A tragic incident occurred in Kyiv last weekend—a mass shooting that claimed the lives of six civilians. It was carried out by a man with a prior military background who used a legally owned firearm. This is the first case of this magnitude during the full-scale invasion and has sparked a major public debate in Ukrainian society about permitting the possession of small arms for self-defence.

In this edition:

• Mass Shooting Incident in Ukraine;

• Ukraine’s Private Air Defence Downs a Jet-Powered Shahed;

• How Privately Owned EW Systems Jam Friendly Drones;

• Adapting Leopard 1A5 Tanks to Modern Warfare;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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Mass Shooting Incident in Ukraine

On April 18, in Kyiv’s Holosiivskyi district, a man opened fire, leaving several dead and injured. The death toll reached 6; additionally, 9 people have been hospitalized, and another 6 received medical assistance on site, including a four-month-old infant.

The gunman began randomly shooting on the street, killing four people. The fifth victim was a hostage in the supermarket. The perpetrator was shooting people at point-blank range, so the chances of survival were very low.

A video surfaced online showing National Police officers fleeing the scene of the shooting and leaving civilians in danger. The police also left an injured person without assistance. As a result, an internal investigation has been launched, and the officers involved have been suspended from duty.

Special forces from the Rapid Operational Response Unit of the National Police carried out an assault on the store where the suspect was located. He had taken people hostage and opened fire on police during the arrest. The perpetrator was killed. A criminal case has been opened under the article on a terrorist act resulting in fatalities, as announced by the Prosecutor General of Ukraine.

Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that the attacker used a registered firearm. “He had a firearm—a carbine—which was legally registered. Moreover, in December 2025, he applied to the licensing system to have the weapon test-fired, as the permit had expired. He submitted a medical certificate. The investigation will determine which medical facility issued that certificate. He also filed an application to renew his authorization to possess this weapon.”

According to reports, the perpetrator used a Kel-Tec SUB2000 carbine chambered for a 9×21 mm cartridge. Such firearms can be purchased by civilians with the appropriate permit. A key feature of this weapon is that it can be folded in half, which significantly simplifies transportation.

According to preliminary information, the man, born in 1968, had previously served in the military and remained in the armed forces until 2005. He reportedly served in a motorized rifle logistics support unit. After completing his service, he was placed in the reserve. These details are being further verified.

Following this incident, public debate over the right to possess firearms for self-defence in Ukraine has intensified.

Heorhii Uchaikin, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the Ukrainian Gun Owners Association, wrote the following: “After such events, we must at least honestly ask whether the state should trust its citizens with the right to self-defence—or leave them to face threats on their own. A terrorist or criminal does not ask for permission and does not follow the law. They already have the means to attack. The only question is whether an ordinary person has a chance to defend themselves and their loved ones in those first, most critical minutes”. He also said that Ukrainians possess more than two million legally registered firearms, and roughly one and a half times more illegal ones. At the same time, there is no comprehensive law on civilian firearms, which should be adopted as soon as possible. (Read my earlier interview with Heorhii Uchaikin here: How the War in Ukraine Is Transforming Small Arms Use).

Meanwhile, other commentators noted that protecting civilians in urban areas is the responsibility of the police, and if firearms are distributed indiscriminately, it could lead to more incidents like this.

On April 19, Ukraine’s Minister of Interior stated that citizens should be granted the right to armed self-defence. He also promised to hold expert consultations in the near future with members of parliament, civil society, and the veteran community to prepare the final version of the draft law on civilian firearms.

On February 23, 2022, Ukraine’s parliament passed, in the first reading, draft law No. 5708 “On the Right to Civilian Firearms,” which had been introduced in 2021. Since then, the bill has still been awaiting consideration in the second reading.

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Ukraine’s Private Air Defence Downs a Jet-Powered Shahed

On April 17, Ukraine’s Minister of Defence Fedorov announced that for the first time, a private air defence unit operating in the Kharkiv region downed a jet-powered Shahed at speeds exceeding 400 km/h.

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Ukraine is taking a serious approach to developing long-needed domestic air defence capabilities and is even providing approximate timelines for their fielding. However, delivering these innovations in time will require high-quality partnerships and financing.

While some may remain skeptical about the feasibility of producing such advanced technologies, it is worth recalling that at the start of the war, few could have anticipated that Ukraine would become a technological powerhouse. Now its solutions are proving effective not only against Russia, but across different regions and scenarios.

In this edition:

• Ukraine Plans to Launch Its Air Defence System by 2027;

• What Is Happening with Ukraine’s Arms Exports?

• Ukrainian Defence Tech Market: Opportunities for Investors;

• 10+ additional developments in Russia and Ukraine.

If you’ve missed my latest Drone Warfare in Ukraine newsletter, check it out to learn more about drone munitions in Ukraine and other developments.

At the end of March, Czech volunteers raised a total of €1 million for drones for Ukraine’s Defence Forces. And here I am, trying to raise only $4,000 for a Mavic 3T drone!

If you can, please consider supporting this fundraiser. It is, as always, for the military unit of my university friend Vasyl, who has been serving since the start of the full-scale invasion.

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Ukraine Plans to Launch Its Air Defence System by 2027

The Ukrainian company Fire Point, a manufacturer of Flamingo cruise missiles and long-range FP-1 drones, plans to launch its own air defence system by the end of 2027. According to Fire Point’s Chief Engineer and majority owner, Denys Shtilerman, it could become a more affordable alternative to the U.S.-made Patriot.

As reported by Reuters, to bring down a ballistic missile, the Patriot system often requires two or three air defence missiles, each costing several million ​dollars. “If we can decrease it to less than $1 million, it will be a game changer in air defence solutions,” Shtilerman said in an interview.

Responding to a question from Serhii Sternenko about the cost of an anti-ballistic interceptor missile, Denys Shtilerman said: “At this stage, the expectation is as follows: if a homing seeker is integrated, the cost per shot will be around $750,000; without it, approximately $500,000. In either case, it will still be capable of intercepting targets. The key priority, however, is integration—with radar systems, command centers, data links, and platforms such as AWACS.”

Fire Point is "deeply interested" in collaboration on radar, missile target-seeking, and communications systems - areas where it lacks expertise. European companies, including Weibel, Hensoldt, SAAB, and Thales, have good radar solutions, the Chief Engineer noted.

While there is a certain degree of skepticism about Ukraine’s ability to develop its own air defence system, Fire Point’s approach reflects a key distinction between the traditional model and Ukraine’s approach. While Western companies often endlessly refine systems before fielding them, Ukraine deploys innovations early and iteratively upgrades them based on real-world use.

Fire Point is currently the largest producer of long-range drones in Ukraine, with a monthly production capacity of up to 2,500 systems. Its Flamingo missiles cost approximately €600,000 per unit. The company plans to scale production further following the launch of a new engine in October and the opening of a rocket fuel plant in Denmark.

Although its FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile is less precise than more advanced ones and remains a work in progress, it is still capable of delivering destructive strikes against critical enemy infrastructure. At the same time, it demonstrates a growing ability to penetrate Russian air defence and electronic warfare systems.

In March 2026, the company reported on the production and testing of the FP-7 ballistic missile. According to Shtilerman, the FP-7 is an analogue of the U.S. ATACMS missile but costs roughly half as much. It is based on the S-400 and has a range of 250–300 km. Ukrainian Dev.UA reported that the FP-7 missile is planned to be named “Pelican.”

According to an interview, the Chief Engineer gave to the Sternenko Community last week, “since we do not yet have a homing head or integration with radar, we are using this highly maneuverable air defence missile as a ballistic missile. It is fully solid-fueled—the propellant is ours, and we cast it ourselves. The flight controller is our own, and the servo drives are also domestically produced”.

By the end of the year, the company also plans to present another ballistic missile, the FP-9, with a range of up to 850 km. The FP-9 was designed from the outset as a ballistic missile; it is not an air defence missile. The missile will have a speed of 2,400 m/s and a very high impact velocity upon hitting the target.

Shtilerman also said that he hopes Ukrainian-made ballistic missiles will begin striking targets in Russia as early as 2026. He also stated that Russia has no real experience in missile defence. ATACMS missiles have been intercepted in part because they have a relatively low terminal velocity when approaching the target.

The most important thing is not to launch one or two missiles, but twenty, thirty, and more.

The company plans to create a pan-European anti-ballistic shield - Project Freya, where a missile derived from Soviet S-400 systems could serve as an interceptor if integrated with European radar and command networks.

“We have missiles similar to those for S-300 and S-400, but our solution is fully composite—unlike the S-400, which uses magnesium. We are telling European companies: we have a product that was designed from the outset specifically to intercept ballistic missiles. This missile is highly maneuverable, relatively low-cost, and—most importantly—we provide access to its software. There are no “switches,” so we would not be able to deactivate it. We invite partners to use our ballistic launches to test and train their radar systems—something that is currently only possible in the United States, where each launch costs more than $5 million. In return, we ask for one thing: allow us to conduct an audit of your software.”

Responding to a question about the viability of laser-based air defence systems, the engineer said he is uncertain how effective they would be in Ukraine’s climate. High humidity presents a significant challenge: instead of a single beam, it may be necessary to split the energy into five, six, or even ten beams, depending on atmospheric conditions—and then maintain all of them on a single point on the target. This is an extremely complex task.

A more promising approach, in his view, is pulsed microwave technology—high-powered radiation capable of disabling electronics and effectively neutralizing drones. Countering such systems would require significantly increasing the cost of drones.

In late March 2026, President Zelensky stated that Ukraine was working with several countries to establish domestic production of all components of air defence systems, “including anti-ballistic ones.” He emphasized that the most important thing now is obtaining licenses and localization in Ukraine.

Also, in March 2026, Fire Point, the State Kyiv Design Bureau Luch, and the research and production enterprise Radionix signed cooperation agreements with the Spanish company Sener, which manufactures, among other things, components for missiles used by IRIS-T air defence systems.

The company Fire Point is often publicly linked to Timur Mindich, who is a suspect in a corruption case related to Ukraine’s energy sector. According to the Chief Engineer, Mindich attempted to buy the company, but his offer was declined. Beyond this, there was no further interaction.

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What Is Happening with Ukraine’s Arms Exports?

Over the past seven months, Ukrainian regulators have failed to establish an effective defence export system.

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Ukraine is demonstrating innovative approaches to defence and security on a weekly basis—if not more often. Its latest initiative, private air defence, which allows key infrastructure companies to establish their own air defence units to protect their facilities, is gaining traction and has already begun delivering initial results in the Kharkiv region.

At the same time, concerns remain regarding the state’s monopoly on the use of force, as well as the potential broader diffusion of weapons and tactics within society.

In this edition:

• Ukraine’s Private Air Defence Shows First Results;

• 5 Main Problems of Ukraine’s Defence Tech;

• Why Ukraine Needs Private Military Companies, and What Options Exist;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

If you find my digest useful, please consider supporting my fundraiser for a Mavic 3T drone for my friend Vasyl, who is serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is the fourth drone we are raising funds for, and I hope this campaign will be just as successful. Here is the link to the campaign page - PayPal.

Currently, almost 40% of the target amount has been raised!

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As a side note, last week, in response to my newsletter section on the controversial statements made by Rheinmetall’s CEO about Ukrainian drone producers, Rheinmetall itself posted a comment. It brought a lot of unexpected attention and new subscribers to my newsletter, which is a positive outcome for me personally. However, the apology itself was missing from their public statements.

Defense Express reported that the German parliament has received a proposal to procure FV-014 drones/loitering munitions from Rheinmetall, worth €25 million, for approval. If the company’s drones successfully pass the qualification stage by April 2027, an order of nearly €300 million will be placed. In total, Rheinmetall is expected to deliver around 2,500 FV-014 drones, bringing the estimated unit cost to approximately €120,000 per system. The FV-014 is designed for both reconnaissance and strike missions, including the capability to operate as part of a swarm.

Two competitors—HX-2 by Helsing and Virtus by STARK—received the green light to supply their drones to the German military about a month ago. Both systems are already being used in Ukraine.

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Ukraine’s Private Air Defence Shows First Results

Ukraine’s experimental government initiative to involve the private sector in air defence is beginning to deliver initial results - Defence Minister Fedorov informed. One of the participating companies has already formed its own air defence unit and joined combat operations in the Kharkiv region.

At the same time, the rollout of additional units is ongoing: 13 more companies have received official authorization from the MoD to participate in the new initiative. They are currently at different stages of readiness, ranging from training to full operational deployment.

Private units are integrated into the unified command-and-control system of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This approach enables a rapid increase in defence capabilities without placing additional strain on frontline units.

The initiative also envisions opening up the air defence sector to the market and fostering a competitive environment. Businesses are given the opportunity to develop their own air defence capabilities and contribute to the protection of infrastructure.

The new framework removes ownership restrictions: both state-owned and private critical infrastructure companies are now allowed to establish their own air defence units.

Key features of this initiative:

• Temporary transfer: The Air Force Command can temporarily provide companies with air defence systems and ammunition.

• Reserve equipment: This includes systems that are not currently deployed with active combat units.

• Case-by-case decisions: The transfer of systems is determined individually for each company.

• Simplified replenishment: Expended ammunition is replenished through a simplified procedure based on documented usage.

The air defence units assigned to such facilities must meet established qualification requirements. To ensure this, personnel will undergo training and certification at institutions designated by the Ministry of Defence.

On air at Espreso TV, Oleksii Yizhak, an analyst at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, stated that the idea of private air defence is promising, but there is a fundamental issue related to the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

“Who in the state has the right to control and use weapons? We have a law on weapons that regulates their registration and who can use them. Before the full-scale war, the rights to use weapons were expanded for the Territorial Defence Forces. As for private air defence, this development is logical and understandable. There have long been decisions suggesting that at least the defence industry should have the ability to protect itself, because the Armed Forces cannot always do so,” Yizhak commented.

In his view, however, strict oversight is also necessary to prevent the excessive spread of private air defence. Otherwise, any company or private business in Ukraine could start using, for example, combat-configured drones and conduct surveillance. This is a serious issue that Ukraine will face after the war, when large quantities of weapons remain in circulation.

Key defence and infrastructure enterprises, and, in some cases, even municipal operators of critical infrastructure, should have a certain level of capability in place before the next winter. The question is what exactly this capability should entail: what types of drones and systems can be owned, accounted for, and operated not by the Armed Forces of Ukraine or military units, but by other actors.

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5 Main Problems of Ukraine’s Defence Tech

Ukraine’s defence tech industry, public officials, and other stakeholders criticized the CEO of Rheinmetall's comments about Ukraine’s drone producers. While the claim about “housewives with 3D printers” is inaccurate, Ukraine’s defence tech sector still faces several challenges.

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Ukraine’s drone innovations are once again in the spotlight—largely because the CEO of Rheinmetall, which is currently building several plants in Ukraine, publicly questioned the innovative nature of Ukraine’s unmanned technologies.

Meanwhile, last week, hundreds of Ukrainian drones continued to strike multiple strategic targets in Russia—defence production sites, oil processing facilities, a port; intercepted thousands of Shahed drones, and destroyed various high-value targets along the frontline.

Perhaps the world should learn more about the nature of Ukraine’s defence innovation.

In this edition:

• “Ukrainian Housewives with 3D Printers”: CEO of Rheinmetall on Ukraine’s Drone Producers;

• “Dozens of Inquiries, Zero Contracts”: The Paradox of Ukrainian Interceptor Drones;

• Pentagon Considers Redirecting Military Aid from Ukraine to the Middle East;

• Brave1 Launches Matchmaking Between Ukrainian and NATO Companies;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

If you’ve missed my last open-access article, take a look - “Turning Virtual Errors into Ukraine’s Battlefield Advantage: Drone Simulator Obriy”.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

We have previously raised funds for three Mavic 3T night-vision drones for the unit of my university friend Vasyl in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Mavic drones are expendable—they are often lost within weeks, or even days. That’s why I’m launching a new fundraiser to purchase another drone.

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“Ukrainian Housewives with 3D Printers”: CEO of Rheinmetall on Ukraine’s Drone Producers

In a conversation with The Atlantic, Armin Papperger, the CEO of Rheinmetall, one of the largest producers of defence equipment globally, called Ukrainian drone manufacturers “housewives”. According to him, “They have 3-D printers in the kitchen, and they produce parts for drones…This is not innovation.”

Papperger also added that Ukrainian drones don’t offer a technological breakthrough. “They make innovations with their small drones, and they say, ‘Wow!’ And that’s great. Whatever. But this is not the technology of Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, or Rheinmetall,” he stated.

This interview sparked a wave of reactions in Ukrainian society.

Yuriy Kasianov, an aerial reconnaissance specialist and founder of the Matrix-UAV unmanned aviation bureau, agreed with Papperger that the vast majority of Ukrainian drones contain no real innovation. “These are instruments of war that perform their assigned tasks reasonably well, but they are certainly not a 'silver bullet,' not a wunderwaffe, and not something the rest of the world has failed to develop,” Kasianov wrote.

He continued: “Our FPV drones, like Russian ones, are nearly identical to Chinese racing drones. Our bomber drones resemble Chinese agricultural drones. Our “analogs” to DJI systems do not reach even half the functionality of the originals, which is why they are not favored on the front line. And it is not surprising: DJI employs hundreds of thousands of engineers, while we do not have that number in the entire country”.

At the same time, according to Kasianov, Ukrainian drones have successfully protected skies in the Middle East — but only because they are operated by a few hundred highly experienced Ukrainian specialists. Modern FPV drones are, ultimately, just radio-controlled devices — and they are worthless without the operator. “Ukrainian drones have struck Ust-Luga and continue to effectively destroy the enemy on the battlefield. That, too, is true,” he added.

Bohdan Krotevych, a former officer of the National Guard of Ukraine, wrote in his LinkedIn post that the claim that Ukrainian drones lack innovation is too narrow: “It reduces innovation solely to the complexity of the product. Historically, that approach does not hold. There was nothing “extraordinary” about combining two wheels, a frame, and a handlebar — yet it became a breakthrough that changed mobility.

Such statements can contribute to a distorted understanding of the effectiveness and potential of Ukrainian manufacturers, and thus affect decisions regarding cooperation”.

According to Krotevych, those who invest in Ukrainian manufacturers are thinking strategically. The notion that this is “simple” or “nothing complex” is a form of devaluation rooted in a backward-looking perspective.

Yaroslav Kalinin, CEO at Infozahyst Research and Production Center, reacted in the following way: “We develop our own components, technologies, and code—not because we wanted to reinvent the wheel, but because your “leading Western companies” would not sell it to us. Not before the full-scale invasion, and often not even after. That is why we are moving toward our own chips and metamaterials—not out of ambition, but out of necessity created by the very “civilized world” itself.

Innovation means solving a problem no one has solved before. A $500 FPV drone that destroys a tank worth millions—that is innovation. Not by your corporate standards, but by the only standard that matters in war: effectiveness”.

I would add to the reactions of the above-mentioned experts that the effectiveness of Ukrainian-made unmanned technologies speaks for itself. Last week, Reuters reported that, according to their own calculations, at least 40% of Russia's oil export capacity is at a halt following Ukrainian drone attacks and the seizure of tankers. This is not to mention the “standard” list of achievements by other Ukrainian innovations, such as maritime drones that have destroyed helicopters, oil tankers, and a submarine, and have significantly constrained Russia’s military activity in the Black Sea; or Operation Spiderweb, which used Ukrainian-made FPV drones to destroy or damage 20–40 aircraft and reportedly caused up to $7 billion in losses to Russia.

Moving to the operational-tactical level, the use of fiber-optic drones—despite their relatively low technological sophistication—is currently considered one of the greatest challenges on the frontline, as they are capable of destroying not only personnel but also high-value military equipment, including tanks.

The vast majority of Ukraine’s innovations began as garage-level production and, over time, reached technological maturity. The manufacturers behind these systems are relatively small companies, certainly not comparable in scale to defence tech giants such as Rheinmetall. Still, the results they have achieved are remarkable.

Large producers are unable to innovate and iterate at the pace of small companies in sectors of novel technologies, where this capability is decisive in determining success in high-intensity conflict.

For the context, Rheinmetall aims to build three factories in Ukraine that will remain operational in the future, regardless of whether the war continues or ends during the construction phase. The Rheinmetall ammunition production plant in Ukraine is expected to begin operations in 2026.

Defense Express noted that it took Rheinmetall 15 months to open the production facility in Unterlüß, near Hanover, Germany. A 30 mm ammunition plant in Hungary was also built within 1.5 years. Meanwhile, in Ukraine, 2.5 years have passed since the contract between the company and the government was signed, yet no tangible progress has been made. The Ukrainian plant would realistically only be able to start production in 2027.

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“Dozens of Inquiries, Zero Contracts”: The Paradox of Ukrainian Interceptor Drones

There are 15 interceptor drone manufacturers in Ukraine that have been producing more units than the country’s defence needs. Output stands at around 5,000 units per month.

Ukraine’s MoD reported that in February, the Defense Forces shot down over 10,000 Russian fixed-wing drones, including Shahed and Gerbera, using interceptor drones. However, none of the Ukrainian manufacturers currently supply interceptor drones to Gulf countries.

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One of Ukraine’s recent priorities has been to disable Russia’s air defence capabilities. Over the first two weeks of March, Ukraine’s Defense Forces destroyed more than 20 Russian air defence assets, including S-400, Pantsir-S1, and Buk systems, as well as rare enemy radars. The apparent intention of the Ukrainian command is to create a “corridor” in Russia’s radar coverage, enabling long-range missiles and UAVs to penetrate deeper into Russian territory.

In this edition:

• How the War in Ukraine Is Transforming Small Arms Use;

• Ukraine Targets Russian Air Defences: What’s Behind It;

• How Ukraine Trains “Shahed Hunters”;

• Drone Warfare in Ukraine: Key Developments;

• and 20+ additional updates in Ukraine and Russia.

As a reminder, over the next few weeks, I will continue merging the “Arms Trends in Ukraine” and “Drone Warfare in Ukraine” newsletters into one newsletter due to my ongoing trip to Ukraine.

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How the War in Ukraine Is Transforming Small Arms Use

In the Russia-Ukraine war, traditional infantry engagement zones are disappearing: 20-km kill zones are now dominated by drones. Ukraine’s mass use of drones has transformed its approach to the use of small arms. Last week, I discussed this with Heorhii Uchaikin, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the Ukrainian Gun Owners Association, and also reviewed his interview with Polskie Radio published in January 2026.

Changing role of small arms on the battlefield

• The war has fundamentally transformed compared to 2022: small arms are increasingly less central in combat operations. Their primary relevance today is engaging FPV drones.

• Traditional rifled small arms (assault rifles) are declining in importance.

• Instead, there is a growing role for smoothbore (shotgun-type) weapons, especially for countering FPV drones and countering fiber-optic drones (currently one of the biggest threats).

• Engagement distances:

  • up to ~80 meters → effective shotgun range against drones

  • often the only available defence for frontline units under drone saturation

• This creates a new requirement: dedicated shotgun operators in each unit.

• Shotguns are becoming a core anti-drone tool. Key characteristics:

  • large spread → higher probability of hitting fast-moving drones

  • effective in chaotic, high-adrenaline environments

• Combat statistics: typically 4–5 shots required to hit a drone

• Pump-action shotguns are declining

NATO Standards in Firearms

• Ukraine is moving away from post-Soviet standards in small arms.

• At the beginning of 2022, the Ukrainian military primarily relied on the Kalashnikov platform, with standard calibers of 7.62 and 5.45. Everything was familiar—ergonomics, logistics, and ammunition stockpiles. Today, the picture has changed dramatically.

• There has been large-scale adoption of Western systems, including CZ BREN 2, Grot, FN SCAR, and various M4/M16 variants. As a result, Ukrainian infantry units have become some of the most combat-tested globally in terms of practical use of Western small arms.

• Market reality:

  • High-end systems (e.g. Italian Benelli M4-type) are effective but expensive

  • Market is increasingly filled with Turkish clones (Sarsilmaz, Typhoon, Hatsan, etc.)

• In parallel with Western supplies, a domestic segment is also taking shape.

• Ukrainian manufacturer Zbroyar has secured its niche. “We are talking about UAR-15 and UAR-10 rifles. For many units, these have already become standard. While they may not always be fully competitive with all foreign models, they confidently occupy their place among modern platforms,” Heorhii noted.

• The Ministry of Defence has codified and approved for use around 30 small-arms models, including 10 types of grenade launchers (from the United States, Germany, and the Czech Republic), significantly expanding infantry arsenals compared to 2022.

• Infantry units are now equipped to a much higher standard.

• Ukraine does not produce Kalashnikov rifles domestically, nor the associated ammunition. This creates dependency—historically even on adversary-linked supply chains.

• Ukraine has effectively changed calibers and standards.

• Today, there are at least four key caliber groups in use—two post-Soviet and two NATO standards. In 2025, more than half of units use NATO-standard small arms.

• Transitioning to new calibers requires time and training. Units are currently undergoing this transition under combat pressure. The pace is challenging but realistic.

• For an experienced shooter, transitioning from AK to AR-platform weapons can take only a few hours. For example, switching from an AK to an AR-15 with prior experience can be done in about 2 hours with basic instruction.

• However, scaling this across hundreds of thousands of personnel is a multi-year process requiring a large number of trained instructors.

Ammunition and Anti-Drone Rounds

• European production capacity for small arms ammunition is estimated at 3–4 billion rounds annually.

• The needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are measured in tens of billions of rounds.

• NATO does not currently have sufficient production capacity to sustain such a scale of war.

• Following the loss of the Luhansk ammunition plant, Ukraine became heavily dependent on ammunition imports.

• Since 2024, Ukraine has started producing certain types of ammunition, but there is still no full-cycle domestic production for NATO-standard calibers.

• The challenge is not only technological complexity—production equipment is subject to strict export controls.

• A full transition to NATO standards requires:

  • maintenance and repair infrastructure

  • full-cycle domestic ammunition production

• Only a limited number of countries produce ammunition manufacturing equipment (Italy, the U.S., Germany, Czech Republic), and demand exceeds supply.

• Ukraine still lacks a full-scale ammunition production plant.

• Importing ammunition is significantly more expensive than domestic production.

• Attempts to establish production face lengthy regulatory and licensing barriers.

• This sector has the potential to become budget-forming (strategically critical for the economy).

• Companies such as CZ and Colt Canada are preparing for localization in Ukraine, as local production is more cost-effective than imports.

• Right now, Ukraine is driving innovation in specialized anti-drone rounds.

• In June 2025, it was announced that Ukraine’s defenсe cluster Brave1 developed the first anti-drone cartridges equipped with a specialized warhead, significantly increasing the chances of hitting moving targets, including FPV drones and Mavics. The anti-drone cartridges resemble standard rounds of the most common calibers and can be used with assault rifles.

• In November 2025, Ukraine’s MoD announced the scaling up of the production of anti-drone ammunition. The Ministry codified rounds of this type from several Ukrainian manufacturers, which are ready for serial production.

• Additionally, a new concept of anti-drone rounds is taking shape in Ukraine - the Pavuk (Spider) - a 12-gauge anti-drone round with a Kevlar-carbon thread. “What we’re seeing now is a small but disruptive shift in the ammunition market — teams experimenting with Kevlar-based solutions are beginning to change the game. Hitting a fast-moving drone at 50 meters is extremely difficult; ideally, you’d want something like a ‘web’ effect to entangle it — that’s one of the few truly effective approaches. These innovations emerged in Ukraine — they simply didn’t exist before,” commented Heorhii Uchaikin to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.

  See an example of such ammunition produced by the Ukrainian BigCat Ammo.

• A Ukrainian servicemember, speaking to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor on condition of anonymity, explained how this works in practice: “When we move to positions, there is always a designated person in the crew riding in the back of the vehicle with a 12-gauge shotgun loaded with these kinds of rounds. There are also a couple of others nearby, ready to engage.

  If something is flying in, everyone opens fire—both with 12-gauge and rifles. Someone will hit it. And all of this happens while we’re on the move.

  At the unloading points, you can have five or even eight people shooting at a single drone at once”.

• At the same time, he underscored the challenges of carrying a separate weapon for anti-drone use: “I personally have my own 12-gauge weapon. Most of the time, it just stays at home, because we already carry too much gear. And I understand that from the moment I spot or hear a drone to the moment of detonation, there are about one to five, maybe up to seven seconds. In that time, you would need to reach for the extra weapon, bring it up, take off the safety, aim, and fire. There is almost no chance of doing all that. And that additional weapon is always ‘somewhere nearby,’ not actually on your body. Your primary weapon, on the other hand, is always accessible—within a second, it’s already in your hands.”

Civilian firearms market and regulation challenges

• Demand for firearms is increasing in Ukraine. However, Ukraine still lacks a comprehensive firearms law.

• Current situation: there is no clear legal distinction between legal vs illegal firearms. The inability of civilians to legally acquire self-defence weapons fuels the black market

• Black market dynamics:

  • strong demand due to lack of legal access (especially pistols)

  • “award weapon” schemes used as a workaround

• The Ukrainian Gun Owners Association advocates for removing traumatic pistols from circulation:

  • they are visually indistinguishable from real firearms

  • at close range, this creates life-threatening misidentification risks

• Globally, less-lethal weapons are clearly marked and used for controlled escalation of force. In the U.S., for example, such weapons are visibly distinguishable to prevent fatal misunderstandings.

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Ukraine Targets Russian Air Defences: What’s Behind It

Ukrainian drones struck two Buk air defence systems in Russia’s Bryansk Oblast on March 22, amid a broader wave of strikes on additional air defence and military targets, the Ukrainian military said.

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Just a few years ago, Ukraine’s offers of cooperation in air defence and counter-drone warfare were rejected by Israel and the United States. Now they are searching for that very expertise. But Ukraine’s strengths are not limited to interceptor drones. The country has been scaling up the production of cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as surface-to-air missiles — capabilities that have now attracted interest from the Middle East. This situation demonstrates how underestimated the potential of Ukraine’s defence industry has been, and how much Ukraine could have achieved if it had received the necessary assistance on time and in sufficient quantities.

In this edition:

• Lessons from Ukraine for Defending Gulf Airspace from Shaheds;

• Ukraine Produces Three Flamingo Missiles a Day;

• Drone Warfare in Ukraine: Key Updates;

• Why Drone Operators Will Be in High Demand in Civilian Life;

• and 20+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

In the next three weeks, due to business travel to Poland and Ukraine and a busy schedule, I won’t be able to publish a separate Drone Warfare in Ukraine edition and will instead include drone-related updates within the Monday digest.

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Lessons from Ukraine for Defending Gulf Airspace from Shaheds

This is a summary of the article by the Ukrainian soldier and lessons learned analyst at Ukraine’s 413th Unmanned Systems Regiment “RAID”, Dimko Zhluktenko, for War on the Rocks.

• Ukraine’s battlefield experience shows that large-scale attacks involving hundreds or thousands of drones and missiles can overwhelm traditional air defence architectures.

• In response to Russia’s mass attacks, sometimes involving over 800 drones and missiles, Ukraine has developed a layered, resilient, and sustainable air defence ecosystem that has proven capable of operating effectively over months and even years of continuous attacks.

• Ukraine’s point-defence model functions as an interconnected ecosystem. Different tools cover different altitudes, geographic zones, and cost levels, all linked through reporting, cueing, and rapid operational adaptation.

• Interceptor drones, mobile fire groups, radars, digital situational awareness platforms, conventional air defence systems, command posts, and a large pool of trained personnel work together in an integrated framework aimed at protecting Ukrainian airspace.

• Interceptor drones have recently become an important layer in Ukraine’s counter-drone architecture, particularly against Shahed-type loitering munitions and reconnaissance UAVs.

• Operating across a battlespace roughly comparable to the size of Texas, Ukrainian forces rely on a radar network for detection, with information fed into digital situational awareness systems accessible to air defence units.

• Air defence commanders coordinate engagements based on this data. Interceptor teams then launch FPV or fixed-wing drones, piloting them manually through analog or digital video feeds to visually track and pursue enemy UAVs.

• Engagement typically occurs through kinetic impact or the remote detonation of about 500 grams of C4.

• These drones are relatively inexpensive—generally between $800 and $3,000 per unit—making them suitable for repeated use against mass-produced threats such as Shaheds or ISR drones.

• Field observations suggest interception rates of roughly 50 percent or higher for well-trained crews.

• The training issue is often misunderstood in Western discussions. Ukrainian operators frequently adapt quickly because many already have experience with drones, allowing them to master interceptor systems faster than most conventional air-defence specialties. This has allowed Ukraine to scale its interceptor units rapidly.

• Ukrainian experience indicates that a single interceptor unit can cover an engagement zone of approximately 40 kilometers when integrated with advanced digital situational awareness systems that aggregate information from a broader sensor network.

• With interception probabilities around 50 percent and the ability to fly thousands of sorties per month, these units can significantly reduce the threat posed by Shahed drones. Importantly, they also serve as a cost-effective supplementary layer, preventing the rapid depletion of expensive interceptor missiles such as those used by Patriot systems.

• Implementing such an approach requires significant adjustments in doctrine, training programs, standard operating procedures, command structures, and operational planning.

• It also requires expanded sensor networks, including acoustic sensors, radars, and robust data-processing pipelines capable of feeding digital situational awareness systems in real time. Above all, success depends on sufficiently trained personnel, since complex defence architectures ultimately rely on people to operate and coordinate them effectively.

Last week, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly asked Ukraine to arrange a conversation with President Zelensky to discuss cooperation on intercepting Iranian drones. Ukraine’s ambassador to Israel, Yevhen Korniychuk, confirmed that the request had been made. He noted that the conversation has not yet taken place due to scheduling constraints, but expressed hope that it will occur soon.

Militarnyi noted that back in October 2022, Ukraine officially approached Israel to begin cooperation on missiles and air defence. Netanyahu said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal that he had rejected requests from the United States and Ukraine to supply weapons to the Ukrainian army. According to him, Israel feared that the weapons could be captured in Ukraine and transferred to Iran.

Read my earlier reports on this topic:

• Ukrainian Drone Interceptors Are Becoming a Global Currency;

• Drone warfare in Ukraine: war in the Middle East and Ukraine’s expertise.

And here is the complete list of my articles on Air Defence and Counter-UAS.

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Ukraine Produces Three Flamingo Missiles a Day

Ukraine is currently producing about three “Flamingo” cruise missiles per day. Production will increase to meet demand once the company Fire Point finalizes its own engine, said Denys Shtilerman, co-founder and chief designer of the defence company.

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In just three days, Gulf countries used around 800 interceptor missiles to counter Iran’s ballistic missile attacks, while Ukraine used about 700 during the entire winter.

Ukraine has been requesting these interceptors for a long time, but as global stockpiles are rapidly depleting, the prospects of receiving them in larger quantities are diminishing. Russia appears to be taking advantage of this situation by launching larger salvos of ballistic missiles against Ukraine.

At the same time, Ukraine is offering its extensive experience in countering Shahed-type drones to partners in exchange for additional PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors.

In this edition:

• Interceptor Missile Shortages in Ukraine;

• The War in Ukraine Is Moving Underground;

• “Knowledge Is Worth Trillions of Dollars”: Ukraine Is Opening Robotics Exports;

• and 10+ additional developments.

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Interceptor Missile Shortages in Ukraine

According to Andrius Kubilius, European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Ukraine spent around 700 interceptor missiles for the Patriot system over the three winter months. By comparison, approximately 800 U.S.-made interceptor missiles were used in just three days in the Middle East.

Kaja Kallas, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said that weapons and defence capabilities, including air defence systems needed by Kyiv, are now being redirected to the Middle East.

Ukraine experienced nearly 2,000 missile strikes in 2025 alone, including around 900 ballistic missiles launched by Russia. This highlights that Ukraine’s battlefield needs for interceptors significantly exceed the current production capacity of Western defence industries.

The WSJ reported that Lockheed Martin produced just over 600 PAC-3 interceptors in 2025. In operational practice, intercepting a single ballistic missile typically requires at least two Patriot interceptors, and sometimes a third or more if the initial attempt fails.

The production of each interceptor—costing several million dollars—is complex and time-consuming. Manufacturing can take months, as the system relies on components supplied by a wide network of facilities across the United States and from international partners.

To replenish 800 PAC-3, Lockheed Martin would need about 15.5 months of production at its current manufacturing rate, writes Defence Express.

Ukraine’s air force estimates it needs at least 60 PAC-3 interceptors a month just to keep pace with Russian ballistic-missile attacks. Reportedly, Russia is now able to produce around 80 ballistic missiles a month, according to Ukrainian and Western intelligence.

The Institute for the Study of War wrote that Russia is likely trying to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of Patriot interceptors and take advantage of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.

Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 6 to 7 that resulted in significant civilian casualties in Kharkiv. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Zirkon hypersonic cruise missiles from occupied Crimea; 13 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk, Kursk, and Voronezh oblasts; and 14 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea.

Russia rarely launches more than 10 ballistic missiles in a single strike package.

As I previously reported in my Drone Warfare in Ukraine newsletter, President Zelensky said that Ukraine is considering providing interceptor drones in exchange for PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles for Patriots. On Sunday, March 8, Zelensky said Ukrainian drone-interceptor experts will arrive in the Middle East next week and be ready to provide immediate assistance.

Separately, Reuters reported that before Russia’s massive winter air campaign, Ukraine's F-16 fighter jets didn't have enough AIM-9 “Sidewinder” air-to-air missiles to shoot down Russian drones and missiles for more than three weeks after supplies from Kyiv's partners dried up.

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The War in Ukraine Is Moving Underground

Military experts say that the emergence of so-called “kill zones” has become a defining feature of modern warfare. Also, militaries are forced to move underground, especially when the adversary has an advantage in aviation.

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Domestic ballistic missile capabilities are a key priority for Ukraine, as they would significantly enhance its ability to strike high-value enemy targets and maximize damage.

Last week, the Ukrainian company Fire Point — well known for its highly effective FP-1 long-range drones and Flamingo cruise missiles — showcased the launch of its ballistic missile, the FP-7, which is capable of operating at a range of up to 200 km. Its sister missile, the FP-9, is expected to reach targets at distances of over 800 km.

Will 2026 be the year of Ukrainian ballistic missiles?

In this edition:

• Anti-Ballistic Solutions in Ukraine;

• Ukraine’s Ballistic Missile FP-7;

• Build With Ukraine: New Deals Announced;

• Modernizing Ukraine’s Shilka and Osa Air Defence Systems;

• and 10+ additional developments.

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Anti-Ballistic Solutions in Ukraine

Ukraine’s Minister of Defence, Mykhailo Fedorov, stated that the country critically lacks PAC-3 interceptor missiles for air defence to protect against Russian ballistic threats. At the same time, according to him, Ukraine has significant potential to independently develop and produce anti-ballistic systems and missiles. Fedorov discussed with President Zelensky the creation of joint consortia with Ukraine’s partners to accelerate the production of anti-ballistic missiles.

According to Serhii FLASH Beskrestnov, advisor to Minister Fedorov, one of Ukraine’s most pressing challenges remains the enemy’s ballistic missile capability.

“It is no secret that, at present, only the Patriot system can effectively counter ballistic missiles,” he noted. “However, Patriot has a defined interception rate and specific engagement algorithms — several interceptor missiles may be required to neutralize a single incoming target.”

In the context of a long war of attrition, the ballistic threat becomes a question of industrial capacity: Russian missile production versus sustained international support for Ukraine’s supply of Patriot interceptors. Beskrestnov emphasized that the ballistic missiles currently striking Ukraine were manufactured as recently as late 2025 and early 2026 — “fresh from the factory.”

The Iskander missile, he explained, is produced using approximately 90% domestically sourced Russian components, with output reportedly reaching around 60 units per month. In addition, Russia continues to use other systems, including S-300 and S-400 missiles in ground-attack roles.

“Can we realistically expect a permanent and unlimited supply of anti-ballistic interceptors? Probably not. Global military stockpiles are not infinite,” FLASH wrote.

The solution, in his view, must be comprehensive. It includes Ukraine’s participation in the development of anti-ballistic systems — both domestic and joint projects with partner countries — as well as the systematic fortification of critical infrastructure. Key facilities, whether military or civilian, must be hardened to withstand missile strikes. Power plants and 750 kV substations, for example, should be designed or reinforced to survive direct impacts.

Beskrestnov also underscored the economic dimension of the war. Ballistic missile production is expensive, and reducing Russia’s financial resources directly constrains its capacity to manufacture such weapons.

“There are other ideas and plans,” he added, “but I cannot discuss them publicly.”

On February 20, Ukraine targeted the Votkinsk Plant, a strategic enterprise of Russia’s defence industry, with domestic long-range FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. This successful strike could potentially suspend Russia’s ability to produce ballistic missiles for up to six months, according to Yevhen Dykyi, a veteran of the Russo-Ukrainian war and former company commander of the Aidar Battalion.

“Ukraine’s ability to shift toward counter-industry targeting to preempt Russian missiles at the industrial base before they can be launched is therefore not an added benefit but a necessity. The fact that Ukraine has not yet been able to do so, partly because its partners have not sufficiently enabled it in this domain, represents a major failure of European and Western policy,” wrote Fabian Hoffman on his Missile Matters Substack.

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Ukraine’s Ballistic Missile FP-7

The Ukrainian company Fire Point for the first time showcased the launch of its ballistic missile FP-7, including footage of the launch and the first phase of flight.

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The disruption of Russian access to Starlink became a major contributing factor, allowing Ukraine to regain around 300 square kilometers of territory.

Although this time Ukraine’s cooperation with SpaceX has been productive, in the past, there have been multiple instances in which Starlink services were deliberately restricted, affecting Ukrainian operations.

For several years, Ukraine has been working on alternatives to Starlink, including the establishment of a military mobile operator — an innovation that began developing directly in frontline laboratories.

In this edition:

• Ukraine-U.S. Partnership in the Unmanned Tech Sector;

• Challenges Faced by Ukraine’s Air Defence Units;

• Ukraine Plans to Establish a Military Mobile Operator;

• and 10+ additional developments in defence tech, transfers, and partnerships in Ukraine.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

Last week, I joined Samuel Bendett, one of the leading experts on Russia, on his podcast to discuss drone developments on the battlefield. Listen to the recording on X Spaces.

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Ukraine-U.S. Partnership in the Unmanned Tech Sector

Ukraine has been focusing on strengthening its partnership with the American private sector, including industry leaders, innovators, and potential defence tech partners.

According to Militarnyi, American partners reviewed and tested several Ukrainian drones as part of work on the Drone Deal. This was stated by the spokesperson of Ukraine’s MFA. Work on the Drone Deal with the United States was announced by President Zelensky last autumn.

Reportedly, Kyiv had proposed a five-year, $50 billion framework that would involve producing up to 10 million drones annually.

Read the September section: Ukraine-U.S. Drone Deal and Military Exports.

In early February, it was announced that Ukrainian drone manufacturers General Cherry and the lesser-known Ukrainian Defense Drones Tech Corp had received invitations from the United States to participate in the Drone Dominance Program, which has a $1.1 billion budget.

The process is currently at the initial stage of the competition. The first phase will involve direct testing of drones submitted by 25 manufacturers.

General Cherry told Defense Express that entry into the first stage of the program required submitting a detailed technical description of the system, confirming compliance with NDAA requirements and U.S. legislation, disclosing ownership structure and supply chains, demonstrating the ability to scale mass production within tight timeframes, and passing a preliminary selection process among hundreds of companies worldwide.

General Cherry is presenting a system that integrates reconnaissance, target detection, and strike capabilities.

To implement the project, the company plans to localize final assembly in the United States or allied countries and establish a separate compliance framework tailored to U.S. contracts. Production streams for international customers and for Ukraine’s Defense Forces will be separated, allowing the company to avoid competition for resources.

Separately, in January, Ukraine’s government platform Brave1, together with the American company Palantir, launched Brave1 Dataroom, a secure environment designed to train and test artificial intelligence models using real-world battlefield data. Brave1 Dataroom is built on Palantir’s software platforms.

Additionally, in March 2026, Brave1 will conduct a U.S. Roadshow—a two-week investment tour across U.S. cities—during which Ukrainian defence-technology startups will showcase their solutions to American venture capital funds, offices, corporations, and lawmakers.

Check out my earlier articles and sections on Ukraine–North America defence cooperation.

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Challenges Faced by Ukraine’s Air Defence Units

The commander of the 1030th Separate Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion “Aquila” of the Third Army Corps, in an interview with 24 Kanal, explained how Ukraine has built a layered air defence system against enemy UAVs. His unit operates in an area of responsibility exceeding 150 km, covering parts of Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions.

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Despite the terrors of war, let’s take note of some positive developments from last week. Among them were a series of successful joint ventures, mostly focused on drone production. It also appears that Ukraine has finally moved to officially open its arms exports.

Starlink restrictions continue to affect Russian operations. And, unexpectedly, another positive development comes from Russia: its self-imposed restrictions on Telegram — a key tool for frontline units, volunteers, and the broader defence ecosystem — are likely to further disrupt battlefield communications for Russian troops.

In this edition:

• Joint Ventures and the Opening of Arms Exports;

• How ISTAR Works in a Real War;

• Russia’s Workarounds to Starlink and Telegram;

• 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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Monday, February 16, is the final day of my fundraising campaign to purchase a vehicle for my friend Volodymyr, who is serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine 🇺🇦 50 people contributed to this campaign and raised 80% of the target amount so far!

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Joint Ventures and the Opening of Arms Exports

Last week, during the Munich Security Conference, several important developments took place, including the announcement of three major agreements between Ukrainian and Europe-based defence manufacturers.

1. Ukrainian defence company TAF Industries signed an agreement with German manufacturer Wingcopter to launch joint drone production in Germany. According to TAF, they are operating within the Build with Ukraine programme.

   TAF Industries is one of the largest FPV drone producers in Ukraine. Read my profile article about them: “We Can Produce 150,000 FPVs per Month”: Ukrainian TAF Industries.

2. European hub of Auterion, a global leader in operating systems for autonomous drones, and Ukrainian defence tech company Airlogix announced the creation of a joint venture to produce AI-guided UAVs for Ukraine and allied countries. Production will take place in Germany, and the first deliveries are scheduled for 2026.

   Airlogix specializes particularly in the development of reconnaissance drones. Read my article about Airlogix: GOR: Top-Rated Reconnaissance Drone by Airlogix.

3. Ukrainian Tencore and German FERNRIDE agreed to establish a joint venture in Germany to produce the TerMIT ground robotic platform. The manufactured systems are planned to be supplied to Ukraine, while the partners will continue joint development in the fields of artificial intelligence and autonomy.

   Read my article about TerMIT here: TerMIT Drone and the Future of Unmanned Ground Vehicles in Ukraine.

Additionally, German defence startup Stark announced the opening of its own R&D Center in Ukraine. It has an area of 2,000 square meters, which will accommodate more than 200 specialists. The center’s tasks will be research and development, system integration, and training, enabling the company to accelerate the transition from development to serial production. In addition, Stark plans to build its own production facilities in Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Zelensky received the first Ukrainian drone (Linza 3.0 multi-purpose drone) manufactured in Germany by Quantum Frontline Industries. A joint venture between German Quantum Systems and Ukrainian Frontline Robotics was launched in December 2025. The QFI facility will enable the large-scale production of 10,000 battlefield-approved drones for the AFU in Germany within a year and has now started early-stage production.

Read about this JV here: Ukrainian Drone Tech + German Automation: Quantum Frontline Industries.

Also, during a visit by a Ukrainian delegation, Quantum Systems unveiled a previously unknown jet-powered UAV, writes Militarnyi. No additional information about the drone’s specifications or intended role has been disclosed.

Last week, Ukrainian defence manufacturers received the first permits to export controlled goods. This was announced by the Chair of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, Rustem Umerov, on Feb. 12. All export decisions will remain under strict state supervision, with the needs of the AFU being a priority.

Ukraine’s initiative to open military exports is intended to unlock an estimated $30–35 billion in unused defence production capacity.

Previously, President Zelensky announced that Ukraine would open 10 weapons export centers across Europe by the end of 2026.

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How ISTAR Works in a Real War

Viacheslav Shelestovskyi, Commander of the ISTAR Company of the 2nd Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine “Khartiia,” in an interview with Army TV, spoke about the processes of information collection and processing within the military. Khartiia was the first formation where ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance) was implemented in a fully integrated manner.

Below is my summary of this interview.

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The largest Russian winter attack against Ukraine so far took place on February 3, involving 450 drones and 71 missiles of various types. This time, Russian forces deliberately targeted Ukraine’s thermal power plants in an attempt to deprive Ukrainians of heating during extreme winter conditions, with temperatures dropping to –25°C and even –30°C in some regions.

For Russia, this represents a window of opportunity aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society by forcing civilians to endure prolonged outages of heating, electricity, and hot water, often lasting more than 10 hours at a time. While Ukraine’s air defences successfully intercepted a large number of incoming targets, the damage caused by the missiles and drones that penetrated defences remains significant.

In this edition:

• Starlink Issue Resolved. New Challenges Ahead;

• Effectiveness of Mobile Fire Groups in Ukraine;

• A Realistic Assessment of a War of Attrition: How to Approach the War with Russia;

• Ukraine Opens Drone Exports;

• 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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I am resuming my fundraising campaign to purchase a vehicle for my friend Volodymyr, who is serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. We have only 14 days left, and for several reasons, I was not actively promoting this campaign earlier, which was my mistake.

I’d appreciate it if you consider donating to PayPal.

In 2025, here on Substack, we raised funds to purchase three Mavic drones for recon purposes for another friend of mine serving in the army.

Starlink Issue Resolved. New Challenges Ahead

On February 1, Ukraine’s government adopted a resolution introducing a Starlink “whitelist.” This initiative will be implemented by the MoD in cooperation with SpaceX.

The introduction of the “whitelist” is a response to Russia's use of Starlink terminals on drones. These drones are difficult to shoot down, fly at low altitudes, are resistant to electronic warfare, and are controlled by an operator in real time, even over long distances.

The Starlink registration procedure differs depending on who owns the terminal.

Military personnel can register their data in the Army+ application. Chiefs of communications or authorized personnel can enter the data into DELTA.

Businesses and civil servants can submit an application through the Diia portal. After receiving a verification notification, they may use Starlink without restrictions.

Civilians should visit an Administrative Service Centre (ASC or CNAP - Ukr.) and register the terminals with their passport and taxpayer card. If they have more than one terminal, they must bring those with them - this is a security requirement to protect communications and prevent misuse.

Serhiy FLASH Beskrestnov, advisor to the Minister of Defense, mentioned that the requirement to bring more than one Starlink terminal to an ASC is driven by the risk that Russian forces could exploit Ukrainian citizens sympathetic to them across Ukraine, who might register Starlink terminals through Diia.

In an interview with Radio NV on February 5, Serhiy FLASH confirmed that after Russian Starlink terminals were disabled, Ukrainian intelligence reported “total panic among the Russians,” and on many axes, Russian assault operations were halted.

“We generally understood that they were using Starlink technology, but the scale of its use came as a surprise even to us. […] At this point, none of the Russians’ command-and-control channels are functioning on the front lines. This affects FPV drone operators, electronic warfare units, signals intelligence, communications with forward positions, and other areas,” Beskrestnov said.

According to him, Russian forces are now trying to “quickly find alternative solutions, but everyone understands how difficult that is, because Starlink was an extremely simple and ideal technology.”

Immediately after the introduction of these measures, a wave of discontent emerged among some Ukrainian military personnel.

A well-known activist and a military figure in Ukraine, Marusia Zvirobiy, wrote that disabled Starlink terminals have crippled her unit's operations. She added that 80% of Starlink terminals are provided by volunteers, and even those submitted by her unit for registration never reached the authorities due to bureaucratic delays.

FLASH clarified that issues with Starlink terminals used by Ukrainian forces—particularly those that were not registered in time—will be quickly resolved, and that new “whitelists” are being submitted to SpaceX daily.

Former Mufti of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Ukraine and now
Lieutenant of the 57th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, Said Ismahilov shared the following observations: “The overall trend appears to be the following: we are more creative and are the first to invent and deploy new high-tech solutions (such as “Starlink drones”), but the enemy steals our ideas, rapidly scales them to industrial levels, and then begins using them against us on a mass scale.

Disabling the unauthorized (“grey”) Starlink terminals that the enemy was using against us in our occupied territories had only a temporary effect. War is a dynamic process, and they will soon be forced either to come up with an alternative technological solution or to register Starlink terminals under the names of their agents holding Ukrainian passports.

By exploiting an extensive network of Moscow-centric religious organizations operating across the country, the enemy could hypothetically recruit thousands of people to register Starlink terminals in their own names. I assume these could include elderly individuals who may not even understand what has been registered”.

As of February 7, Russians deployed an entire network to search for Ukrainian citizens willing to register Starlink terminals in their own names through ASCs, and offer them up to 10,000 hryvnias ($230). Other ideas involve using a shell company or removing a Starlink terminal from a captured (trophy) drone, and so on.

Ukrainians found guilty of assisting the enemy face 15 years’ imprisonment or life imprisonment if Starlink is used in a way that leads to the deaths of people.

Additionally, the Russians do the following:

1. Scaling up the use of Wi-Fi bridges

2. Attempts to use LTE in various ways

3. Attempts to return to satellite internet via the Yamal and Express satellite systems.

Russians initially planned to use Starlink actively to support their strike UAV operations, but are now forced to rapidly adapt or seek alternative technical solutions.

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Effectiveness of Mobile Fire Groups in Ukraine

On Feb. 7, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that during the daily coordination call, he had a “rather tough conversation” regarding the performance of mobile fire groups.

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Russia’s so-called “energy ceasefire,” brokered by Donald Trump, went largely unnoticed in Ukraine. Deliberate strikes on civilian infrastructure continued, with targets including a passenger train, a bus carrying miners, and a maternity hospital.

These attacks are likely to continue in the coming weeks, despite a positive solution reached between Ukraine and SpaceX regarding restrictions preventing Russian use of Starlink terminals.

In the coming days, Ukraine is expected to face another wave of extreme frost and potentially new Russian salvos, as the so-called “ceasefire” expired on February 1.

In this edition:

• Ukraine Works with SpaceX to Limit Russian Use of Starlink;

• Mirage 2000-5 and Its Core Functions in Ukraine;

• Ukrainian F-16 Pilot on the Realities of the Air War;

• 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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Ukraine Works with SpaceX to Limit Russian Use of Starlink

Ukraine and SpaceX have taken initial steps in countering Russian drones using Starlink terminals. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk said his company appears to have successfully blocked Russia from "unauthorized" use of Starlink internet systems in Ukraine.

SpaceX has limited the movement speed of Starlink terminals in Ukraine to 75-90 km/h. Reports of terminals being flagged for excessive movement speed began appearing on Feb.1 in Ukraine’s Facebook group “Narodnyi Starlink” (People’s Starlink).

These measures are considered temporary or emergency solutions and will be replaced by a global, well-thought-out solution, which will take time, according to the advisor to the Minister of Defence, Serhiy FLASH Beskrestnov.

The next step will be implementing a system that allows only authorized Starlink terminals to operate in Ukraine. In the coming days, instructions for Ukrainian users on Starlink registration and verification will be published. Unverified terminals will be disconnected.

The registration process is expected to be simple, fast, and user-friendly.

In the meantime, Russians hope that the Starlink restrictions will also affect Ukrainian long-range drones and uncrewed surface vessels (USVs).

“The operator-imposed limitation affects both Russian and Ukrainian fixed-wing UAVs. Ukrainian Armed Forces are prepared to accept this constraint, given the significant damage caused by Russian “Italmas” and “Geran” long-range drones. At the same time, the speed cap may also ground Ukrainian Magura V5 uncrewed surface vessels, which are capable of reaching speeds of up to 80 km/h”, according to Voennyi Obozrevatel.

FLASH wrote that since Ukraine has closed the Starlink loophole for Russians, they will now return to mesh modem–based control. It is another solution for enabling online control of UAVs. “Mesh modems on UAVs can be effectively suppressed. Ideally, DDS-based jamming is preferable, but even basic Chinese jamming modules affect mesh modems. Even at around 40% effectiveness, they are still valuable due to their low cost and scalability”, FLASH added.

On February 1, another attack involving online-controlled Shahed drones was carried out in Dnipropetrovsk oblast of Ukraine. A Russian UAV struck a company shuttle bus carrying miners, killing 15 people and injuring 15 others. According to FLASH, a group of Shahed drones, operating under real-time remote control via mesh radio modems, was flying along a road. The operator of the first Shahed spotted a bus below and decided to attack it.

The drone struck near the bus. As a result of the blast wave, the driver lost control and crashed into a fence. Injured passengers began evacuating the bus, helping one another.

At that moment, the operator of a second Shahed saw the people outside and deliberately redirected the drone directly at the civilians.

The operators, acting from the territory of Russia, clearly saw and identified the target as civilian, understood that these were not military personnel, and made a conscious decision to carry out the attack.

This is not an isolated case of Russia’s deliberate use of drones against Ukrainian civilians. Check my earlier reports:

• Russian Shaheds Strike a Passenger Train in Ukraine;

• Drones Against Civilians: How Russia Uses UAVs to Kill and Terrorize.

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Mirage 2000-5 and Its Core Functions in Ukraine

Ukraine expects additional Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets from France, as well as missiles for various weapons systems. This was stated on social media by Ukraine’s Defence Minister Fedorov following a conversation with his French counterpart, Catherine Vautrin.

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Russia’s recent strikes against Ukraine are aimed at depleting Ukraine’s air-defence missile stocks —capabilities that have already been in short supply for months. According to some estimates, Ukraine would require an additional $27 billion in military equipment from non-EU sources in 2026. Patriot systems and interceptors, along with missiles for other air-defence platforms, represent the most critical capability.

Amid rising tensions between European partners and the United States, and Washington’s growing reluctance or slow decision-making to provide or sell additional equipment and ammunition to Ukraine, Russia is well aware that air-defence missiles are likely to remain scarce in the coming months and is adjusting its strategy accordingly.

In this edition:

• Russia Strikes Ukraine With Anti-Ship Missiles;

• Five Ukrainian Weapons That Need to Be Scaled Fast;

• Defence City Regime and Arms Export in Ukraine;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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Russia Strikes Ukraine With Anti-Ship Missiles

On January 24, Russia struck Kyiv for the first time in a long while with Kh-22 anti-ship cruise missiles. The enemy launched 12 such missiles at Kyiv, which was an unprecedented number.

They are designed to strike aircraft carrier groups, have a 950 kg warhead, and can carry different types of payloads. These missiles have an accuracy error of up to 600 meters, said the Head of the Communications Department of Ukraine’s Air Force Command.

The missiles were launched from Tu-22M3 bombers, which Russia has redeployed from the Far East closer to the territory of Ukraine.

Ukraine’s air defence destroyed 9 out of 12 missiles.

The air attack was repelled by aviation, anti-aircraft missile troops, electronic warfare units, unmanned systems units, and mobile fire groups of the Defense Forces.

In total, Russia has used 412 Kh-22 missiles; only 12 have been intercepted — in practice, only Patriot systems are capable of shooting them down.

Ukrainian expert Serhiy Misiura wrote that there were at least three objectives behind this strike:

1. A show of force and impunity ahead of the negotiation process in the UAE.
A message along the lines of: “Next time we can do even more if our conditions are not met.”

(On Jan. 23, Ukrainian and Russian negotiators held talks in the United Arab Emirates, with the key issue of territory dominating the agenda as the United States pushes for an agreement to end the war).

2. Energy infrastructure.
To cause blackouts in Kyiv and Kharkiv. This objective also implies that the public could turn against the authorities, demanding an end to the cold in their homes and the blackouts. At the same time, this supports the first objective: to push Ukraine to make a diplomatic démarche and withdraw from the negotiation process. To show the world — and especially the Americans- that Ukraine supposedly does not want peace and therefore walked away from the talks in the UAE.

3. Depleting Ukraine’s stock of Patriot PAC-3 missiles.
These stocks were only recently replenished by allies. The Russians roughly know how many PAC-3 missiles Ukraine received. Ukraine has nothing else capable of countering such threats. That is why this is already the second strike in a week, in which most of the missiles were extremely difficult for all air defence systems.

“Ballistic missiles and Kh-32 missiles were launched in sequence during the night — calculating what we could intercept, what we had left, how much they had, and what would be needed for the next “course.” A multi-million-dollar intelligence operation conducted through missile combat. Yes, we are already witnessing this. 21st-century warfare is on the march, and we are at the front of the column,” writes Serhiy on his Facebook.

The Russians are also tracking the use of PAC-3 missiles and will factor them into the next attack.

And the next attack will again aim to exhaust Ukraine’s PAC-3 missiles.

A Kh-32 missile costs Russians about $3 million, while a PAC-3 interceptor used to shoot it down costs $4–5 million. Kinzhal missiles cost even more. It is simply the math of war — and the Russians have finally started counting money.

“Of course, the Iskander-M ballistic missile is cheaper, and aircraft are not required to launch it, but they are available in smaller numbers, and their range is significantly shorter. To strike Kyiv from 500 km, a launcher must be physically moved closer by land. Meanwhile, Tu-22 bombers are already launching from around 600 km away… And as long as the freezing temperatures persist, the likelihood of the next attack being prepared and carried out quickly is at its highest,” Serhiy concluded.

Earlier this week, on the night of January 20, Russian forces attacked Vinnytsia Oblast with their hypersonic anti-ship missile, Zircon.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia has used Zircon anti-ship missiles several times to strike ground targets in Ukraine. Notably, the missile was originally designed to counter the United States Navy.

Earlier, analysts at Militarnyi suggested that the warhead recovered from a missile shot down in 2024 was significantly smaller than those used in comparable Russian supersonic anti-ship missiles. Based on its dimensions, the warhead measures approximately 400 mm in diameter and 450 mm in length. By weighing the fragments, its mass was estimated at 150–200 kg, of which roughly 40–80 kg consisted of explosive material.

Read my previous reports on the topic:

• Russia struck Lviv region with an Oreshnik missile;

• How Weather Affects the War in Ukraine;

• Drones Against Civilians: How Russia Uses UAVs to Kill and Terrorize.

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Five Ukrainian Weapons That Need to Be Scaled Fast

Ukrainian experts named the top five Ukrainian weapons capable of significantly influencing the course of hostilities.

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As of January 12, Russia’s war against Ukraine has become longer than the Soviet–German campaign. Russian forces are losing 1,000–1,400 troops per day, and their battlefield gains over the past three years have been marginal. Instead, they have intensified exhaustive attacks against civilians, seeking to destabilize Ukrainian society and exert pressure for political change inside the country.

In the midst of all this, Ukraine has a new Minister of Defence, who is expected to address multiple challenges, including frontline supplies and ongoing mobilization issues.

In this edition:

• Priorities and First Decisions of the New Defence Minister of Ukraine;

• How Weather Affects the War in Ukraine;

• Ukraine and the UK expand cooperation;

• Ballistic Missiles and AI: Forecasts for 2026 from the CEO of the Ukrainian Council of Defence Industry;

• 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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Priorities and First Decisions of the New Defence Minister of Ukraine

Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov has been appointed as the new Minister of Defence of Ukraine. 34-year-old Fedorov is the youngest Minister of Defence in Ukraine’s history. He is one of the few public figures who have remained on Zelensky’s team since 2019.

Fedorov was behind the creation of the digital system Diia, an app that allows Ukrainian citizens to access digital documents on their smartphones—now used by more than 23 million Ukrainians.

Thanks to Fedorov and his team, Ukraine has deployed Starlink, launched the Army of Drones, Drone Line, Brave1, the e-points motivation system, UNITED24, and the world’s first “Amazon for war,” Brave1 Market (read my report on the Brave1 Market).

President Zelensky has set the following tasks for Fedorov:

• The main priority is the protection of Ukraine’s skies.

• The second priority is significant strengthening of the technological component to halt Russian advances on the battlefield, in coordination with the military.

• The need to resolve problematic issues related to the frontline supply.

• More large-scale changes to the mobilisation process, which will ensure greater opportunities both for Ukraine’s Defence and Security Forces and for the country’s economic processes.

Fedorov told the parliament: “The Defense Ministry is coming into my hands with a minus 300 billion [hryvnias] ($6.9 billion), 2 million Ukrainians who are wanted, and 200,000 in AWOL (absent without leave) status”.

Some points from his inaugural speech:

• Ukraine is moving toward full autonomy on the battlefield—from machine vision and data analytics to drone swarms. “Our ambitious goal is to make Ukraine the first country in the world capable of predicting and neutralizing enemy attacks using AI”.

• One of the first decisions as Minister of Defense will be to ensure a baseline level of drone availability for brigades, which is currently clearly insufficient. This will increase predictability and improve planning quality.

  “Today, the top 50 units out of roughly 400 account for 70% of enemy losses. Imagine the potential of Ukraine’s Defense Forces if we help the remaining 350 units grow”.

• The Minister set a goal to increase the volume of international military assistance. Integrating partners—particularly their scientific and research potential—will strengthen Ukraine’s defence system while simultaneously enhancing their own defence capabilities.

• Defence tech will become one of Ukraine’s key industries on global markets and a driver of the country’s economic growth. There is still important groundwork to be done to develop Ukraine’s own air defence systems and laser-guided artillery munitions. This will allow artillery to operate more accurately, faster, and more effectively, while reducing risks to Ukrainian servicemembers.

A day later, Ukraine’s MoD launched a fully automated system for distributing UAVs among military units. According to Fedorov, the time from warehouse receipt to drone delivery to a unit will be reduced by 2–3 times, down to roughly 1 day.

Due to this change, MoD will receive high-quality data, allowing it to:

• see unit requests in real time within a single system;

• track drone inventories in warehouses;

• generate issue orders within minutes;

• plan deliveries without delays or duplication.

The automated drone distribution between units runs on the SAP platform. The system covers the entire drone supply chain, from procurement to handover to the unit.

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How Weather Affects the War in Ukraine

Under conditions where Ukraine is covered in snow and temperatures remain at –15 to –20°C, conducting combat operations is extremely difficult, as well as defending Ukrainian cities from Russian missiles and drones.

Previously, I published a section on how extreme cold affects drones in Ukraine and Russia, and below is a section on the impact of freezing temperatures on combat operations more broadly.

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Russia has continued to strike Ukraine’s energy infrastructure amid exceptionally harsh winter conditions. As a result of the drone attacks, approximately half a million residents of Kyiv and Kyiv oblast were left without electricity and heating during some of the coldest days of the winter.

Although the reported supply rate of interceptor drones has reached around 1,500 units per day, this alone remains insufficient to counter sustained Russian salvo attacks. Ukraine is therefore urgently requesting additional air defence missiles from its partners.

In this edition:

• Russia struck Lviv region with an Oreshnik missile;

• Ukraine’s Brave1 will present Ukrainian drones in the U.S. Roadshow;

• Obstacles to integrating lasers and microwaves in Ukraine’s air defence;

• 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

I have an ongoing poll in this post to determine whether I should keep Arms Trends in Ukraine as my priority section or switch the focus to Drone Warfare. Please help me decide!

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Russia Struck Lviv Region with Oreshnik Missile

On the night of January 8–9, Russia for the first time struck the outskirts of Lviv, just 70 km from the European Union border, with an Oreshnik ballistic missile. The missile was traveling at 13,000 kilometers per hour. No more than 15 minutes passed between the explosions in Lviv and reports by monitoring groups of a probable launch from Kapustin Yar shortly beforehand.

No civilians were injured. Damage was reported to a critical infrastructure facility and six private cargo trucks.

According to an official statement by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the components found at the site belong to the Oreshnik missile system. Among the recovered parts were:

• a stabilization and guidance unit;

• components of the propulsion system;

• fragments of the orientation mechanism;

• nozzles from the separation stage platform, among others.

It became the second use of such a weapon following a similar strike on Dnipro on November 24, 2024.

Although Oreshnik can carry nuclear warheads, the strike on Lviv—like the one on Dnipro—was evidently carried out without such a warhead. The Lviv Regional Military Administration confirmed that radiation levels in the region remain normal.

Russian media claimed that the strike was allegedly carried out against either major underground gas storage facilities or a joint NATO–Ukraine Combined Forces command post. ISW reported that available visual evidence indicates that the Russian Oreshnik struck a Ukrainian defence industrial enterprise in Lviv City.

Ukraine’s Air Force Command emphasized that such a missile has not yet been intercepted because interception is technically difficult.

Oleh Katkov, Editor-in-Chief of the military-political outlet Defense Express told Liga.Net, that Ukraine currently—and in the foreseeable future—does not have the capability to intercept the Oreshnik missile.

Oreshnik is a medium-range ballistic missile with separable warheads. It must be intercepted before the warheads separate. This requires exo-atmospheric interception—i.e., in space. However, the key question is when exactly the missile’s warhead separation occurs and whether it is within the engagement envelope of these missile defence systems.

Oreshnik can theoretically be intercepted by the ship-based Standard Missile-3 and Israel’s Arrow-3 missile defence system. According to Katkov, SM-3 missiles are used on ships equipped with the Aegis system. There are also two U.S. Aegis Ashore bases—one in Romania and one in Poland. The Arrow-3 missile defence system, meanwhile, is deployed in Germany.

The American Patriot system is designed to counter tactical and operational-tactical ballistic missiles, such as the Iskander. However, medium-range missiles require different systems: THAAD, SM-6, and SM-3.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, the Kremlin likely targeted the westernmost part of Ukraine with an Oreshnik missile to deter Europe and the United States from providing security guarantees to Ukraine.

Fabian Hoffman, in his Missile Matters, wrote that Oreshnik poses a distinct challenge to European security. This challenge stems less from the missile’s technical characteristics, which remain overstated, than from the way it exposes and amplifies existing European capability gaps that require urgent attention. Non-nuclear Oreshnik strikes are best deterred by presenting Russia with a credible non-nuclear counterstrike capability. However, European states currently face a substantial capability gap in deep-strike weapons, including medium- to intermediate-range ballistic missile systems comparable to the Oreshnik.

Defence Cooperation

🇺🇸 In March 2026, Ukraine’s defence innovation cluster Brave1 will conduct an investment tour across the United States to present Ukrainian drones and defence-tech developments to American investors and potential partners.

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In 2025, Ukraine attracted a record $45 billion in international assistance, which was directed not only toward the transfer of ready-made systems but also toward Ukraine’s own defense production. The Armed Forces received 3 million FPV drones and 15,000 ground drones, the majority of which were domestically produced.

However, industry representatives note that financial resources remain insufficient to fully utilize the production capacity of Ukraine’s defense enterprises. In the coming year, Europe will have to take on a greater share of financial assistance to Ukraine, with the use of frozen Russian assets likely to play an instrumental role.

In this edition:

• Ukraine’s Defence in 2025: Key Highlights from MoD;

• Ukraine Has Full Technical Capability to Confront Russia Across All Parameters - Ukrainian Armor;

• Role of the Danish Model in Strengthening Ukraine’s Military Readiness;

• Ukraine’s Security Reshuffle (Budanov, Fedorov, Maliuk).

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Ukraine’s Defence in 2025: Key Highlights from MoD

Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence published a list of key highlights for 2025, including the number of certain drone categories delivered to the Armed Forces, the volume of international assistance, and other industry-related data.

• In 2025, Ukraine secured $45 billion in international assistance - the highest number since the start of the war. This is almost 30% more than last year.

• The main areas of support in 2025 included weapons and ammunition, the development of air and missile defense systems, investments in joint production and procurement for Ukraine’s defense-industrial complex, as well as training, repair, technical support, and logistics.

• Nearly $3 billion was provided to Ukraine from the proceeds of frozen Russian assets in the EU and the United Kingdom.

• More than 20 countries joined the PURL, a mechanism that enables the procurement of U.S. weapons, with total contributions exceeding $4 billion.

• Over $6 billion in foreign financing was directed to Ukraine’s defense industry, including through the Danish model.

• The Build with Ukraine and Build in Ukraine initiatives were launched.

• Ukraine’s military received a record 3 million FPV drones.

• More than 15,000 ground robotic systems were delivered to military units.

• Nearly 1,000 interceptor drone systems are now supplied to combat units every day.

• The DELTA combat digital system has been officially deployed across all levels of the Defence Forces of Ukraine. Supported by DELTA, Ukrainian defenders engage more than 2,000 enemy targets every day.

• During the recent REPMUS-25 exercises, Ukraine’s DELTA served as the core system for command and control of the combined team of participating nations. Check the list of my previous posts on Delta here.

• Direct drone procurement: MoD launched DOT-Chain Defence. It is a marketplace — a store where the military can order drones directly from manufacturers in just a few clicks, within the state-allocated budget.

  The selection includes more than 180 FPV drone models.

• The average time from order to delivery is 10 days. A total of 186 brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and two corps of the National Guard of Ukraine have already joined the project. The plan for next year is to shift 70% of drone procurement to the DOT-Chain Defence platform.

• The Ministry of Defence has developed and is scaling the first digital personnel record-keeping system, ‘Impulse’. With ‘Impulse’, personnel services will have access to up-to-date data on every service member and their assignment history, as well as the ability to generate reports and draft orders automatically. The entire process will be paperless, efficient, and transparent.

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Ukraine Has Full Technical Capability to Confront Russia Across All Parameters - Ukrainian Armor

Ukrainian Armor is one of Ukraine’s largest private defense manufacturers. The company develops and supplies the Armed Forces of Ukraine with VARTA-2 and Novator armored vehicles, mortars, ammunition, FPV drones, and other weapons systems.

In 2025, Ukrainian Armor reached the following production capacities for NATO-standard ammunition:

• up to 300,000 rounds of 155 mm,

• up to 100,000 rounds of 105 mm,

• up to 240,000 mortar rounds of various calibers.

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As 2025 comes to an end, we are grateful that Ukraine is holding the front. This has been made possible not only by military assistance from partner countries, but above all by the efforts of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, as well as nationwide resistance and society’s readiness to confront the enemy.

In my final Arms Trends in Ukraine edition of the year, I want to stress the need for societies across different regions and continents to recognize and prepare for the realities of modern warfare. Even in countries not directly in armed conflict, everyday life can be disrupted at any moment by “mystery drones” or even “a stray missile”. When Russia, its allies, and other malicious actors feel empowered, the world becomes an increasingly dangerous place.

In this edition:

• Technological Militarization of Society: How Ukraine Is Doing It;

• Russia’s Recent Drone and Missile Attacks on Ukraine;

• Drone Warfare: Weekly Developments (Shaheds with remote control; Russian UGVs);

• U.S. military assistance is being replaced by support from Northern European countries;

• 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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Technological Militarization of Society: How Ukraine Is Doing It

The Ukrainian technological miracle is a successful nationwide project built on charity and volunteerism. In one of my final articles of 2025, I decided to highlight the role of civil society in Ukraine’s defence. These organizations prepare both military personnel and civilians for the realities of modern warfare. As Russia’s weapons increasingly reach communities far from the front lines, everyone must be ready to respond.

Victory Drones is the largest technology training project in Ukraine. Mariia Berlinska is the head of the Victory Drones, and co-founder of the Dignitas Foundation. In her column for Ukraiinska Pravda, Mariia shares that the foreign delegations come to her foundation with one main question: how can their countries and societies prepare for a potential Russian invasion in the coming years? Mariia explains this using Ukraine’s experience.

• The most important factor was a clear understanding that technology would determine the course of the war and its final outcome. Mariia therefore set herself one goal: to form a competent team and, in the shortest possible time, train the maximum number of people to defend themselves using technology. Total technological militarization of society.

• From the first days of the invasion, the Victory Drones team has implemented a strategy of technological militarization across multiple domains:

  • advocacy and development of unmanned robotic systems;

  • promotion of systemic changes in state regulatory policy;

  • creation and support of the largest technology community of military personnel, engineers, donors, and manufacturers;

  • attracting investment;

  • developing the miltech labor market;

  • large-scale training of specialists for the фронt;

  • rapid scaling of best practices based on in-depth internal analysis.

1. Education

• In May 2022, the course “Application of Technologies in Wartime” was launched. This was the first online course in Ukraine—and possibly in the world—to provide comprehensive military-technological training.

• The course featured lectures by the country’s leading experts, many with combat experience dating back to 2014, and covered topics ranging from radio communications and cybersecurity to drones, software, and Starlink systems.

• By the end of 2025, more than 150,000 military personnel had registered for the course. It demonstrated that military technological education could be delivered online.

• Now there are five core technology courses covering a wide range of topics—from building a drone (People’s FPV) and setting up technological production (Bootcamp), to understanding OSINT and cybersecurity. The courses are regularly updated.

2. Community Building

• Unfortunately, neither the Ministry of Defence nor the General Staff has yet created a “single window” for everyone working on frontline technologies. Until that happens, this role has been assumed by volunteers.

• In the first days of the invasion, the Victory Drones military-technology community began to take shape. Today, it consists of a network of highly specialized channels that connect technology manufacturers, military personnel, engineers, volunteers, government officials, donors, charitable organizations, and investment funds.

• These channels range from sharing invaluable combat experience to informal marketplaces where drone pilots exchange drones, captured equipment, and components.

3. Practical Training

• In March 2023, volunteer efforts under Victory Drones led to the launch of the first official FPV drone training program in Ukraine. Later, the Dignitas Foundation also initiated frontline training programs.

• Over nearly three years, more than 7,000 specialists have been trained, including operators of reconnaissance fixed-wing drones, multirotor bombers, interceptors, as well as specialists in UAV maintenance, electronic warfare, and software.

4. Bootcamp

• In April 2024, Victory Drones launched another free course —Bootcamp—designed for aspiring and future military technology manufacturers to help supply the front with essential capabilities.

• The course was developed in cooperation with experienced UAV manufacturers and engineers, government representatives, and trainers. It consists of more than 15 lectures, with a total duration of over 33 hours.

• Over the course’s lifetime, approximately 2,000 registrations were received from representatives of military units, volunteers, and engineering teams. As a result of completing the course, several dozen new production facilities were created or optimized. A dedicated community was also formed around the course, where manufacturers consult with and support one another.

5. “People’s FPV”: From Kitchens and Garages to Defence Industry

• The goal of this initiative was to convey a simple idea: every person is capable of creating weapons with their own hands—literally producing “death for the enemy” in their own kitchen. This does not require expertise in microelectronics or even an engineering degree.

• Under the guidance of Victory Drones volunteers and with support from the Vyriy team (Ukrainian FPV drone producer), the “People’s FPV” course was created. Early cohorts studied live online, with thousands attending lectures simultaneously. The course was later recorded and made freely available on the Prometheus educational platform.

• By the end of 2025, approximately 59,000 people had registered for the engineering course on Prometheus, with more than 20,000 completing it in full.

• The course can be completed in a few weeks—or even over several evenings.

• In addition to lectures, participants were provided with:

  • a list of verified components with links to purchase them at the best prices (regularly updated and increasingly featuring Ukrainian-made parts);

  • a selection of tested modern tools;

  • configuration files and firmware with detailed instructions.

• Drones assembled by participants are not delivered directly to combat units. They undergo thorough testing and trial flights conducted by military personnel and engineers.

• Within this initiative, more than 4,000 drones assembled at home have been delivered to Ukrainian forces.

After completing training, graduates can choose among the following options:

• purchasing components and sending completed drones to the military, becoming part of the rear supplying “ammunition”;

• joining professional miltech production, where Victory Drones graduates are in high demand;

• self-organizing with friends to create a “garage miltech” operation—either producing drones free of charge for the military or scaling up to commercial production.

6. 3D Printing in Schools

• “3D Printing in Schools” is an educational program in 3D modeling and printing for students in grades 8–9. The pilot phase of the project was completed at the end of November 2025.

• As part of this phase, 16 IT and technology teachers completed training in 3D modeling, 3D printing, artificial intelligence, and the safe use of 3D printers, and are currently awaiting certification.

• The course includes: 3D scanning (teaching students how to scan objects using a smartphone and create 3D models with the help of AI); 3D modeling (teaching students how to design required objects using Tinkercad and Blender 4.5); and 3D printing (teaching students how to print 3D objects using a Bambu Lab A1 mini printer).

• It is important to note that this initiative is intended to familiarize children with 3D printing technologies for civilian use. Unlike programs in Russia, it does not involve children producing 3D-printed components for drones or other military equipment.

Over nearly four years of invasion, Victory Drones have brought more than a quarter of a million Ukrainians into the technological domain. The organization has demonstrated how a nationwide technological project can be built step by step without state funding, political influence, or oligarchic backing.

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Russia’s Recent Drone and Missile Attacks on Ukraine

Russia launched over 500 drones against Ukraine, as well as 40 missiles, including Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, on the night of 26-27 December.

The prolonged Russian attack on Kyiv indicates that Russia has not only stockpiled Shahed drones but has also increased the size of its UAV personnel.

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Where would Ukraine’s frontlines be today if partners had provided everything Ukraine asked for from the start? HIMARS, ATACMS, Leopards and Abrams, F-16s — Ukraine has eventually received much of this long-requested equipment, but at what cost, and on what timeline?

Today, Ukraine faces a critical shortage of air-defence missiles, which European partners are reluctant to share, fearing new provocations from Russia. This suggests that Russia’s tactics have worked: they have diverted and constrained military assistance to Ukraine, weakening the continent’s first line of defence.

In this edition:

• How Delays in U.S. Assistance Affected Ukraine;

• Britain’s Economic and Military Dividend from Supporting Ukraine: RUSI Report;

• Proliferation and Control of Arms and Ammunition in Wartime Ukraine: SAS Report;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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Military Transfers to Ukraine

The United States is one of Ukraine’s steadfast partners. However, delays and pauses in military transfers from the U.S. have resulted in Ukraine missing critical opportunities on the battlefield or being unable to adequately protect itself against Russian attacks.

Below is a summary of a post by Ukrainian expert Anatoliy Amelin outlining how delays in U.S. assistance affected Ukraine:

March 2022 – MiG-29 blocked

• Poland proposed transferring MiG-29s to Ukraine via Ramstein. The U.S. blocked the plan, citing “serious concerns for the alliance.”
  Impact: Ukraine’s Air Force received no critical reinforcement during the Battle of Kyiv; Russia retained air superiority.

Feb–June 2022 – HIMARS delayed

• Ukraine requested HIMARS from the first weeks of the war. The U.S. approved delivery only in June, after the fall of Mariupol and Severodonetsk.
  Impact: Azovstal defenders could not strike Russian logistics; ammunition depots remained untouched. After HIMARS arrived, Ukraine destroyed dozens of depots within weeks.

Summer–Dec 2022 – Patriots delayed

• Ukraine requested Patriot systems in the summer of 2022. Approval came only in December, after mass strikes on energy infrastructure.
  Impact: ~40% of Ukraine’s energy capacity was destroyed; millions were left without electricity and heating in winter 2022–23. By April 2024, ~50% of generating capacity was lost.

Spring 2022–Jan 2023 – Western tanks delayed

• Ukraine requested Leopard 2, Abrams, and Challenger 2 in spring 2022. The decision came only in January 2023.
  Impact: ISW assessed that Ukraine lost a “window of opportunity” for a winter counteroffensive. Russia used the delay to build ~2,000 km of fortifications.

Mid-2022–Oct 2023 – ATACMS delayed

• Ukraine requested ATACMS from mid-2022. 165 km version arrived in October 2023; 300 km version - secretly in February 2024. Permission to strike Russia came only in November 2024.
  Impact: Russia regrouped and redeployed aircraft beyond strike range.

Summer 2023 – Counteroffensive without air power

• Ukraine launched its counteroffensive without F-16s and with a critical shortage of artillery systems, engineering, and demining equipment.

• Defence Minister Reznikov stated that Ukraine had become “the most heavily mined country in the world.”

• Impact: Russian EW reduced Excalibur's accuracy from ~70% to ~6%. The counteroffensive failed to achieve its goals.

Oct 2023–Apr 2024 – $60B aid package blocked

• U.S. military aid was blocked in Congress for over six months.

• Impact: Avdiivka fell on Feb 17, 2024. Ammunition shortages reached 10:1 in Russia’s favor.

Until May 2024 – Ban on strikes into Russia

• Ukraine was prohibited from using U.S. weapons to strike military targets in Russia, creating a “safe haven.”

• Impact: May 2024: Russia launched an offensive in the Kharkiv region after amassing approximately 50,000 troops near the border. 76 strikes hit Kharkiv, resulting in 278 killed and wounded.

  Russian Su-34 aircraft were able to take off with impunity from airfields 30–60 km from the front line.

  2024: Russia dropped over 3,500 guided aerial bombs (KABs) — 16 times more than in 2023.

Aug 2023–July 2024 – F-16 delayed

• Transfers approved in Aug 2023; aircraft arrived only in July 2024.

• Impact: Only ~20 pilots trained by end-2024; senior officials warned full effectiveness would take 4–5 years.

2024–2025 – Chaotic deliveries

• A Reuters investigation found that even after the $60 billion aid package was approved, deliveries remained “slow and chaotic.”

• Impact: By late 2024, Ukraine received only ~50% of the promised aid.

July 2025 – Air defence transfers frozen

• The Trump administration halted delivery of Patriot PAC-3 missiles.

• Impact: Officials warned of infrastructure destruction and civilian casualties; Russia launched its largest air attack of the war (60 missiles + 477 drones).

In 2025, the United States took a particularly damaging step by pausing intelligence sharing with Ukraine, delaying the delivery of previously promised aid packages, and engaging in rhetoric about ending the war in Ukraine on the Kremlin’s terms.

At the same time, it would be unfair to attribute all negative developments solely to the U.S.'s slow decision-making. Other partners have also been cautious, slow, and concerned about escalation, and Ukraine itself faces internal challenges.

Nevertheless, U.S. military assistance — particularly in key areas enabling long-range strikes, counteroffensive campaigns, and air defence — remains critically important for Ukraine.

Additional developments:

• 🇵🇱 Poland is ready to transfer MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine in exchange for counter-drone systems, with a decision expected after certain “formalities” are resolved. Polish President Nawrocki added that such a decision does not contradict Poland’s policy and, in his view, will be made once the remaining formal issues are settled.

  According to Zelensky, training a pilot on the F-16 takes from 8 months to a year and a half, while Ukrainian pilots can fight on the MiG-29 immediately – without additional training.

• 🇦🇺 Australia completed the transfer of M1A1 Abrams battle tanks to Ukraine as part of military assistance. The last 12 of the 49 promised Australian tanks were recently delivered to Ukraine. The equipment, accompanied by Australian military personnel, was shipped by cargo ship in October. After 55 days, it arrived at a classified location in Poland. There, it was inspected and prepared for transfer to Ukraine.

• 🇬🇧 The UK committed £600 million in air-defence capabilities. New British systems, including RAVEN and GRAVEHAWK, and counter-Shahed turrets are set to bolster Ukraine’s defences this winter.

• 🇳🇴 Norway will finance another batch of U.S. weapons for Ukraine worth more than €267 million. The new package will include air defence missiles, as well as weapons and ammunition for F-16 fighter jets.

• 🇵🇹 Portugal is ready to contribute €50 million to the PURL mechanism. In addition, Lisbon has decided to allocate €25 million annually over five years under the European SAFE initiative to procure Ukrainian defence products.

• 🇨🇿 The Czech Republic has confirmed funding for 760,000 artillery shells for Ukraine in 2026 under the “Czech Initiative.” The funding is long-term and planned for the next year, rather than a one-off aid package. As part of the “Czech Initiative–2025,” the Czech Republic delivered all 1.8 million artillery munitions promised to Ukraine in 2025.

• 🇨🇦 At the Ramstein meeting, Canada announced CAD 50 million (USD 36 million) in funding to support Ukraine’s unmanned systems. It will be allocated through the Drone Coalition. The new package complements USD 296 million that Canada has provided since 2022 for optical and infrared systems.

• 🇳🇱 Ukraine is set to receive €250 million from the Netherlands for the procurement of ammunition for F-16 fighter jets.

• President Zelensky said that Ukraine is facing a shortage of missiles for Patriot, NASAMS, and other air defence systems, as European countries have slowed ammunition transfers amid Russia’s drone attacks.

  Ukraine proposed producing missiles for air defence systems domestically, but this is currently impossible because manufacturers are unwilling to transfer the necessary licenses.

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Domestic Innovations and Internal Affairs of Ukraine

The WAR Museum at the National Defence University of Ukraine has acquired a sample of the BARS drone missile, which is being used systematically and effectively to strike enemy rear areas.

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Ukraine’s future as a sovereign state is directly linked to the strength of its military capabilities, which remain the primary security guarantees the country can rely on. According to Zelensky, Ukraine has moved to the active use of its domestically produced long-range missiles, including the long-range Neptune, Flamingo, and Sapsan. With the necessary testing and codification procedures underway, mass production of Ukraine’s FP-7 ballistic missiles is expected to begin in spring 2025.

In this edition:

• Disparities in military aid to Ukraine across Europe;

• When Ukraine will have ballistic missiles, and how the “Flamingo” missile was developed;

• Export map for domestic manufacturers;

• Ukraine needs more chief designers in defence tech;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

I’ve launched my third fundraiser for a Mavic reconnaissance drone for my university friend Vasyl. These drones save lives. Link to PayPal.

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Military Transfers to Ukraine

🇳🇱 The Netherlands has announced an additional €700 million in support for Ukraine for next year. The country typically allocates around €3.5 billion annually to assist Ukraine, but €2 billion from the upcoming year’s budget has already been used. As a result, the Green–Labour alliance has proposed increasing the 2026 budget to cover the shortfall.

At the end of November, outgoing Prime Minister Schoof stated during parliamentary debates that he did not currently see a need to allocate further billions for Ukraine. He argued that other countries — particularly those in southern Europe — should step up their contributions.

According to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker, disparities in military aid to Ukraine across Europe widened further in 2025.

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom sharply increased their military contributions compared to 2022–2024: Germany nearly tripled its average monthly allocations, while France and the UK each more than doubled theirs. Even so, relative to their 2021 GDP, all three countries remained well below the leading Nordic donors — Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Reaching Nordic levels would require Europe’s largest economies to substantially scale up their assistance.

The contrast with Italy and Spain is even more striking: neither country increased its military allocations in 2025. Italy reduced its already modest levels by 15 percent compared to 2022–2024, and Spain provided no new military aid in 2025. This limited engagement significantly weakened Europe’s overall response.

Additional developments:

• 🇨🇿 The Czech Republic has completed the delivery to Ukraine of 1.8 million large-caliber munitions promised for 2025, former Prime Minister Petr Fiala reported. The Czech initiative to procure ammunition for the Armed Forces of Ukraine from third countries has been operating since February 2024, with around 20 nations joining the effort. Deliveries of shells began in the summer of 2024.

• 🇨🇦 Starting in 2022, Ukraine has been receiving Canadian Roshel Senator armored vehicles in both APC and MRAP variants, with the total number exceeding 2,000 units by the end of 2025.

  Ukraine began receiving Roshel Senator vehicles back in 2022 as part of military aid. The production of vehicles is currently localized in Ukraine.

• 🇺🇸 The United States House of Representatives approved a compromise version of the National Defense Authorization Act for the 2026 financial year (NDAA). A key element of the document for Kyiv is the continuation of funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). The bill allocates US$800 million for Ukraine, divided equally into two tranches of US$400 million over the next two years. This programme allows the US administration to purchase weapons and equipment directly from manufacturers for transfer to Ukraine’s Armed Forces, rather than drawing them from existing US military stockpiles.

  It includes a provision prohibiting the Pentagon from independently redirecting weapons that were manufactured for Ukraine. In cases of extreme need for such weapons, the law requires that compensation be provided.

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When Ukraine Will Have Ballistic Missiles, and How the “Flamingo” Missile Was Invented

For Ukraine, it will be very difficult to win this war without possessing critical weapons—particularly ballistic missiles. That is the main focus of Ukraine’s company Fire Point.
Fire Point is demonstrating rapid progress in the missile program — something the Ukrainian state was unable to achieve over the past 30 years.

This is a summary of a BBC Ukraine interview with Fire Point leadership.

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Ukraine’s Armed Forces struck around 50 fuel and military-industrial facilities in Russia this autumn alone, marking an unprecedented tempo of successful attacks.

In total, in 2025, Ukraine carried out more than 160 strikes on Russian oil extraction and refining sites — a sector that remains the Kremlin’s primary source of revenue and a key financial engine of its war.

Looking ahead, Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities will remain a top priority, especially as Kyiv continues launching joint production facilities with European partners.

In this edition:

• Australia considers transferring Tiger helicopters to Ukraine;

• Ukraine doubles down on weapons-component production;

• Ukraine and the Netherlands to launch joint drone manufacturing;

• 20+ additional developments from Ukraine and Russia.

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Military Transfers to Ukraine

🇦🇺 Australia is considering the possibility of transferring its Tiger attack helicopters to Ukraine, as the Australian Army is phasing this type out in favour of the US-made AH-64E Apache.

The government is currently assessing the options and feasibility of such deliveries in response to Ukraine’s request for helicopters.

Pressure on the Australian government has increased due to outrage within the local Ukrainian diaspora over the refusal to supply MRH-90 Taipan transport helicopters, which were instead buried for disposal. According to ABC, the discussion concerns 22 Tiger attack helicopters that are scheduled to be withdrawn from service by 2028.

However, Defence Express noted that not everything appears to be working well with these helicopters. The public government audit published in 2016 revealed that the Full Operational Capability (FOC) of Tiger helicopters came with major caveats across nine areas, including electronic warfare systems, identification-friend-or-foe, communications, and command and control.

The audit also recorded that the Tiger had 76 deficiencies, 60 of which were classified as critical.

In June 2014, during flights in different parts of the world, both a German and an Australian Tiger helicopter lost their launchers for unguided rockets. The causes were never identified, but Australia’s Ministry of Defence subsequently prohibited Tiger helicopters from flying over populated areas.

The audit also noted a deficiency in the optical targeting system, which does not allow the use of precision-guided weapons beyond man-portable air-defence system (MANPADS) range.

Additional developments:

• 🇳🇱 The Netherlands will allocate an additional €250 million under the PURL initiative for the purchase of air defense systems and ammunition for F-16 fighter jets for the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

• 🇨🇦 Canada pledged another $200 million on military equipment for the PURL initiative. Canada’s overall contribution to PURL amounts to $890 million.

• 🇮🇪 Ireland announced an additional €125 million in assistance for Ukraine, which will be directed toward non-lethal military support and strengthening the country’s energy system.

• 🇩🇪 Reportedly, within just a few days of operation, the IRIS-T SLS system recently delivered by Germany to Ukraine intercepted nine Russian targets, including five Kh-101 cruise missiles, two Iskander-K missiles, and two Shahed-131/136 UAVs.

• 🇪🇺 The initiative by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, to provide Ukraine with 2 million rounds of ammunition in 2025 has not been implemented. Kallas herself stated this following the conclusion of the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting at the level of defence ministers.

• 🇸🇪 Sweden will phase out development aid to five countries (Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique, Liberia and Bolivia) in the coming years and use the money to increase support for Ukraine. The government said the measures would free up more than 2 billion crowns over the next two years that could be diverted to Ukraine, to be used in such projects as rebuilding the country’s energy infrastructure. It was not specified whether this funding will go to Ukraine’s military needs.

• 🇩🇰 In 2026, Denmark plans to allocate 9.4 billion kroner (€1.26 billion) in military aid to Ukraine, compared with 16.5 billion kroner (€2.21 billion) in 2025 and nearly 19 billion kroner (€2.54 billion) in 2024.

  According to the Kiel Institute, Denmark is the country providing Ukraine with the highest level of support as a share of GDP. Therefore, according to Defence Committee member Simon Kollerup, “it is natural that we now see a stabilisation in the level of support being provided.”

Production of Weapons Components

Ukraine’s Brave1 government cluster announced the launch of a new grant program for manufacturers of components used in Ukrainian weapons.

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