The drone munitions sector in Ukraine is evolving alongside unmanned systems and must be continually adapted, as military units require specific quantities of munitions of varying weights and characteristics for their tasks. The same delivery platform can carry varying amounts of explosive material, enabling different effects. Although the state incentivizes Ukrainian manufacturers, improvised munition production continues to play a significant role in filling this critical capability gap.

In this edition:

• Hell’s Kitchen: Drone Munitions in Ukraine;

• Can Ukraine Get Rid of Chinese Cameras?

• Fiber Optics Are Getting More Expensive — So Are Drones;

• and 5+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

If you care about drones as much as I do, don’t ignore this fundraiser for a Mavic 3T drone for my friend serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Currently, over 50% of the target amount has been raised!

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Hell’s Kitchen: Drone Munitions in Ukraine

Ukraine’s Arms Monitor’s source in the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated that around 90% of drone munitions in the military are improvised, while only about 10% are factory-produced. “Factory-produced munitions are always better, as they are properly engineered and tested. But this is not a matter of preference—it is the result of a munitions vacuum. The state does not allow its widespread production, and it takes time to develop and refine solutions. The battlefield, however, demands results “here and now,” the serviceman mentioned. “There have been absurd cases—for example, when a brigade was supplied with 7-inch drones and then, separately, with 8.5 kg aerial bombs. And what were we supposed to do with that?” he added.

As a result, highly skilled personnel have emerged within the military to fill this gap. In practice, almost every unit has its own workshop or production capability. The sources of explosives are either the battlefield itself or repurposed stockpiles.

• According to the serviceman, the first munition adapted for drones appeared in 2022—an F1 grenade rigged for release from a Mavic drone. Development was initially very simple: a pipe filled with ~0.5 kg of plastic explosive, plus another 400–500 grams of ball bearings for fragmentation. The focus was on increasing the effect of dropped munitions.

• “Then FPV drones appeared. The first munition used was the PG-7—a rocket from an RPG, as the initial focus was on targeting armored vehicles and FPVs were still scarce. A simple activation mechanism was devised using contact “whiskers”: like a button—contact equals detonation. The goal was straightforward: impact the tank”.

• The evolution then split into two main paths: bomber drones and FPV drones.

Bomber drones:

• Initially used anti-personnel mines and 82 mm mortar rounds, along with various types of grenades.

• The first custom designs appeared around 2023: a pipe filled with plastic explosive or TNT plus fragmentation elements.

• These produced significantly stronger blasts, although factory-made munitions fragment more effectively—as expected, since they are properly engineered rather than improvised.

• For bombers, the classic option remains the VOG-25 grenade.

  • It has been used since the early stages and continues to be used today.

  • It can be loaded in large numbers (e.g., 20 in a rotary dispenser) and dropped sequentially.

  • Lightweight but highly effective against infantry in trenches.

FPV drones:

• Evolution started from the PG-7. It was later modified by adding fragmentation elements around the explosive, creating what became known as a cumulative-fragmentation munition.

• This type remains widely used today due to its versatility.

• Another development was a simple pipe filled with plastic explosive or TNT, resulting in a high-explosive (blast) munition, used for attacking dugouts and shelters—relying primarily on blast effect rather than fragmentation.

Modern variants:

• The core concepts remain the same, but the range of weights has expanded: 0.4, 0.5, 0.8, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 4, 4.5 kg, etc.

• These can be cumulative-fragmentation, purely cumulative, or high-explosive (without fragmentation).

Earlier, UNITED24 reported on a workshop led by Ukrainian servicemen from the Special Forces Regiment that processes dozens of defective shells every day, converting them into munitions for FPV drones and bomber UAVs.

• With limited resources, the team repurposes old, unusable artillery shells, some of which date back to the 1950s.

• Frontline troops also supply anti-tank missiles from systems such as Javelin and NLAW that were damaged by shrapnel but still contain explosive material. This explosive is used to fill the warheads used by Ukrainian drones.

• For instance, footage showing the cutting of one of the shells revealed that it had been exposed to corrosion for a long time and was unlikely to be usable for its original purpose. Such munitions are filled with phlegmatized explosives, meaning they will not detonate without a proper detonator.

• The workshop also repurposes PG-7 shaped-charge grenades for RPG-7 launchers by adding counterweights and stabilizing fins so that they can be dropped from bomber drones.

• In October 2024, the Cabinet of Ministers authorized the extraction of explosives and other components from unexploded ordnance for use in support of the Defense Forces, effectively legalizing a long-existing “industry.”

• According to rough estimates, up to 20% of munitions in combat zones fail to detonate. A mechanism was therefore developed not only to safely dispose of hazardous items, but also to turn this process into a benefit for the military.

A proper UAV munition must be effective, and only then convenient and easy to use, wrote Vladyslav Khrystoforov for Oboronka in January 2026. It should consist of a warhead of optimal weight, a guidance or stabilization system, an initiation system, a detonator/explosive charge, and a standardized mounting mechanism for UAV platforms. At the same time, it must withstand the harsh conditions of the frontline—vibrations, temperature fluctuations, and challenging storage environments.

Currently, the market for drone munitions in Ukraine is gradually stabilizing. Professional manufacturers have emerged, but a significant share is still supplied by volunteers and improvised (“garage”) production.

• Military units often receive drones separately, while munitions are procured through different channels—or even assembled on-site.

• To compensate for shortages at the front, non-standard “drops” are used. For example, servicemen from the “Khartiia” unit modified an unexploded Russian Grad rocket and used a bomber drone to strike enemy infantry positions.

• Drone operators from the “Perun” unmanned systems battalion have dropped 155 mm and 122 mm munitions on enemy targets. Such solutions are largely a forced measure due to the shortage of dedicated UAV munitions.

• The volunteer initiative “DrukArmiia” unites around 2,500 volunteers with their own 3D printers, producing plastic components for “cold” munitions and sending them to the front. Their product line includes 128 munition variants.

• “DrukArmiia” ships over 110,000 “cold” munitions per month. However, these are not yet “hot,” combat-ready munitions. Their effectiveness depends on the correct composition and quality of the explosive material, as well as proper assembly—often carried out by sappers on the frontline.

• Another category includes improvised drops with stabilizing fins. These were often made from rounds for automatic grenade launchers or by attaching hand grenades to drones that mechanically release the safety pin over the target. To improve aerodynamics, such munitions began incorporating 3D-printed tail fins, fairings, and impact fuzes.

• One of the most difficult challenges in munition production has been sourcing explosives. Many new manufacturers and volunteers, lacking access to standardized military-grade explosives, rely on industrial explosives with lower explosiveness. This reduces both armor penetration and fragmentation effectiveness against enemy infantry.

• The global explosives market is relatively limited, and procuring components is economically viable only under large contracts.

• At the same time, to secure contracts, manufacturers must already have access to these materials. Importing and storing them is costly and requires specialized facilities—leading many companies to focus only on “cold” munition production.

• The company Defenses Solution was for a long time a major importer of VOG rounds for grenade launchers. Through surveys of military personnel, it identified demand for drone-delivered munitions. It turned out that VOG-type munitions were increasingly used not for their original purpose, but as drops from DJI Mavic drones.

• One of the solutions developed is the “Tsviakh” munition, designed primarily to engage infantry in open terrain or lightly protected structures. It can also disable vehicles, communication antennas, electronic warfare systems, and unprotected infrastructure.

• “Tsviakh” consists of plastic components produced via injection molding and metal parts manufactured on high-precision CNC machines. It is delivered as a fully assembled munition, including initiator and explosive charge.

• Ukrainian Armored Vehicles, traditionally focused on artillery munitions, developed the UB60D FPV drone munition based on a 60 mm mortar round. This codified munition can be used both as part of a mortar shot and as an FPV drone drop, allowing production standardization and rapid scaling. Compared to a standard mortar round, the FPV version lacks the tail assembly and propellant charges and features a modified fuze.

In July 2023, the Ministry of Digital Transformation launched a two-year experimental project on the production, procurement, and supply of munitions for unmanned systems, as well as warheads for UAVs. This initiative aimed to encourage private companies to manufacture drone munitions.

As a result of this initiative, 76 new companies were added to the Register of participants and contractors eligible for state defense procurement, granting them official manufacturer status.

The duration of approval processes has been reduced to just a few days, due to the temporary suspension of requirements under 19 existing regulatory acts.

This has significantly accelerated munition development and delivery: 370 new munition types have been codified and approved for use by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, of which 250 are specifically designed for unmanned systems.

Seán Moorhouse, Mine Action/EOD Consultant, wrote in his recent article that this revolution in drone warfare has left the EOD/IEDD world behind:

• There is no lexicon to describe factory-designed and produced one-way-attack UAV warheads. To further confuse the issue, Russia and Ukraine use very similar nomenclature to describe their drone-delivered munitions.

• “The Geran-2 can be fitted with a range of warheads, from the most common, 50 kg blast and fragmentation version, to a 90 kg blast and fragmentation version and 50 kg thermobaric version. All versions can then be further modified by the addition of an incendiary compound. What do we call the warheads fitted to one-way-attack drones like the Geran-2? Their role is clear, but there is no existing lexicon that they fit into,” Seán writes.

• There is a similar gap regarding munitions delivered by bomber drones.

• Munitions dropped from bomber drones fall into three categories: factory-produced, modified, and improvised. Having three categories is controversial, with many in the sector arguing that there are only two: factory-produced and improvised. That said, there is no place in the existing lexicon to adequately describe a factory-produced munition dropped from a bomber-drone or a munition that has been modified, rather than improvised.

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Can Ukraine Get Rid of Chinese Cameras?

Cameras are a critical component of unmanned systems, as they determine navigation, reconnaissance, and data transmission from the battlefield. In my article last year on the localization of FPV drone production in Ukraine, several manufacturers identified cameras as one of Ukraine’s biggest import dependencies.

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Ukrainian interceptor drones are likely at the peak of global demand. Ukrainian crews have travelled to the Middle East to demonstrate the effectiveness of interceptor systems, while foreign delegations are visiting Ukraine to learn the secrets of its air defence. Ukrainian manufacturers are also being contacted by private companies in the Middle East seeking to protect their facilities from Shahed attacks.

Ukraine has long warned that other states would eventually need to defend themselves against Shahed drones and reportedly even offered the United States cooperation in this area, which was not fully appreciated at the time.

In this edition:

• Ukrainian Drone Interceptors Are Becoming a Global Currency;

• Drone Piloting Should be as Remote and Protected as Possible: 412 Nemesis Brigade;

• P1-SUN: Ukrainian Interceptor Drone by SkyFall;

• 10+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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Ukrainian Drone Interceptors Are Becoming a Global Currency

On March 11, President Zelensky announced that Ukrainian experts in counter-drone technologies had begun working in Gulf countries. “Three of our teams have gone to the Middle East. Strong teams — with experts, military personnel, and engineers. Our military is already communicating and already working there,” Zelensky said.

The presidential spokesperson separately confirmed that the three countries where Ukrainian experts are currently operating are Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Others are also helping the US defend its military presence in Jordan.

In his column for Liga.Net, Valentyn Badrak, Director of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies, argues that Kyiv’s logic in helping provide protection for U.S. bases (particularly in Jordan, and possibly Saudi Arabia) is well-grounded and aimed not only at countering Russian missile attacks today, but also at building a safer future.

• Ukraine has received 11 requests from countries neighboring Iran, as well as from European states and the United States, seeking security support in countering Iranian drones.

• This points to the formation of stable political partnerships through defence technologies — and potentially, in the future, even deeper alliance relations with the United States.

• The author suggests that the use of Ukrainian interceptor drones could significantly reduce the consumption of expensive interceptor missiles. In the longer term, this could lead to Ukraine obtaining U.S. licenses for air defence missile production, and possibly even for strike missiles such as ATACMS or PrSM.

  (Last week, President Zelensky stated that Kyiv needs only one step from Washington — a license to produce interceptor missiles capable of stopping Russian ballistic threats. According to him, Ukraine’s industrial base and engineers already have all the necessary technologies to quickly establish mass production and provide air and missile defence not only for Ukraine, but potentially for the entire European continent.)

• A key issue for Ukraine is the ability to rapidly scale up domestic production of interceptor drones.

• This challenge can be addressed primarily by expanding the number of manufacturers, including through licensing agreements with large and experienced companies, particularly private enterprises.

• In early January, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense announced that it had granted 30 licenses to private manufacturers to use military-developed technologies. These licenses covered radio-electronic intelligence systems, countermeasures against Shahed-type strike drones, and guided munitions with automatic terminal guidance.

• MoD has also changed its drone procurement approach: demand for drones will now be generated automatically based on battlefield data — eliminating human bias, subjective influence, and corruption risks.

• Already in December–January, Ukraine’s Defence Forces were receiving more than 1,500 interceptor drones per day.

• There are, therefore, strong grounds to believe that Ukraine will be capable of supplying interceptor drones to both its own armed forces and partner countries.

• Ukraine has de facto already built a layered air and missile defence system. The development and integration of interceptor drones into the air defence system has become a Ukrainian solution to the problem

Ihor Fedirko, Executive Director of the Ukrainian Council of Defence Industry, said in an interview with Radio NV that the current production of Ukrainian interceptor drones exceeds the Defence Forces' needs by two to three times.
As of January 2026, Ukrainian defence manufacturers were producing 80–90% of the interceptor drones required by the Defence Forces, but over the past two months production has increased significantly.

The WSJ reported that the oil corporation Saudi Aramco is negotiating with at least two Ukrainian companies (SkyFall and Wild Hornets) to purchase interceptor drones to protect oil fields from potential attacks by Iran. According to sources, Saudi Aramco is moving quickly to secure these drones — racing ahead of the Saudi government itself and regional competitors, particularly Qatar.

Wild Hornets wrote on their social media that this information does not reflect the company's current position or activities. The company is not conducting any direct negotiations regarding exports. "The Government of Ukraine is currently engaged in discussions with international partners regarding operator training and the potential supply of interceptor drones within broader security cooperation frameworks. Should such initiatives require industrial participation, Wild Hornets is prepared to contribute accordingly,” the manufacturer added. Read my article about Wild Hornets and their interceptor drone Sting here.

Here is my earlier open-access report, “Drone warfare in Ukraine: war in the Middle East and Ukraine’s expertise.”

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Drone Piloting Should be as Remote and Protected as Possible: 412 Nemesis Brigade

The 412 Nemesis Brigade operates in a multidomain format. It works at different depths and across different environments—from interceptors and maritime operations to frontline and middle-range strike missions. The brigade is also one of the leaders in intercepting Shahed drones.

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This week, Shahed drones once again made headlines, this time in the context of the war in the Middle East. Affected countries and their Western partners immediately sought Ukraine’s expertise in countering Shaheds.

Ukraine remains in a unique position to provide valuable insights into Shahed variants, the development of layered air defence systems, and the application of low-cost countermeasures.

That said, such preparations should have begun earlier, and implementing these solutions may now take months.

This is a special edition of my Drone Warfare in Ukraine newsletter, focused exclusively on several aspects of Shahed countermeasures, interceptor drones, and featuring multiple exclusive commentaries. It is free to read and share.

In this edition:

• War in the Middle East and Ukraine’s Expertise;

• Thermal Imaging Cameras in Ukraine’s Interceptor Drones: Odd Systems;

• Importance of Operator Training for Interceptor Drones: Kruk Drones UAV Training Center;

• Russian Drone Adaptions: Future Trends

• additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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War in the Middle East and Ukraine’s Expertise

Since the United States and Israel launched a military operation against Iran, Iran has turned to using its Shahed drones to strike targets in multiple countries across the region. According to the BBC, in six days Iran launched more than 2,000 low-cost drones at targets across the Middle East to overwhelm defences and spark chaos in the region.

The Gulf states have been using Patriot interceptor missiles to defend against attacks by Iranian drones. However, their stocks of interceptor missiles are already being depleted, and Middle Eastern countries are now seeking cheaper alternatives to Patriot missiles.

This is largely because a single Shahed drone costs around $30,000, whereas interceptor missiles such as the PAC-3 used in the Patriot system cost millions.

Since then, there has been a surge of interest in Ukrainian interceptor drones capable of intercepting Shaheds at a very low cost, according to the FT report.

An industry representative noted that any sale of Ukrainian systems — even those manufactured outside the country — must be approved by Kyiv.

President Zelensky stated that partner states are seeking Ukraine’s assistance in stabilizing the situation amid ongoing hostilities in the Middle East. Ukraine is now discussing with them the possibility of sending Ukrainian experts to the region. He added that the Ukrainian military has the necessary capabilities, and that Ukrainian experts will “work on the ground”.

On March 5, Zelensky wrote that Ukraine had received a request from the United States for specific support in defending against Shahed drones in the Middle East. Reuters reported that in addition to interceptor drones and electronic warfare systems, the United States and Qatar have also expressed interest in Ukrainian acoustic detection systems designed to identify long-range strike drones.

Zelensky also said that Ukraine is considering providing interceptor drones in exchange for PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptor missiles for Patriots.

However, there is a mixed response from Ukrainian military personnel and experts regarding the type of assistance Ukraine may be able to provide to Middle Eastern countries.

A major in Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service, aerial reconnaissance specialist, and founder of the Matrix-UAV drone bureau, Yuriy Kasianov, noted that long-range strike drones in the Middle East are used mainly as a cheap supplement to ballistic missiles. According to him, drone attacks by Iran are primarily terror-style operations aimed at spreading fear, causing panic, and exhausting air defence systems.

He criticized attempts to highlight Ukrainian successes abroad while Russia continues to strike Ukrainian military, civilian, and energy infrastructure near the front line and border regions.

At the same time, even if Ukraine can supply some interceptors, merely deploying Ukrainian systems in other regions would not be enough.

A Ukrainian serviceman who has been directly involved in intercepting Shahed-type drones told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor that Ukraine faces a large-scale, daily drone threat, and its air defence responses have evolved around this reality. Russia conducts attacks according to a structured and methodical concept, which allows Ukrainian forces to anticipate the approximate directions, frequency, and patterns of strikes. For example, when Shahed drones follow known routes—such as through the Chernihiv region—defenders can estimate the azimuth and deploy mobile fire groups in advance.

The situation in the Middle East is different. Drone attacks there tend to be less predictable and less structured, often involving single drones or small numbers of drones flying toward different countries in seemingly random directions. As a result, only part of Ukraine’s experience can be directly applied.

According to the serviceman, there is one major limitation to the use of interceptor drones. Their practical interception radius is usually around 10-50 kilometers (depending on type), meaning that saturating entire national borders with interceptor coverage would be extremely difficult.

However, Ukraine can still provide valuable expertise in several areas. The first is technical knowledge about Shahed drones. Ukrainian specialists have accumulated extensive data on different Shahed variants and their components. For instance, about nine months ago, Russia began widely deploying Kometa navigation modules, which are highly resistant to electronic warfare interference.

It remains unclear which generation of Shahed systems Iran currently operates, but understanding these technical differences is crucial because countermeasures vary significantly between models.

Some drones can be disrupted by cutting mobile communications, others by electronic warfare systems, while certain variants require physical destruction. Some platforms also serve as reconnaissance drones or communications relays, complicating the defensive picture. Ukraine’s main contribution in this area could be sharing technical databases, identification methods, and operational experience.

A second area where Ukraine could help is in operational coordination and doctrine. Ukrainian forces have developed practical methods for organizing mobile fire groups, communication procedures between them, and low-cost countermeasures against Shahed drones.

One tactic that could be particularly relevant for Middle Eastern countries is the layered defence of urban areas. Creating a defensive ring of 8–10 kilometers, forming a buffer zone where drones can be intercepted before reaching urban infrastructure, is a realistic solution.

Even within Ukraine, the situation differs significantly between fronts—for example, between the Kharkiv and Kherson directions—and Russia’s tactics for employing different types of Shahed drones vary. The operational environment in the Middle East is, therefore, fundamentally different as well.

“One area where Ukraine can provide meaningful assistance is in rapid adaptation to evolving threats. Ukrainian forces have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to quickly adjust tactics and countermeasures in response to new developments. This experience could help partners develop flexible and adaptive response frameworks tailored to the specific threats they face,” a Ukrainian serviceman told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor on condition of anonymity.

At the same time, implementing a large-scale interceptor drone system in the Middle East would require time, infrastructure, and trained operators—something that ideally should have begun earlier.

In the near term, many countries are likely to rely more heavily on short- and medium-range air defence systems, such as Stinger, which are available and already integrated into air defence architectures.

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Thermal Imaging Cameras for Ukraine’s Interceptor Drones: Odd Systems

According to the Victory Drones community, the interceptor drone STING, developed by the Wild Hornets, has remained the most effective interceptor drone for five consecutive months. According to official data, STING currently leads in the number of successful interceptions of Shahed-type drones. Read my article about STING here.

In August 2025, it was reported that Sting drones were equipped with Kurbas thermal imaging cameras developed by the Ukrainian company Odd Systems.

The founder of Odd Systems, Yaroslav Azhnyuk, mentioned that the Kurbas module outperforms Chinese-made Caddx cameras, offering better image quality, greater reliability under heavy vibration, and improved moisture resistance — all at the same or even lower cost.

Last week, the company unveiled an updated version of its Kurbas thermal imaging line - the new Kurbas-640 Beta thermal camera.

The updated model includes pre-configured modes for different operational scenarios, including “Air Hunting,” “Ground Hunting,” “Navigation,” and a mode designed for extreme weather conditions.

In addition, the camera offers deep customization options for drone manufacturers and military engineers, allowing them to create their own image profiles by adjusting parameters such as contrast, brightness, noise reduction, detail enhancement, gamma settings, digital zoom, and sensor recalibration algorithms.

“The strength of Kurbas-640 Beta lies in its maximum adaptability to mission requirements. From now on, not only we as the camera manufacturer, but also any drone manufacturer or unit operating drones can configure the camera to meet their specific needs. Moreover, this can be done not only before a mission but also during the mission, including changing image parameters and modes programmatically,” wrote Yaroslav on his post on LinkedIn.

A week earlier, Odd Systems announced plans to build a factory to produce sensors for thermal imaging cameras. The goal is to reduce Ukraine’s dependence on foreign components, particularly those imported from China.

According to Azhnyuk, Europe currently produces fewer than 500,000 such sensors per year, while Ukraine consumes roughly the same amount in about five months. He noted that European sensors are around five times more expensive than Chinese ones and are often not of higher quality, and that they are extremely difficult to purchase due to high demand within Europe itself. The plant is expected to triple the production of sensors for thermal imaging cameras on the European continent.

In my conversations with Odd Systems, the company highlighted several important points regarding the localization of component production.

• Supply chains for miltech components are not only about price. They are also about availability and risk. For some critical components, localization is a security issue.

• Over the last two years, Ukraine has launched many new manufacturing facilities. At first, this was mostly low-tech production, for example components for FPV drones. Now we see a new phase.

• New factories are being launched that focus on more advanced components. This helps Ukraine become independent not only in security terms, but also economically. In many categories, Ukrainian producers can already compete with China on price.

• This includes motors, cameras, communication systems, and other key components.

• Microelectronics will also develop in Ukraine. This is not about leading-edge chips. It is about industrial microelectronics designed for real-world use, with a focus on reliability, stability, and repeatable production.

In 2025, Odd Systems started a partnership with the Danish prime Terma. The teams are working closely on a low-cost, AI-powered drone interceptor.

Odd Systems brings its expertise working with FPV drones, thermal cameras, and cooperation with the Ukrainian Defense Forces to deliver a scalable and reliable platform for countering various drone threats that arise in modern warfare.

The company’s focus is on joining R&D efforts to develop effective battlefield solutions, enhancing capabilities, and scaling internationally.

Odd Systems has a sister company, The Fourth Law, which focuses on autonomous technologies.

On March 6th, Yaroslav Azhniuk presented Zerov — an autonomous Shahed interceptor. Autonomous detection enables the system to identify targets at distances 2–3 times greater than comparable solutions.

Technical specifications of Zerov-8:

• Designed in a tailsitter configuration (an interceptor model with vertical takeoff and landing), combining the speed of a missile with the maneuverability of a drone.

• Maximum speed: 326 km/h (intercepts targets moving up to 270 km/h).

• Combat radius: up to 20 km.

• Warhead: up to 0.5 kg.

• Deployment time: vertical takeoff (launch within 30 seconds).

• Optics: daytime or thermal camera, depending on mission requirements.

“The most important part of an autonomous interceptor is detection. We trained the system to see targets where the human eye or standard sensors fall short. That gives us precious time and distance to maneuver — the difference between a Shahed being intercepted or striking the ground,” wrote Yaroslav.

I published a detailed profile article on The Fourth Law, which you can read here.

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Importance of Operator Training for Interceptor Drones: Kruk Drones UAV Training Center

To better understand the role of operators in the effectiveness of interceptor drones, I spoke with Viktor Taran, co-founder and CEO of the Kruk UAV Operator Training Center.

The center was established in April, 2022, in response to the urgent need of the Ukrainian Defence Forces for qualified UAV operators. Today, Kruk operates as a non-governmental training center certified by the Ministry of Defence, specializing in training operators for various types of UAVs as well as related technical and operational specialties.

Here are the key highlights from our conversation:

• For more than two years, Ukraine has warned its partners that the nature of the air war has fundamentally changed.

• Drones have become the main threat because they are: inexpensive; widely available; highly precise; capable of targeting specific objects (for instance, using Starlink communication).

• Traditional air defence systems, built around expensive interceptor missiles, are not designed for this type of threat.

• Countering drones requires a fundamentally different air defence architecture.

• These warnings were largely underestimated by Western partners in the early stages of the war.

• At the Ukrainian House during the Munich Security Conference in February 2026, visitors were shown a downed Russian Shahed drone and an AI-generated video simulating drone attacks on European cities, including Munich, Vienna, Davos, and Brussels.

  The video depicts drones launched from Russian territory striking major landmarks, including the European Parliament in Brussels, and features quotes from Western officials alongside threats from Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov.

• Even then, many Europeans treated the threat as exaggerated.

• Today, Western countries are trying to rapidly implement Ukraine’s experience in counter-drone warfare, but building such systems takes months and often years.

• A good example is the announced “drone wall” along the EU border, which has yet to materialize.

Interceptor Drones

• Interceptor drones will remain an important element of air defence, but they are not a universal solution.

• Their effectiveness depends heavily on the type of drone being intercepted.

• Against Shahed-type drones flying at 200–250 km/h, interceptor platforms are effective.

• Against jet-powered Shahed variants, flying at higher speeds (350-500 km/h), interceptor drones are less effective.

• Future developments may include interceptors with autonomous or AI-assisted targeting.

Training Interceptor Operators

• The biggest challenge today is not interceptor drones, but the shortage of trained operators.

  • Training a single operator at the Kruk Center can cost 40,000–70,000 UAH (910-1600 USD) for Ukraine’s Defence Forces. Organizing similar training programs for foreigners would likely cost more.

  • Current training groups at Kruk typically include 4–6 people, while the actual need is in the tens of thousands.

• Training interceptor drone operators is complex and time-consuming. A beginner with no drone experience requires 1.5–2 months of training. Experienced drone pilots can transition to interceptors in 3–4 weeks.

• Kruk Center conducts training in two main categories of interceptor drones:

  • Fixed-wing interceptors (similar to the Mriya or Interceptor concept)

  • FPV interceptor drones such as P1Sun or Bullet

• At the moment, fixed-wing interceptors show higher interception success rates. FPV interceptors are a newer direction at the Kruk Center.

• Training includes:

  • simulator sessions

  • theoretical instruction

  • work with radars

  • operating multiple drone platforms

  • interception training

  • night operations

  • field deployments.

• The center operates a large drone training range near Kyiv (around 80 hectares) equipped with electronic warfare systems; training support from friendly units; and operational testing environments.

• The center also deploys alongside combat units and participates in operational missions.

• In addition to training operators, Kruk also offers testing services for promising domestic and foreign defence innovations, allowing developers to receive feedback from end users.

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Russian Drone Adaptions: Future Trends

Ukrainian activist and Victory Drones founder Maria Berlinska shared her vision of Russian drone developments over the next 1–2 years:

• Using Shahed/Gerbera-type drones as a universal platform.
  These UAVs may increasingly serve multiple functions: acting as communication relays and mesh-network nodes, laying mines, serving as “mother drones,” and enabling real-time attacks on civilian infrastructure.
  Attacks using fiber-optic drones are also likely to increase, potentially carried by other drones, which would extend the effective strike range even further.
  Ultimately, the side with the longer strike reach and faster decision-making cycles—including through remote control, autonomy, and networked operations—will have a clear advantage.

• Expanded use of LTE networks to intensify aerial attacks.
  It is likely that Russia is already planning operations even larger in scale than Ukraine’s “Spiderweb” operation, where operators located thousands of kilometers away could simultaneously control hundreds of drones to attack critical infrastructure.
  Fully autonomous drone operations are also becoming increasingly plausible. Overall, the use of autonomous systems will continue to grow, alongside countermeasures such as electronic warfare, mechanical interception, laser systems, and electromagnetic defences.

• Integration of unmanned systems into a unified operational network.
  Russia is likely to link its aerial, ground, and maritime unmanned systems into a single coordinated ecosystem through software and mesh networks.
  In simpler terms, this would resemble an “army of unmanned systems” where drones provide communications for one another and are controlled from thousands of kilometers away through unified software platforms. Operators could then assign tasks—such as targeting specific locations—in real time via centralized digital interfaces.

Additional Updates

• There are two main types of interceptor drones: fixed-wing drones and multicopters, wrote Vladyslav Khrystoforov for Oboronka.

  Fixed-wing interceptors resemble small reconnaissance aircraft. They are equipped with a warhead and additional target detection and tracking systems and are typically launched from a catapult.

  These interceptor aircraft have a relatively low speed of around 160–180 km/h, but they can remain airborne longer and reach higher altitudes. If the mission fails, the drone can be safely recovered, refurbished, and launched again. To enable this, the detonation system is designed so that the drone explodes only on the operator’s command rather than on contact.

  Multicopters, on the other hand, are operated similarly to standard FPV drones. They take off vertically from hard surfaces and can reach high speeds of 350–400 km/h. These drones can be controlled either with a traditional FPV controller and goggles or with a more advanced control panel with a screen.

  Their main disadvantage is short flight endurance. While a fixed-wing interceptor may have time for a second interception attempt or return to base after a miss, a multicopter may run out of battery during additional maneuvers. Moreover, landing an explosive-equipped multicopter for reuse can be dangerous.

• Due to weather conditions, interceptor drones targeting Shaheds have been less effective, and work is underway to improve them, President Zelensky said. “We are currently upgrading interceptor technologies. We are working on universal interceptors that can operate in any weather conditions. This winter showed us that interception rates can drop due to weather. We are now developing new technologies to ensure they function effectively in all weather,” he noted.

• Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov, technology advisor to the Defence Minister, wrote that Ukraine is steadily improving the effectiveness of its interceptor drones and will sooner or later reach an interception rate of up to 90 percent. He added that he believes this could happen relatively quickly.

  At the same time, he outlined how the enemy may respond:

  1. Introducing evasion systems

  2. Creating flight corridors for drones

  3. Flying at extremely low altitudes in manual mode

  Serhiy argues that Ukraine will be able to address these challenges, but that the enemy’s main bet will likely be speed.

  This could include increasing the speed of jet-powered Shahed drones from 280–320 km/h to 350–400 km/h, and potentially introducing the Geran-5 variant, capable of speeds of 500–600 km/h. In such a scenario, many of Ukraine’s current interceptor drones could suddenly become ineffective.

  FLASH, therefore, called on manufacturers to begin developing interception systems capable of countering strike UAVs at these higher speeds now, while there is still time.

Related articles:

• Stopping Shaheds: Ukraine’s Solutions;

• Russia’s New Geran-5 Drones;

• Shahed Drones Are Evolving in Three Main Directions;

• Drones Against Civilians: How Russia Uses UAVs to Kill and Terrorize;

• Shaheds with real-time remote control.

Read more about long-range drones in this section: Deep Strike Capabilities.

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Ukraine has been actively working to disable Russia’s mesh-network technologies — a new solution designed to compensate for the loss of access to Starlink. Last week, the Defense Forces neutralized a mesh network that had enabled Russian Shahed-type drones to enter northern Ukraine from Belarus.

With all these innovations being actively reverse-engineered and adapted, the key question is: when will Ukraine adopt mesh networking? Or perhaps that process has already begun?

In this edition:

• Mesh Networks and EW Trends in Ukraine;

• Depth Ownership in Ukraine’s Drone Warfare;

• Ukraine’s Long-Range Drone Capabilities;

• and 5+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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Earlier this week, I joined for a 30-min conversation about drones in Ukraine - listen here.

Mesh Networks and EW Trends in Ukraine

In last week’s digest, I wrote about the growing challenge posed by mesh networks in Russian drones and the need for Ukraine to further strengthen its EW capabilities.

Mesh has the potential to reshape not only the tactics of mass drone attacks but also to increase drones’ resilience against electronic warfare and the loss of direct communication with operators.

Tymofiy Yurkov, a Ukrainian defence industry expert in the development and production of EW equipment, told ArmyInform that mesh networks allow the enemy to rapidly respond to areas of active countermeasures and attempt to reroute drones around zones where air defence or EW systems are most effective.

Mesh modules are not installed on every drone, according to Tymofiy. They are typically used during mass launch scenarios, when a large group of Shaheds is simultaneously airborne. In these cases, the network architecture makes sense and provides additional capabilities for control and coordination among unmanned systems.

There have been documented cases in which Russians use algorithms or elements of artificial intelligence to enable automatic drone coordination.

At the same time, operator-controlled systems remain more effective for now. However, the algorithms are already embedded: the system can automatically register that a drone has successfully passed through an area covered by EW or air defence, and redirect other Shaheds along a similar route without direct operator intervention.

The logic behind the development of such systems is to reduce dependence on human operators and shift decision-making directly to algorithms.

Full autonomy would mean that a group of UAVs could independently assess the operational environment — identifying areas where electronic warfare is active, where air defence systems are engaged, and which routes are safer — and adjust their behavior accordingly without manual intervention. “This is the direction in which the enemy is evolving. Given the current pace of development, such capabilities could emerge in the near term, potentially within the next six months,” explained Tymofiy.

To better understand these developments, I spoke with the Ukrainian company Kvertus, one of the leaders in developing tactical electronic warfare (EW) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems.

According to Yaroslav Filimonov, CEO and co-founder of Kvertus, we are now seeing a transition from standalone pieces of equipment to a unified digital battlefield.

• The key trend is the deep integration of electronic warfare (EW) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems into interconnected networks, where target detection and suppression occur almost instantaneously.

• Beyond expanding frequency ranges, we are also seeing the active deployment of AI-enabled algorithms to analyze the electromagnetic spectrum. This enables the automatic identification of hostile signals among thousands of others — a capability that is critically important in today’s highly saturated and contested spectrum environment.

Yaroslav shared that the main difficulty in countering mesh technologies lies in their decentralized resilience. Drones relay signals to one another, meaning that disabling a single node does not collapse the entire network. This significantly reduces the effectiveness of traditional jamming solutions.

Today, Ukraine’s primary challenge is not technological capability per se, but scale. The critical task is to move from isolated solutions to the development of global, automated systems. The future lies in architectures where data from ELINT sensors is automatically transmitted to strike systems or EW assets with minimal operator involvement. In modern warfare, the speed of information transfer determines frontline survival.

“As for future threats, we are already seeing the adversary move toward machine vision capabilities. This allows drones to ignore electronic warfare interference in the final phase of flight, as the system switches to autonomous terminal guidance. We must begin preparing now for the large-scale deployment of such “smart” drones,” Yaroslav added.

At the same time, Ukraine needs not only to scale up its electronic warfare (EW) capabilities but also to improve coordination among military units. According to the commander of the EW company of the 260th Territorial Defense Brigade “Khortytsia”, the effectiveness of EW operations depends on coordination between units, as it is necessary to agree on who is blocking which frequency, given that both enemy and Ukrainian drones are operating simultaneously in the air. EW units need personnel ready to operate electronic warfare systems at the front, as well as developers.

He emphasized that in the first years of the full-scale war, Ukraine paid insufficient attention to the field of electronic warfare, while Russia had been systematically developing these capabilities for a long time.

“The enemy’s EW is not just powerful — it is several times stronger, and this must be taken into account. The adversary has been developing it for a long time. They have many long-range systems that ‘hit’ at 45 kilometers and are also capable of jamming communications at distances of 60–80 kilometers,” the serviceman noted.

Since November 2025, Ukraine’s government has been promoting the decentralized procurement of EW systems, allowing military units to purchase them directly. 180 brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the National Guard of Ukraine can now order EW equipment directly through the DOT-Chain Defence weapons marketplace using their own allocated budgets. On the very first day after EW systems appeared on DOT-Chain Defence, military units placed orders worth nearly 6 million UAH (139,000 USD).

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Depth Ownership in Ukraine’s Drone Warfare

One of the most discussed pieces in Ukraine was a thread on X by Ryan O’Leary, an American serviceman and former company commander in Ukraine. In January 2026, he wrote that Ukraine is not losing the drone war tactically. Rather, it is losing operationally and strategically because it never defined control of depth as the objective.

His ideas gained significant attention in Ukraine’s military and defence-tech circles and prompted a response from the Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert “Madyar” Brovdi.

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Ukraine’s solution to the Starlink problem affected Russian long-range drone operations, but their current adaptations are even harder to counter. Russia is now focusing on the mass deployment of mesh technology across various types of drones — something that has been observed since the end of last year. It allows a group of drones to operate as a chain, with the signal relayed through aircraft that remain in the air.

Investment in electronic warfare and radar infrastructure by Ukraine must grow exponentially.

In this edition:

• “Baba Yaga” Drones in Ukraine: Key Trends;

• Mesh Networks on Russian Drones and Ways of Countering Them;

• Russia’s Use of LTE Networks to Control FPV Drones;

• Drone Warfare Lessons for NATO: The Hedgehog-2025 Exercise;

• and 5+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

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Last week, I joined Samuel Bendett, one of the leading experts on Russia, on his podcast to discuss drone developments on the battlefield. Listen to the recording on X Spaces ⬇️

“Baba Yaga” Drones in Ukraine: Key Trends

One Russian milblogger, in a recent interview with Radio Sputnik, stated that the area where Ukrainians hold an absolute advantage is the so-called “Baba Yaga” drones — thousands of heavy multirotor drones capable of dropping six 82mm rounds, hovering over Russian positions, and leveling trenches. He said it remains an absolute mystery to him why Russia, now almost in the fifth year of the war, has not deployed such bombardier drones at scale.

“We have very good FPV drones. But all Ukrainian FPV drones are integrated into a unified ground control station, while ours are fragmented — there’s a control station for Ovod drones, then separate systems for fiber-optic drones — all different. They have better standardization. The biggest problem is ‘Baba Yaga,” the blogger added.

He also cited private initiatives to produce such drones. For example, the Upyr drone was presented to Putin after reportedly striking an Abrams and a Bradley. It had been built with public donations, and after seeing its performance, Putin ordered funding for further production. Later, the heavy Berdysh drone emerged, but it still remains at the level of a grassroots individual initiative.

Four years have now passed, and these drones still do not exist at scale.

Before the war, the drones now known as “Baba Yaga” were agricultural platforms used for spreading fertilizer.

A personal contact of mine on the frontline mentioned that: “The Russians tend to call all heavy bombers’ Baba Yaga,’ regardless of the specific model. And the sound it makes - it’s like a helicopter on steroids! At night, it really gets under your skin. They fear it first and foremost because of the sound”.

Now, Ukrainian units use “Baba Yaga” type drones for:
• precision strikes against equipment in the enemy’s near rear;
• targeting ammunition depots and personnel concentrations;
• remotely mining routes used by enemy vehicles;
• maintaining a constant aerial threat, especially at night — when it may not be visible, but can always be heard.

One of the most well-known units to have mastered the use of “Baba Yaga” drones is the 412th Separate Unmanned Systems Brigade “Nemesis.” It is known for actively striking enemy air defence systems with its bomber drones. The military personnel of this unit created their own heavy bomber, also named Nemesis. It can fly over 20 kilometers, and for uninterrupted communication, Nemesis integrated Starlink satellite communication terminals. According to the unit, “We have an operator who sits in Kyiv in a warm office with a smoothie and drops 3-4 shells in one mission.”

The flight route is programmed in advance using specialized systems, and only at the final stage — when the target is in close proximity — the operator takes manual control to guide the drone onto the object and evade electronic warfare systems.

The Nemesis unit has its own workshop, which monitors the condition of the bombers, conducts inspections, and performs test flights. In addition, there is meticulous record-keeping of sorties and returns, operator checklists, and verification of operational algorithms.

One of the representatives of “Baba Yaga”-class drones in Ukraine is the Vampire drone (I reported on it here in April, 2025). It is a large hexacopter that previously operated at around 20 km and can now reach targets up to 60 km away. The payload capacity of the drone is steadily increasing (over 15 kg).

Developed by the Ukrainian company SkyFall in 2022, the Vampire was designed for strike missions, including the destruction of armored vehicles, fortifications, ammunition depots, and enemy personnel. It is also used to deliver equipment to the frontline.

According to a Ukrainian serviceman interviewed for this article, “frontline logistics would collapse without it. So it’s not only a strike platform, but also a very high-quality logistical tool.”

The manufacturer recently told Oboronka that the current version of the Vampire drone surpasses the first version in every aspect — communications, range, resilience to electronic warfare, ease of operation, speed, and design for production.

Previously, the company could produce around 50,000 units per year; now, it has a capacity of 100,000 units annually while maintaining consistent quality.

The producer mentioned that there are still many areas for improvement. Whereas earlier the system relied on GPS, it no longer does. Alternatives include visual navigation, inertial guidance, and ground-based “beacons.” In the Starlink-enabled version, navigation can also be based on satellite constellation tracking.

The goal is to ensure that, even under heavy signal suppression, Vampire can complete its mission and return safely.

SkyFall has more than halved the production cost of its Vampire drone during the full-scale war, from nearly $20,000 to the current $8,500 per unit.

The producer acknowledged that there is still room to reduce the price further, but the potential for further reductions is limited. The company plans to lower costs by installing its own camera and localizing the production of key components, which, in some cases, are already cheaper than their Chinese counterparts.

SkyFall has already localized a significant share of production: communications systems, antennas, the chassis, and almost the entire ground control station are now Ukrainian-made. The company has also developed its own motors, although their serial production has not yet been scaled.

A separate focus area is the development of an in-house camera. A prototype has already been created, with an MVP version expected in the spring. By the end of the year, SkyFall plans to launch mass production of cameras for the Vampire. The company already offers a “Vampire non-China” version — free of Chinese components — and aims to make the drone fully Ukrainian by the end of the year.

According to Russian media, Russian forces repair downed Ukrainian Baba Yaga drones and then use them against Ukrainians.

Reportedly, a trophy “Baba Yaga” drone can be purchased at the market in occupied Donetsk for approximately 600,000 rubles ($7,860 USD). Some drones are cheaper. Sellers are reportedly willing to arrange a “test drive” outside the city to demonstrate the drone in operation.

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Mesh Networks on Russian Drones and Ways of Countering Them

Ukrainian military communications specialist and advisor to Minister of Defence, Serhiy “FLASH” Beskrestnov, wrote on Facebook that a fellow serviceman had sent him photos of the internal configuration of a new Russian Molniya UAV. The images confirmed what he had feared - Russian forces have installed a mesh modem on the Molniya UAVs.

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Ukraine is known for its successful use of ground and waterborne unmanned vehicles against the enemy. These systems are considered among the best in the world in their respective domains — cheaper, and often more effective than their Western counterparts.

At the same time, Russia is developing similar systems. While we have not yet seen many notable successes on their side, once Russia identifies a viable solution, it is likely to scale it rapidly, as it did with Shahed-type drones, fiber-optic drones, KABs, and the adoption of Starlink.

In this edition:

• Ground Drones in 2026: What to Expect;

• Small and Agile Systems: The Role of River and Naval Drones in Ukraine;

• Russia’s Gerbera Drones as FPV Carriers;

• Is the Starlink Whitelist an Effective Solution?

• 5+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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I'm running a fundraising campaign to buy a vehicle for my friend Volodymyr, who is serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine 🇺🇦

I’d appreciate it if you consider donating to PayPal.

In 2025, here on Substack, we raised funds to purchase three Mavic drones for recon purposes for another friend of mine serving in the Ukrainian army.

Ground Drones in 2026: What to Expect

Some weeks ago, we saw an awesome video of the Ukrainian Droid TW-7.62 ground robotic system, based on the NUMO platform, that captured three Russian soldiers. The video was shared by the manufacturer, Ukrainian company DevDroid.

I connected with the company and asked for their assessment of trends in ground drone development in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. “From a technological perspective, 2026 will be a year of evolutionary rather than revolutionary change,” the company said.

And here is what we can expect from ground drones in the coming months:

1. Increased range and speed

The first and most fundamental challenge for Ukraine’s Armed Forces is the expanding kill zone. If earlier tactical and technical specifications for unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) assumed an operational range of 5–7 km, this is no longer sufficient. Real combat tasks now require a one-way range of up to 20 km.

At the same time, speed requirements are also increasing. The optimal speed must be 40–50 km/h; otherwise, these platforms become easy targets.

For manufacturers, this means working simultaneously with several complex parameters: energy consumption, communication stability, drivetrain reliability, and platform survivability.

2. UGVs as the backbone of battlefield logistics

The second key trend is the growing logistical role of UGVs. In some combat areas, up to 90% of logistical tasks are already performed by ground robots: ammunition resupply, evacuation, and equipment delivery.

Human resources have limits. Operators often conduct two to three missions in a row. In reality, units are sometimes forced to pause operations for several days simply because operators are physically exhausted.

This directly leads to the next major trend.

3. Transition to semi-autonomy

In 2026, UGVs will inevitably move toward semi-autonomous modes. This is one of the most technically complex challenges ahead.

Civilian autonomous vehicles operate on paved roads, with lane markings, traffic lights, and predictable environments. UGVs, by contrast, operate off-road, under fire, and in conditions of unstable communications.

Full autonomy will not yet be achieved, but the first functional solutions—of varying quality—will appear. This will serve as a starting point for reducing operator workload and scaling UGV use.

4. Countering FPV drones

Another serious challenge is protecting UGVs from FPV drones. Previously, the primary reliance in this area was on electronic warfare. However, the battlefield is seeing a growing number of “loitering” FPV drones that can wait for targets for extended periods, as well as fiber-optic FPVs that are immune to traditional jamming methods.

As a result, developers will increasingly focus on finding new solutions to protect UGVs from FPV threats.

5. Combined combat operations

The next stage of evolution is multi-domain operations. Coordinated use of ground and aerial unmanned systems significantly increases the effectiveness of firepower and enables faster and more precise responses to battlefield threats.

When an enemy group is detected, a machine-gun-equipped ground robot moves in first, using suppressive fire to pin the enemy down. A second robot armed with a grenade launcher then advances, engaging targets with fragmentation effects within a radius of approximately 25 meters. FPV drones are used to eliminate what remains.

If FPV drones are deployed first, the enemy tends to disperse and hide, making detection—especially in wooded terrain—much more difficult. This is why sequencing matters: machine gun first, then grenade launcher, followed by FPVs, delivers better results.

In combat scenarios, ground robotic systems can also function as carrier platforms—acting as “mother drones” for FPVs.

6. From improvised solutions to mass platforms

While improvised systems dominated at the beginning of the war, the market is now moving toward scalable platforms. This includes adaptations based on serially produced equipment—such as quad bikes, pickup trucks, and heavier carriers—modified to meet combat requirements.

In October 2025, DevDroid created a universal “operating system”, Droid Box, to accelerate UGV development. The Droid Box is the "brain" of a ground drone, responsible for all key functions, including communication, control, and integration of combat modules.

Also, the company is integrating an AI-driven optical detection system into its ground robotic complexes.

Read my previous report on their work here: Ground Drones as Mini-Artillery Systems: DevDroid.

And here is my assessment of general drone trends in 2025: Drone Warfare in Ukraine: Key Trends of 2025.

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Small and Agile Systems: The Role of River and Naval Drones in Ukraine

Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi published an insightful interview with Velbot, Commander of the 443rd Separate Naval Division “Neptun Shadow” of the 9th Brigade of the Unmanned Systems Forces. He shared insights on the use of maritime and river drones in Ukraine. Here is my summary of this interview.

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This week, Russia deliberately struck a passenger train with a Shahed-type drone, later claiming that the train was transporting military personnel.
Unfortunately, this development had been anticipated weeks earlier, amid a rapid increase in Russian drones equipped with mesh modems or Starlink terminals, enabling real-time, online control.
New upgrades to Shahed-type drones are being documented on a weekly basis, and with freezing temperatures returning across Ukraine in the coming days, there are growing concerns that Russia may launch another wave of destructive attacks.

In this edition:

• Russian Shaheds Strike a Passenger Train in Ukraine;

• Ukraine Aims to Create an Anti-Shahed Shield;

• Ground Drones as Mini-Artillery Systems: DevDroid

• 10+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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Russian Shaheds Strike a Passenger Train in Ukraine

On January 27, three Russian Shahed-type (Geran-2) drones with online control attacked a moving train carrying 291 passengers in the Kharkiv region. As of January 28, six fatalities have been confirmed.

The strike was not directed at the locomotive but at the train's center. Serhiy FLASH Beskrestov, now an advisor on technological issues to the Minister of Defence, wrote on his social media that the operator who controlled the Shahed (either via a radio modem using a mesh network or Starlink) acted deliberately, as drone operators can clearly distinguish between different types of railcars.

Russian channels are claiming that the train was transporting military personnel, which is false. Among the passengers were service members returning from leave and traveling back to their units as ordinary passengers. Many of them, having combat experience and medical training, provided first aid to injured women and children.

The attack occurred near Yazykove, approximately 60 km from the front line. According to comments, only one daily passenger train currently operates on that section of the route, with another running every other day.
This not only raises the issue of deliberate targeting, but also suggests careful planning and prior study of the train schedule by Russians.

In an earlier interview with The New Voice, Serhiy FLASH said that Ukrainian experts had documented the use of Starlink terminals with Molniya UAVs. According to his own statistics—compiled with the help of OSINT colleagues—38% of these attacks were successful.
Molniya UAV controlled by a human operator via Starlink can fly at very low altitude, evade Ukraine’s interceptor drones and radars, and strike targets with high precision.

Later, he observed Starlink terminals on the BM-35, a fuel-powered UAV. It can strike targets at distances of up to 500 kilometers thanks to its fuel reserve. While it is smaller than a Shahed, it remains highly dangerous.

This pattern of attacks is expected to continue. Starlink performs very well: it provides a stable video transmission channel and precise control.

On January 24, Russian forces carried out a Shahed drone strike on helicopters in the area of Kropyvnytskyi. “In the footage, we can see automatic target lock and manual guidance based on the video feed. However, there were no UAVs nearby to form a mesh radio network. I therefore conclude that this is the first recorded use of Shahed drones operating via Starlink,” FLASH explained.

Serhiy added that Ukraine cannot wait for the enemy to devastate everything using Starlink-controlled Shaheds. Ukraine must act quickly and develop countermeasures. The most immediate solution is administrative and regulatory—at the level of SpaceX, the U.S. government, and Ukraine’s government.

According to him, one countermeasure Ukraine can take is to ban roaming for foreign Starlink terminals entering Ukrainian territory. Only authorized Ukrainian Starlink terminals should operate within the country.
”To achieve this, we need to establish a registry of all Starlink terminals used by the Armed Forces and volunteers, transfer them to servicing by an official dealer in Ukraine, and ensure that all new activations go exclusively through that channel. This would give us full visibility of all terminals operating inside the country. Any Starlink terminals purchased abroad should not function on Ukrainian territory,” Serhii said.

On Jan. 29, Minister Fedorov and advisor Serhii FLASH reported that the Ministry of Defense team promptly contacted SpaceX and proposed concrete steps to address the issue. “I am grateful to SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell and personally to Elon Musk for their swift response and for initiating work on resolving the situation,” mentioned the Minister.

According to FLASH, the teams are preparing a comprehensive response that includes both rapid, temporary measures and more systematic, long-term solutions.

Just a week earlier, I reported on at least six methods by which Russia uses its UAVs to kill and terrorize Ukrainian civilians; check this free article.

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Ukraine Aims to Create an Anti-Shahed Shield

During the daytime on January 26, a Russian Shahed drone was observed flying over Kyiv; however, no air raid alert was issued. This may indicate not the absence of air defence, but rather that the UAV was flying below 100 meters. Ukrainian experts say the UAV’s ability to reach the capital undetected is deeply concerning.

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Ukraine’s drone warfare is moving by leaps and bounds toward digitalization. Ukraine’s new Defence Minister started strong, announcing the launch of a project to train and test AI models using real-world battlefield data to detect and intercept aerial threats, and introducing Mission Control, a comprehensive drone management system within the DELTA.

Zelensky assessed the current performance of Ukraine’s defence forces in countering Shahed-type threats as insufficient, and clearly defined strengthening these capabilities as the top priority for the newly appointed minister.

In this edition:

• Shahed Drones Are Evolving in Three Main Directions;

• Ground Drones Through an Operator’s Eyes: What Works—and What Breaks in War;

• Ukraine Collects Data for Its Interceptor Drones;

• 5+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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Shahed Drones Evolve in Three Main Directions

Radio communications expert Serhiy FLASH Beskrestnov gave an exclusive interview to Fakty ICTV about how Russia is modifying Shahed drones, why they have become more dangerous, and how Chinese technologies are helping the enemy bypass electronic warfare.

He said that Shahed-type drones are currently evolving in three main directions.

First direction - improving the accuracy of Shahed drones and their strike precision.

Shaheds previously flew according to pre-programmed coordinates. An operator or pilot in Russia enters the coordinates in advance, and the drone follows them. All circling, altitude changes (descent or climb) occur automatically based on a preloaded flight program.

Shahed guidance relies on satellite navigation. If satellite navigation is unavailable, the Shahed cannot orient itself, locate a target, or strike it. Contrary to many rumors, the Shahed does not simply fall straight down like a stone. Instead, it continues flying using its inertial and internal navigation systems while searching for satellite navigation signals.

If the signal does not reappear, the drone eventually runs out of fuel, fails to find a target, and crashes. If the signal is restored, the Shahed corrects its course, returns to the target area, reacquires the target, and strikes it.

To counter this system, Ukraine deploys EW across its territory. The denser Ukraine’s EW coverage becomes, the more Russians enhance satellite navigation protection systems on Shaheds.

Early Shaheds were equipped with the Russian “Kometa” antenna, a four-element system capable of countering four EW sources. As Ukraine increased EW density, Russia upgraded to an eight-element antenna, requiring eight EW sources from different directions to suppress it.

They later introduced a 12-element antenna, requiring twelve EW sources. Russia did not stop there: they began installing Chinese antennas with 16 elements. “In some captured Shaheds, we have even documented antennas with 32 elements,” said Serhiy.

Weight is not a critical issue for Shahed drones. They can easily carry an additional 10–20–30 kg without major performance loss. An antenna weighing around 3 kg does not significantly affect flight range. Fuel reserves and engine power allow for these upgrades.

Second direction - increasing the warhead size and experimenting with payloads. “We have already seen thermite and cluster warheads. Recently, dual warheads have become common—two 50 kg charges, totaling 100 kg”.

Third direction - modifying Shahed drones to carry secondary weapons or additional equipment. Experts have observed cluster dispensers releasing PTM-3 anti-tank mines. The Shahed flies over an area and drops these mines from under its wings.

Not everyone realizes how critical Ukraine’s military aviation is in countering Shaheds. “This is an enormous effort carried out every night by our pilots, who risk their lives. Helicopters operate in fog; visibility is severely limited. Pilots cannot know the Shahed’s exact position down to the meter,” commented Serhiy.

Russia is developing systems to hunt helicopters. Recently, Shaheds equipped with rear-facing lights designed to blind Ukrainian interceptor drones were detected. A wide range of external payloads has been seen—various release mechanisms and experimental equipment. Russia continues searching for additional uses of Shahed drones during flight.

Why do Shaheds or Gerberas fly in circles? Previously, this was assumed to be a malfunction, a software error, or the effect of Ukrainian EW. Now, experts understand that these Shaheds, or Gerberas, act as signal relays.

Their task is to penetrate Ukrainian airspace, climb to altitude, and loiter in circular patterns, creating a radio signal for subsequent Shaheds deeper behind them. Serhiy mentioned, “When analyzing nightly air attacks, we consistently observe these Shahed relay drones. This is extremely dangerous.”

Shaheds are also being adapted for reconnaissance. Chinese video cameras are being installed on both Gerberas and Shaheds. According to the expert, almost all of these technologies are sourced from China.

In addition to ground surveillance, cameras are now being mounted upward, allowing the drones to observe the sky. Why? To look for Ukrainian interceptor drones.

Russia is actively searching for “corridors” for Shahed penetration. The first threat is air defense systems, the second is electronic warfare, and the third is interceptor drones. They try to bypass all of these.

Now, interceptor drones account for up to 20% of Shahed shoot-downs. Russia, therefore, seeks corridors without interceptor coverage. A logical approach is to send a cheap Gerbera first. If it flies through with a camera, then a second one follows and detects no interceptor drones in the sky, those corridors can subsequently be used to send Shaheds.

In his most recent Facebook post, FLASH wrote that, for Ukraine, it is appropriate to build layered defenses along the borders to prevent Shaheds from penetrating deep into the country. To do this, three things are required:

1. Establish a dense, unified radar coverage along all borders.

2. Ensure a high concentration and density of air-defence crews along the borders, including interceptor drones (and not only drones).

3. Make all of this operate effectively and in a coordinated manner—which requires a clear system for target allocation.

“Will this be a victory? No. As soon as this is achieved, Russia will immediately shift to jet-powered UAVs of the Geran-5 type. If we want to secure victory in this aerial war, we must already be developing solutions against Shahed-type drones capable of speeds of 500+ km/h,” writes FLASH.

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Ground Drones Through an Operator’s Eyes: What Works—and What Breaks in War

A summary of the conversation with the commander of an Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) platoon from the 190th Training Center about operator training, battlefield use, and the challenges UGVs face on the frontline.

Check the list of my articles and sections on ground drones here.

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While writing my recent newsletters on drones, I could not help but notice that over the past month, Russia’s innovations in unmanned technologies have stood out not for technical ingenuity but for the scale of civilian suffering they cause. These systems are becoming more dangerous and more lethal, with a clear emphasis on maximizing harm to civilians during the harsh winter months.

In this edition:

• Extreme Cold Affects Drones in Ukraine and Russia;

• Starlink Saga Continues: Russia Imports Terminals and (Reportedly) Develops an Anti-Starlink Weapon;

• Russia’s New Geran-5 Drones;

• 5+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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The poll announced in the previous post has ended, and by a relatively small margin of 10%, Drone Warfare in Ukraine was selected as the section that should become my priority. I will make this transition over the next couple of weeks.

Interesting results—I personally expected Drone Warfare to be significantly ahead.

Extreme Cold Affects Drones in Ukraine and Russia

Due to severe freezing temperatures, Ukrainian forces are losing more drones. Before the onset of extreme cold, one to two drones were typically used to strike a single target; in freezing conditions, units are sometimes forced to deploy more than three drones per target.

This was stated by the Head of Communications for the 155th Separate Mechanized Brigade named after Anna of Kyiv, speaking to Hromadske Radio.

According to him, extreme cold accelerates battery depletion in drones, reducing their operational range. In addition, the risk of icing and system failures increases.

At the Dronarium Academy training ground near Kyiv, fiber-optic lines froze due to deteriorating weather conditions and a temperature drop to –8°C. The site hosted training and exercises on operating unmanned aerial vehicles. Under these conditions, conducting training flights becomes technically impossible.

Icing poses a serious problem also for Russian drones, particularly the Geran UAVs, as ice can form on the aircraft’s front parts, significantly complicating flight.

Serhiy FLASH Beskrestnov wrote that Shahed-type drones have a winter variant that includes in-flight heating of some internal components. However, the Shahed lacks heating on its aerodynamic surfaces, which can cause ice buildup. For this to happen, several factors are required: high humidity or rain, and a sharp temperature transition from above to below freezing. This phenomenon usually occurs within the –5°C to +5°C range.

“But even here, it is not so straightforward. A Shahed can carry a significant payload, and if icing is minor, does not alter the wing profile, and does not disrupt the UAV’s overall balance, it can continue flying. Otherwise, the Shahed will crash,” Serhiy added.

Another Ukrainian expert, Anatolii Khrapchynskyi, said that some Shahed components were modernized to mitigate the effects of cold weather. For example, the servo actuators were enclosed.

In addition, heating systems were installed for certain elements, enabling their use in adverse weather conditions. “Icing can occur on any aerial object: any civilian aircraft is treated with a special fluid before takeoff,” the aviation expert noted.

The enemy continues to use strike UAVs against Ukraine. Even in freezing conditions, these drones are still deployed, though in smaller numbers.

Russian attacks on residential buildings cannot be excused by blaming icing or weather conditions. Many strike drone routes deliberately pass over densely populated urban areas, increasing the risk of civilian casualties.

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Starlink Saga Continues: Russia Imports Terminals and (Reportedly) Works on an Anti-Starlink Weapon

Two parallel lines of reporting suggest that Russia is both using Starlink terminals for its own drones and also might be developing anti-Starlink space-based weapons.

Read the first part of my reporting here: Integration of Starlink Terminals into Russian Molniya UAVs, and the second part below.

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We all remember several instances when the Starlink satellite service was unexpectedly restricted for Ukraine’s Armed Forces during the war, including in 2025. At the beginning of 2026, there is a growing trend of Russian forces using Starlink terminals integrated into their Molniya strike drones, making them more resistant to jamming and highly dangerous.

This development needs to be addressed with SpaceX, although how this will progress, given recent developments, remains difficult to predict.

In this edition:

• AI-Enabled Drone Bumblebee and Pasika Swarming Technology — NYT report;

• Ukrainian Deftech Forecasts for 2026: Insights from Industry;

• Operation Spiderweb: WSJ reporting;

• Integration of Starlink Terminals into Russian Molniya UAVs.

• additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

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Now let me run a small experiment—a poll.

For the past two years, I have focused primarily on the general newsletter, Arms Trends in Ukraine, published on Mondays, while preparing Drone Warfare when time allowed—sometimes on Wednesdays, sometimes on Saturdays, and sometimes even skipping it (sorry 🙈). However, many of my contacts have said they are particularly interested in the Drone Warfare section, and, honestly, most of my analytical work outside the digest also focuses on drones.

I am therefore considering whether Drone Warfare in Ukraine should become my priority section. Given my limited time, I want to focus on what is most interesting for my audience. Please vote—it will help me decide.

Thank you!

Integration of Starlink Terminals into Russian Molniya UAVs

Russian Molniya UAVs are now being used not only as strike drones, but also as carrier platforms, transporting several smaller drones — including FPVs — to extend their strike range. These systems, which began appearing more frequently on the battlefield in 2025, are increasingly being used alongside Starlink terminals.

According to an assessment by Ukrainian radio technology specialist Serhiy FLASH Beskrestnov, these are not improvised, garage-style mounts, but appear to be factory-level or small-series integrations, with Starlink terminals embedded directly into the drone’s airframe.

This is a serious warning signal for Ukraine. Drones controlled via Starlink are largely immune to ground-based electronic warfare, meaning they cannot be jammed in the traditional way.

A Molniya UAV under Starlink control can reliably reach its target and strike with an accuracy of tens of metres, hitting what are often the most sensitive targets.

There is currently no clear understanding of the supply channels through which Starlink terminals are reaching Russia at scale. One reported scenario involves relatives or intermediaries in Europe purchasing Starlink units and transferring them to Russian military personnel under personal accounts.

While purchasing one or two units is relatively easy, serial use implies either corporate accounts or affiliated entities abroad acquiring terminals and registering them on their own accounts.

On 17 December, Starlink terminals were also documented on Russian armoured vehicles, where they are being used as a substitute for conventional radio communications, enabling data exchange between units.

Overall, there are growing indications that Russia’s use of Starlink at the front is becoming systemic.

This erodes what was previously a key Ukrainian advantage. From a cost perspective, this is also sustainable for Russia: a Starlink Mini reportedly costs USD 400–500 wholesale, comparable to the price of a thermal camera for a single-use FPV drone.

The only viable response is political and organisational: capturing terminals, tracing their origin through partners, and engaging directly with SpaceX to identify purchasing accounts and block them where large-scale misuse is proven. If thousands of terminals are linked to a single account or supplier, such activity should, in principle, be traceable and stoppable.

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Ukrainian Deftech Forecasts for 2026: Insights from Industry

The war has led to uneven technological development. What already works in combat conditions in one area still exists only at the prototype or simulation level in another. As a result, experts often reach different and sometimes even opposing assessments of where the sector is heading.

While I have already published my own assessment of developments in 2025, the section below brings together insights from key industry players in Ukraine, along with their forecasts for 2026.

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Quantity over quality? The ability to scale or a groundbreaking innovation?

In 2025, Russia clearly led in the first category—the ability to produce thousands of its most effective drones, whether Shahed-type systems or fiber-optic FPVs, to overwhelm Ukrainian defenders both at the frontline and deep in the rear.

Ukraine’s advantage, by contrast, lies in its capacity to innovate and to allow those innovations to prove themselves on the battlefield. Across all categories of unmanned systems, Ukraine has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt, iterate, and find creative solutions under enormous pressure and multiple constraints. This adaptability aimed to compensate for shortages in air-defence systems and missiles, artillery ammunition, long-range strike capabilities, and naval assets. And, to some extent, it succeeded.

Observing drone warfare in 2025 has been an interesting exercise. It would be easier if it were not about my own country.

Below is a summary of the key developments that caught my attention in 2025.

And what stood out to you in the Russia-Ukraine drone war?

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Fiber-optics

“2025 will become the year of fiber-optics,” the commander of Ukraine’s K-2 regiment said in March. In 2025, fiber-optic drones were used en masse by both Ukraine and Russia. Russia is leading in terms of production volumes - in September 2025, it doubled the production of its fiber-optic FPVs to more than 50,000 per month. In terms of reported accuracy and range, Russia also appears to be ahead.

Ukraine, which was initially in a reactive position in this niche, quickly organized the codification, procurement, and scaling of all available fiber-optic drones.

However, Russia still holds an advantage, as it has its own facilities for fiber-optic cable production at the plant in Saransk, and actively cooperates with China on spool production.

Meanwhile, Ukraine remains reliant on cable imports from China.

Both Russia and Ukraine experiment with integrating fiber-optic systems into more complex unmanned operations. For example, Russia has unveiled a fiber-optic sea drone. While its range is not expected to exceed 100 km, it could perform a variety of useful tasks, such as acting as a drone carrier—delivering FPV drones to other areas and launching them for strikes.

Ukraine is working on integrating fiber-optic FPVs onto its maritime drones, such as the Sea Baby.

Despite their simplicity, fiber-optic drones are not expected to disappear from the battlefield. They are highly effective in areas with strong electronic warfare coverage and are often used in ambushes. “A fiber-optic drone is not designed to conduct 30–40 sorties per day. It is intended for a single sortie and a precise strike. Countering it is extremely difficult; so far, only kinetic interception is effective,” said a Ukrainian veteran.

More recently, Russia has reportedly increased the range of its fiber-optic drones to up to 50-65 km, using them to strike Ukraine’s logistical nodes.

Interceptor drones

In 2025, we witnessed the emergence of a large category of inexpensive interceptor drones - kamikaze, dome-shaped FPVs capable of reaching speeds exceeding 300 km/h and targeting enemy strike drones.

Unfortunately, the need for these systems was not recognized early enough. Ukrainian manufacturers mentioned that work on these drones began several years ago, but only in 2025 did we see their scaling.

This was preceded by two related developments: a shift in U.S. support and an increase in Russian strikes. Shortages of air-defence systems and missiles—caused by delays in U.S. assistance—combined with repeated pushes for various “peace deal” negotiations, played to Russia’s advantage.

In the summer of 2025, Russia significantly increased both the size and frequency of its drone and missile salvos. If in 2022, a typical attack involved about 100 weapons and occurred roughly once a month, by 2025, attacks had grown to nearly 370 munitions and were taking place about every eight days. The largest Russian strike since the start of the full-scale invasion occurred in September 2025 and involved 818 drones and missiles.

In response, interceptor drones emerged as a cost-effective, complementary air-defence solution that Ukraine is able to produce and scale.

Interceptors have now become an integral part of Ukraine’s layered air defence, alongside surface-to-air systems, mobile firing units, electronic warfare, and helicopter crews.

According to various estimates, they are among the most effective means of countering Shahed-type drones, intercepting around 20% of targets.

With a cost of around $2,500, interceptors are an economical option to counter Russian Gerans, which cost $30,000-50,000.

As of December 2025, the use of interceptor drones over cities and other residential areas in Ukraine remains forbidden. As Russia is increasingly using Shahed-type drones for targeted strikes against Ukraine’s residential areas, this ban might be reconsidered.

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Asymmetric warfare

2025 provided several outstanding examples of how a smaller country with limited resources, like Ukraine, can successfully damage the strategic capabilities of a large nuclear state.

Operation Spiderweb in June 2025 involved the use of small FPV drones to damage or destroy over 40 Russian high-value aircraft deep in the rear, including Tu-95MSs, Tu-22M3s, and A-50s jets capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The operation took around 1.5 years to prepare. Ukrainian forces used not the usual $500 FPVs, but systems specifically designed for this complex operation. The drones used mobile data networks and were operated remotely from Ukrainian territory.

Later, Russia introduced restrictions on mobile internet in several regions and is now effectively copying Ukraine’s tactics, remotely operating Shahed drones through mobile network.

In August–September, Ukraine carried out a series of highly successful strikes against Russian energy infrastructure: processing facilities, and ports. As of October 2025, Ukrainian drones have delivered a historic blow to Russia’s oil industry, disrupting operations at 38% of oil refineries and triggering an unprecedented fuel-market crisis. Residents in at least 57 regions of the country faced gasoline shortages, and in several regions, authorities introduced limits on fuel sales per customer. In December 2025, the Russian government extended the ban on gasoline exports for the third time.

According to estimates by the ‘Oko Hora’ open-source intelligence community, in 2025, the Ukrainian Defence Forces carried out more than 350 successful deep-strike attacks on Russian territory.

In late autumn and winter 2025, Ukraine returned to one of its best-known weapons—maritime drones—to strike Russian maritime infrastructure and, for the first time in naval history, hit a submarine at the Russian naval base in Novorossiysk in the Black Sea.

We can draw several conclusions from these developments. First, there is awareness that smaller states with limited military capabilities now possess effective tools of warfare that can significantly damage much more powerful adversaries. Their innovative thinking, careful planning, and deep knowledge of the enemy allow them to strike deep and inflict serious harm.

Second, these events show how industrialized states with large traditional capabilities remain vulnerable to modern asymmetric warfare. Following Operation Spiderweb, reports emerged highlighting how poorly protected strategic sites are in Europe and North America.

What is important to note is that not only states, but also malicious non-state actors worldwide are observing and learning from the Russia–Ukraine war.

Humans and AI

Drone warfare still very much depends on people—drone operators, engineers, and technicians. The skills of these specialists are essential to operate and service even small systems, let alone long-range drones, which often involve larger crews. For instance, the above-mentioned Operation Spiderweb relied on a team of more than 100 drone pilots during its execution—one pilot per drone (117 drones in total).

Training drone pilots remains a major challenge, especially amid manpower shortages in Ukraine. With the rise of interceptor drones operating at very high speeds, Ukraine needs a significantly larger pool of well-trained pilots.

AI-enabled innovations are intended to address this challenge. Ukrainian companies are already developing and testing autonomous targeting and terminal-guidance modules designed to counter Shahed-type loitering munitions.

The ultimate goal of AI-tech is to make autonomous operations possible. The human involvement is expected only at the final stage—the decision to engage a target. This would comply with guidelines on the use of autonomous systems in conflict, though it will slow operational tempo, which is critical in this sort of mission.

AI development for unmanned systems in Ukraine has advanced in several directions — optical target recognition and acquisition, navigation algorithms, and swarm technologies.

In 2025, Ukraine experimented with drone swarms. Reportedly, it has already tested swarm technologies in more than 100 operations involving groups of 8–25 drones.

On the Russian side, there were innovations in V2U drones, including attempts to develop pattern-based recognition. According to experts, these drones adopt “bird flock” technology: each wing of a drone has a unique pattern that allows the drones to recognize each other.

At the same time, these are still early experiments that cannot yet be described as true “swarm technologies.” They do, however, show that Russia actively invests in these developments and aims to transfer the most successful technologies to its Shahed-type drones.

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Ground drones

Ground drones in Ukraine continued to improve in 2025, though they have not yet reached the peak of their development. They are increasingly effective in evacuating wounded soldiers from the battlefield and in logistical deliveries, especially as Russia began targeting logistical nodes in the rear of Ukraine’s frontline.

Ground drones have also been used in offensive operations and work well in combination with aerial systems. Notably, we observed the first unmanned assault operations—including the capture of prisoners of war—using a combination of UGVs and UAVs.

Russia’s Innovations

With each iteration, Russia’s drone tech is becoming more lethal and increasingly dangerous to military and civilians. The use of FPV drones to deliberately strike Ukrainian civilians in near-frontline areas is already a well-documented fact, reported by several independent investigative bodies. This amounts to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

More recently, improvements in Russia’s long-range Shahed-type drones have placed civilians across all of Ukraine in immediate danger.

Russian Shahed-type drones, which are considered the best strike drones in their niche, are now being deployed with double payloads, increasing their explosive weight to up to 100 kg. They are equipped with cameras and R-60 air-to-air missiles to target helicopters.

Now they also have modems that allow stable connections with operators inside Russia, enabling the deliberate targeting of civilian trains, highways, and residential buildings far from the front lines.

As of December, Ukrainian forces have been recording Russian Molniya UAV strikes using Starlink terminals almost daily. These attacks are occurring not only along the front line but also in rear regions such as Poltava and Mykolaiv. EW is ineffective in this case.

In 2025, multiple drone incursions were recorded in countries neighboring Ukraine, with the most striking case occurring in Poland in September. Expert assessments showed that the Russian drones that entered Polish airspace were modified specifically to reach such long ranges, and according to some reports, several of them were armed.

This Russian operation exposed multiple vulnerabilities in European drone detection and air-defence approaches, highlighting how few lessons have been learned despite four years of active warfare in Ukraine.

Russia’s production of more advanced systems is only partially constrained by sanctions. It remains resilient: more and more domestic components are being identified in the wreckage of Russian drones. Support from China also plays a crucial role in sustaining Russia’s military capabilities. According to a NATO official, about 80% of critical electronic components used in Russian drones and other modern equipment are manufactured in China.

Russia’s main advantage lies in its financial and human resources. It is able to scale the most effective systems and deploy them in “nearly unlimited” numbers against Ukraine’s Armed Forces.

Looking ahead to 2026, we can definitely say that Ukraine will focus on scaling its long-range capabilities - particularly deep-strike drones—in order to increase the size and frequency of salvos used against Russia. The launch of the Build with Ukraine program in 2025, which enables the co-production of these vehicles in European states, is specifically aimed at mitigating the security risks faced by production facilities located on Ukrainian territory.

In this context, it is important to stress that Ukraine is increasingly investing not only in drones, but also in indigenous ballistic and cruise missiles, which have already been used against Russia—albeit with limited effect so far. At the same time, the development of mini cruise missiles represents a timely innovation within Ukraine’s broader long-range strike portfolio.

Another emerging trend—visible in both Ukraine and Russia—is the growing production of cheap reconnaissance platforms. Systems such as Russia’s Knyaz Veshchiy Oleg are treated as consumables, as more advanced reconnaissance assets are now intercepted with greater frequency.

Improvements in ground robotics, along with an increase in their numbers, are another trend we can expect to see. Russia continues to lag behind in this area, while Ukraine’s primary objective is to expand the use of ground robots in offensive operations.

While Ukraine’s ability to incentivize bottom-up innovation has produced many effective battlefield solutions, it has also resulted in a ‘zoo of drones.’ As a result, the standardization of unmanned systems and the shift toward modular architectures are likely to continue.

I personally will keep an eye on two things: laser technologies against Shahed-type drones and swarm innovations. Although we’ve heard a lot about Ukraine’s Tryzub laser system, virtually nothing has been reported about its actual use against Russian drones.

As for swarm technologies, we have only fragmented reports. Even if they have already been used in hundreds of operations, the details remain scarce.

Naturally, many things are happening behind the scenes, as they should be—not to impress or prove something to anyone, but to achieve real results.

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Among my 157 articles published in 2025, the most popular were:

• (Un)Manned Warfare: 80% of Drone Success Depends on Pilot Skill

• Ukraine’s Pursuit of Drone Autonomy: NORDA Dynamics

• Stopping Shaheds: Ukraine’s Solutions

Every week, we see new Russian innovations in drone warfare: Shahed-type drones equipped with dual payloads of up to 100 kilograms; Starlink terminals mounted on Molniya drones; and mesh modems and cameras that allow Shaheds to be guided in the terminal phase—selecting targets based on live video, bypassing decoys, or altering course mid-flight. This latter trend enables Russian forces to identify and strike targets such as Ukraine’s mobile fire groups.

In this battle of innovation, where Russia enjoys a significant advantage in financial and human resources, Ukraine continues to push forward but faces clear constraints. In this context, foreign financing and international cooperation projects that allow Ukraine to scale the production of its most effective systems are a critical factor for success.

In this edition:

• Ukrainian Drone Tech + German Automation: Quantum Frontline Industries;

• From Idea to a Working AI Model for FPV Drones;

• How Ukrainian Civil Society Fills Critical Military Capability Gaps: Sternenko Community Foundation;

• What Solutions Do Frontline Drone Workshops Need?

• additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

Also, check my Topic Navigator for earlier publications.

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Ukrainian Drone Tech + German Automation: Quantum Frontline Industries

At the 8th German–Ukrainian Business Forum, a joint venture between Germany’s Quantum Systems and Ukraine’s Frontline Robotics was launched. Quantum Frontline Industries (QFI) is being implemented within the framework of the international Build with Ukraine initiative.

This JV will enable the mass production of the battlefield-proven Zoom and Linza drones developed in Ukraine. All systems will be delivered to Ukraine’s Defence Forces.

The company plans to produce more than 10,000 drones per year.

Quantum Systems will provide the industrial infrastructure and administrative support, while Frontline Robotics will supply the production licence, conduct onboarding, and organise personnel training in line with NATO standards.

Frontline Robotics told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor that the biggest obstacle to scaling production in Ukraine is Russia’s continued strikes on Ukrainian territory. Establishing production abroad is a form of risk diversification, allowing the company to ensure a stable and uninterrupted supply of systems to Ukrainian military units. “Amid sustained high demand for our products, we are in a process of continuous scaling. Over the course of 2025, our production capacity in Ukraine increased 9.5 times, yet this remains insufficient given the intensity of ongoing combat operations. QFI represents an additional scaling pathway, aimed at fully meeting Ukrainian brigades’ critical demand for small multirotor drones,” the company added.

Quantum Systems shared in an exclusive commentary that they will initially scale the production of LINZA due to its high battlefield demand and the potential for automated production and scalability.

“We carefully chose our partners in Ukraine based on battlefield performance and experience in unmanned systems. Frontline has a great reputation among the Ukrainian military, and upon meeting the team, we learned that we share the same DNA in excellence in our product, eagerness for technological advancement, and personal conviction of the cause,” Paul Strobel, Public Affairs Lead & Spokesperson for Political Communications at Quantum Systems, commented.

LINZA is an EW-resistant, multifunctional UAV, often described as a bomber drone with reconnaissance capabilities. It has a tactical range of up to 10 km and can carry a payload of up to 2 kg.

The operator controls the system from a covered position, using a secure communications link with encrypted video transmission. As a bomber platform, the drone is designed to return to its launch position after completing a mission.

The communications system was developed from scratch, including both the hardware and software components, and forms the core of the LINZA system architecture. Watch more about this drone here — English subtitles available.

Zoom is a 10-inch reconnaissance drone, often referred to as the “Ukrainian Mavic.” Frontline Robotics emphasises the mission efficiency of their Zoom drone: while a standard Mavic typically completes around 60 missions, the Zoom averages approximately 300, reducing the cost per mission by roughly fivefold. I previously wrote in detail about Ukrainian “Mavic-type” drones and the Zoom platform here.

German drone manufacturer Quantum Systems is producing its Vector reconnaissance drones in Ukraine: the company opened a factory in April 2024, and now a network of its facilities manufactures 40–80 Vectors per month. We have previously seen the successful implementation of the recce–strike concept using the Vector UAV from Quantum Systems and the Virtus UAV from Stark. In this model, a reconnaissance drone is launched and flies over a specific sector of the front, hovering while the operator scans for targets. Once a piece of Russian equipment is identified, soldiers rapidly deploy the Virtus strike UAV (with vertical take-off), which subsequently destroys the enemy target. Read my profile article about Quantum Systems here.

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From Idea to a Working AI Model for FPV Drones

A Ukrainian hobbyist shared his experience of building two working AI models, capable of recognising targets in FPV drone video footage. He worked without a team and without a budget, relying solely on Google Colab, open-source tools, and extensive self-study materials. He warns about the ethical implications of developing and applying such models in both wartime and peacetime contexts.

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We can only estimate how many lives are saved every time a Russian Shahed is intercepted. In this edition, I focus on some of the most effective ways to counter Shaheds: interceptor drones, as well as electronic warfare, which is not a panacea and must be used together with other air-defence measures. Ukrainians have already learned how to down jet-powered Shaheds, and the best technologies — including autonomous solutions — are now being used to strengthen the tools that protect Ukrainian communities.

Chinese Mavic drones also save lives. In honor of the recent Day of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, I am launching my third fundraising campaign for a Mavic reconnaissance drone for the military unit of my university friend Vasyl. Previously, with the support of my subscribers and friends, we raised funds for two Mavics (first and second). These drones save lives on the battlefield, and I intend to do everything possible to protect my friend and his brothers and sisters in arms. Link to donate: PayPal.

In this digest:

• STING Interceptor Shots Down Jet-Powered Shahed;

• We Expect More from Electronic Warfare Than It Can Actually Deliver;

• Components of Freedom: How Ukraine Localizes Drone Component Production

• Russia Tests SIM Cards for Drones in Kazakhstan and Türkiye: Molfar Intelligence Institute

• and additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

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STING Interceptor Shots Down Jet-Powered Shahed

On November 30, for the first time, a jet-powered Geran (Russian analogue of Shahed) was shot down by a Ukrainian interceptor drone STING developed by Wild Hornets, equipped with an Odd Systems Kurbas-640a camera.

The STING can be deployed in 15 minutes, takes off without a catapult from any flat surface, and instantly pursues its target. If the Shahed is already destroyed by another drone, STING returns to base. Its effective range reaches 25 kilometers. It can reach speeds of up to 315 km/h.

According to the manufacturer, assembling a single STING interceptor drone takes only two minutes.

The drone is operated by a pilot using VR goggles, and its cost (around $2,500) is significantly lower than that of surface-to-air missiles, making it a cost-effective weapon against Shaheds.

Engineers note that the drone is compatible with any FPV station, and operators can learn to fly it in just three days. Thousands of these drones are now produced every month and are helping to destroy enemy UAVs.

The Wild Hornets posted that STING drones have prevented 1,520 potential civilian casualties since May 2025. They have downed over 1,500 targets, including 16.9% of all Shahed-type drones downed Nov 5-20 by Ukraine.

These drones were developed in collaboration with the Ukrainian companies Odd Systems and The Fourth Law, both founded by Yaroslav Azhnyuk. The Fourth Law is developing software and autonomous targeting modules, while Odd Systems manufactures the Kurbas series of UAV cameras. Together, they aim to build an intelligent system that can recognize targets and guide an interceptor drone more accurately than a human operator, who may make mistakes or lack the experience to destroy a target on the first attempt.

Currently, Wild Hornet’s anti-Shahed drones are equipped with a custom-modified Kurbas-640 camera from Odd Systems, engineered specifically for interception missions. In a statement to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor, the company explained that this system enables pilots to identify targets much earlier and to operate effectively even under challenging conditions, including high humidity and rain.

The team of The Fourth Law shared that it is developing an autonomous targeting and terminal-guidance module designed to counter Shahed-type loitering munitions. Autonomous detection and tracking are already performing well in tests, and the guidance element is now moving toward evaluation in operational conditions, with a clear pathway to large-scale deployment.

“The technology can significantly increase the effectiveness of interceptor drones. It extends the distance at which a target can be identified and maintained in track, and it calculates the optimal interception trajectory while continuously adapting to course changes. In practice, this delivers a much higher probability of a successful intercept and far more efficient use of each platform,” the company added.

During the Brave1 Components exhibition, The Fourth Law told Militarnyi that its new TFL Anti-Shahed module automatically guides interceptor drones toward Shahed-type targets. The module is installed between the thermal imaging camera (typically the Kurbas-640a) and the flight controller or video transmitter. Once a target is detected, the system highlights it with a green outline and maintains stable tracking, running in parallel without interfering with the drone’s flight. The pilot still independently selects the interception approach.

In February 2025, the Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR) warned that Russia was setting up production of its own version of the jet-powered Shahed-238 — the “Geran-3”, equipped with a compact Tolou-10/13 turbofan engine (the same type used in the Shahed-238).

According to intelligence, this should give the drone a flight speed of 550–600 km/h and a range of 2,500 km.

It is known that the Shahed-238, on which the Geran-3 is based, has a length of 3.5 meters, a wingspan of 3 meters, and a height of 0.5 meters. Its maximum takeoff weight reaches 370 kg (some documents list 250 kg). The warhead weighs 50 kg.

It was believed that such characteristics would make the Geran-3 / Shahed-238 practically unreachable both for mobile fire groups equipped with small arms and cannons, and for electric-powered interceptor drones.

The actual cruising speed of the Geran-3, as recorded by Ukrainian forces, is approximately 300–350 km/h. The drones reach their maximum speed only on the final stretch of the route or on segments where Russian intelligence has identified Ukrainian air-defense positions. This makes these drones fully reachable for Ukrainian interceptor drones.

• Read my earlier report on STING drones here: STING Interceptor Drone by Wild Hornets: When Civil Society Powers Defence

• Check the list of my previous posts on Air Defence and Counter-UAS.

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We Expect More from Electronic Warfare Than It Can Actually Deliver

On the frontline, EW systems are considered the most effective means of countering drones. According to Ukrainian experts, 70–80% of UAVs are currently radio-controlled and susceptible to electronic-warfare interference. However, sometimes the expectations placed on them exceed what they can actually deliver.

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Russia’s drones are rapidly becoming a global threat. In October, Germany reported a record number of drone sightings over its military bases. More recently, Russia has begun training Venezuelan forces in the use of FPV drones. In Ukraine, where these technologies are being tested and refined, experts point to Russia’s use of mesh networks, AI-enabled systems, and other innovations that not only help Russian forces gain battlefield advantages but also intensify their terror against the Ukrainian civilian population.

In this edition:

• How to Increase the Effectiveness of Deep Strike Drones: Comments from Ukraine’s Aerorozvidka;

• Russians Train Their AI for Better Solutions: Summary of Interview with Serhiy FLASH;

• How Ukraine’s Drone Exports Will Work;

• additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

I’ve recently launched the Topic Navigator, where you can find all past articles organized by theme. Check it out!

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

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How to Increase the Effectiveness of Deep Strike Drones: Comments from Ukraine’s Aerorozvidka

Current long-strike drone practices do not always deliver the required precision or effectiveness. Uncontrolled munition drops lead to wasted resources, increased risk for drone operators, and greater collateral damage.

In his column on DOU, Oleksandr Kvyatkovskyi, IT engineer at the Ukrainian NGO Aerorozvidka, explains why the development of guided munitions for strike drones is one of the most promising and essential directions for Ukrainian defence tech (Read the earlier column by Aerorozvidka here “DELTA, UAVs, and Real Combat: Lessons from Ukraine for Allies).

Oleksandr gained direct combat experience using bomber drones and has personally seen how much it depends on the pilot. Each mission is a complex coordination effort requiring synchronisation between reconnaissance units, drone operators, and infantry on the ground.

Why unguided munitions often fail

• When a pilot drops unguided munitions, many strikes miss the target. Sometimes the munition lands just centimetres from the intended point but still fails to cause critical damage.

• Subjectively, the accuracy of standard dropped munitions is 40–60% in ideal weather, and may fall to 15–25% under unfavourable conditions.
  For example, a cumulative charge hitting 50 cm away from armour will not penetrate it. High precision is essential — and it requires exceptional operator skill.

• External factors heavily impact outcomes: wind at different altitudes, target visibility, and enemy electronic warfare. Weather is especially critical: at wind speeds above 8 m/s, accuracy drops sharply — and with gusty winds, it declines even more.

• Modern drone missions require many people, making each operation labour-intensive and risky. A typical sortie requires at least 2–3 personnel: a drone operator, a navigator, and a sapper. Each of them faces danger, especially during equipment deployment and during the flight itself.

• The consequences of a miss can negate all this effort. The drone may be unstable due to wind or a lack of satellite signal. It may also come under small-arms fire, forcing the operator to maintain a higher altitude, which further reduces accuracy.

• This creates a vicious cycle that can only be broken through technological solutions.

The technical solution: guided munitions

• Strike UAVs are enormously valuable, but their full potential can be unlocked only when they carry guided munitions, says Oleksandr.

• This represents a paradigm shift from “drop and hope” to “drop and reliably hit the target.”

• Guided munitions would allow drones to operate from higher altitudes, increase platform survivability, improve operator safety, and reduce training time.

• Missions from 300–1000 m could become standard practice, removing drones from effective small-arms range.

• Such systems would also allow a single drone to carry out multiple strikes per sortie, improving resource efficiency.

Examples of guided solutions

• There is already a broad spectrum of guided munitions — from relatively simple, semi-automatic systems (laser-beam riding), such as APKWS (Hydra 70) by BAE Systems; Korsar / Stugna-P anti-tank systems by Luch Design Bureau, to complex systems like the GBU-53B StormBreaker by Raytheon, which provides fully autonomous multi-sensor guidance.

• A successful Russian example for traditional aviation is the UMPK bomb kit. Known widely as “KABs,” these modules consist of wings, a guided tail assembly, and a computing unit with a GNSS receiver. They attach to standard FAB-250/500/1500 bombs.

• This design is relatively simple but highly effective. Russia has already modified it into UMPB-30D and others, extending the range to 100 km. Russian aircraft can drop these munitions from outside the range of Ukrainian air defence. The simplicity of the construction allows Russia to produce thousands of such kits every month.

What mass adoption of guided munitions would achieve

In the initial concept, the operator is supposed to point the camera at the desired object, lock onto the target, and release, after which the munition would guide itself. This greatly simplifies the pilot’s work and reduces the skill requirements: instead of complex calculations for lead and wind correction, the operator simply needs to “click” on the target displayed on the screen.

Introducing guided, precision strike munitions at scale would bring several key advantages:

• Higher effectiveness of each strike.

• Lower skill threshold for pilots: simplified guidance procedures would speed up training and reduce operator stress.

• Expanded use cases: bomber drones could operate from higher altitudes and in both day and night conditions.

• Reduced drone consumption: a single platform could perform multiple strike tasks per flight.

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Russians Train Their AI for Better Solutions: Summary of Interview with Serhiy FLASH

Probably my favourite radio-technology expert, Serhiy FLASH Beskrestnov, gave a two-hour interview in which he assessed the current state of the Russian Armed Forces—their breakthroughs and development; new Shaheds and Ukraine’s long-range capabilities. I listened and took detailed notes.

Additionally, here is my summary of the other interview with Serhiy: “Daily Dynamics of Drone Warfare”.

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While Ukrainian military units remain heavily dependent on the Chinese Mavic drones, supply limitations have led to persistent shortages of these systems. It is logical that Ukrainian manufacturers have begun producing Mavic analogues and have already fielded 1,000 domestic systems.

However, this is still far from meeting frontline needs — and it highlights an important difference between Ukrainian and Russian realities. While Russia has a massive inventory of all types of drone systems, Ukrainian solutions remain limited in number, forcing Ukrainian personnel to use these scarce resources with extra care.

In this edition:

• Ukraine Starts Mass Production of Domestic “Mavics”;

• Russia’s Rubikon: What Drives Its Success in Drone Warfare;

• Drone Customization to Military Units’ Needs: The Example of TAF Industries;

• and 10+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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Ukraine Starts Mass Production of Domestic Mavics

Ukraine is launching mass production of drones that will serve as an alternative to the popular Mavic models, according to President Volodymyr Zelensky.

“In addition to the contracts we already have, which are funded and operational, we have been looking for alternatives. Those alternatives have been found,” he said.

During the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, the DJI Mavic has become one of the most common reconnaissance tools on the frontline. It is used for surveillance, artillery fire adjustment, and the delivery of improvised munitions.

By 2023, then-Prime Minister Shmyhal stated that Ukraine was purchasing up to 60% of the world’s total Mavic production, using the drones for reconnaissance, artillery fire adjustment, and evacuation missions.

In the spring of 2025, DJI discontinued its Mavic 3 series and introduced the Mavic 4 Pro, featuring enhanced sensors and a 40-minute flight time. However, Zelenskyy disclosed in May that China had suspended drone sales to Ukraine and Europe while continuing supplies to Russia.

Recently, the US government has deemed DJI a security risk.

Throughout 2025, Ukraine has been actively working to replace imported DJI Mavic drones with domestically developed models, steadily increasing production volumes. As a result of this initiative, the first one thousand Ukrainian-made Mavic analogues have already been delivered to the frontline, RBC Ukraine reports.

Currently, there are at least eight Ukrainian analogues — Kruk, Yautzha, PD10ND, Roksoliana, Ukropter, ZOOM, Ptakh-S, and Shmavik.

Among the Ukrainian companies producing Mavic analogues is Frontline Robotics, which presented its EW-resistant reconnaissance drone Zoom in October 2024.

The co-founders of Frontline Robotics began considering the creation of their own company and product in the summer of 2023, while already working in the defence robotics sector. They decided that their first product would be a Ukrainian reconnaissance drone, given that the main tool for reconnaissance had become the civilian Mavic drone. “It is important to understand that DJI’s drone was designed for civilian use, whereas our drones were built from the outset around military requirements and mission needs. One of the most important among them is robust control-link resilience and high-quality digital video,” a representative of Frontline Robotics commented to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.

Zoom is a 10-inch drone manufactured on the basis of the company’s own communication platform for control and Hertz communication platform for control and video transmission. The drone is controlled in two bands simultaneously with the IFR on a 225 MHz bandwidth. Digital video communication on a 650 MHz band, divided into 9 channels, allows for bypassing interference.

Zoom is part of a complete UAV system that includes a ground antenna and a control station. This allows military units to use the drone straight out of the box, without spending time on pre-flight adjustments such as modifying antennas for remote placement, installing additional amplifiers, or anonymizing the system.

David Hambling wrote for Forbes that the company heavily invested in R&D to create affordable, EW-resistant communication systems, addressing one of the main causes of drone losses in the Russia–Ukraine war. The Zoom quadcopter incorporates AI-assisted visual navigation that enables flight even when GPS is jammed, which is a frequent issue. It also includes a fail-safe mechanism allowing it to return to a designated point if both the GPS and the operator link are lost.

Although the cost of Zoom is higher than that of a Mavic, its durability compensates for the difference. Frontline Robotics emphasizes mission efficiency over price per drone: while a Mavic typically completes around 60 missions, the Zoom averages about 300, reducing the cost per mission by roughly fivefold.

The company’s goal is to develop a product that, at a similar cost to the Mavic 3, would be notably more effective than its counterpart. That is why their key metric is the cost per mission.

“Due to several design features — including a durable construction intended for harsh operating conditions, a dedicated ground control station, our own robust control-link platform, and encrypted digital video transmission — our systems operate two to three times longer, or even more, which has a positive impact on the operational economy of the brigades working with us,” a representative of Frontline Robotics stated.

A contact from an infantry battalion shared with Ukraine’s Arms Monitor that the Mavics in his unit usually complete far fewer missions than the numbers claimed by the producers. “The survivability of Mavics at this stage of the war is much shorter. Just yesterday, our new Mavic—never used before—was shot down during its first mission,” he said.

Frontline Robotics noted that the number of combat sorties performed by each Zoom drone depends on a range of factors, with the training level of personnel and the intensity of combat operations in a given sector being among the most important. For this reason, the figures may vary. (If you have not seen my recent article, (Un)Manned Warfare: 80% of Drone Success Depends on Pilot Skill, check it out.)

There is also a concern over the logistics and training needed to transition to a new system other than the Mavics, considering its prevalence.

When it comes to fully replacing Chinese drones on the Ukrainian battlefield, this does not seem possible at the current stage of the war. However, Ukraine’s defence-tech industry is developing rapidly and increasingly meeting a larger share of the Defense Forces’ needs with domestically produced drones.

Frontline Robotics also tries to reduce the reliance on Chinese components; currently, about 15% of its parts come from China, with an increasing share now manufactured in Ukraine.

The manufacturer is open to cooperation with foreign countries, organizations, and investors, and already has successful cases of such collaboration. The company sees great potential in combining Ukraine’s practical battlefield experience with Europe’s scientific foundation and manufacturing capabilities.

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Russia’s Rubikon: What Drives Its Success in Drone Warfare

Even if it’s unpleasant to talk about the enemy’s successes, it is still important to learn from them. Russians have been studying Ukraine’s drone warfare extensively, but their specialized elite unit, Rubikon, has become a real problem for Ukrainian troops wherever it appears.

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While we focus on the immediate goal — Ukraine’s victory in this war and the role drones can play in achieving it — criminals, terrorists, and other malicious actors worldwide are observing and taking notes. I have raised this issue several times in my newsletter: states must not only learn and acquire unmanned systems, but also implement robust counter-UAS measures. Because nothing will easily stop criminal groups from adopting these innovations and exporting violence into civilian life.

In the context of the war in Ukraine, multiple independent reports confirm that Russian forces are using unmanned technologies to target civilians — acts that amount to nothing less than war crimes.

In this edition:

• Crime by Drone: a New Paradigm for Organized Crime (report by GI-TOC);

• “Digital warfare” — a New Reality: Russian Perspective;

• How Ukraine is Developing “Middlestrike” Drones;

• 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

After an almost one-month break, I’m slowly returning to a more regular release schedule for Drone Warfare in Ukraine.

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Crime by Drone: a New Paradigm for Organized Crime (report by GI-TOC)

Drones are our new reality, and it’s time to take them seriously.

This report by Paddy Ginn and Alex Goodwin from the Global Initiative Against Transorganized Crime (GI-TOC) demonstrates that states must be fully prepared for the use of drones by criminals, terrorists, and other security disruptors. Such preparedness requires not only robust regulatory frameworks but also the development of counter-drone capabilities and skilled personnel capable of operating them effectively.

Even if a particular country does not face a direct armed conflict and does not want to get involved in a global drone race, it should still be closely familiar with these technologies and invest in counter-UAS solutions.

At the heart of the research is an exercise conducted with Ukrainian drone pilots, which aimed to understand the potential crossover of drone technology into organized crime within the land, air, and sea domains.

The authors demonstrate that the use of drones requires a suite of skills and considerations that could represent points of disruption for law enforcement and policymakers. The risk should not be underestimated.

Here is my summary of the report:

• Drones are being adopted for criminal purposes: smuggling, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and worse. The trend is towards criminal gangs using them with greater scale and sophistication.

• The Russo-Ukrainian war has led to technological advances in drone capabilities, which organized crime groups are adopting. We may be witnessing the prodromal signs of an underworld paradigm shift.

• The resulting breakthroughs rarely remain confined to the battlefield; once the conflict ends, these innovations diffuse into wider society, reshaping economies, daily life, and even cultural expectations.

• Criminal gangs have moved quickly to exploit the accessibility and adaptability of drone technology.

• These developments have enabled them to reduce personnel risk, innovate across domains (air, land, and sea), and bypass traditional patrol and surveillance regimes. Their methods range from small quadcopters carrying heroin or methamphetamine to adapted industrial UAVs and autonomous underwater vehicles designed for the bulk transport of drugs.

• In the air, for example, drones enable surveillance, delivery and targeted violence.

• On land, they facilitate the movement of goods and reconnaissance.

• The sea domain offers opportunities for large-scale smuggling and transnational logistics, with drones and digital networks increasingly being layered onto maritime trafficking.

• The integration of drones and humans, and the convergence of physical and digital methods, produce a flexible and resilient criminal system that is increasingly difficult to counter with conventional law enforcement tools.

• The unmanned systems, however, have their limitations.

• Aerial platforms have been used for high-profit smuggling and assassinations. However, precision strikes demand detailed reconnaissance, skilled pilots and/or AI-enabled targeting. Consequently, criminal gangs still employ hitmen, but drone assassinations could be used for hard-to-reach targets

• Although land drones can carry heavy payloads in smuggling operations, they have a limited range and are unable to navigate rough terrain. As they use line-of-sight signal communications, they also require a chain of repeaters at regular intervals, which complicates their use for criminal activities. However, an armed land drone could provide a powerful element of terror in urban environments, an alarming prospect for public security, worth illustrating. Armed land drones could effectively act as foot soldiers for organized crime groups, pushing out competitors and claiming territory in street battles.

• Maritime drones are a long-range, high-capacity option well suited to the trafficking of drugs or even arms, and may also have potential as offensive weapons in maritime piracy. Although they have more limited distance capabilities, they are more robust and technologically advanced than the narco-submarines previously employed for these activities. However, due to their high cost and the challenges of operating at sea, they are likely to be accessible only to the most sophisticated criminal groups operating in lucrative illicit markets, such as the cocaine trade.

  The prospect of criminal control may also make sea drones an attractive option for arms trafficking, particularly if the craft could ferry illicit commodities back on the return journey. With a payload of 650 kilograms, a drone could carry 100 AK-47s with magazines or the same number of 72 mm RPG-32s – a serious proposition, and one that may be appealing to some of organized crime’s customers, such as terrorists and non-state actors.

• Future responses to the criminal use of drones will need to combine ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ approaches within an integrated ecosystem of technology, regulation, and forensics.

• On the soft side, electronic warfare tools such as jamming, signal seizure and directed-energy weapons can be used to suppress hostile unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), supported by next-generation detection technologies such as AI-enhanced radar, as well as acoustic, optical and radio-frequency monitoring systems.

• Hard countermeasures focus on physically destroying drones using anti-aircraft weapons, interceptor drones, lasers and microwave systems. Passive protection measures like geofencing, nets, false walls and specialized hangars could provide an additional defensive layer for critical sites.

• Regulatory frameworks such as flight restrictions, identification schemes and interagency coordination mechanisms will help to shape the threat landscape, with concepts like ‘urban anti-drone domes’ offering metropolitan-scale protection.

• Forensics plays a vital accountability role by enabling investigators to trace captured or destroyed drones back to their operators through serial numbers, GPS data, communication packets or firmware. However, this process is often hindered by damage, encryption or deliberate erasure.

• Consultations with drone operators in Ukraine reveal that human expertise remains at the heart of the capability and a vital point of intervention. Engineers, workshop operators, parts suppliers and firmware modifiers are all vital for scaling up the use of drones. Unmanned systems also rely on skilled technical networks, particularly pilots. Couriers, spotters and coordinators play a critical role in marking drop zones and retrieving payloads.

I would like to add that the large number of skilled personnel capable of operating and maintaining unmanned systems—resulting from the Russian-Ukrainian war—will create an additional layer of complications after the active phase of the conflict. According to recent data, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces aim to expand their staffing to 5% of the Armed Forces, or roughly 30,000-45,000 personnel.

Russia plans to train more than 1 million specialists for the drone industry by 2030. “This effort already involves 42,800 schools and vocational education institutions, as well as 70 higher education institutions,” the Russian authority said.

In Russia’s case, its involvement in distant regions raises concerns that experienced drone operators returning from Ukraine, if left without employment at home, may seek to apply their skills elsewhere, in areas where Russian troops or paramilitary organizations are active.

Read my summary of the previous GI-TOC report: Future trends in arms trafficking from the Ukraine conflict.

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“Digital Warfare” — a New Reality: Russian Perspective

I rarely summarize Russian sources, but this article was shared with me by a contact of mine in Ukraine’s defence forces, and it deserves attention.

(The only other summary of an interview with a Russian expert can be found here: American drones turned out to be junk”: interview with the Russian drone producer.)

Read my summary below.

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What qualities should interceptor drones have to counter Shaheds? What can Ukraine teach Europe about counter-drone measures? Can the EU simply buy enough electronic warfare systems to protect its territory?

In this and the following editions of Drone Warfare in Ukraine, I will explore these questions together with Ukrainian developers, soldiers, and drone warfare experts. When calculating the cost-efficiency of these systems, many factors are often overlooked — in reality, they’re not as cheap as they may seem, yet still far more affordable than traditional air defense solutions.

In this edition:

• Successful Interceptors and Jam-Resistant FPVs: United Unmanned Systems;

• Daily Dynamics of Drone Warfare: Summary of an Interview with Serhiy FLASH;

• 10+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

This week, I received a Substack Bestseller badge — so thank you to everyone who chose to support my independent reporting financially. As you know, for my work on Ukraine’s Arms Monitor, I don’t receive any remuneration from any organization, government, or individual. That means I get to decide what to write about — and how to do it.

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Successful Interceptors and Jam-Resistant FPVs: United Unmanned Systems

Unidentified drones in Europe aren’t going away anytime soon. Last week, Zelensky said that Russia is employing its shadow fleet tankers not only to finance the war, but also to carry out sabotage and destabilising activities across Europe. Recent launches of drones from tankers are one such example.

I decided to speak with several Ukrainian producers and experts about how Europe should approach this problem. This time my attention was caught by United Unmanned Systems (UUS), a German-Ukrainian firm that focuses on FPV drones — used on the battlefield to strike military targets — as well as interceptor drones. UUS has already handled direct orders for 20,000 drones from frontline brigades, and its systems are in use with several elite units, including the Azov and Rubizh brigades. The startup says it has the manpower, equipment, and production lines to produce up to 15,000 FPV drones a month.

Sergej Sumlenny, co-founder of UUS and founder of the European Resilience Initiative Center, said that FPV drones have shifted firepower from senior commanders to platoon leaders, creating a battlefield where “any target you have – tanks, radio stations, radars, manpower – is done by drones now.”

In his conversation with Ukraine’s Arms Monitor, he said, “The success of using drones depends above all on scale and consistency. Our drones hit targets in about 70% of cases. On the Dobropillia axis, units holding back the Russian forces report 140 successful hits out of 200 sorties. That’s what truly matters, because a single successful hit even on a high-value target cannot change the situation at the front — unlike sustained hits that wear the enemy down”.

The key to success is a focus on improved radio technology, which allows the production of almost unjammable drones. UUS decided to refine it, so they could field a light, maneuverable, and reliable radio-controlled drone — one that avoids the shortcomings of fiber-optic systems while still being protected against EW. The startup works closely with the units that use their drones — from Sumy to Donetsk sections of the frontline. Every month, UUS representatives go to the front, and every week, they talk online with the pilots.

Based on feedback from those units, UUS developed its Black Widow resilient radio-link technology. It combines rugged components, the choice of effective frequencies, and an advanced drone layout. This is no longer a drone built on amateur civilian tech. “As a result, our drones can even fly into basements at ranges of 15–18 km without losing radio contact, which the military units greatly value,” Sergej says.

Recently, the developers discovered a new niche - interceptor drones. Now the UUS call themselves “the only German company producing interceptor drones which are successfully used in Ukraine by the Ukrainian army against russian recon and strike drones”. Its interceptor has already taken down Russian drones such as Lancet and ZALA, but the much bigger task is to take down Shaheds — work is underway in that direction.

Answering my question, what should be the qualities of an effective interceptor against the Shahed, Sergej said that because Shaheds operate at high altitude and speed, the most effective countermeasures are drones that can remain airborne for at least 20–30 minutes, reach 350–400 km/h, and carry a warhead capable of reliably destroying a Shahed even if detonation occurs at some distance.

Ideally, such an interceptor should also be able to trigger the Shahed’s warhead, since a damaged Shahed falling onto residential areas would pose an unacceptable risk. These requirements create hard engineering trade-offs — from aerodynamics to balancing battery weight, warhead mass, and overall dimensions. At high velocities, automatic target-acquisition systems are essential for the pilot.

Air-defense units are currently testing the high-speed Shahed-interceptor drones developed by UUS; this is the third generation of designs, and the firm expects the fourth to be unveiled soon. Last month, their Furia air defense drone demonstrated a speed of 350 km/h, and is expected to be live tested against Russian Shaheds.

Recently, the United Unmanned Systems were invited by a NATO airbase to share their drone knowledge freshly from the frontline, and to discuss security concepts for NATO facilities. A meeting with officers of seven nations included a simulated drone attack with UUS drones, and testing of countermeasures.

“The problem for Western countries is that many of them — for example, Germany — are quite unwilling to admit that, whether they like it or not, they are already living in a state of war imposed on them. Because the war is officially denied, it becomes, for instance, impossible to shoot down these drones — the use of weapons over a civilian airport is effectively prohibited,” said Sumlenny.

He adds that NATO must accept that the number of drone incidents will only increase, and that they can be countered only by force: by shooting down reconnaissance drones such as Orlan and ZALA, by physically protecting vulnerable sites, and by embedding mobile anti-drone teams within the technical services of airports and other facilities. United Unmanned Systems has already been providing advice on protecting military airbases, but, unfortunately, the process is taking longer than needed.

Read my previous articles on the topic:

• Stopping Shaheds: Ukraine’s Solutions;

• Russian Drone Incursions in Europe;

• Russian Gerberas: What Made Those Drones Reach Poland.

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Daily Dynamics of Drone Warfare: Summary of an Interview with Serhiy FLASH

Many of you have heard of Serhiy “FLASH” Beskrestnov, Ukraine’s expert in military radio technology, who posts daily updates on Telegram about new developments in drone warfare. He receives hundreds of photos of drones, antennas, and other enemy equipment every day, which he analyzes and uses to propose battlefield solutions. Last week, Politeka Online published a one-hour interview with him that’s packed with technical insights — it took me a couple of days to watch, rewatch, and take notes. I learned a lot; here are some key takeaways:

• “Every morning I wake up and think — what will I see today? The dynamics are daily — changes in frequencies, bands, tactics, technologies”.

• Why is Ukraine keeping up? Because large military conglomerates are now inert, integrating new frequencies and bands requires huge bureaucratic processes. By the time a large corporation integrates something, that novelty is already outdated.

• Current bets are on the mid-tier manufacturers: they are more dynamic and can react quickly to counter UAV measures. Ukraine focuses on this segment.

Survivability & frontline effects

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In recent months, Ukraine has reportedly struck 16 of Russia’s 38 refineries, with the longest reported strike reaching 1,800 km. Kyiv has also unveiled new drones said to have a reach of up to 2,100 km. While a number of countries would like to purchase Ukraine’s long-range strike technologies, those systems are unlikely to be intended for the newly opened military export.

Naval drones, by contrast, are already being prepared for export. Ukraine fields several families of unmanned naval vehicles — both surface and underwater — and below I provide a brief description of each.

In this edition:

• Ukraine’s long-range drones hit Russia’s oil network;

• Naval drone export: what Ukraine can offer;

• Russia’s massed strikes: the strategy of coercion by salvo (summary of the report);

• Additional key developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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Ukraine’s Long-Range Drones Hit Russia’s Oil Network

Since early August, 16 of Russia’s 38 refineries have been hit, some repeatedly, including the Ryazan plant near Moscow, one of the country’s largest fuel-processing facilities with a capacity of 340,000 barrels per day. Historically, oil refineries are concentrated in Central Russia.

The strikes have disrupted more than 1 million barrels a day of Russia’s refining capacity.

Russia is the third-largest producer of oil worldwide, accounting for over 12% of global crude oil production. The Russian oil and gas sector contributes about 20% of the country's GDP on average.

Repeated long-range drone strikes on refineries, terminals, and logistics nodes have cut Russian refining capacity in some periods by up to a fifth.

Damage to ports and coastal terminals (examples reported: Ust-Luga, Primorsk) constrains seaborne shipments, storage, and loading, and therefore export logistics.

I addressed many of these points in the recent geopolitics podcast Behind the Lines, hosted by , an Associate Fellow at RUSI and former UK diplomat (check his Substack). You can listen to the episode on Spotify or Apple Podcasts.

• Ukraine views the sector as a legitimate military target, both for its role in providing the energy products to fuel Russian forces’ tanks, aircraft and drones and the revenue it generates to pay for the war.

• “Ukraine will not stop drone attacks on military targets in Russia until Moscow agrees to peace,” Ukraine’s officials stated.

• Some of the drones used in these attacks include the Liytyi and the FP-1.

• Liutyi was developed to strike targets deep inside Russia at a time when Ukraine was not permitted to use weapons that the United States had supplied across the border. That is why the UAV is called a “Tomahawk for the poor”: a smaller, slower, cheaper, and less powerful version of weapons like the Tomahawk cruise missiles used by U.S. forces.

• Liutyi (AN-196) — described publicly as a long-range attack drone used for deep strikes. It is a unique analogue of the Iranian Shahed. It has high resistance to jamming and can vary its altitude during flight depending on the terrain.

• Liutyi has the following characteristics: hybrid guidance (inertial navigation plus satellite communications); reported payload figures vary (~75 kg or higher in some claims), and ranges have been reported in the order of 1,000+ km, with some sources citing extended ranges up to ~2,000 km.

• Each unit is estimated to cost around $200,000—significantly more than the Russian Shahed (around $50,000) but substantially less than a cruise missile.

• The inertial navigation system ensures full autonomy on the flightpath, while satellite communication makes it possible for the operator to change the trajectory at any moment for maximum precision. Satellite communication is not always available due to interference or jamming by Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems, but, when the opportunity presents itself, the operator can take control to complete the mission with maximum results.

• Liutyi is assembled, armed, programmed, and takes off like an airplane from a stretch of road or an airstrip, while the team of fighters disperses before the Russians can strike the launch site. Launches are coordinated so that several Liutyi drones simultaneously enter Russian airspace alongside other types, some of which are decoys fitted with radar reflectors. Read my previous report on the Liutyi drone here.

• FP-1 long-range drone — publicly unveiled and reported to be manufactured at scale: production rates have been compared to Shahed-class loitering munitions (estimates ~100 units/day), with an estimated unit cost around $55,000. Reports attribute ~60% of deep strikes to FP-1-type platforms.

• These drones use simple, low-cost construction to keep unit cost and build time low while enabling mass production. Read more about the long-range kamikaze FP-1 drone here.

• Generally speaking, the production scale of long-range drones in Ukraine remains a constraint: estimates suggest Russia can produce Shahed variants in much larger volumes (approximately 70,000/year), so Ukraine’s effort is impactful but not necessarily volume-equal to Russian output.

• Design trade-offs are central: a longer range requires more fuel, which reduces space for the explosive payload. “Drones that fly far are forced to allocate a large portion of their weight and space to fuel/batteries, which leaves less room for explosives. A longer flight range also creates aerodynamic challenges – to carry more fuel, drones have to be larger, which makes them heavier, slower, and easier to intercept,” experts note.

• The result is drones optimized for reach and cost rather than maximum blast effect, so individual strikes often cause less structural damage than larger missiles but cause cumulative degradation of refinery throughput and logistics.

• Ukraine’s long-range attacks rely heavily on a mix of attack drones and decoys/swarm tactics to complicate defences and increase mission success rates.

• Reported typical mission mix includes strike vehicles plus decoys/diversionary drones; one reported sortie involved 100 drones entering Russian territory with ~30% tasked as diversionary, flying ranges of ~280–340 km.

• Drone teams in Ukraine synchronize launches so multiple systems (strike drones, loitering munitions, and decoys) enter defended airspace together to overwhelm or deceive Russia’s air defences.

• Mission success is assessed through three main, non-operational channels: ground reconnaissance, monitoring local reports (including open Telegram groups), and follow-up satellite imagery analysis.

• In September 2025, the United Kingdom announced the decision to finance thousands of long-range, one-way attack drones for Ukraine as part of its military aid. The drones will be manufactured in the United Kingdom and delivered to Ukraine within the next 12 months.

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Naval Drone Export: What Ukraine Can Offer

Last week, President Zelensky announced that Ukraine is ready to begin controlled exports of surplus military goods, including naval drones. Around the same time, reports appeared that Ukraine is launching serial production of its unmanned underwater vehicles.

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While the eastern flank of NATO is deciding what to do with a handful of Russian dummy drones, Ukrainian startups are raising millions of dollars for drone swarm technologies, moving toward AI-enabled interceptors, and mass-producing UAVs with terminal guidance modules. In fact, there are expectations that the most frontline drones will be fitted with similar autonomy systems within six to nine months. Drone technologies in Ukraine are progressing rapidly, but so are those in Russia.

In this edition:

• Russian Gerberas: What Made Those Drones Reach Poland;

• Global Starlink Outage: How Important This Is for Ukraine;

• Autonomous Technologies in Ukraine: New Developments;

• How Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb Affected Russia’s Strategic Bomber Fleet.

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Russian Gerberas: What Made Those Drones Reach Poland

On 15 September, Poland’s FM Sikorski confirmed that all Russian drones that entered Polish airspace on 10 September were “dummies” — without warheads. Based on photos, they appear to have been Russian “Gerbera” UAVs.

These drones, made from very cheap materials, plywood and foam, can also carry a warhead of up to 5 kg or reconnaissance equipment.

The Gerbera UAV is a simplified version of the Iranian Shahed-136 kamikaze drone. Russians have been using Gerberas en masse since 2024 to wear down Ukraine’s air-defence systems.

By size, the Gerbera drones are similar to Shaheds, with a wingspan of about 2.5 m. However, Shaheds are far more dangerous: they carry warheads of roughly 40 kg (upgraded variants up to 90 kg), while the Gerbera can lift only about 5 kg of explosive payload.

Gerbera drones typically have a range of up to 600 km, but to extend that distance, the Russians fit them with additional soft-polymer fuel tanks — exactly those types of tanks were found on the drones that reached Poland.

The drones found in Poland were also fitted with Iranian CRPA satellite navigation antennas (Tallysman) to counter EW. After clarifications, Polish authorities said at least 21 drones were located, of which only four were shot down.

Gerberas in Ukraine are usually not shot down to avoid wasting air defence resources. These UAVs typically end up in the Ukrainian Air Force’s statistics as “locationally lost.”

These drones are significantly slower than Shaheds in terms of speed. “To avoid overloading our air-defence systems, there is a speed-selection mode. If you set the equipment parameter to ‘do not display targets moving at speeds below 150 kilometres per hour,’ no one will monitor them and they will be locationally lost,” Ukrainian expert Romanenko explained. “You don’t know which ones carry warheads and which don’t. But if you spend air-defence resources on all 200 Gerberas, the Russians will have achieved their goal,” he added.

The Kyiv Independent reported that Russia’s far-western city of Bryansk is the closest launch point to Western Europe, lying less than 600 km from the borders of Lithuania and Latvia. Further south, Russia also launches drones from occupied Crimea.

At their estimated ranges, these attack drones could put almost all European NATO members within reach.

In their report Countering the Swarm for CNAS, Stacie Pettyjohn and Molly Campbell note that the counter-drone mission entails much more than simply air defense and cannot be relegated to traditional, isolated air defense formations. The report concludes that there is no silver bullet capability that can defeat all drones. In their recommendations, the authors stress the need for a layered system of active defenses. When integrated, multiple different types of sensors and effectors can compensate for the weaknesses of any one system, and collectively find, track, identify, and defeat drones.

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Global Starlink Outage: How Important This Is for Ukraine

For the second time, Starlink has experienced a global outage. Connectivity is gradually being restored. The outage was also reported along the entire front line by the commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert “Madyar” Brovdi.

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Russians have increased Shahed-type drone production to 2,700 per month. While the world was shocked to see 20 of them entering NATO airspace, Ukraine faces 500–800 drones every night, on top of ballistic and cruise missiles.

This mix includes decoys, turbojet-powered Shaheds packed with explosives, and AI-enabled systems — good luck trying to sort them out! The Gerberas that reached Poland had an extra fuel tank. Coincidence?

Separately, just last week, Russia unveiled its fibre-optic–guided naval drones, with a current operating range likely no more than 100 km, but this is only the beginning.

In this edition:

• “Iron Brothers-in-Arms”: Key Trends in Ukraine’s Ground Robotics;

• Ukraine’s Interceptor Drones Reach New Milestones;

• Russian Fibre-Optic Naval Drone: What We Know So Far;

• and 10+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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“Iron Brothers-in-Arms”: Key Trends in Ukraine’s Ground Robotics

The primary purpose of using ground robots is to save human lives. Today, the “kill zone” — a stretch of several kilometers along the line of contact remains under constant surveillance and fire control. Ukrainian sources report that the kill zone now extends up to 10 kilometers from the frontline, complicating Ukrainian movements in the immediate rear, troop rotations, and medical evacuations.

This is where ground robotic systems come into play — taking over functions such as logistics, demining, and mining hazardous areas, and direct combat operations. Among them are kamikaze UGVs, packed with explosives, that break through to enemy positions and detonate on target.

I spoke with one of Ukraine’s leading ground drone producers, Robotic Complexes — the company behind systems such as Murakha, Pliushch, Bohomol, and now also Tryminer. I asked them to tell me about the key trends and roles in the use of ground systems in Ukraine. Here is what they shared in an exclusive commentary for Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.

Key trends:

• The most noticeable trend in Ukraine’s ground robotics is cost reduction to enable faster scaling without sacrificing reliability. This remains a constant challenge for manufacturers.

• Demand for digital communications is growing. Users increasingly expect multiple communication options integrated into the basic configuration, allowing for rapid adjustment to each mission.

• Another pressing requirement is an extended operational range.

• In the segment of combat UGVs, there is a clear trend toward larger calibres and the use of heavy weaponry — from grenade launchers to mortars.

• And finally, a separate priority is protection against FPV drones. Here, a variety of solutions are emerging: from electronic warfare systems to active protection, including the physical interception of enemy drones.

Priority functions of ground drones:

• Logistics remains the core and most widespread function. Most manufacturers — including Robotic Complexes — are focused on this need. A good examples are “Murakha” and “Murakha Mini.”

• Beyond logistics, RC is also investing in several other areas:

  • Mining. “Tryminer” is a reusable drone-minelayer designed for TM-62 mines. It is a simple and affordable solution. While many other manufacturers emphasize “kamikaze” options, Robotic Complexes are prioritizing reusability for now.

  • Combat UGVs. “Bohomol” is a heavy platform with a turret for a Browning 12.7 mm machine gun. The goal is to create a high-precision weapon, which requires solving complex challenges: from developing a ballistic computer and stabilizing recoil to integrating detection and targeting systems. In parallel, the producers are also working on “Soroka”, a platform for mortar fire.

  • Communications and reconnaissance. “Pliushch” has a 10-meter mobile mast that provides communications and can detect enemy drones — a unique product on the market.

• In this way, the company covers both the basic and specialized needs of the front. “While most companies focus on a single niche, we remain committed to logistics while also developing other solutions”.

Here is a video shared by the founder of Robotix Complexes, featuring the “Pliushch” ground drone, which is greatly needed at the front.

• Answering the question of whether it is possible to integrate ground platforms produced by RC with aerial drones or other robotic systems, the representative of the company explained that yes, such integration is possible and has already been implemented.

• “But our approach is broader — we are working on integration with situational awareness systems. This should become the standard for all manufacturers. Our goal is to give the commander a complete picture of the battlefield: from operational planning and friend-or-foe identification to coordination of actions and rapid response. The task is not only to connect multiple platforms, but to manage them effectively within a single system,” he added.

Recommendations for investors and developers:

• Robotic Complexes advises international investors to focus on the development of Ukraine’s defence industry, especially the private sector. For developers, the most practical and effective path is to establish partnerships with Ukrainian companies.

• According to the recent survey by Tech Force in UA, Ukrainian producers prioritize joint ventures and partnerships while continuing to seek new expertise and attract investment. Financing preferences vary: most companies select one or two instruments that fit their strategy rather than accepting all available options. Survey results show 50% prefer debt instruments, 46% joint ventures, 42% minority shares, and 38% convertible debt/SAFE loans.

• Ukraine has an army with unique combat experience and miltech companies operating under real wartime conditions. “Here, we can devise a solution today, implement it tomorrow, and test it on the battlefield the day after. This cycle enables rapid technological improvement and the scaling of effective solutions,” the representative of Robotic Complexes said.

Read my first article on the ground drones developed by Robotic Complexes here.

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Ukraine’s Interceptor Drones Reach New Milestones

During the latest largest Russia attack against Ukraine involving 805 drones, a fifth of all downed Russian strike and decoy UAVS were destroyed by interceptor drones. They accounted for over 150 enemy drones shot down.

Additionally, experts suggest that interceptor drones have the potential to protect valuable military equipment from FPV drone attacks.

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