defense ministries of Iran and Belarus, during which the parties agreed to expand military cooperation. The Iranian delegation confirmed its readiness to deepen cooperation, particularly in the area of technology transfer. Belarus is already using Iranian-made weapons - Shahed-136 drones.

Russia continues to strengthen its bilateral relations with North Korea, despite growing warnings from the United States against deeper Russian-North Korean cooperation. According to the most recent reports, North Korea appears to have sent at least 3,000 more soldiers to Russia early this year, South Korea’s military said. Pyongyang has also sent a “significant amount” of short-range ballistic missiles and about 220 pieces of 170-millimeter self-propelled howitzers and 240-millimeter multiple rocket launchers. These contributions are expected to increase according to the situation. On March 27, North Korean state media reported that Pyongyang tested domestically produced drones aided by artificial intelligence (AI).

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Russia’s Arms Exports Decreased by 47% in 2024 (SIPRI)

Russia was the third-largest arms exporter in the world after the United States and France in 2020–2024, accounting for 7.8% of global arms exports. Russia’s arms exports declined by 64% between 2015–2019 and 2020–2024.

In 2024, the volume of Russian arms exports remained at approximately the same level as in 2023, which was 47% lower than in 2022. This decline since 2022 is likely due to Russia’s decision to prioritize the production of major arms for its own armed forces over exports, the impact of multilateral trade sanctions imposed on Russia, and increased pressure from the United States and its allies on countries to avoid purchasing Russian arms.

Between 2020 and 2024, Russia delivered major arms to 33 states. Of its total arms exports, 74% went to states in Asia and Oceania, 12% to Africa, 7.4% to Europe (Armenia, Belarus, and Serbia), and 6.4% to the Middle East. Two-thirds of Russia’s arms exports during this period were concentrated in three countries: India (38%), China (17%), and Kazakhstan (11%).

According to the Congressional Research Service report published back in 2021, Russia exported a variety of weaponry, including legacy and advanced aircraft, air defense systems, naval vessels and submarines, radars, missiles, tanks, armored vehicles, small arms, and artillery. According to official Russian statistics, aircraft made up 50% of Russian arms exports.

Russia is one of three countries currently producing fifth-generation stealth fighters, alongside China and the United States. Recently, Russia offered its Su-57E to India—not only for purchase but also for local production—entering into competition with the U.S., which is reviewing its policy on releasing fifth-generation fighters to India.

According to Russian officials, Russia and India have more than 200 joint defence projects. India emerged in the 2000s as by far the largest foreign client for Russian defence exports. The Indian Armed Forces fielded many signature Russian weapons systems in larger numbers than the Russian Armed Forces themselves in peacetime, including T-72 and T-90 tanks, modernised MiG-29 fighters, and Su-30 fighters. The developments of the T-90, the MiG-29M, and the Su-30 were very heavily facilitated by Indian orders, as the post-Soviet Russian defence sector lacked the funding needed to realise these programs.

However, in recent years India has sharply reduced orders for defence equipment from Russia and is now buying more from Western suppliers, most notably France, Israel, and the US. According to reports, some of India and Russia’s plans, such as a project to jointly develop and manufacture helicopters and advanced fighter jets, were shelved some time ago. A separate proposal to lease a nuclear-powered submarine from Russia to train Indian crew is also unlikely to move forward.

Is Russia Running Out of Tanks or Shifting Tactics? (Stefan Korshak for The Kyiv Post + other sources)

In February, Ukraine’s Army General Staff (AGS) registered the 10,000th enemy tank claimed destroyed in combat. Most analysts estimate that two out of three Russian tanks, on average, have been taken out by a Ukrainian drone.

However, the number of Russian tanks destroyed on the battlefield has been decreasing with time. Ukrainian troops in March 2025 destroyed about half the number of Russian tanks they did in March 2024 (192 vs. 376).

Troops are seeing fewer Russian tanks committed to attacks, leading to fewer Russian tanks destroyed. Eyewitness accounts tell of a Russian shift in tactics that, instead of tanks, now prefers light armored vehicles or even civilian automobiles or motorcycles to heavy armor for an assault.

Analysis of daily Russian losses by Ragnar Gudmundsson found that, over the course of the war, the lion’s share (50-70%) of tanks used by the Russians are mid-Cold War-era T-72 tanks, or early Cold-War-era T-62 tanks, or even museum piece T-55 tanks pulled from mothballs and sent to the battlefield.

Over the past six months, the relative numbers of older tanks participating in Russian attacks have contracted sharply, pointing to diminishing Russian tank reserves or increased Kremlin unwillingness to send reserve tanks into combat.

Ukrainian drone swarms, particularly FPV drones, had forced the Russian military to reduce the number of armored vehicles it was fielding, and kill rates are falling because fewer and fewer Russian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles seem willing to drive out into the open.

Recently, it was reported that the Russian military received the first batches of modernized T-72B3 tanks in the 2024 version with better armor protection. Compared to previous iterations of improvements, the new vehicle’s dynamic protection overlap has increased in the area, which should improve protection primarily against high-precision FPV drone strikes at vulnerable points in the tank.

During the event “Human Domain Lessons from Russia-Ukraine | Conflict in Focus” hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the panel discussed the challenges of tank use in modern warfare.

Ben Connable argued that there is no doubt that tanks still play a critical role on the battlefield. They continue to fulfill their historical functions—providing shock, speed, and mobile-protected firepower up to the line of contact. While poor tactics are evident on both sides and often contribute to losses, the rate of tank losses in the Ukraine war is significantly lower on a day-to-day basis than in most previous wars. In fact, losses are about 38 to 39 times lower than during the 1973 war and far lower than in the Gulf War.

Lt. Gen. David Barno added that one of the biggest challenges is the cost disparity between destroying a tank and the cost of the tank itself. How many tanks, each costing several million dollars, can be sustained if they can be taken out by swarms of mass-produced drones costing just $1,000 apiece?

Analysts from Defense Express suggest that it is essential to assess not only the formal cost of drones and tanks as weapon systems but also the time required to produce the necessary quantity of these UAVs, as well as the estimated cycle for restoring or repairing main battle tanks after sustaining combat damage.

Additional developments:

• Defense Intelligence of Ukraine revealed that Russia continues to maintain a robust missile production program. Russia’s priorities include the Kh-101 and Kalibr units, which have been integral to Russia’s arsenal. In addition to these, Russia is also investing heavily in the production of the Iskander missile system. The emphasis on the Iskander production is aimed at achieving enhanced accuracy and increased destructive power, a critical component of modern warfare strategies. Hypersonic missiles, such as the Kinzhal and Zircon units, are also at the forefront of Russia’s military technology development.

• Russian missile production has reportedly not significantly increased, but Russian forces appear to be prioritizing the production of missile and drone variants that are more effective against Ukrainian air defenses.

  ISW previously assessed that Russia likely intended to further increase its production and use of Shahed drones and other Shahed-variants following the signing of the Russian-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in January 2025. Russian forces continue to innovate their strike packages and leverage larger numbers of Shahed and decoy drones in an attempt to penetrate Ukraine's air defence umbrella.

• Russia will strengthen its military and logistics presence in the Arctic, including boosting its fleet of nuclear icebreakers and the number of servicemen in the region, Putin said at the International Arctic Forum in Murmansk on March 27. Despite Western sanctions and tensions, he expressed his readiness for cooperation. Read my older newsletter about Russia in the Arctic.

• Russia started to strengthen its ties with the new Syrian government by offering support. One of the first signs of improving relations between the two nations was Russia’s transfer of approximately $23 million in Syrian currency to the country’s central bank. Also, in March, Russia shipped its Arctic oil to Syria for the first time.

  Meanwhile, Russian tactical aircraft continue to operate from Syrian air bases. Recently, France accused a Russian Su-35 fighter of dangerous maneuvers near its Reaper UAV during flights over the Mediterranean Sea.

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Last week was crazy. Is it already possible to say that Russia has a new ally, or not yet?

Focusing on Russia’s military affairs, I’ve gathered key insights from reports by two reputable organizations—RAND and the Center for Strategic & International Studies. The RAND report analyzes four potential pathways for the postwar reconstruction of the Russian Armed Forces, while the CSIS report examines Russia’s missile attacks on Ukraine and how Ukraine is countering them. I wrap it up with a timely ACLED report, illustrating Russia’s relentless targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine.

Subscribe, share, and, if you can, support my work with a paid subscription. I spend many hours gathering and analyzing information to bring you the most important updates, so any support would be greatly appreciated!

Let’s dive in!

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Breaking Down Russian Missile Salvos: What Drives Neutralization? (Yasir Atalan and Benjamin Jensen for Center for Strategic & International Studies).

Russia relies on a mixed group of expensive, high-precision missiles, as well as legacy systems and cheaper models that allow for constant daily pressure on Ukraine. While these legacy systems and cheaper drone models are not successful in hitting targets, they allow Russia to increase the intensity of the firepower during the offensives.

Over time, Russia diversified its missiles used to attack Ukraine, and included ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, kamikaze drones, and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In certain months, over 25 unique missile and drone models were launched, with a daily maximum of 14 unique models.

In 2024, Shahed-131/136 drones alongside Kh-101 and X-555 air-launched cruise missiles, accounted for 75% of all launched missiles. Kalibr missile use has fallen dramatically, shrinking to just one-fifth of its previous level in the 2022–2023 period.

Across the entire study period from September 28, 2022, to October 6, 2024, the overall intercept rate by Ukrainian forces stands at 84.1%. Approximately 4 out of every 5 missiles or UAVs launched by Russian forces were intercepted by Ukrainian defense systems or went missing, likely due to electronic warfare capabilities.

Authors pose a question: what determines the rate at which Ukrainian defenders neutralize Russian missiles? Research shows that it is not simply the mass of missiles fired that matters but rather their make and model.

A notable number of missile types, including Lancet, ZALA, Orlan-10, Supercam, Merlin-VR, Orion, and various UAVs, were intercepted entirely, demonstrating the robustness of Ukrainian defense systems against these specific reconnaissance UAVs. However, models such as the X-22 and certain iterations of the Iskander series exhibited lower intercept rates, indicating significant vulnerabilities against ballistic missiles.

The study reveals that short-range, ballistic missiles remain the deadliest weapon in the Russian arsenal.

U.S. and European policymakers should bolster Ukraine’s ballistic missile defenses by integrating rapid detection, high-speed interceptors, and improved resource allocation. Ukraine, in turn, should expand its arsenal of advanced Western interceptors (e.g., Patriot and SAMP/T), invest in real-time intelligence sharing, and ensure sufficient interceptor stockpiles to sustain high-intensity salvos.

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Russia’s Military After Ukraine. Potential Pathways For the Postwar Reconstruction of the Russian Armed Forces (Michelle Grisé, Mark Cozad, Anna M. Dowd, and others for RAND)

In this report, authors distinguish conceptually between Russia’s efforts to equip and sustain its armed forces in the war in Ukraine and the strategic decisions that Moscow will have to make following the war to address Russia’s postwar strategic environment.

The process of reconstitution is already underway: Former Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu has outlined Russia’s future force structure; Russia’s economy and defense industries have been adapted to meet the demands of the war; and Russia’s military is larger and has more combat experience than at any point since the end of the Cold War.

Although the Russian armed forces have made significant tactical and operational adaptations in the past year, the war has led to the deaths of tens of thousands of Russian service members and the loss of trillions of rubles in cutting-edge materiel.

Military losses: According to the data, Russia has lost roughly half of all tanks that were in active military service at the start of the. The VKS (Russian Aerospace Forces) has lost nearly one-third of the prewar inventory of its most advanced attack helicopter, the Ka-52 Alligator. Despite its overwhelming naval power relative to Ukraine, Russia has lost a nontrivial number of maritime vessels, mainly due to Kyiv’s innovative use of unmanned and long-range strike systems.

The first pathway, The Shoigu Plan, is designed to reflect statements that were made in 2023 by Shoigu and other Russian military leaders about their ongoing planning for reconstitution. Russia would pursue quantitative increases and selective qualitative investments. It would seek to increase the armed forces’ overall personnel and equipment numbers to reflect the evolution of the threat environment—in particular, Finland’s and Sweden’s admittance to NATO.

A second potential reconstitution pathway, Revisiting Old Models, would entail a regression to a Soviet operational model, including a heavy reliance on mass and minimal qualitative investments. Under this pathway, Russia would primarily rely on the technology it can produce domestically, making up for any technological gaps through quantity or asymmetry rather than sourcing technology from its foreign partners.

A third potential reconstitution pathway, A New, New Look, would emphasize qualitative investments in lieu of an emphasis on mass. Under this pathway, Russia would rebuild a smaller, yet qualitatively superior, force. This approach would entail a serious attempt to pursue personnel reforms and prioritize the development and use of asymmetric means of warfare.

A fourth potential pathway, A New Operational Model, would entail qualitative investments in lieu of an emphasis on mass. Under this pathway, Russia would reject the Soviet and Russian operational models of the past and implement major institutional reforms within the defense establishment. Russia would seek outside expertise to improve its operational art and tactics and would leverage key external relationships (especially with Iran, North Korea, and China) to support the acquisition of new technologies and strategic partnerships.

Key conclusions from the report:

• The way in which the Ukraine war ends will inform the lessons that Russia learns from the conflict and, by extension, the decisions that Russia makes about reconstitution.

• Russia’s relationships with its key partners—including, notably, China, Iran, Belarus, and North Korea—will play an especially influential role in shaping the reconstitution process.

• Russia’s decision to restructure the country’s economy for wartime has created dependencies within the defense industrial base that will be difficult to reverse.

• Although U.S. allies are closely tracking Russia’s reconstitution efforts, their focus is on the speed of reconstitution rather than the nature of the reconstituted Russian military.

• A partially reconstituted Russian military will still pose a significant threat to U.S. and Western interests in the European theater.

Bombing into submission: Russian targeting of civilians and infrastructure in Ukraine (Olha Polishchuk, Nichita Gurcov for ACLED).

Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians reached an all-time high in 2024, with an over 30% increase in the total number of remote attacks leading to civilian casualties amid Russia’s steamroller offensive. ACLED estimates that over 1,600 civilians have died as a result of these attacks in 2024 — 16% more than in 2023. In 2024, the number of aerial attacks against civilians more than tripled, of which over a quarter were combined with shelling.

A little under 5,500 events (out of a total of over 140,000 conflict events recorded between February 2022 and December 2024) explicitly list damage to residential properties (over 4,200 events), schools (over 650 events), health care facilities (over 350 events), and energy infrastructure (almost 1,000 events). An additional 4,500 events are based on reports that mention damage to civilian infrastructure but provide few details.

The extent of destruction is likely greater than reports suggest, especially in settlements that have been turned into battlegrounds and reduced to rubble as a result.

Russia has also been explicitly targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The campaign in late March 2024 marked a shift toward the destruction of power generation itself. By September, Ukraine lost 80% of its thermal power generation capacity and about half of its overall power generation capacity.

Other developments:

• According to Janes, in combat operations against the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Russia is using a total of 95 Mi-24 and Mi-35 helicopters, 75 Ka-52 helicopters, and 55 Mi-28 units, totaling 225 attack helicopters. These figures account for the fact that at least 30% of Russia’s available helicopter fleet is unusable due to various technical issues (translated from the article in Ukrainian by Defense Express).

• Russia will resume production of the Soviet TVD-10 aircraft engine for An-2 Kukuruznik aircraft. As part of the modernization, it is proposed to install a TVD-10B engine on the aircraft.

• Russia started striking Ukraine with unknown drones. The police reported that this fixed-wing drone is painted gray, has two wings arranged in a "biplane" configuration, and is equipped with an electric motor with a pusher propeller at the tail. It is equipped with a nearly 3-kilogram warhead in the nose section. Due to its small size and low-noise electric motor, the drone is difficult to detect from a distance.

• Russia's outreach to American adversaries continues despite Russian President Putin's efforts at rapprochement with the Trump administration. Russian officials met with Iranian and North Korean officials on February 25. Putin spoke with China President Xi Jinping on February 24, the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

• North Korea has sent more soldiers to Russia and re-deployed others to the frontline in the western Kursk region, according to South Korea's intelligence agency.

• North Korea’s Special Missile Vehicles Roll Into Battle (David Axe for Forbes). A Ukrainian drone recently registered the first hit on a North Korean M1989 howitzer near Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine, and recent releases by Russian channels indicate North Korean Bulsae-4 missile vehicles are active in Kursk.

• North Korea carried out a test launch of strategic cruise missiles to showcase its nuclear deterrence capabilities.

• The Kremlin is intensifying a campaign launched in late 2022 and early 2023 to prevent the emergence of an independent veterans-based civil society and an influx of alienated veterans in Russia, likely because it perceives the demobilization of Russian veterans as a potential threat to regime stability - Institute for the Study of War.

• The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) detained two Russia’s intelligence services' spies, directing missile strikes on airfields and air defense systems.

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Despite Russia’s “readiness for peace,” as perceived by the Trump administration, it continued its attacks on Ukraine last week, targeting both the frontline and civilian areas with glide bombs, drones, and missiles. To put a few numbers into perspective: Russia’s military expenditure stands at 6.7% of its GDP, while defense budgets in European countries range from 1.3% to 4.1%. The Russian war machine operates 24/7, running on three shifts at its military facilities to produce the necessary weapons and ammunition. Russia’s military partnerships with Iran, North Korea, China, and Belarus are continually evolving, allowing its allies to gain valuable insights from the battlefield.

Even if there are developments in peace negotiations, the trends in Russia’s militarization will persist, and Russia will remain a threat to the democratic world.

Now, let’s explore the latest innovations and updates in the military realm that Russia contributed last week.

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Russia continues hyping up its Su-57 fighter jet while its arms exports collapse by 92%

Following the fifth-generation showdown at the "Aero India 2025" biennial air show at Yelahanka Air Force Station, which began on Feb. 10, Russia has continued to hype up its Sukhoi Su-57 (NATO reporting name: Felon), claiming that "Our Su-57 outperformed the American F-35 in the sky of Bengaluru."

The aircraft's manufacturer, Rostec, noted that at Aero India 2025, both the Su-57 and the F-35 performed flight demonstrations. During a nearly seven-minute flight, "the Su-57 performed more than 20 aerobatic maneuvers, including Pugachev’s Cobra, the Bell, the Barrel Roll, and others."

Some aviation experts suggest that while the Su-57 is indeed a highly maneuverable aircraft, making it ideal for air shows, its stealth capabilities have been repeatedly questioned. According to The National Interest, the Su-57 would likely be shot down long before it could execute those intricate maneuvers.

Only three countries currently produce fifth-generation stealth fighters: China, the United States, and Russia.

Recently, Janes reported that Algeria has become Russia’s first export customer for the Su-57 stealth fighter jet. Meanwhile, Russia has formally pitched the idea of local production of the Su-57 to India, though India has yet to make a decision.

According to an analysis by the Jamestown Foundation, Russia’s arms exports dropped by 92% from 2021 to 2024 due to redirected resources for the war in Ukraine, sanctions, inflation, and funding issues. The number of countries purchasing Russian arms has declined dramatically, with major customers such as India showing caution or shifting to competitors.

In 2022, Russia exported major arms to 14 states, in 2023, this decreased to 12. Among the countries that remain on Moscow's list of "traditional" clients, are India, China, and Myanmar, which are considered important for the Kremlin.

It is expected, that Russian arms exports will continue to remain low for some time to come.

Russia begins producing turbofan-powered Geran-3 (Shahed-238) drones and modifies Shahed-136 drones

According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia has begun local production of Iranian Shahed-238 kamikaze drones, rebranded as Geran-3.

Ukrainian sources suggest that these drones are equipped with a twin-spool turbofan engine, giving them a range of up to 2,500 km and a top speed of 600 km/h. This makes them extremely difficult to intercept for Ukraine’s mobile air defense teams, which primarily rely on anti-aircraft machine guns and autocannons.

A notable aspect of the Shahed-238’s construction is its use of Western components, despite international sanctions. Analysis of downed drones has revealed parts such as the Czech-made PBS TJ150 turbojet engine, electronic chips from Intel and Texas Instruments, and satellite navigation components from Tallysman Wireless. The Russian analog uses Tolou-10/13 jet engines (Tolou-10 is an Iranian copy of the Czech PBS TJ100).

The addition of these advanced drones to Russian forces poses a significant threat to both Ukraine’s military and civilian population. However, they can be countered with air defense systems such as the Grawehawk, recently supplied to Ukraine by the United Kingdom.

Also, according to Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, since the beginning of 2025, several significant changes have been observed in the design of the Shahed-136 (“Geran-2,” “Harpy”):

● A new warhead weighing 90 kg;
● The flight controller, power distribution unit, and battery have been relocated from the nose to the tail section;
● Additional ballast has been incorporated into the UAV's structure.

Russia is increasingly using Chinese-made products as an alternative to components from the U.S., the EU, and other countries.

Center for Strategic & International Studies named Shahed the most cost-effective munition in Russia’s firepower strike arsenal. Even though Shahed’s only hit their target less than 10 percent of the time, their low cost means Russia can fire mass salvos almost daily, wearing down Ukrainian air defenses and terrorizing the population. The data compiled by the research team demonstrates the cost-effectiveness of long-range, one-way attack drones. Despite seeing large numbers of these systems shot down by Ukrainian air defenders, they remain the cheapest way to generate effects in Moscow’s firepower strike arsenal. Precision bombardment with Shahed-type drones costs Russia roughly $350,000 per target struck. That is compared to around $1 million per target struck for their most cost-effective missile, which the data suggest could be the Kh-22 air-to-ground cruise missile.

Russia is using Belarusian components for Kh-69 missiles

According to Ukraine, Russia is using Belarusian components in the production of Kh-69 subsonic missiles, confirming Belarus' role in supplying military materials to Russia. These missiles are already being used in offensive operations against Ukrainian targets.

The War & Sanctions portal, managed by the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, reported that as of Feb. 18, 2025, 58 foreign components had been discovered in Russian Kh-69 missiles. Most of these are electronics from companies headquartered in the United States, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Among the producers of these components, the portal mentioned companies such as Analog Devices (USA), NEC (Nippon Electric Company) (Japan), AXICOM (Switzerland), and Infineon Technologies (Germany).

The Kh-69 missile was developed by MKB Raduga and was first officially introduced at the Russian "Army" forum in August 2022. According to open sources, the missile weighs up to 800 kg, with 310 kg allocated for the warhead, and has a range of up to 400 km. In May 2024, Ukraine's Defense Intelligence reported that Russia produces between one and three Kh-69 missiles per month.

This missile can be launched from the external winglets of Su-30, Su-34 and Su-35S aircraft, as well as from the internal compartment of the latest Su-57 due to its square cross-section.

Experts have compared the Russian Kh-69 to the Storm Shadow and its French equivalent, SCALP, in terms of hypothetical capabilities. However, these Western missiles have a longer range and are also larger in size: in terms of length and payload, the Kh-69 is about two-thirds the size of the Storm Shadow/SCALP.

The Kh-69 missile was reportedly used against Ukraine as early as February 2024 and became widely known for being used in the strike on the Trypilska thermal power plant (TPP) near Kyiv in April 2024.

In October 2024, the Russian military began using a new version of the Kh-69 missile, which received a cluster warhead.

In December 2024, Mikhail Shatsky, an engineer behind the Russian Kh-69 cruise missile, was killed in the Moscow region as part of a Ukrainian intelligence operation.

Other news:

• Reportedly, Iran is rearming its missile program and a ship of supplies just arrived from China. CNN reported that the first of two vessels carrying 1,000 tons of a Chinese-made chemical that could be a key component in fuel for Iran’s military missile program has anchored outside the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. It could be a signal that Iran’s missile production is back to business as usual.

• India has manufactured a batch of Igla-S man-portable air defense systems under a Russian license. As part of the technology transfer agreement with the Russian company Rosoboronexport, the Indian company Adani Defense Systems and Technologies Limited (ADSTL) will produce and supply 48 Igla-S launchers and 100 missiles to the army at the first stage.

• North Korea is participating in Russia's war against Ukraine to gain combat experience and modernize its military technology - Ukraine’s Intelligence Chief Budanov. Russia has succeeded in improving the accuracy of the KN-23 missiles supplied by North Korea. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated in November 2024 that North Korean forces had been training alongside Russian naval infantry and airborne (VDV) units - traditionally more elite forces in the Russian military.

• Western intelligence officials report that Russia's spy agencies have established a secretive new unit responsible for carrying out covert attacks across Europe and beyond. Previously undisclosed operations linked to this group include assassination attempts, acts of sabotage, and a scheme to place incendiary devices on aircraft.

• Russia and the United States discussed possible cooperation on energy projects in the Arctic at a meeting in Saudi Arabia - Politico reported. Check out the previous edition of this newsletter about Russia’s growing presence in the Arctic region.

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“The threat that I worry the most about vis a vis Europe is not Russia, it’s not China, it’s ... the threat from within,” said the US Vice President Vance at the Munich Security Conference. Well, I can name at least five threats from Russia just in the past week, including increased military spending, an agreement to open a military base in Sudan, joint drone development and production with India, expansion in the Arctic, and espionage at a German airbase. And what about the strike on Reactor 4 at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant with a Shahed drone?

The new public post is ready for your attention.

Russian threats to Estonia, other NATO members, and the West - Estonian intelligence report

Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) assessed that Russia is working to strengthen its capabilities not only to support its war effort in Ukraine but also to prepare for a potential future conflict with NATO. This aligns with ISW's assessments, which highlight ongoing Russian efforts to ready its military and society for a possible confrontation with NATO in the medium to long term.

Key points from the report:

• Russia continues to mobilise resources and rebuild its mass army. By 2025, Russia is expected to form additional divisions and combat support and service support units in the Leningrad and Moscow military districts.

• Russia is committed to advancing drone technology and integrating drones extensively into its armed forces. Drone production in Russia remains dependent on Western components. The development and production of drones are very likely a top priority for Russia, as demonstrated by the launch of a national drone development project, which is divided into five federal subprojects (stimulating demand for domestically produced drones; standardising the drone industry and ensuring mass production; developing drone industry infrastructure, safety assurance and certification processes; securing qualified personnel for the drone sector; and advancing cutting-edge drone technologies).

• Russia seeks to restore Moscow’s control over most of the South Caucasus to gain access to strategic infrastructure in the region. One of the keys to achieving this is the subjugation of Georgia. Controlling the South Caucasus would provide Russia with access to strategic infrastructure – railways, roads and ports. Subjugating Georgia would be a two-for-one deal for Russia: take Tbilisi, and Yerevan comes with it.

• In the Gulf region, Russia concentrates on strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – the regional powerhouses – to counter the economic and diplomatic isolation caused by sanctions and to spread its narratives about the war in Ukraine. The UAE has become a hub for Russian economic activity, offering opportunities for business and sanctions evasion, alongside relatively frequent political, military, and intelligence interactions.

• China views Ukraine as part of Russia’s sphere of influence but only provides selective support to Russia in the information war, guided by its own strategic interests. For China, Russia’s defeat in the war against Ukraine would represent a victory for its main rival, the United States.

• The Chinese Communist Party uses scientific collaboration as a tool to acquire Western technology and strengthen its capabilities. Collaborating with China on research projects requires a heightened focus on knowledge security to prevent sensitive information and technology from reaching Chinese research institutions, which could pass it on to Chinese businesses or the military sector.

• Lessons from cyber warfare: strong cryptography is critical. Russian special services actively seek access to critical information of their perceived enemies, both classified and unclassified. Russian special services continuously attempt to penetrate systems containing sensitive information. During Russia’s war against Ukraine, these efforts have also targeted systems used by Ukraine’s Armed Forces, such as the Delta situational awareness platform.

Denmark's Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) also published a declassified intelligence report and assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to launch a full-scale war against NATO in the next five years.

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India buys Russian anti-ship missiles and negotiates additional supplies

Last week, India signed a deal with Russia to acquire anti-ship cruise missiles for its submarine fleet. The Indian Ministry of Defence announced the agreement but did not disclose details about the missile type, order quantity, cost, or delivery timeline.

According to Russian state media TASS, citing an Indian news outlet, the missiles are expected to equip the Indian Navy’s Sindhughosh-class diesel-electric submarines, which are based on Russia’s Kilo-class design.

Additionally, Russia has proposed manufacturing its fifth-generation stealth fighter jet, the Sukhoi Su-57, in India for the Indian Air Force. A Russian and an Indian official confirmed the offer, as reported by Reuters.

Both countries are also considering cooperation in drone development and production. Media representative of Rosoboronexport told FinancialExpress.com on the sidelines of Aero India 2025, “A key area of focus will be the development of UAVs, utilizing Russia’s extensive experience in high-intensity combat operations and counteraction against modern air defence systems.”

Background:

India was the world’s biggest arms importer in 2019–23 with a 9.8 per cent share of all arms imports.

Russia has long been India's primary arms supplier, with its fighter jets forming a key part of India's military fleet. However, the war in Ukraine has weakened Moscow’s ability to export. India’s reliance on Russian defense imports has dropped significantly, from 76% in 2009 to 36% in 2023. This shift reflects India's efforts to diversify its military procurement, increasing purchases from Western countries like France and the U.S.

With Russia’s military focused on Ukraine and its defense industry prioritizing domestic needs, delays have affected deliveries of the remaining S-400 missile defense system units and spare parts for existing Russian weapons in India's arsenal.

Deepening Russia-China ties are a problem for India. Beijing had become Moscow's top trading partner and expanded military cooperation through joint naval drills and exercises. China has also acquired advanced Russian weapons, including S-400 missile systems and SU-35 fighter jets.

India's shift toward diversification should not be mistaken for a move away from Russian arms. The Indian military still heavily relies on Russian equipment, including T-72 and T-90 tanks; SU-30 MKI, MiG-29, and MiG-29K fighter jets; KA-31 helicopters; the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier; and Akula and Kilo-class submarines.

Interestingly, many Indian navy ships are powered by gas turbines from the Ukrainian company Zorya-Mashproekt. In December 2024, Russia delivered the INS Tushil frigate, ordered by India in 2016. The frigate reportedly uses engines made by a Ukrainian company. India had to physically procure these engines from Ukraine and have them delivered to Russia before they could be installed on this warship.

According to Bloomberg sources, Ukraine’s state-owned Zorya-Mashproekt is in talks with Indian private sector companies to jointly manufacture gas turbines used by warships. The two countries are also discussing manufacturing aircraft and aero-engines in India.

The dual focus of India’s defense cooperation was highlighted by the appearance of artillery shells sold by Indian arms makers in Ukraine in 2024. Italy and the Czech Republic, which led an initiative to send artillery shells to Kyiv from outside the European Union, were among the European countries involved in the transfer.

The Arctic as a potential conflict zone: Russia’s military presence in the region

Recently, The Wall Street Journal published a report, “See How Russia Is Winning the Race to Dominate the Arctic,” detailing how Russia is expanding its presence in the Arctic in cooperation with China, while North America lags behind in military infrastructure in its far North.

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the U.S. reduced its bases in Alaska, and Russia’s Arctic forces fell into decline. During this period, both countries cooperated on environmental issues, fisheries, and maritime safety.

Now, rising tensions are driving Russia and NATO to reinforce their military presence in the region. “The Arctic is a region for potential future conflict,” Russia’s Commander of the Northern Fleet, Aleksandr Moiseyev, stated at a recent Arctic conference in St. Petersburg.

According to a CNN report published in 2021, Russia has been refurbishing Soviet-era airfields and radar installations since at least 2013, constructing new ports and search-and-rescue centers, and expanding its fleet of nuclear- and conventionally powered icebreakers. It has also been strengthening its anti-access and area-denial capabilities by expanding its network of air and coastal defense missile systems across key parts of the Arctic.

For example, the military observation post and radar station on Kotelny Island were largely abandoned after the Soviet Union's dissolution. However, redevelopment began in 2013, leading to the expansion of the Temp airfield. The runway is now accompanied by another "trefoil" military base complex, reinforcing Russia's strategic presence in the region.

Russia has increasingly opened its Arctic territory to Beijing, as China has helped prop up the Russian economy and supplied dual-use equipment to bolster its military.

China has long sought a greater role in the Arctic, viewing melting ice as both an economic opportunity and a security challenge. In 2018, it declared itself a “near-Arctic” nation and an “important stakeholder in Arctic affairs.”

In July, two Russian and two Chinese bombers flew together near Alaska, prompting U.S. and Canadian fighter jets to intercept them. Meanwhile, both countries are deploying advanced missiles capable of flying much farther than their predecessors—at speeds up to five times the speed of sound—posing a challenge to America’s existing sensor systems.

As sea ice retreats, the number of high-latitude voyages through the Arctic has increased, turning the region into a zone of intense commercial competition. Russia-China cooperation has been particularly prominent, with Chinese companies playing a key role as investors and equipment suppliers in Russian energy projects, including the Yamal LNG and Arctic 2 LNG projects.

In return, Russia has been shipping fuel to China using its so-called shadow fleet—sanctioned vessels that make illicit deliveries of Russian oil to Asian markets. In 2024, transit cargo through the Northern Sea Route, from northwestern Russia to the Bering Strait, reached a record high. Meanwhile, melting sea ice is easing access to critical minerals, with Russia leading efforts to tap into Arctic resources.

According to the Wall Street Journal, NORAD—the joint U.S.-Canada command focused on the North Pole—relies on an outdated surveillance network of satellites, ground-based radar, and air force bases. To bolster their presence, the U.S. and Canada plan to acquire more icebreakers, but their current fleet is limited. The U.S. has only three polar icebreakers, one of which is 50 years old and another that was sidelined last year due to an onboard fire.

In contrast, Russia operates three dozen icebreakers, many of them nuclear-powered, providing greater endurance and power at sea. China, despite being more than 900 miles from the Arctic Circle, deployed three polar icebreakers to the region last year.

Another crucial topic is the use of unmanned aircraft, which provide critical intelligence and strike capabilities in the Arctic. According to Reuters, NATO countries are working to catch up with Russia in drone technology. A Reuters survey of 14 companies and six defense ministries and armed forces across northern Europe and North America highlights an industry racing to develop or acquire drones capable of enduring extreme Arctic conditions.

Meanwhile, Russia has already made significant advancements. Zala Aero, a subsidiary of the Kalashnikov Group, offers drones specifically designed for Arctic operations. Additionally, Russia has stated that its long-range S-70 Okhotnik combat drone, which can operate at temperatures as low as -12°C, will be deployed in the region.

Other news:

• Russian defence spending exceeds all of Europe combined - the Financial Times reported. Russian defense spending surged by 42 percent last year in real terms, reaching Rbs13.1tn, or $462bn based on purchasing power parity, which accounts for the value of currencies in their home countries. In comparison, European defense budgets, including the UK and EU member states, increased by nearly 12 percent to $457bn — just under Moscow’s spending.

• The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated that Russia lost 1,400 main battle tanks (roughly four tank divisions' worth) and over 3,700 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs) — totaling 5,100 lost tanks and armored vehicles in 2024. ISS assessed that Russia refurbished and built over 1,500 tanks and 2,800 IFVs and APCs in 2024 — suggesting that Russia produced enough vehicles to replace all of its tank losses and three quarters of its armored vehicle losses last year.

• The German military is investigating suspected Russian espionage after six drone sightings over an airbase in the northern town of Schwesing, where Ukrainian soldiers are trained on Patriot missile defense systems. Between Jan. 9 and 29, unidentified drones repeatedly entered restricted airspace above the Luftwaffe facility in Schwesing. Despite deploying electronic countermeasures, including the HP47 jammer, Bundeswehr forces failed to bring them down or locate their operators.

• Russia appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states - ISW. Reports that a NATO member state is struggling to combat likely Russian reconnaissance drones demonstrate the need for NATO states to further develop their defensive capabilities as Russia continues to use its experience on the battlefield in Ukraine to innovate new technologies.

• In December 2024, the Kaluga Research Institute of Radio Engineering (KNIRTI), which produces systems for aircraft of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, signed contracts for RUB 720 million ($7.4 million) to import equipment from the German company Rohde & Schwarz and the American company Keysight - Militarny reported. The bulk of the equipment is to be manufactured in Germany, the Czech Republic and Malaysia by the international concern Rohde & Schwarz, headquartered in Munich.

• Algeria is to be the launch export customer for Russia's Sukhoi Su-57 ‘Felon' combat aircraft. Algerian media reported that up to 14 examples of the Su-57E export version of the ‘fifth-generation' fighter had been acquired, seemingly firming up Russian pronouncements in 2024 that a first buyer had been secured.

• Sudan said a final deal has been agreed with Russia to establish a naval base on its Red Sea coast. Moscow has for years sought to establish a base near Port Sudan. The port agreement, which was to last for 25 years, had been for Russia to establish a naval logistics hub, with warships including nuclear-powered vessels, and up to 300 personnel. The Red Sea provides a strategic route that is vital to global commerce as well as a defence and geopolitical hotspot.

• Zelensky said that Russia may be preparing an act of aggression against NATO members as early as next year. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference, he said the attack might come from Belarus: “Russia is preparing 15 divisions. Around 100-150,000 troops are being trained to aggravate the situation on the Belarus direction”.

• Ukrainian emergency services have confirmed the discovery of Shahed drone debris at the site of a Russian strike on the shelter of Reactor 4 at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant. The attack, which occurred overnight on February 14, did not cause an increase in radiation levels, according to officials.

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This weekend, I invite you to explore Russia’s naval ambitions. In its effort to maintain its “great imperial status,” Russia continues to showcase impressive projects, such as the refurbished nuclear-powered battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov. While its deployment has been repeatedly delayed, it will be interesting to see whether it follows the comedic fate of Admiral Kuznetsov.

Over the past week, several insightful assessments of Russia’s military presence in Africa have emerged. To provide a clearer picture of Moscow’s current priorities in the region, I have summarized some of the key findings.

Meanwhile, partnerships with North Korea and Iran remain a crucial topic of analysis, as these alliances significantly strengthen the military capabilities of the parties involved.

Enjoy your weekend and my latest publication! If you find my newsletter useful for your work, I’d love to hear from you!

Russia’s Modernized Nuclear Battlecruiser Finally Powers Up Its Reactors: Report (Thomas Newdick for The Warzone).

Russian state media stated that the 28,000-ton battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov now has both of its nuclear reactors online, claiming that the warship should return to sea for trials starting this summer. Its service return has been delayed multiple times in the past.

Russia has already invested the equivalent of $5 billion into this cruiser, which is intended to be equipped with launchers for up to 80 missiles. However, the Admiral Nakhimov is still no closer to returning to active service with the Russian Navy, with its reactivation already postponed until 2026.

First launched in 1986, the Admiral Nakhimov is part of the class of warships known in Russia as Project 11442, which is codenamed Kirov class by NATO.

Currently, the Russian Navy operates a single Kirov class battlecruiser, the Pyotr Veliky (Peter the Great), which serves with the Northern Fleet having undergone only minor modernization. It still relies primarily on its Soviet-era weapons and sensors.

For years, the Admiral Nakhimov was in a dry dock undergoing a deep refit, with the original promise being that the warship would eventually emerge as basically new, with a whole range of new weapons and sensors. Previous images have shown huge portions of the warship entirely gutted, with the expectation that they will accommodate new weapons and sensors.

Originally, the refit was set to provide the Admiral Nakhimov with no fewer than 174 vertical launch tubes — which would provide it with more than any other surface combatant or submarine in the world. Plans called for 80 of these tubes to accommodate various modern Russian cruise missiles, including the subsonic Kalibr, the supersonic Oniks, and supposedly the hypersonic Zircon.

Other reports in the past have suggested that missiles from the land-based S-400 air defense system may be incorporated, as a further evolution of the S-300FM, which would provide a more robust anti-ballistic missile capability.

The Kirov class represents the last nuclear-powered surface combatant in service anywhere in the world, with the U.S. Navy having retired the last of its nuclear-powered cruisers in the 1990s, primarily on cost grounds.

In the final paragraph of this article, the author says the following: “this impressive warship will be a very significant symbol of Russian naval power”. While the developments surrounding this battlecruiser will be interesting to watch, this statement is debatable given Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s navy and other military infrastructure, and Russia's declining naval power.

In September 2024, it was reported by Forbes, that the Kremlin reassigned the sailors of the Admiral Kuznetsov ship (the only aircraft carrier) to the army—and sent them into battle in Ukraine. Kuznetsov has completed just seven patrols since launching in 1985. During the flattop’s most recent deployment, off the coast of Syria in 2016, the air wing lost two of its 24 jets to accidents in the span of just three weeks. Two years later in October 2018, Kuznetsov suffered serious damage when the drydock PD-50 sank while the carrier was aboard for repairs. Then, in December 2019, a fire broke out on Kuznetsov itself.

Fleet leaders considered decommissioning the damaged ship. The Kremlin opted to repair and modernize Kuznetsov, instead. The plan, at the time, was for Kuznetsov to return to sea in 2022. But another fire broke out in December 2022. Nearly two years later, the carrier is still stuck in Murmansk port.

The publication in The Warzone was critiqued by Ukraine’s Defense Express, which recalled the story of the Russian nuclear destroyer project Lider, which has remained only on paper. In 2020, Defense Express published an analysis of this project, arguing that such naval initiatives are intended to preserve Russia’s so-called "great imperial status," which is unimaginable without a powerful fleet capable of operating worldwide. However, Russia’s current naval capabilities rely mainly on a limited number of aging Soviet-era ships, whose operational lifespan is rapidly coming to an end.

Earlier last week, the Institute for the Study of War reported that Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to significantly change the routes of its ships traveling between Russia and Syria. According to the Ukrainian Resistance Center, Russian vessels stopped using the Black Sea for this route in the spring of 2024, likely due to the threat posed by Ukrainian naval drones. Instead, Russian ships reportedly began traveling from ports in the Baltic Sea to Syria via the Atlantic Ocean, despite this route being several times longer than the Black Sea passage.

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Ukraine sees marked improvement in accuracy of Russia's North Korean missiles (Tom Balmforth for Reuters).

According to sources in the Ukrainian military, North Korean ballistic missiles fired at Ukraine by Russian forces since late December have demonstrated significantly greater accuracy than previous launches over the past year. Earlier in the war, these missiles had an accuracy of 1-3 kilometers, but recent strikes have shown precision within 50 to 100 meters. This improvement suggests that North Korea is using the battlefield as a testing ground to refine its missile technology.

By manufacturing missiles and receiving feedback from their primary customer—the Russian military—North Korea is gaining valuable experience in producing more reliable weapons.

The advancements in North Korean missile accuracy raise serious concerns about the country's growing ability to threaten South Korea, Japan, and the United States, as well as its potential to export enhanced weapons to unstable states or armed groups.

Experts suggest two main reasons for the increased precision: the missiles may now be equipped with improved navigation systems or maneuvering mechanisms. Additional contributing factors could include better targeting data for launch crews, new guidance system components supplied by Russia, and refinements made using battlefield data collected by North Korean scientists.

Russia began launching North Korean K-23, K-23A, and K-24 short-range ballistic missiles at Ukraine in late 2023 and has since fired approximately 100. Kyiv also reports that Russia has received millions of artillery shells and thousands of troops from Pyongyang to support its war effort.

Although North Korean ballistic missiles make up only a small fraction of Russia’s overall missile strikes, they carry a substantial warhead of up to one tonne and can reach distances of up to 800 km. In contrast, Russia’s Iskander-M missile, a comparable system, has a smaller payload and a shorter range of 500 km.

Additional development related to the North-Korean involvement: President Zelenskyi informed that the North Korean military has resumed combat operations in Russia’s Kursk oblast after previously pausing their active involvement in assaults against Ukrainian forces.

After the Fall. Russian Influence on Africa’s Illicit Economies Post-Wagner (Report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime).

The Wagner Group, had built up operations in several African countries over the preceding decade by providing mercenary troops, conducting political influence campaigns and by establishing a network of companies in the extractives sector. After the death of its leader Prigozhin in July 2023, Moscow acted quickly by sending high-level officials to several countries to reassure Wagner’s former clients that support would continue uninterrupted.

The establishment of the Africa Corps, under the direct supervision of Russia’s military intelligence service (GRU), was the most pertinent to Wagner’s Africa operations. Its creation signaled an ambitious stepping up of Russia’s footprint on the ground, even though the Africa Corps has struggled to generate momentum, with recruitment targets being revised downwards and personnel transferred to Russia.

Some other aspects of Wagner’s operations have also continued under new titles. For example, the African Initiative in Burkina Faso, which disseminates pro-Russian messaging in the region, is in many ways another iteration of Wagner’s media and political influence work, and includes several former Wagner or Wagner-linked staff.

Maintenance of Wagner as an entity – at least in name – has been a key consideration in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), where the brand is strong due to entrenched involvement in economic activities and security services. However, this continuity may also mask how much has changed behind the scenes: while Wagner ‘lives’ in the CAR and Mali, it is now much more tightly under Moscow’s control.

The new opportunities for intervention emerged for Russia in 2023–2024. This has led to expansion into several countries in West Africa – Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger – where governments have sought to explore economic and security alternatives to their long-standing Western partners, particularly France.

Finally, there has been a diversification of actors in the post-Prigozhin period, from the abovementioned Africa Corps to other Russian PMCs, such as Redut and Convoy. Unlike Wagner under Prigozhin, these PMCs are tightly controlled by the Kremlin; they are all required to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which Prigozhin resisted.

In their article Recalibration or Retreat? Russia's shifting Africa strategy for Responsible Statecraft, John Lechner and Sergey Eledinov mention the fact that some analysts believe Russia’s influence and ability to project power in the Sahel is waning, or that the Kremlin no longer considers the Sahel and other friendly states in Africa a priority. Indeed, there are members of Russia’s military, political, and expert communities pushing to scale back Moscow’s presence on the continent or to use Africa as a bargaining chip in any potential negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump.

Authors of this article argue that a retreat from the Sahel, and Africa more generally, still appears unlikely. Claiming a leadership position within the Global South remains an important priority to the Kremlin. The Sahel and Africa more broadly also offer a platform for strengthening Russia’s cooperation with China and Turkey.

Other news:

• Ukraine's Ministry of Defense has acknowledged that Russia still retains the capacity to produce nearly all types of weaponry. At the start of its full-scale invasion, Russia had over 1,300 defense industry facilities employing nearly two million workers—forming a powerful mechanism to sustain the war effort.

  However, Russia's military-industrial enterprises currently face a shortage of hundreds of thousands of skilled workers due to a significant scaling-up of arms production. Certain types of weaponry are now being manufactured at three to six times the previous rate, and Russia remains the leading producer of Soviet-caliber artillery shells.

  Russia's defense industry is unable to fully meet battlefield demands, forcing the Kremlin to seek support from North Korea and Iran.

• Russia has announced that a US-made armored personnel carrier captured from Ukraine’s forces will be integrated into its military arsenal to support a variety of missions. It is an M113 fully-tracked personnel carrier, a widely-used armored vehicle in the ongoing war due to large-scale deliveries from Western allies. Reports suggest that Moscow might be overestimating the value of its war trophies, potentially exaggerating their strategic significance. The M113 captured from Ukrainian forces is believed to be over 70 years old, with its design dating back to the Vietnam War era. The US military has already replaced these vehicles with next-generation models like the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle from BAE Systems.

• Russia’s Uralvagonzavod has produced the first T-90M Proryv tank with the Arena-M active protection system, capable of intercepting guided missiles and other threats. The Arena-M system is designed to intercept missiles and other anti-tank munitions in the near area around it by physically destroying them. It consists of radars that monitor the area around the tank. After successfully detecting a threat, the system fires a munition that hits it with a narrowly focused stream of heavy fragments.

• Russia has announced the Kub-2 drone, claiming it incorporates Switchblade technology, but in reality, it is merely an improved version of its predecessor - Ukrainian experts claim. The drone's upgrades are aimed at developing a low-cost alternative to the Lancet drone, reducing production expenses. At the same time, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of this drone.

• After Ukraine's Defense Forces successfully deployed kamikaze surface boats in the Black Sea, Russia's defense industry began developing its own versions. In 2023, the Kingisepp Machine-Building Plant (KMZ) introduced the GRK-700 "Vizir", initially presented as a platform for hydrographic tasks. However, the design concealed its potential for military applications. It became known that Russia would receive serial GRK-700 Vizyr kamikaze boats in 2024. It is noted that the Vizir can move at a speed of about 85 km/h. It is equipped with electronic warfare and can perform tasks in the riverbeds. Russians say that such a boat could be used on the Dnipro river to destroy crossings. The Vizir can also be used to counter Ukrainian kamikaze boats. Large-caliber machine guns, missiles, or even anti-drone nets are considered the main weapons against them.

• Russia has developed a 7.62 mm round to combat drones. Reportedly, Russian private organizations have begun production of 7.62 x 39 caliber ammunition for assault rifles, with bullets printed on a 3D printer.

• Russian officials are investigating a plot that allegedly sent explosive-laden first-person view (FPV) goggles to drone units in the hope they would detonate, killing or injuring the operator. It mirrors the mass attack Israel carried out against Hezbollah last September using thousands of explosive-packed pagers and walkie-talkies.

• According to Ukraine, Russia is forming unmanned systems forces and plans to recruit up to 210,000 personnel for the new branch by 2030.

• A Russian state-run poll suggests that the Russian public maintains a high level of support for the war in Ukraine despite mounting challenges. 67 percent of the people polled support Russia’s war in Ukraine and 65 percent believe that the war is "going well" for Russia.

• Azerbaijani experts have recovered a fragment of a Russian Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile from the wreckage of the downed Embraer ERJ-190 passenger plane.

  Azerbaijan-Russia relations continue to sour following Russia’s refusal to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024 downing of an Azerbaijani Airlines (AZAL) passenger plane - ISW. Azerbaijani outlet APA News, reported that Azerbaijan is preparing to take legal action against Russia in an international court, citing recent clear evidence identifying unspecified Russian actors responsible for the crash and Russia's failure to take responsibility for the crash.

• Russia announced the destruction of a Ukrainian naval drone by a guided missile launched by an Orion reconnaissance and strike drone. The drone, which was immobilized under unknown circumstances, was hit in the Black Sea by a Kh-BPLA laser-guided missile.

• The Russian army command has begun withdrawing individual anti-aircraft missile units from occupied Crimea and redeploying them deep into Russia, according to the Atesh guerrilla movement.

• Syria's new government will decide the fate of Russian military bases based on national interests, the Syrian Defense Minister told The Washington Post. Russia's ability to retain its naval base in Tartus and airbase in Khmeimim will depend on what Moscow offers in return.

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I started this weekly digest about Russia’s military trends one week ago. It’s free because I want it to reach more people and make them realize that Russia is not a joke—every state, whether in Europe, the Americas, or even Australia and Oceania, should take the threats from this country seriously. Even states that cooperate with Russia should stay aware of what’s happening, as Russia is known to be an unreliable partner.

In this edition, I’ve curated research on three main themes: Russia’s production of Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles—critical for its deterrence capabilities; its ambitious plans to become the world's leading drone power by 2030; and the establishment of relations with the new administration in Syria. And, of course, more extra news!

Let’s go!

How Russia's Struggles with ICBM Sarmat Production Impact Its Nuclear Deterrence Capabilities

Russia is facing difficulties with the production of its intercontinental ballistic missile, Sarmat, according to The Business Insider, which quotes experts Timothy Wright and Fabian Hoffmann (if you haven’t subscribed to his Substack, be sure to check it out).

Russia's new RS-28 Sarmat ICBM appeared to suffer a catastrophic failure during testing in September, with satellite imagery showing a big crater around the launchpad at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome.

The Sarmat is meant to replace the Soviet-era R-36, which first entered service in 1988. Without the new Sarmat, Russia has to rely on older missiles.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has developed capable solid-fueled ICBMs. But with Sarmat, it decided to use a liquid-fueled system, which was something the Ukrainians previously did.

The particular feature of Sarmat is its ability to carry 10 large warheads or 16 smaller ones. Other Russian ICBMs are much smaller. As of May 2023, Russia had 1,674 warheads deployed, with a total stockpile of 4,489. Russia wants a big missile with a tremendous destructive capacity, so if they then took Sarmat out of service, then they have a bit of a gap.

For Russia, it's also important to ensure they have warhead parity with the Americans. Wright said he can't see Russia deciding to cancel the Sarmat program. Putin has invested a lot of propaganda into the system. Russia appears to be keeping its warheads limited in accordance with the New START treaty. But if that changes, and it may as Russia has suspended its involvement with the treaty, Russia may want to deploy more warheads. Without the Sarmat, Russia will need to find other places for its warheads.

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Mass Drone Production Plans and Manpower Problems

On January 28, 2025, Putin announced plans to establish 48 drone production centers within the next decade, with 15 of these facilities already operational. This initiative aims to increase production capacity and make Russia a world leader in drones by 2030.

Existing centers are located in various regions, including Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novgorod, Ryazan, Sakhalin, Tomsk, Perm Krai, Udmurtia, and Tatarstan, with an expansion planned for Samara.

Identified as a key hub for drone development, the Samara research and production center for unmanned aircraft systems is expected to expand, forming a broader research, educational, and production cluster focused on civil unmanned aviation.

The Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan has been identified as a key production center, manufacturing Shahed-style loitering munitions and reconnaissance drones under Project Boat, an initiative reportedly involving Iranian cooperation. Recently it was reported that Russia is fraudulently attracting foreigners to the production of Shahed-136 strike drones. These are citizens of post-Soviet countries, including Azerbaijan, who are offered employment under the Alabuga Start program in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone through an online advertising campaign.

More than 400 domestic companies are involved in research and production efforts, with supporting infrastructure being developed to facilitate the transition from concept to mass production.

In December 2024, the Institute for the Study of War published a special issue “Russian Efforts to Centralize Drone Units May Degrade Russian Drone Operations” analyzing a coordinated effort by Russian MOD to create a centralized separate branch for unmanned systems, likely to reorganize informal specialized drone detachments and centralize procurement of unmanned systems.

It is noted, that decentralization and greater degrees of independence have given drone operators on both sides of this war advantages in the extremely rapid evolution of combat techniques and in the offense-defense race between drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Russian MoD’s centralization and restructuring efforts may degrade the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slow the Russian unmanned systems innovation cycle.

The author of this report, Kateryna Stepanenko stated, that the Russian MoD is likely trying to catch up to the establishment of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) earlier in 2024.

For context, Ukraine officially established the USF on June 11, 2024, and Ukrainian military officials announced that the new separate branch will become the first in the world to use aerial, surface and underwater naval, and ground-based unmanned and robotic systems in combat missions.

The Russian MoD's coercive centralization of Russian drones and specialized detachments closely resembles its attempt at formally subordinating the Wagner Group PMC under the Russian MoD's control, which resulted in the destruction of one of Russia’s most effective and innovative military organizations.

Developments in Syria

Satellite imagery suggests that Russia has been withdrawing from Syria’s port of Tartus. Maxar satellite imagery taken on Jan. 25, obtained by TWZ, shows the Russian-flagged roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) cargo ships Sparta and Sparta II docked in Tartus, along with ongoing cargo transloading activity. The images also reveal the disappearance of a significant number of Russian vehicles and other materiel from a pier where they had been marshaled weeks ago.

The final status of Russia’s naval base in Tartus and Khmeimim Air Base remains unclear. This recent activity around Tartus follows still-unconfirmed reports claiming that the government in Damascus has canceled Russia’s 49-year lease agreement for the Tartus base.

Several days later, on Jan. 28, a delegation of Russian officials arrived in Damascus for the first such visit since the fall of former President Bashar al-Assad. The delegation included Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, who also serves as Putin’s special envoy on the Middle East and Africa, and Alexander Lavrentyev, the president’s special envoy on Syria. Bogdanov, a former diplomat in Syria during the 1980s and 1990s, speaks Arabic. Lavrentyev has previously participated in negotiations with Assad.

Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, emphasized the deep strategic ties between Russia and Syria, stating: “All Syria’s arms are of Russian origin, and many power plants are managed by Russian experts... We do not want Russia to leave Syria in the way that some wish.”

Thus, there are currently no indications of a total Russian withdrawal from Syria or the closure of its military bases.

In December 2024, Ukrainian diplomats met with Syria’s new leadership, with Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiga urging Sharaa to expel Russia from the country.

Other news:

• Russia’s Year of Truth: The Missing Military Hardware (Pavel Luzin for CEPA). 2025 will be the last year Russia can rely on its massive stockpiles of Soviet-era conventional arms, including artillery, main battle tanks and armored vehicles. If the intensity of combat, and consequent Russian losses, follow the same pattern as 2022–2024, most stockpiles will be exhausted by the second half of the year, forcing Moscow to rely on newly manufactured arms rather than repaired and modernized ones. The examples of Rostec and Tactical Missile Corp. show clearly that Russia’s military-industrial complex is suffering the effects of cost-push inflation and pressure from the weakness of the ruble. This is the inevitable result of the sector’s continuing dependence on imported supplies of components and machine tools, despite the import substitution policy. Another major obstacle to manufacturers is a shortage of qualified workers, although, this data is contradictory. The Kremlin’s strategic threat could be weakened, if not eliminated, if, in the long term, Ukraine is able to maintain and increase military pressure on its invaders.

• After the EU and the U.S. imposed sanctions in 2022, China became Russia's sole source of gallium and germanium, as well as one of the leaders in supplying antimony, chemical elements necessary for the production of weapons, including nuclear ones. These metals are imported into Russia by state and private connected to the Russian military-industrial complex, purchasing them from Chinese state-owned firms. This is stated in the investigation by Schemes, a project of Radio Free Europe (full text is available in Ukrainian).

• Russia appears to be on the brink of starting serial production of a new version of its well-known Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile system, which could reshape the strategic capabilities in the region. Some experts are calling it the Iskander-1000, with its main distinguishing feature being the extended range, reaching up to 1000 kilometers. One key component is the autonomous inertial navigation system, which provides high accuracy by using built-in sensors to track the missile’s position and orientation during flight. This technology has been improved with new algorithms for course correction, greatly reducing the chances of deviation. Additionally, the missile is equipped with satellite navigation capabilities, such as GPS and Russia’s GLONASS system, ensuring precise targeting over long distances and in open terrain. This integration of satellite guidance is especially critical given the extended range of the Iskander-1000. To further safeguard against interception, the Iskander-1000 could deploy advanced electronic countermeasures, including active and passive decoys designed to confuse or mislead enemy missile defense systems.

• To continue using military airfields near the border for strikes against Ukraine, Russia has installed new air defense systems and is building hangars for aircraft. New positions for S-300/S-400 air defense systems have appeared at the Millerovo air base in the Rostov region. They were not there last October. Hangar construction was also observed at the Belbek air base in occupied Crimea and the Primorsko-Akhtarsk airfield in the Krasnodar region.

• A senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) official revealed that Iran has proceeded with its planned purchase of Russia’s Sukhoi-35 fighter jets. It was not specified how many Sukhoi-35 jets have been ordered or if they have already been delivered to Iran. Dubbed by NATO as the “Flanker-E” or “Super Flanker,” the Sukhoi-35 (Su-35) is widely regarded as a “marvel” of Russian aerospace engineering. The aircraft is also capable of carrying a variety of air-to-air, air-to-surface, and precision-guided munitions, depending on mission needs. The Su-35 is expected to replace Iran’s aging fleet of F-14 Tomcat jets, which were originally delivered by the US in the 1970s when the two countries were still allies.

• A senior NATO official confirmed that there was a Russian scheme to kill Armin Papperger, the head of German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall. The plot, which was foiled by the United States and German intelligence, was part of a series of Russian plans to assassinate defense industry executives across Europe.

• Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB) claimed to have uncovered and dismantled a criminal group operating a smuggling network that transported firearms, ammunition, and military uniforms from the United States to Russia via Kyrgyzstan.

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What is a better way to start your weekend than by reading about Russian weapons and warfare tactics? Jokes aside, I’ve decided to take this entire section out of my main newsletter and turn it into an independent weekly product, dedicated to key stories about Russia, its military capabilities, warfare tactics, and cooperation with allies. I’ll complement it with more information and curated research to help you understand Russia’s current military priorities and how its partnerships and alliances are evolving.

This week we focus on the recent investigation by The Kyiv Independent exposing Russia’s military exports to Saudi Arabia (which purchases Western weaponry as well); new military deliveries from North Korea, as well as an overview of the continued imports of Western military goods by Russia.

Investigation: How Russia profits from arms exports to Saudi Arabia despite sanctions — leaked emails (Alisa Yurchenko for The Kyiv Independent).

While numerous investigations have exposed Russia's sanctions circumvention schemes, this report offers a different perspective—Russia’s continued military exports to several countries. These exports not only support Russia’s war machine but also help foster alliances. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which purchase both Russian and Western weapons, risk compromising sensitive Western technologies that could be accessed by Russian experts.

Today, we have a brilliant investigation by a journalist from The Kyiv Independent, who analyzed leaked documents containing thousands of internal emails from Roselectronics, a subsidiary of Russia's state arms giant, Rostec. The documents reveal that Saudi Arabia, along with India, China, Algeria, and other countries, has not canceled previously signed contracts with Russia after the invasion of Ukraine. Instead, they continue buying Russian weapons, bolstering its defense production and war effort. Experts suggest that Russia’s motivation for selling weapons abroad extends beyond financial gain to include the prospect of establishing or strengthening geopolitical ties and alliances and helping secure votes at the United Nations.

After analyzing classified Russian documents, the lead investigator concluded that Saudi Arabia had purchased Russian Pantsir air defense systems. Various references to the contract in the leaked emails suggest that Saudi Arabia ordered between six and ten Pantsir batteries, agreeing to pay €2.17 billion for the systems, additional equipment, ammunition, and operator training.

The Pantsir contract brings significant risks, as it could enable Russia to gain familiarity with Western technologies through its cooperation with Saudi Arabia, a major buyer of U.S. weaponry as well as arms from South Korea and EU countries. The risk is particularly high because the contract includes “integration” services, which involve incorporating the Pantsir systems into Saudi Arabia’s command, communications, and intelligence infrastructure.

Russia is waiting for the perfect conditions to deliver a "decisive" missile strike on Ukraine. But several factors prevent that. (An interview with the Ukrainian aviation expert. New Voice. Available in Ukrainian).

In his interview with the New Voice, Valerii Romanenko, an aviation expert and senior researcher at the State Aviation Museum, stated that currently, Russians are waiting for the right conditions to launch a massive missile strike on Ukraine. However, they are struggling with this due to a range of factors, including the increased effectiveness of Ukraine's air defense systems, the extensive use of electronic warfare (EW), and unexpectedly high losses on their side.

Ukraine now has more means of defense: at least eight Patriots integrated into Ukraine’s air defense system. This means Ukraine can protect several key targets against all types of missile attacks. Russians understand this, especially in cases when 90% of ballistic missiles are intercepted, and sometimes even more when it comes to cruise missiles. In the case of attacks on well-defended targets, interception rates can reach up to 100%. Russians realize that trying to hit and disable these targets would be extremely costly for them.

Ideal weather conditions for Russian attacks involve low temperatures, severe frost, and other meteorological factors that would allow them to effectively use cruise missiles. So far, they haven’t had such conditions. It's also important to note that Russia’s best missiles rely on TERCOM and DSMAC systems, which navigate using the landscape over which they fly.

Ukrainian electronic warfare developers have been hugely helpful, creating systems capable of effectively disrupting these missiles. Russians have stopped using Kalibr missiles because they lack onboard navigation systems (this is a direct translation of the expert’s phrase; it may not be technically precise). As a result, Kalibrs have become ineffective and are now almost unused.

Additionally, Russia's aircraft production has been steadily declining every year. In 2023, production dropped by three units compared to 2022, and in 2024, it was expected to decrease by one more unit compared to 2023. What does this tell us? Aircraft production primarily depends on complex radio-electronic components. It seems that such supply channels have been blocked for Russians, leaving them unable to produce these components. The same applies to missile production, which also requires highly advanced technology and systems, as well as a significant amount of radio-electronic components.

The recent publication by The Economist reports on the work of the Kyiv Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Expertise to study downed Russian missiles. Experts at the Institute noted an increase in the use of Russian-made parts in weaponry. At the start of the war, the Kalibr, one of Russia’s most destructive cruise missiles, relied mostly on Western electronic components. Today, most of the Kalibr’s “brains” are made in Russia. There is also a growing presence of Chinese components.

North Korean Reinforcements to Russia (*Based on two reports by Howard Altman and Thomas Newdick for The War Zone)

Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, Budanov, told TWZ that North Korea is expected to send reinforcements to Russia’s Kursk region, primarily consisting of gun and rocket artillery units and their hardware, as well as short-range ballistic missile capabilities. North Korea has provided about 120 170mm M1989 Koksan self-propelled artillery guns and 120 M-1991 240mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Russia in the last three months, and will likely send at least as many more in the future. In addition to the artillery, Pyongyang is expected to send 150 more KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles to Moscow in 2025, said Budanov, adding that there were 148 sent last year.

In another TWZ article, it was reported that a North Korean multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS), designed to be disguised as an ordinary truck, appears to have surfaced in Russia’s Kursk region. Once the fighting begins, this MLRS could maneuver more freely, blending in as a normal truck before quickly firing, relocating, and repeating the process. This tactic complicates the enemy’s targeting plans significantly.

However, this type of artillery has notable limitations. Compared to traditional MLRS, it is far less mobile outside of established roads, which could hinder its operational flexibility. Besides, it’s unclear if it features any kind of protection, even against small-arms fire and shrapnel.

A recent New York Times article “Fighting Alongside Russia, North Koreans Wage Their Own War” examined the strategies and mindset of North Korean soldiers engaged in combat against Ukrainian forces. These troops navigate through heavily mined fields under intense fire, often advancing in groups of 40 or more. Once they capture a position, they do not stay to secure it, instead retreating to regroup for another attack, leaving Russian reinforcements to take over.

To counter drones, the North Koreans reportedly send one soldier to lure the drone while others try to destroy it. Severely injured soldiers are said to carry grenades to avoid being taken prisoner, detonating them as a last resort. Ukrainian military intelligence indicates that approximately 500 North Korean officers, including at least three generals, have been deployed. The generals are stationed at Russian command and control centers to oversee operations. Although these troops provide additional manpower, integrating them into Russian operations has been challenging.

Other news:

• The Insider's investigation found that nine European industrial companies continue operations in Russia, with at least two of them working with military factories. Manufacturers from the Czech Republic, as well as Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland, which previously collaborated with defense factories in Russia, continue to supply equipment to the Russian defense industry through affiliated Russian companies (the full text is available in Russian).

• Russia has managed to purchase over 22,000 CNC (computer numerical control) machines, components, and consumables worth $18.2 billion between 2023 and the first seven months of 2024, according to research by the Economic Security Council of Ukraine (ESCU). Without CNC machines, manufacturing any weapon would be impossible, making their procurement critical to sustaining Russian aggression. According to customs payment data, the top three manufacturing countries are: China — over 62% of all imports, valued at $2.6 billion; Taiwan — 8.9%, valued at $371 million; South Korea — 5.47%, valued at $228 million.

  Nearly a tenth of Russia's imports came from European manufacturers. Russia acquired over 10,000 CNC machines worth $405 million, including: Italy — 4,459 machines worth $168.8 million; Germany — 2,849 machines worth $139.9 million.

• Russia is rearming effectively and will pose a “serious military threat” to NATO with conventional weapons by 2028, Christian Freuding, head of the Ukrainian Situation Center at Germany’s Defense Ministry, said in an interview with Welt am Sonntag. “Each month, the Russian military gains more tanks, ammunition, missiles, and drones. Production is increasing, and stockpiles are growing”.

• The new Syrian government has terminated an investment agreement with a Russian company to manage the port of Tartus, where Russia’s only foreign naval base is located. A military cargo ship that had been loitering just off the coast has now berthed at the Russian naval pier, where military vehicles are staged for a likely evacuation. Tartus is home to Russia’s only foreign naval base. After the outbreak of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, the base became an important hub for the Russian Navy’s military presence in the Mediterranean.

• According to the investigation by the Azerbaijan-based international news channel AnewZ, Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 was downed by a missile on 25 December fired from a Pantsir-S1 air defence system which was brought from Syria to Russia.

• President Trump has accused Russia of stealing U.S. plans for a hypersonic missile during the administration of President Barack Obama. Trump offered no evidence to back up his claim, but he previously raised the accusation in 2023.

• The Kremniy El plant, one of Russia’s largest manufacturers of microelectronics, has suspended operations after being hit by a Ukrainian drone attack on Jan. 24.

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